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By 1800 slavery and cotton had become the chief means of
socio-

economic mobility in Alabama.

However,

from territorial days white Ala-

bam ians expressed apprehension about an ever-increasing slave
population
and slave insurrections.

Attacks by bondsmen on owners, overseers, and

drivers exacerbated white fears.

In the 1820's and 1840's colonization

of former slaves and checks against the domestic slave trade were encouraged, and the Alabama slave-code was continuously revised in attempts

to control bondspeople.

Alabama's cottom kingdom was centered in the ten counties running
through middle Alabama

— the

Black Belt.

In some of these counties slaves

were more than 66 percent of the population.

However the great planter

made huge profits from the slave-cotton nexus and did not consider abo-

lishing the plantation system.

But the rise of immediate abolitionism

and "f ree-soilism" in the north aggravated racial fears, and many Black
Belt whites felt slavery had to spread into the territories.

Because of its geography, Alabama was divided over resistance to

northern attempts to restrict slavery from the territories.

North Ala-

bamians lived in regions where soil was not conducive to cotton and
slavery.

Consequently, they were not as threatened as south Alabamians.

Moreover, upstate yeomanry were national Democratic Party loyalists

and many were unionists.

Furthermore, north and south Alabama Democrats

fought over control of high offices in the State.

Each section demanded

equal representation for their region.

Downstate the Democrats and Whigs were fragmented.

Both parties

had extreme southern-rights cliques--political outsiders--who agitated
the slavery in the territories issue.

Some of these men owned

fev;

slaves

and aspired to become great planters.

Many of these firebrands were from east-central Alabama where
they found their socio-economic mobility blocked by the monopolizing

tendencies of the planters.

By the 1850' s the large plantation owners

controlled the best cotton lands, and the ultras turned to politics as
These opportunistic lawyer-

the best means of enhancing their careers.

politicians demanded a territorial slave code and the re-opening of the

African slave trade.

They used the slavery issue in attacking the moder-

ates and conservatives who controlled both political parties.

In their

from party to party
pursuit of high office many of these radicals shifted

public sentiment.
and from secessionism to unionism depending on
powerful poliSenator Benjamin Fitzpatrick ran the state's most

tical factlon-the "Montgomery Regency."

He and his followers were loyal

dispensed patronage.
to the national Democratic Party and

William L.

of the Alabama Democracy.
Yancey yearned to replace Fitzpatrick as leader

Fitzpatrick of being "soft
Yancey and other southern chauvinists accused

on southernir™.

11

south Alabama was the Whig
The only significant unionist bloc In

planters.
Party, controlled by conservative

However, by the late 1850's

and the death of the national Whig
because of Democratic gerrymandering

.

vi

Party there was no union structure left in south Alabama.
a one party State.

Alabama was

But the Democrats were still fragmented between up-

state unionists and moderate southernists and lowland moderate and ultra

southern nationalists.

John Brown's raid gave the firebrands the issue they needed to
challenge Alabama's moderate-conservative leadership.

The ultras poli-

ticized racial fears by equating a Republican victory in 1860 with slave

rebellions and racial amalgamation.
split.

The State's Democratic Party was

The party-regulars supported Stephan A. Douglas.

backed John Breckenridge

.

The firebrands

They hoped to throw the presidential election

into Congress where they could bargain their votes for a federal terri-

torial slave code and recognition of their power in Alabama.

After Lincoln

triumph, Alabama's ultras struck for separate state secession, hoping
for political advancement in a southern Confederacy.

Thus, chronic

into
racial anxieties were exploited by politicians who provoked Alabama

sucession
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INTRODUCTION

Many Civil War historians, in trying to determine the War's causes,

have emphasized the growing alienation between two different cultures.
According to their analysis, an industrialized, aggressive, and politically and socially mobile north confronted a stratified slave society
in which planters exerted unchallenged political control.

The presence

of slavery based on race supposedly created a ^"Herrenvolk democracy."
Class conflict among whites was largely absent, and all whites were equal

regardless of their relative wealth.

2

Although these beliefs were held

by the entire South, they were evidenced more in slave dense centralsouth Alabama than in the hilly northern counties where slaves were re-

latively few.

Much of Alabama's political ferment was based largely upon differences in slaveholding and geography.

Consequently, like other regions

of Jacksonian America the state's ante-bellum politics defies reductionism.

The fertile far northern counties of the Tennessee Valley were characterized by small plantations and small farms, and by 1860 was largely

white.

The mountain and hill counties just south of the Valley were

not fit for large-scale cotton plantations.

white, the yeoman farmers held sway.

Here,

in an area overwhelmingly

By 1860 blacks were less than 20

percent of the population, and in some counties no more than 10 percent.

Largely because of the small farm economy, the upcountry was isolated
ineffecfrom the rest of Alabama, and its parochialism, heightened by an

consciousness
tive transportation system, made for a special regional

and pride.

4

control
Its farmers deeply resented the statewide political

X

exerted by the political chieftains downstate in Montgomery.
more, Jacksonian

Further-

nationalism shaped upcountry yeomanry into national

Democratic party loyalists.

A piedmont area separated northern Alabama from the Black Belt.
The upper piedmont was much like the mountainous hilly counties in geography, economic and population.

5

The lower piedmont by 1860, with its

considerable flat cotton lands, was merging into the Black Belt. 6
The State's "cotton kingdom" was in the ten counties of central
Alabama, with their rich black silt soil.

Slaves comprised two-thirds

of the population of these counties and even three-fourths in some of
them.

It was in this fertile Black Belt,

at the state capital in Mont-

gomery, that Alabama's political leadership centered.^

Farther south,

in the pine woods and wiregrass districts--there was little farming,

especially in south-western Alabama.

In many of these counties the popu-

lation was almost evenly divided between blacks and whites.

g

These regional differences had the effect of making the State almost
a political microcosm of the whole nation.

In central and south Alabama,

where more than half of Alabama's slaves toiled, southern chauvinism generally prevailed, while, as indicated above, pro-unionism characterized
the highlands.

Thus,

it is erroneous to describe ante-bellum Alabama

slaveholders.
as politically quiescent, managed without challenge by great
factional
Party politics embodied inherent intrastate conflict and searing

struggles.
clashed
Factions, particularly southern-rights Democrats and Whigs,

over elective and appointive offices.

Outsiders sought by any means to

wrest control from Alabama's political establishment.

Their opportunism

xi

included capricious party loyalty as well as erratic political commitments, and expediency often masqueraded as principle.

By the late 1850's,

with the expiration of the Whig Party and with the plantation system

increasingly dominated by the big operator, politics became one of the
few means of upward mobility left to the "man on the make."

The protection of slavery in the South and in the territories

became important political issues in Alabama.

Southern rights, which

embodied these issues, became a rallying cry for those ambitious lawyer-

politicians frustrated by Montgomery's Democratic Party loyalists who
ran the State machine.

William L. Yancey typified these status-seeking

politicians insofar as he used the Southern-rights issue as a level by

which to gain power.

To men like Yancey, the "soft on southernism" ac-

cusation proved politically advantageous against conservative Democrats.
One issue bound together most white Alabamians, particularly those

residing in the heavily slave populated south-central counties, namely
Racism had always

that the State must remain a white man's country.

been common among white Alabamians.

However, with the growth of the

black population Alabamians developed a cohesive doctrine of white supremacy.

Throughout the history of Alabama any hint of black resistance

was especially traumatic in slave dense south-central Alabama.

These racial anxieties were intensified by the rise of immediate

abolitionism and territorial restrictionism in the north.

Such develop-

ments inspired Alabama's office seekers to politicize negrophobia for
their own ambitions.

Henceforth, any Alabama politician who consorted

with the "abolitionized" north could not be trusted.
cratic Party, it followed, had to be "southernized

.

"

The national DemoWhat the political

xll

climbers needed in order to vault themselves into power was a "northern

outrage" against southern institutions.

They had this outrage in 1859

with the great slave-uprising scare engendered by John Brown's raid,
and they capitalized on it, attempting to take over the State Dcmocrati

organization and to turn the national Party into

own and slavery's interests.

a

vehicle for their

After living with periodic slave-insurrec

tion scares for generations, lowland Alabamians of all political persua
sions were convinced that racial mastery had to be maintained at all
costs.

After Lincoln's election, the majority of Alabamians chose a

southern Confederacy.

This study will describe the convoluted history

of Alabama's political battles and the chronic racial fears that even-

tually shaped the decision for disunion.

—

CHAPTER
THE ALABAMA SLAVE:

I

A SPECTER HAUNT LNG THE LAND

Alabama's defense of slavery was based not only on political and

economic arguments but also on racial fear.
fied by the specter of the rebellious savage.

White Alabamians were terriFear of the African

particularly dread of the imminent consequences of emancipation- -animated
tensions throughout the state's slave history^ Moreover, numerous slaves
resisted bondage--individually and collectively--and by defying slavery

bondspeople exacerbated the deep fright that provoked so many whites.
Of course many uprising scares were imaginary, but they were nonetheless

The overwhelming majority of slaves resided in central Alabama

vexing.

--the Black Belt

— Alabama's

"cotton kingdom," where consternation over

slave conduct was chronic.

This perpetual fear often led to attempts to restrict slave imSuch apprehensions, often came into conflict with the desire

portations.

of large slave-owners to maintain or increase their social and economic

hegemony.

At different times, as we shall see in this chapter, this

conflict was resolved in different ways.

Nevertheless, the general

trend was to resort to ever stricter control of the activities of blacks

—both slave

and free.

Since neither the restriction of domestic slave

importations nor the colonization in Africa of the slave population was
and economic power,
a feasible solution for those who held political

insurrections
stricter codes came to be used to provide protection from
activity.

brought huge
Thus, slavery was not only a labor system which

way of keeping
profits to a few but also a means of racial control, a

y

2

in subordination a population viewed by white southerners
as hostile,

alien, and a threat, to the very fabric of their civilization.

By 1861

many white Alabamians were ready to die to maintain Alabama's peculiar
institution.

1

In 1785, before Alabama entered the Union, alarm was expressed

by whites over the growing number of slaves and their insubordinate be-

havior.

For example, one shocked slaveholder learning that his bonds-

men were implicated in an insurrectionary plot, declared:

"Judge my

surprise, of what avail is kindness and good usage when rewarded by such

ingratitude; tis true indeed that they are kept in due subordination
and obliged to do their duty... but two of the three [slaves] had behaved
so well that they had never once received the whip."

An investigation

revealed that one rebel committed suicide rather than be executed by

his captors.

The other conspirators were tried and three of them were

hanged less than ten days after the discovery of the planned slave uprising scheme.^
Five years before statehood Mobile, in 1814, was the first city
It required slaves to retire to their

to establish a slave curfew law.

dwellings before eight p.m.

Huntsville, Montgomery, Tuscaloosa, Selma,

and smaller towns followed suit.

3

In 1818, David Holmes, the territorial

Governor, never questioned the demands of white settlers for slaves, yet

he felt that the influx of Africans would increase danger, particularly
in regions where blacks outnumbered whites.

In a letter to James Wilkinson,

the
the Governor General of the territorial militia, Holmes insisted on

need for more armed security for the territory:

^

3

Of the slaves who compose so large a portion
of
our population, I entertain much stronger apprehension. Scarcely a day passes without my receiving some information relative to the designs
of those people to insurrect.
It is true that
no clear or positive evidence of their intensions
has been communicated; but certain facts, and
expressions of their views have justly excited
considerable alarm amongst the citizens. For
my own part I am impressed with the belief that
real danger exists, and that it is my duty to
lose no time in procuring arms for the defense
of the country.

Holmes and other Alabama whites were manifesting the chronic fears that

Western Hemispheric slavemasters had of servile insurrections.

In point

of fact, in 1793, the French slavocracy on the island of Santo Domingo

had been overthrown by a slave revolt.

Many Alabamians were keenly aware

of the Caribbean uprising as well as of periodic slave rebellion scares
both real and imagined in the upper South.
As a result of these apprehensions as well as of a desire to fix
the legal status of the slave, codes were established to control the

behavior of bondspeople.

From 1798 to 1817, while Alabama was part of

the Mississippi Territory, legislation was enacted to govern slaves and
free blacks within the territory.

After Alabama became a state, the

General Assembly passed slave provisions which were incorporated in the

Constitution of 1819.

According to the first state slave code, bonds-

people might be freed by their owners with the consent of the legislature,
or the lawmakers might take the initiative in liberating blacks provided
the consent of their owners had been obtained, or compensation made.

Slaves were not to be deprived of trial in capital cases, though not,
of course, juries of their peers.

Acts were passed forbidding slaves

to sell any articles except "simple things made with their own hands."

4

Passes were required of bondsmen who wished
to visit other plantations
in order to prevent them from wandering
around the countryside or holding

unauthorized meetings "where dangerous doctrines
might be inculcated."

A slave patrol system was inaugurated and military
districts were established; all able-bodied men were required to serve
in the militia, and
the Captain of each company was required to detail
patrols whose duty
it was to enforce the slave law. 5

From the beginning of statehood, slave-masters insisted that
they

treated their bondsmen with kindness and humanity.

James B. Sellers,

author of Slavery in Alabama, emphasizes that planters went to great
lengths to care for the needs of their slaves.

"As we

look at the early

beginnings of Alabama," Sellers affirms, "master and slave stand out as

necessary co-partners in the great task of winning a new region from
the wilderness...."

In one section descriptive of plantation life,

en-

titled "Bonds of Affection," Sellers stresses the love between master
and slave.

Although admitting that some overseers could be brutal, he

nonetheless declares that overseers in general followed the humanitarian
advice of the owners.

Another historian of Alabama slavery has indicated

that where sentiment was lacking, business prudence inclined the master
to a policy of good treatment.

Without question there were owners who

treated slaves with solicitude.

Thus, most of the early written record

of slavery in Alabama expresses dismay at the belligerent reaction of
so many bondspecple to servitude.

Sellers and likeminded southernists

attributed slave recalcitrance to their "infantile" nature, a reflection
of the white attitude that all blacks were inherently inferior.

Despite the "bonds of affection" approach to slavery, the reality

5

of the situation was somewhat different,

bama had a brutally distinctive side.
set by the early twenties.

m

fact,

slavery in early Ala-

The plantation routine was well

Work began at dawn and lasted until sunset.

The overseer usually blew a horn to summon the
hands from the shacks.
In order to prevent any loitering,

the 1820's stated,
I

James Tait, a plantation owner of

"I make them get off quickly after the horn
is blown,

always whip the last one out."

As they prepared for a day's toil,

bondspeople on some Alabama plantations were often fed a sparse diet.
For breakfast a piece of cornbread and for dinner boiled vegetables such
as peas and beans and occasionally some meat.
7

Small wonder then that

percent of a sample of more than 8500 slaves above the age of fifteen

were either physically impaired or chronically ill.
undernourished, slaves were also poorly housed.
small and filthy, were germ infested.

In addition to being

The earliest slave cabins,

A newly arrived planter noted in

1822 that a disease known as ship's fever had repeatedly occurred among

his bondsmen, and he was convinced it was caused by conditions in the
slave quarters.^

There were some planters in the 1820 's who candidly admitted that

bondage was a harsh experience.

However,

they were concerned with the

brutality of their overseers rather than with the brutality of slavery
itself.

In 1825 a plantation owner discovered that he had found no solu-

tion even when employing a relative as overseer.

"I want you to distinctly

understand me without your rushing and whipping and lashing for
not stand it any longer."

Alabama social critic

D.

R. Hudley,

I

will

remember-

ing the early days of slavery in Alabama, maintained that slaves were

badly treated on some estates.

Masters were sometimes unconcerned about

6

it:

"He must be a very bold man who will deny
that the overseers
s on

many plantations are cruel and unmercifully severe."

Hudley allso

re-

called that he was repulsed as a young man the first
time he saw a slave
sale:

"In order to force them to bring as much money
as possible the

cold blooded villain deliberately sold man and wife,
parents and child
in separate lots.

In view of such outrages,

who are anti-slavery."

g

I

do not wonder at those

After visiting Alabama in the late 1820 's,

Harriet Martineau, a British essayist, confided that "slavery is nowhere

more hopeless and helpless than in Alabama.

The richness of the soil

and the paucity of inhabitants make the slave labourer a most valuable

possession; while his distance from any free state .. .makes the attempt
to escape desperate."

9

But no matter how hazardous Alabama slaves fought bondage and

contributed to the constant trepidation that whites harbored for the
enslaved African.

In the twenties slave owners expressed continual

anxiety about their bondspeople.
central Alabama, complained,

In the twenties slave owners in Tuscombia,

"We observe for some time past slaves of

the neighboring plantations roam about in large parties with impunity

on the Sabbath day; the result of which must be, the pilfering of our
village .... If not speedily prevented by a well regulated and steady patrol.

"^

Tuscaloosa newspapers around time time carried advertisements about

runaway slaves or reported that blacks were unmanageable and dangerous.

A Tuscaloosa slave was stopped and accused of stealing merchandise.
He was about to be whipped when he drew a knife and killed his accusor.
"The sable culprit was captured, " reported the Tuscaloosa Observer,

was led to a tree, tied to it... and burned to ashes.

"^

"and

7

In south Alabama in 1827 a group of runaways
was attacked and

several were captured after a bloody encounter.
the others escaped.

Three were shot and

"Some of these negroes have been runaways several

years and have committed many depredations on the local
plantations...
a great number of negroes in secret were to join them, and
it is thought

that in that event they could not be taken without bringing
cannon to

bear upon them."

12

Escaping slaves often camped in groups and lived

by stealing food and provisions.

was typical.
at noontime.

One band of fugitives outside Montgomery

Well organized and daring, it even attacked some plantations
13

Alabama's first decade as a slave state, therefore, saw

some bondspeople—individually and collectively-manifesting resistance
to bondage which would aid in causing whites to re-examine their commit-

ment to slavery.

A depressive cotton market resulting from the panic of 1825 also
inspired doubt respecting bondage, and in 1826 a measure was enacted that

prohibited the importation of slaves.

The measure was passed both be-

cause of fear of a massively growing black population and because many

planters felt that the increasing number of slaves would result in overproduction.

However, before the end of the decade the act was abrogated.

14

Other Alabama whites expressed their uncertainty by aligning themselves

with newly formed anti-slavery colonization societies.

In 1824,

for

example, the Tuscaloosa Mirror advertised that subscriptions to Benjamin

Lundy's Genius of Universal Emancipatio n would be received at the of fie.
of the paper.

15

Reacting mildly to a memorial from the Ohio legislature

which advocated general emancipation, the governor of Alabama in 1825
said that an offer of government remuneration might some day be opportune.

16

8

The icathgra Advocate in the same
year published an editorial critical
of the slave trade."'
In 1826 Jcmes Birney began his
activities as a colonization ad-

vocate.

Birney, a Princeton graduate and member
of the Kentucky planter

aristocracy, practiced law and operated a
cotton plantation with slave
labor in Huntsville.

of the city.

He later entered politics and was
elected mayor

In 1826 Birney became attorney for the
Cherokee Nation

vhich at that time occupied the northeastern
part of Alabama and he
joined the American Colonization Society for the
Southwestern district

about the same tise.

Writing to a collaborator in 1827, Birney confided

skepticism as to the future success of the Society in the State:

"The

society in chis place [Huntsville] considered by me one of the most
important in this whole region, has been recently in rather languid con-

dition...."

By 1832 Birney had returned to Kentucky.

He freed his slaves

in 1834 and, a year later, was condemned by a Montgomery public meeting
for being a threat to the stability of Alabama. 18

An even earlier sign

of growing rigidity about slavery came in 1827 when the Alabama Assembly
tried to pass an act forbidding the teaching of slaves by free persons.

This measure received its heaviest support from the emerging Black Belt

region and south Alabama.

19

Another incident that alerted Alabama officials to the necessity of a
slave anti-sedition measure was the case of Jacob Cowan. Governor John Gayle

received a communication from David Crawford, solicitor of the first Judicial
Circuit Court of Mobile, in which he was informed that one Jacob Cowan, a slave

formerly of Wilmington, North Carolina, had served a jail sentence there for

distributing, it was rumored and reported, two-hundred copies

9

of David Walker's Appeal to bondsmen.

(In 1829 David Walker,

a

black

tailor from Boston, Massachusetts, had written and
paid for the printing
of a tract calling for a slave uprising in the
south.

Some copies had

found their way into Dixie and caused great apprehension.)

At the time

of Cowan's arrest in 1830 no law existed which covered
the dispensing

of seditious literature in North Carolina.

After Cowan left North Caro-

lina the North Carolina legislature passed an anti sedition law and
seven

Wilmington slaves were arrested for conspiracy originally instigated
by Cowan's activities.

Crawford called Gayle's attention to the fact

that Alabama still had no law covering distribution of insurrectionary

pamphlets.

Jacob Cowan, he asserted, "can be identified without any

difficulty and he should be at once removed from this state,
can be done without injuring the rights of the owner."

if this

But Crawford

feared it could not be done without a slave sedition ordinance.

Then

he reminded Governor Gayle of the slaves recently convicted in Monroe

County of conspiring against the white inhabitants of that county.
ton,

Little-

one of the three convicted, had declared that a letter had been re-

ceived from Mobile stating that there would be war soon between whites
and blacks.

"Tis possible that this fellow Jacob Cowan communicated

this intelligence and that he had secretly excited and encouraged the

Monroe County conspiracy...."

Crawford concluding, called for speedier

trials and "more immediate punishments of slaves guilty of treasonable

conspiracy" in order to "increase the sec*-ity of society and to the
interest of the slave holder."

20

Slavemasters throughout the 1820 's indicated dismay about acts
of slave resistance, but Nat Turner's Virginia rebellion in 1831 alarmed

10

and frightened them to the extreme.
tion,

As a result of Turner's inst
>urrec

the Alabama legislature passed a
revised slave ordinance which

made it a crime for any black, free or
slave, to receive instruction
in reading or writing.

White Alabamians were well aware that the
leader

of the Virginia uprising was literate and
used his knowledge to incite

rebelliousness among other bondsmen.

Another law was passed making any

meeting of more than five male slaves with or without
passes, not on
the owner's plantation, unlawful.

It

became the duty of the slave patrol

to disperse all congregated slaves, and the patrol
might give each slave

ten lashes without the permission of the slaveowner.

A slave caught

strolling without a pass was subject to fifteen stripes; the death
penalty

was proscribed for anyone who should distribute, circulate, or publish
any seditious papers, pamphlets, or writing tending to produce conspiracy
or insurrection among the blacks, slaves or free.

The same act made

it unlawful for free blacks to associate with slaves in the kitchen,

outhouse, or slave cabin without the written permission of the master.

Those violating this act were to receive fifteen lashes for the first

offense and thirty for every one thereafter.

Finally, the General Assembly

made an unsuccessful attempt to control the number of slaves brought into
the state for sale.

21

Mounting apprehension over slave obstinacy was intensified in
October 1831 by an Indian-assisted slave revolt in eastern Alabama.
'*The

infection is pretty general with the negroes," it was reported,

"and many of uhem were arrested."
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On November

5,

Advocate editorially attacked existing patrol laws.

1831,
It

the Southern

called them

"very lame" in spite of the revised code passed as a result of the Nat

11

Turner tremor.

The Advocate noted that many citizens
had been critical

of the policing system.

"If the patrol lers are not clothed
with powers

to severely correct negroes who have
insulted them/' it advised,

"they

had as well remain at home...." 23
By the end of 1831 Alabama achieved consensus on
slavery and the

doubts of the mid 1820«s had vanished.

Moreover, the gnawing uneasiness

about a potentially menacing slave population combined
in the early thirties

with a resentment toward the emergence of immediate abolitionism
in the
north.

In 1831,

for example, at the request of the legislature, Governor

Gayle sought the cooperation of other southern governors in an effort
to halt the publication of abolitionist literature in the north.

Gayle

felt that southern states should extradite northern abolitionists for

publishing and distributing pronouncements encouraging rebellion among
southern bondsmen.

2^

Acting on Governor Gayle's recommendation, the Tuscaloosa Grand
Jury on October 14, 1835, returned an indictment against Robert

G. Williams,

New York editor of the Emancipator for circulating "within our State,
pamphlets and papers of a seditious and incendiary character," and making
"illicit appeals to the passions, to excite to insurrection and murder

our slave population."

An editorial in The Huntsville Democrat called

upon the Governor of New York to extradite Williams to Alabama to stand
trial.

Governor Gayle in a letter to Governor William Marcy of New York

demanded that Williams be sent to Alabama "for attempting to produce in-

surrection and rebellion among our slave population."

Later,

in his

annual message to the Legislature, Gayle declared that incendiary publications are "the readiest way to introduce the bloody scenes...

12

deliberated p i otted £or our ruln .„

^

^^

^

centious... publications of William
and the infuriated demons
associated
25
with him."
That same month a group of Wilcox
County planters resolved that
"Our right of property in slaves
is fixed and guaranteed by
the Federal

Constitution and we regard the acts of the
anti-slavery societies at
the North as treason against the Union."
Another public meeting in Mont-

gomery offered a $5000 reward for the
capture and delivery of William
Lloyd Garrison to state authorities.

The Grand Jury of Montgomery pre-

sented "to the condemnation of the world
Arthur Tappen, William Lloyd
Garrison, James Birney, George Thompson, the
Reverend British emissary,
and all their associates as offenders against the
peace and dignity of
the state of Alabama."
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Dread of Garrisonian Abolitionism continued to engender
anxieties.

Would not the Emancipator help light the fuse for an Alabama
"Southampton"
insurrection?
sisted.

Regardless of stricter slave codes, slave resistance per-

In Wilcox County,

in 1833, one bondsman was charged with killing

his mistress and the court sentenced him to death.
in the same County,

The following year,

five slaves conspired in the murder of their master.

They were tried before the County Court and three of them were found
guilty by the Jury, which sentenced them to death. 2 7

Again some white

Alabamians traced the cause of these outbreaks to northern anti-slavery
publications which were flooding the deep South.

The Southern Advocate

was now among the foremost critics of abolitionist activities.

"If the

North continues to disregard the voice of reason, patriotism and humanity,"
it editorialized,

"we must obey the law of self-preservation--throw ourselves

1

13

upon our committer of vigilance
and hang up all slaves suspected
of
being infected with the abolitionist
28
virus."
Henry Watson, a trans-

planted Connecticut Yankee living in
the Black Belt, wrote his brother
that copies of the

f^nc^a^ ^ xe

found in nearby Greensboro
^

%^9±m

passionate mobs to arise searching the
countryside for abolitionist

emissaries."

But Watson was not alarmed:

"I would as freely sleep with

my door wide open now as ever, and here as
in Connecticut."

He observed,

however, that Greene County residents were
extremely prone to uprising
29
scares which were "frightening distant communities
as well."

The events of the thirites led Alabamians to conclude
that unre-

strained manumission would produce massive numbers of
potential black

abolitionist revolutionaries.

These fears were acted on by the Legislature.

The lawmakers prohibited any free person of color from settling
within
the limits of Alabama and if any free black migrated to the State he had
to leave within thirty days or face thirty lashes.

Police powers were

given to any white person to arrest any freedman suspected of conspiracy.
Moreover, it was illegal for free-blacks to trade with slaves, aid runaways, visit plantations without the owner's permission, preach without

a license, forge a plantation pass, or retail liquor to slaves.

Before

1834 manumission was possible only by a general or special act of the

legislature.

Now a new law stated that a slave who was freed by his

master must move outside the state within twelve months; complete freedom

would not take place until such removal.
he could be sold back into bondage.

3

If the freedman should return

In 186 0, during a period of severe

rebellion panics, a law was passed halting the emancipation of all slaves.
By the end of the 1830' s the total number of slaves in Alabama

32
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had risen to 253,532.

Major planters, with 56,736 slaves, possessed

22.38 percent of this total, though they were only
one-fifth of one
percent of the white population.

The individual large planter held an

average of 79.6 slaves by the end of the decade. 33

The massive increase

in the slave population would, naturally affect the
slaveowner's sense

of security.

Notwithstanding new slave codes and heightened concern, individual

bondsmen continued to resist as the 1840 's unfolded.

In March 1840,

one Charles was charged with murdering his master in Limestone County;

he was convicted and hanged.

Protracted black resistance inspired

further conspiratorial fears, some groundless and others real.

A slave

assembly around the Huntsville market place was producing tensions, and
a local statute prohibited slaves from coming "to that place unless they

had a written pass from their owner."

35

Eighteen forty also witnessed

a severe rebellion panic in the Black Belt where more than 2/3 of the

slave population resided.
The tremendous excitement of the 1840 presidential campaign with

each party accusing the other of being "abolitionists," roused "dangerous"

hopes among the slaves of Perry County in central Alabama.
they were to be freed.

Many believed

One bondsman, for example, claimed that Martin

Van Buren was in the area of Montgomery with a 2000-man army of liberation.
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Peter Still, ex-slave and abolitionist, recalled that in the

summer of 1840, when the political "hoopla" of "Tippecanoe and Tyler
too" spread throughout one Black Eelt County, it fashioned an unexpected

response.

Speeches were made by local Democrats and Whigs using slogans

such as "liberty" and "freedom."

The slaves, Still said, did not remain

15

indifferent listeners; some interpreted such
talk literally and imagined
the dawn of liberty had arrived.

The whites, they observed, were already

free, and if liberty was to become universal—
and both political parties

insisted it would become
its blessings."

so— "then

the black folks too would soon enjoy

Talk of liberty, Still reported, spread from the
town

to the plantation slaves; the news was at first whispered
about but, he

observed, "as they became more certain that their hopes were
well grounded,

they gradually grew bolder, soon they were discussing the subject
in
their religious meetings."

The slaveholders learning of these discus-

sions and seeking the identity of the plotters created an espionage system.

Black preachers were silenced, slave meetings forbidden, patrols

strengthened.

"Every Negro, free and bond, who were met by the patrol

was searched; the plantation pass was meaningless."

white community, and

it

Panic pervaded the

was whispered, "the Negroes intended to rise!"

Old stories of black rebellions were revived, and even the most faithful

servants were now suspect.

The fear soon abated, but Still nonetheless

contended that this incident showed the slaves that slaveholders' confidence could easily be shaken.
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Slave plots, increased abolitionist activity in the north, the

introduction of anti-slavery petitions in Congress and Congressional

debates over the "gag rule" were a deeply troubling combination of events.
They prompted Governor Bagby in 1840 to speculate whether Alabamians could
live much longer with Abolitionists in the same Union.

"Fervent attach-

ment to the Union of the states," he told the General Assembly, was being

weakened by criticism of slavery.

"There is a point in public, as well

as private affairs, beyond which forbearance ceases to be a virtue," he

16

asserted.

Moreover,

"it was time to waken from the state of fancied

security in which we have hitherto reposed ... for the rude
tide of inno-

vation and fanaticism is constantly lashing us."

Bagby ended with

a

call upon southerners to act immediately "or their weight and
importance
in the scale of national existence will be lost, and their safety
en-

dangered forever."
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Symbolic of slaveholder fear of these years was a special local
patrol law passed in Baldwin County in 1841.

White southerners in each

precinct were divided into four patrol groups, each under the control
of a deputy marshal.

Each person liable to military duty would serve

one year out of every three and violators were to be fined fifty dollars
The Black Belt town of Wetumpka,

in 1842,

under the command of the town marshal.

organized a municipal patrol

All slaveholders residing within

the limits of the town were required to serve.

^

Demands were made in

north Alabama, a region of low slave density, to strengthen the patrol

system there:

"We must have a patrol,

a regular efficient patrol at

all hazards and upon any terms," demanded the Huntsville Democrat
is madness to remain longer without

it."

.

"It
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But augmented slave patrols could not prevent further slave re-

taliation.

In Limestone

County two slaves, belonging to William Parham

were jointly charged with murder of their overseer and executed.
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In

December 1844 near Huntsville, a slavemaster was slain by a bondsman
and he was hanged until, the press emphasized, "he was dead, dead, dead

Two transplanted Alabamians living in Mississippi recalled the conster-

nation of white southerners:

"Where

I

used to live [Alabama]

I

remember

they built pens in the woods where they could hide, and Christmas time

17

they went and got into them »fraid
the niggers was rising." 44
Into the mid forties Alabamians
continued to attack the "aboli-

tionist menace."

The Jacksonville Republican had been
moderate on the

subject of abolitionism in the 1830's,
minimizing it as a threat to

"Southern customs."
it

But by 1844 two years before the Wilmot
Proviso,

demanded Texas annexation and an end to
northern criticism of slavery.

"The course pursued by the Abolitionists,"
it declared,

"seems likely

ere long to present distinctly to the country the
alternative of aboli-

tion of slavery and all its horrible evils or the
dissolution of the
Union.

When the choice is forced upon us we are fully prepared for
a

separation."

45
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By the mid forties then the strains created by slave

reprisals, insurrectionary panics, and abolitionist criticism provoked
a major debate

in Alabama regarding the future importation of slaves.

In 1845 some important planter-politicians called for an end to

slave importation.
Belt,

Dr. P. W. Kittrell, a Whig legislator from the Black

introduced a restriction bill.

session and nothing was done about it.

It was presented too late in the

Colonel A. J. Pickett, a prominent

literary figure and a Democrat, urged Kittrell to reintroduce the bill
at the next legislative session.

against the slave trade.
County grand jury:

Public opinion, he said, was turning

Pickett cited a statement made by the Perry

"Perry is a great mart for slaves.

Perry County

has suffered much from the introduction of that species of property

among us."

Pickett cited statistics to the effect that during the de-

cade Alabama's slave increase was greater than that of any other slave
state.

In thirteen counties of southern Alabama, he claimed,

population already exceeded the white population by 23,500.

the slave

This total

18

was deduced from the 1840 census and, he
was sure, "conditions were much

worse now."
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At the next General Assembly meeting
Kittrell chaired a special

committee appointed to investigate slave restriction.

The slave popu-

lation, reported the committee, was becoming
too large for the interest
and security of Alabamians.

Kittrell

»a

committee observed that nonresident

planters exported their slaves into Alabama but took out
the proceeds
of slave labor.

Many of these slaves of absentee owners,

was charged,

it

were of poor character— from the jails of other slave states.

"The in-

troduction of such criminals to Alabama could only create a spirit of
unrest and insubordination among the slaves already here."

Marengo

County's slave population was double that of the white in 1846.
rate, the legislators warned,

At that

in another decade the state would have a

black population more than double the white.

The Committee report con-

cluded with what was by then a familiar observation--the mounting possi-

bility of a servile revolt.

Such a possibility would certainly increase,

if the black population continued to grow.

It

had already necessitated

many of the petitions to the legislature urging prompt measures that
would halt the domestic slave trade.
.

•

-

,

passage of a restriction ordinance.

Finally

the.

Committee recommended
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Publication of the Kittrell proposals provoked dispute.

J. J.

Hooper, eidtor of the Wetumpka Whig, agreed that "such a law would in
a great measure prevent the contact of our slave population with portic...,

of the slave populations of states fast preparing for emancipation, whic h

contact is dangerous and every day becoming more so .... Half the negro

villainy of Alabama...

is

perpetrated by slaves of recent importation.

,
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They have ideas and a degree of
intelligence [that]

..

.should [not] be

communicated to the black population of the
South West."

Hoo P er insisted

that Alabama had "to close one of the
easiest roads by which fanaticism

can reach us, we must shut our doors
against infected importations." 48
One of the most vociferous protests against
the Kittrell suggestion came

from a newspaper in north Alabama, an area
with a modest slave population.

The Huntsville Democrat, owned and operated by
the Clays, a planter-

politician family, asserted that far from being too
numerous, the slave
population was the foundation of all the wealth in Alabama.
the editor J. Withers Clay contended,

investments.

"were the best judges of their own

When the people of Alabama found investment in negroes

unprofitable, they would stop buying them."
passed, Clay warned, whites would evade it. A9
so anxious.

"Individuals,"

Kittrell's bill failed to pass.

If a restriction law were

He need not have been
In 1846 and 1847, however,

in an attempt to limit and discourage the slave trade the General Assembly

passed new levies on slave traders:

they had to pay license fees amount-

ing to ten dollars on each slave offered for sale."* 0

The passage of the slave trade tax did not, however, end the debate
over slave importations.

One of the most controversial statements made

in opposition was issued by Soloman A. Heydenfeldt.

Born in Charleston,

South Carolina, in 1816 of German-Jewish extraction, his family had been

identified with the Jewish community there for generations.

Upon becoming

a lawyer, he went to Alabama in 1837, had a successful practice, was a

judge in Tallapossa county, and settled in Russell county on the eastern
end of the Black Belt."'*

On January 31, 1849, he aroused a storm with

an open letter in the Huntsville Democrat

addressed to Governor Reuben

"
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Chapman.

The address called upon the Governor to
utilize his constitu-

tional powers and recommend a slave-import curb
to the legislature.

Heydenfeldt advocated a far reaching measure.
immigration for any purpose.

It

would block all future

Many of the border states, he observed,

were looking to unload their slave population; and this
practice could
cause the Gulf states to become the "Santo Domingo of the north
American

continent and rush the South into a war of extermination with
its black

population.

There was another equally ominous reason for action against slaver
in Alabama.

Many Alabamians wanted more populous white communities not

just because of their fear of slavery insurrection; some regarded slave

labor as their rival labor force.

had substance.
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This fear of competing black labor

Many Alabama bondsmen were skilled bricklayers, black-

smiths, clerks in stores, carpenters, gardeners, and cooks.

employed them as laborers and sawyers.

A notice in

asked for blacks for work in a flour mill.

a

Moreover,

slaves were used by railroads on construction jobs.
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Huntsville paper
large groups of

A well known

architect in the southern part of the state was a slave.
achievement for 1845 was

a

Sawmills

His most notabl

bridge in Columbus, Mississippi, for which

he served as the chief architect.
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In addition to pointing out the slave's competition in the labor

market, Heydenfeldt also challenged the planters' obsession with cotton.
In 1845 cotton was selling at 5.63 cents a

Thus, at the current price,

tivation.

pound—a new low for the 1840'

cotton was scarcely paying expenses of cul-

Money was being made only in the western Black Belt.

Slave

immigration into these areas was increasing so rapidly that production

21

and consumption could not keep pace with
it.

Heydenfeldt stressed that

cotton investment had retarded Alabama's
economic growth.

If the slave

trade were halted, he concluded, a healthy
white population would soon

begin to migrate into counties now mainly black. 55
Heydenfeldt was almost immediately the target of criticism.

One

Black Belt editor deplored the fact that the issue had been
raised.
question \«>uld solve itself.

No one would suffer if slave markets were

opened in every town in Alabama.

slave-owners.

The

Men of moderate means could then become

If Heydenfeldt 's proposals should become law,

"the prospects

of the poor man would be forever marred; exclude the slaves for sale and
a Negroid owning Aristocracy would be created."

The fear that a planter

elite would control a major portion of the slave population was already
a reality.

The 1850 census revealed that since 1840 the slave population

had enlarged to 342,844, an increase of 89,312 from the 1840 figure.

Moreover, the major planter,

by the end of the forties, owned 96,106

bondspeople or 28.03 percent of the 1850 total.

The wealthy planter

had increased his average holdings to 83.13 slaves.

Another critic of Heydenfeldt

'

s
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recommendations, a rabid pro-slavery

newspaper located in Barbour county (which would become the leading "fire-

eating" county in the state), questioned Heydenfeldt
south.

's

loyalty to the

The goals sought by slave restrictionists were essentially those

of the abolitionists, the editorial declared, and

It

accused the restric-

tionists of wanting Alabama to do what the abolitionists urged on Congress.
If the

blacks were confined to their present limits, the editor predicted,

the time would soon come when there would be an inevitable conflict between
the "Southern white man and the black and not for one moment would hardy,
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enterprising Americana ourrender their glorious South to
lazy, idle and
careless Africans."

If curtailment was ever successful then it would

mean "the extermination of the negro race in the United
States.

The

people of the South, as the only true friends of the slave, owed
it to

him and to themselves to silence the wild fanatics of both north and
south."
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The Huntsville Democrat likewise raised doubts about Heyden-

feldt's loyalty and insisted that the subject should never have been
raised:

Restriction will "not be called for in our day and generation." 59
While Alabamians disputed the issue of domestic slave importations,

bondsmen were providing additional support for the restrictionist position.

patrol.

A slave in Jefferson County insulted and threatened the slave
The patrollers went after him and one was wounded by the knife-

wielding fugitive.

Another white prusuer attempted to subdue him and

was "so miserably lacerated" that he died before help could reach him.

Then the slave returned to his owner's home and took his own life.^

Another slave residing in Coosa County was charged with the murder of
his master, tried, and sentenced to the gallows.^ *

In a third incident

in Chambers County, on the fringe of the Black Belt, Dr. F. McCantz, a

highly respected physician, was shot in his home.

One of his "trusted"

servants was accused after it had been learned he had previously made

an unsuccessful attempt on his owner

t

s

life.
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Such incidents of resistance angered Alabamians.

In 1849,

the

town council of Eufaula, Barbour County, enacted legislation in regard
to the slaves of their community.

ment of slaves and free blacks.

This legislation restricted the moveFurthermore, the town marshal had the

responsibility of whipping slaves if they were disorderly or profane.
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At the same time, the town council revised
the patrol ordinances for
the tov/n by calling for five man patrols with
one of the five acting
as captain.

Failure to patrol was punishable by a fine of three
dollars.

The patrol had to inspect all streets and alleys for
slaves and free

blacks who had to be off the streets by nine p.m.

Strengthening and

enforcing the patrols was not only inspired by the acts of violence
occurring in neighboring communities but by the assumption that many
of the "recent fires in and around the town" were caused by slaves
who

were in the community after hours.

To combat this, the town council

authorized the marshal to appoint four men to act as night watchmen;
they were to patrol in pairs on alternate nights.

During this same

period, there was an attempt to restrict the practice of slaves hiring

their own time or otherwise going at large within the community.

Whites residing in other regions of the state deemed slave insubordination the result of abolitionists' teachings.

For example,

the

citizens of New Market in Madison County were outraged by the activities
of an alleged "abolitionist emissary" who had attempted to distribute

anti-slavery pamphlets.

The local post-office refused to circulate them

and the "agitator" was removed from the village.

moment doubt," said the Huntsville Democrat,

"No one can for a

"that the incendiary's

principle object was to produce agitations and discontent among our

black population, as it is known that many of them read, and as these
documents have been circulated so profusely through the County, there
could be no difficulty in their obtaining them."
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Auburn in Russell

County similarly experienced an abolitionist scare and also forced a

suspected "abolitionist who had been acting the Missionary" to leave town,
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Abolitionist literature even found its
way to Governor Henry Collier.
He was sent an impassioned unsigned
anti-slavery appeal.
"You exclude
our persons from you," it declared,
"and deny the right to speak
against
the sin at your own doors... know that
by the same principles by which

you enslave others you may be enslaved...

I

beseech you do not procasti-

nate but... seek some way of setting yourself
free from sin and your

bondsmen free from oppression.

1,66

As a result of these incidents the' General
Assembly in 1849

strengthened the slave codes.

A bill was passed to "more effectively

suppress the practice of trading with slaves."

This measure was intended

to prevent communication between bondspeople and anyone
attempting to

"instruct them in abolitionist doctrines." 67

The legislature also con-

sidered an act to compel black seamen coming into the port of Mobile
to be removed and confined to jail while their ships were anchored.

It

was feared that "alien blacks" could spread emancipationist plots among

Mobile slaves.

But some thirty-five Mobile merchants sent a petition

to Governor Henry Collier protesting the proposed ordinance for they

feared that commercial ships would be reluctant to use Mobile if the
law were passed.

Forebodings about slave conduct and about whites who seemed "soft
on Southernism" continued to create tensions in some heavily black populated counties.

Slaveowners in Autauga County were convinced that bonds-

people were in "a disorganized state, and that danger may be apprehended."
At a meeting of slave-holding families a series of resolutions were passed,

They called for tighter security on the part of the patrols, and leaders
were "to enquire what white men are in the habit of visiting certain
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negro quarters":

they also urged an investigation of
those "mysterious

individuals who had been shooting guns on
Sundays near the plantations." 69
Forced confessions, after severe whippings by
a vigilance committee of

Triana (Madison County), elicited testimony from
slaves of a "hellish
insurrectionary plot."

The patrol executed several blacks, including

a preacher, notwithstanding his owner's plea that his
life be spared;

and two white men suspected of "tampering with the slaves'*
were imprisoned
to await further action.

One white man who had been "too friendly" toward

bondsmen was given until Christmas to settle his affairs and leave the
County.
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The citizens of Eufaula were active again when they organized

vigilante committees to ensure that all whites shared the same sentiments.
The local committee drove an elderly man, Captain Elisha Betts, out of
town because he subscribed to "abolition papers," circulated anti-slavery

opinions in the community, and corresponded to "abolition" journals.
Petitioning to return to Eufaula, the Captain signed a written agreement
that he would not offend the community again.

When three of his neighbors

guaranteed him, he was allowed because of his advanced age to resume his
residence in the town.

7

Fear of servile rebellion and emancipation was grist for Alabama

politicians who, from 1846 to 1851, agitated the pro-slavery defense.
Future Supreme Court Justice John A. Campbell, a Mobile lawyer, and
Democrat, wrote his mentor John C. Calhoun that the south must demand

termination of the slavery debate for the "slaves' temper had been excited.
"They begin to understand," Campbell warned,

on their account."
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"that society is being moved

Similar forebodings came from H. W. Conner who

also wrote to Calhoun and observed that people were despondent, believing

1
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slavery to be doomed.

Most important, the slaves, recognizing
these

fears, grew "arrogant and troublesome." 73
In January 1849 the Southern Congressional
caucus composed an

"Address to the Southern People," with four of
Alabama's seven Congress-

men signing the statement.

Both Alabama Senators endorsed the appeal.

Interestingly, two of the Alabama representatives who did
not sign the

address came from north Alabama--a region of low slave density.
third was a Whig who refused to sign for partisan reasons.

The

Like many

southern Whigs he strongly opposed exacerbating sectional tensions.
The address was authored by John C. Calhoun.

Appearing in a host of

Alabama newspapers, Calhoun's appeal was virulently negrophobic.

It

asserted that if abolition succeeded then "the horrors of black domination would befall the South."

peace and harmony.

evils."

The two races could not live together in

"Emancipation would be but prelude to a host of black

It also predicted a new political coalition of newly freed blacks

and northern voters for the purpose of suppressing the white south.

Then these blacks and "profligate whites" would gain federal patronage,
and vault themselves into a higher socio-economic position than white

southerners.

"We would in a word, change conditions with them--a degra-

dation greater than has ever yet fallen to the lot of a free and enlightened
people.

.

.should emancipation take place."
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These predictions portended

evil for every white Alabamian, slaveholder and nonslaveholder alike.

Consequently, the people of Alabama of every rank had an interest in

preserving slavery and foiling the antislavery menace.
Also raising the specter of racial conflict was state representative

Percy Walker, a Whig from Mobile.

He urged passage of a series of
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resolutions confirming slavery's rights in the
territories and predicted
that confining slavery to its present limits would
"result in completely

breaking up the relations of master and slave ... .Because
a growing black

population would either force the whites to emigrate or provoke
and bloody conflicts over the lands."

fi<
Lerce

Unless Alabama forcefully

corn-

batted northern attacks, he cautioned, southern civilization would
collapse.
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Governor Reuben Chapman concurred.

He warned that if souther-

ners yielded to northern assaults, then "no eye can penetrate the dark

future that is before us, no tongue can describe the degraded condition
to which we shall be reduced

only with our serfs."

— serfs

where we were equals, and equals
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William L. Yancey utilized the same racial appeal in numerous
stump speeches.

Time and again he warned his listeners of the prospect

of black equality imposed by the north.

For example, he opposed Senator

Lewis Cass's view that slavery in the New Mexico territory was moot since

most of the territorial population was colored and would not consent to
slavery.

'*The

only comment," Yancey exclaimed, "which

I

will present

on this to you, a slaveholding population, is that... we the people of
the South have been accustomed to think that in legislating for the States

or territories, the whites should not ask the consent or permit of the

colored race to regulate our internal concerns."

political equality as calamitous and declared:

Yancey viewed black
"If General Cass is elected

how will the South have opportunities to move into territories where this
colored race whom General Cass holds are our beloved fellow citizens.
As a result of these heightened racial concerns, a movement got

under way in late 1851 to resurrect the Colonization Society.

It

was
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reorganized for the purpose of colonizing free
blacks to Liberia.
tial support came from the Weekly Alabama

.Tourn.il
r

Ini-

a Whig organ which

maintained that freedmen were "instruments of
insubordination and disorder."

"Many of them live by vicious means," it continued,
and are

"medians between the slave and dishonest traders"; together
they "plunder
the masters."

But most decisive, the editorial concluded, the presence

of manumitted blacks served as a "constant source of discontent
and in-

subordination to the slaves."

Their removal would "tend materially to

the good order and security of the slave population.

1,78

Another news-

paper published an announcement asking for support of the Society.

The

appeal was signed by several prominent planters and lawyers both Whigs
and Democrats.

7^

Some free blacks also championed colonization.

Among them

S.

Wesley Jones, a free black merchant from Tuscaloosa, who worked actively
for emigration.

From 1848 to 1851 Jones corresponded with William McClain

of the American Colonization Society,

He wrote,

Alabama freedmen desired to remove to Liberia.

in June 1848,

Furthermore,

that many

if he had

the financial backing, he could "raise a company of a hundred or more."

He would soon canvass the north Alabama free black community, he declared,

claiming that there were some twenty-five freedmen in the vicinity "that

manifest such anxiety to leave here."

He lamented,

in 1849,

"there are

too many [free blacks] who listen to the well invented tales of the
enemies of colonization."

Most freedmen would not consider immigrating

without first hand knowledge of Liberia.

Nevertheless, several blacks

in north Alabama looked forward to departure in the spring of 1850; and

others from the eastern part of the state also desired to colonize.

1
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Mcclain's letters expressed uneasiness about
the possibility that his
correspondence with Jones would be opened and
censored with resultant
trouble for free blacks.

Jones reassured him:

"you need not entertain

any fears as to what you write me doing harm,
write freely upon any subject for your letters come safely and none see
them but myself."

In

late 1850 Jones reported that many whites now urged
the removal of freed-

men:

"All classes speak of it in the highest terms and
seem to be very

anxious that it be carried out."

According to- him funds were the only

obstacle for a mass migration of Alabama free-blacks. 80
By December 1851 Jones had noted the formation of the Alabama

Colonization Society and predicted that "there will be an uprising of
the free people of color--not only in Alabama—not only in the much per-

secuted South, where it is said by the fanatics that we are sorely op-

pressed and inhumanly treated...."

The national society offered Jones

free passage to Liberia, but he asked for a few months delay until some

business matters were cleaned up.

He recommended that Alabama's 2000

freedmen donate twenty-five cents apiece so two delegates could be sent
to Liberia.

"Let national pride be kindled," he eloquently concluded,

"and go to and make us a great nation of our own, build our own cities

and towns, make our own laws, collect our revenues, elect our own governors and law makers, have our own schools and colleges, lawyers, doctors,
in a word, cease to be hewers of wood and drawers of water and be men."

No evidence exists as to whether Jones ever went to Liberia.

Meanwhile the plight of Alabama free blacks worsened during the
1850 's.

At various times the General Assembly considered resolutions

to re-enslave all manumitted blacks.

Statutes were passed that almost

8
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completely curtailed the few liberties
possessed by the freedmen.

Further-

more, the early optimism expressed by
the newly formed colonization
society
in Alabama proved to be a chimera.

Nothing was done to put colonization

into operation.

By 1852 nonimportation and colonization, therefore,
were rejected
as a means of quieting fears.

the only security.

Some politicians suggested secession as

But having repudiated disunion in 1851,
Alabamians

turned instead to the slave code; and the 1852legislature both codified
and augmented it.

The patrol system was a prime concern.

All white

male slave holders under sixty as well as whites between eighteen
and
forty-five were now subject to duty--which meant a minimum of one night
a week and more often when the Justice of the Peace deemed it necessary,

e.g., when evidence of "insubordination, threatened outbreak, or any

contemplated unlawful assembly of slaves or free-negroes came to light."

Patrols were authorized to investigate any plantation and check all passes
of visiting bondspeople.

thirty stripes.

Any slave caught without a pass would receive

Any white who refused to perform patrol obligations would

be subject to fine unless good cause could be given.
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Under the new code slave movement was circumscribed as never before,

reflecting the deep uneasiness of slave holders.
could hire himself out.

Henceforth no bondsman

Not more than five slaves could visit any plan-

tation at the time except for church services or funerals.

Possession

of a weapon by a slave, always meriting a penalty, was now punished by

thirty-nine stripes "on the bare back,

earlier penalty.

"

rather than by the twenty of the

Any slave found hunting at night "must be given thirty-

nine lashes" and the owner fined fifty dollars if the bondsman had his

.
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permission.

No casual assembly could exceed five
slaves vith ten lashes

for all if that maximum was violated. 83

Almost all communication between freedman and
slaves was halted.
Free blacks entering the state were given thirty
days to leave and were

subject to two years imprisonment if they did not.

Any free black found

at an unlawful gathering would be fined twenty-five
dollars or jailed

for sixty days.

If any freedman wrote a pass for a slave or aided
slaves

to escape, he would be liable to seven years imprisonment.

Once out of

jail, a free black was given a month to leave Alabama or face
a five-year

jail sentence.

Freedmen also had to get an owner's permission in order

to visit slaves.

The revised code called upon masters to treat bondspeople with

humanity, giving them proper food, clothing, and care.

alty awaited those who disregarded these provisions.

However, no pen-

Masters were still

given the option of manumission with the approval of a probate iudge.
But the freedman then had to leave Alabama within six months or face
re -ens lavement for life.
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There was, of course, a wide gap between

literal enforcement and actual practice.

Nevertheless, these regulations

reflected Alabamian concern and fear of living among a growing slave

population
Equally illustrative of the consternation that Alabamians revealed
toward bondspeople was the evolution of their pro-slavery argument.
Some historians maintain that the pro-slavery defense was elaborated

specifically for southerners who knew slavery was immoral and had to
rationalize their culpability.
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But there is little evidence in Alabama

of guilt -ridden slaveowners. There is, however, evidence of a fabric

"
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of fear which many whites manifested
toward blacks-slave and free-and

which motivated them to justify slavery
and to insist upon its necessity
for economic and social stability.

Slaveholders and nonslaveholders alike
joined in constructing

Alabama's slavery defense.

Frederick Law Olmsted while traveling
through

the state in 1853 recounted a conversation
with a nonslaveholding yeo-

man.

Olmsted inquired how Alabamians would react to
emancipation:
Well 1*11 tell you what I think on^it, I'd like
it if we could get rid on 'em to youst
I wouldn't
like to hev 'em freed if they was gwine to 'hang
round. They ought to get some country and put
'em war they could be by themselves.
It wouldn't
do no good to free 'em and let 'em hand 'round,
because they is so monsterous lazy; if they hadn't
got nobody to take keer on 'em, you see they
wouldn't do nothin' but laze round, and steal,
and pilfer, and no man couldn't live, you see,
war they was--free no couldn't live. And then,
I've two objections; thats one on 'em no man
couldn't live and this ere's the other: now suppose they was free. Now just suppose you had a
family of children, now would you like to hev a
nigger feeling just as good as a white man? How'd
you like to hev a nigger steppin up to your darter. 8 7

—

Blacks, the farmer told Olmsted, must be kept in bondage because they

are lazy and larcenous.

whites for status.
aggressive!

Moreover, once freed they would compete with

Thus, Africans as slaves are lazy and as freedmen

Law and order would be severely tested by emancipation.

However, the sexual threat posed by abolition was foremost among this

yeoman's concerns.

He was obsessed about "a nigger steppin up to his

darter.

Nonslaveholder misgivings about potential black economic competition were apparent in a letter by Robert

C.

Tharin, who tried to es-

tablish a newspaper, The Non-Slaveholder, in the late 1850's.

Before

"

33

Tharin could begin publication he was
expelled from the state.

The paper

purported to support the economic interests
of the "poor white" and

attack the planter class for existing
difficulties.

Tharin said in a

letter that he had seen the rich man's
slave "come in contact with the

poor white blacksmith, bricklayer, wheelwright
and farmer."

Preference

traditionally "has gone to the planter's negroes
in all such trades.
Poor whites of the south fear the coming of
negro equality" which Tharin

blamed on the "rich planters."

White mechanics in Mobile, Montgomery,

and Wetumpka had told him of their fear of black
emancipation.

"Have not

the planter for years condemned every mechanic in the
South to negro

equality" one asked.

"My dislike of them [planters] arose from.

.

.their

daily usurpations of power and privileges at variance with my rights
and the rights of my class."

Meanwhile plantation Negroes accustomed

to observing and identifying themselves with their masters "harbored

a deep contempt for white people of small property and no social dis.

t

met ion. „88
.

.

,

Tharin 's observation that numerous Alabama slaves had acquired
mechanical talents has been noted earlier.
skills,

Because of their increasing

it is easy to see why white artisans felt threatened especially

in the regions of dense-slave concentration—the Black Belt.

Through

the 1850's bondsmen were extensively employed in the state's infant in-

dustry in central Alabama.

Scores of expert slave machinists worked

in Danial Pratt's cotton gin factory in Prattville, Autauga County.

An

associate of Danial Pratt stated that "white hands had to be trained....
These [whites] were brought up from the piney woods [south Alabama] many
of them with no sort of training to any kind of labor; in fact they had
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to learn everything, and in learning
many made mistakes and blunders

which were fatal to success."

One Mobile bakery had sixteen black
bakers.

A cotton mill, according to a New York Tribune
reporter who visited Alabama in 1858, included "black operatives who
were quite skilled at their

business."
gent fellow

A black foreman was in charge.

"Branch was a fine intelli-

He made all the machinery belts, covered the
rollers,

weighed out all the yards, thread and waste on the floor,
kept a journal,
and rendered an account to his employer."

Robert Jemison, the Tuscaloosa

planter- industrialist, computed that slaves were 26 percent cheaper
to

employ than white laborers and by 1859 46 percent less expensive than
whites.

Some slaves developed creative talents beyond the functional.

For example, the west Alabama Agricultural Society awarded a silver cup
to Page, a Mobile slave, for his portrait of Francis F. Lyon, a former

Alabama Congressman.
concluded the account.

Portrait painting was a natural gift with Page,
89

A slave mechanic keeping a kiln in the town of Marion prompted
this statement in the Marion Commonwealth

;

"Common safety required the

end of all slave shops... for if it is not done

consequences may result

which will prove disastarous to the peace and quietude of the town."
In 1858 the state legislature was urged to pass a law preventing bonds-

men from being trained as mechanics.

Black men should only "do rough

and ready work which is unsuited to the white man."

The new statute

must "fix the slave to the plantation and then all industrious white

mechanics" would be able to take jobs occupied by black craftsmen.

With

the passage of such an act, slaves "would not be half so hard to manage."

The new law would also diminish "a large amount of thieving carried on
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by negro mechanics...." 90

The fears expressed by the Marion
Commonwealth

again mirror the conflicting image that
white Alabamians had of blacks.

Belief in inherent black inferiority, as
previously noted, implied permanent inability to compete with whites.
But paradoxically if bondsmen

were allowed to develop any skills they would
become a challenge to white
labor.

As common field hands they were doing work
befitting their sup-

posed talents.

But the cotton toiler was also considered
a potential

insurrectionist and must always be watched.

was a double threat:

The slave artisan,

then,

an economic menace and a potential rebel.

Although white farmers and mechanics in south Alabama were clearly
at a socio-economic disadvantage, they never made any attempt to
disrupt

the Alabama social structure and did not pose the threat that blacks
did.

Many of these white farmers aspired to be planters.

However, in north

Alabama the independent yeomen were hostile to the economic control of
the large planter.

Their interests were represented by W.

R. W.

Cobb.

Cobb from north Alabama's sixth district, an area of slight slave density,

successfully campaigned for Congress with a class appeal of yeoman versus
planter.

He held office from 1847 to 1861 and was the most convinced

Unionist in Alabama.

Upper-class planters were never at a loss to remind nonslaveholders

what they had to lose by abolition.

A host of well-placed Alabamians

wrote tracts, delivered sermons, and made speeches claiming that slavery
elevated the white man, making him proud of his race and liberty.

Ala-

bama's pro-slavery polemic reflected what one recent historian has called
'*Herrenvolk" democracy, a society based on the "natural distinctions of

race."

Educated, upper-class Alabamians expended much effort persuading
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deprived whites that they were as priviledged
as anybody, if not more
so.

If slaves were freed,

and identity. 91

Poverty,

then poor-whites would forfeit their
status
it

was asserted, was not only less
prevalent

under slavery than in the north, it also
constituted less of a stigma,
since race, not money, conferred honor.

The bitter struggle between

capital and labor in northern industrial society
was unfavorably compared with the spirit of humanity and co-operation
between planter and
slave in the south.
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Newspapers consistently played on the poor-man s-stake-in-slavery
'

theme.

If freedom came to blacks, editor J. Withers Clay affirmed,
then

poor whites would become "degraded to the condition of blacks who
would

become their equals in society.

Indolent free negroes would thrust them-

selves into their society and make proposals of marriage with their sons
and daughters"; and all distinctions of color would disappear.

One Black

Belt paper editorially asserted, "As it is now in the South, the white
man, whether rich or poor, occupies an elevated position.

He is inde-

pendent and has the proud satisfaction of feeling himself to be equal
in all respects to his wealthy neighbor."
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Another argument used by

slave defenders was that of Mobile physician Josiah Clark Nott, who at-

tained a national reputation with a series of articles and lectures on
the "natural inferiority of the African race."

Blacks and whites, Nott

tried to prove, did not belong to the same species.

benefits he derived from writing on slavery and race.
"popularity, money, and professional repuuat ion,

94
"

Nott listed the

They were, in order,
These benefits would

also induce other ambitious Alabamians to enter into the slavery debate
and defense.
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In the midst of this mounting
defense of slaveholding in the 1850'
s

came recurrent slave unrest and violent
slave reprisals.

At Mount Meigs

in Montgomery County in the fall of
1854 Dr. James McDonald punished

a bondsman for disobedience and was
himself clubbed to death.

The slave

charged with the murder was captured and
jailed; a group of McDonald's
friends gathered, and with the Sheriff's
co-operation took the prisoner
and burned him to death.

The Huntsville Democrat advised,

"in matters

involving the control of that class of the population,
we hold that the

law of self protection, which abrogates all other
law, must necessarily
find its exponent in the action of the majority of
those immediately

interested.
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The following week in Montgomery County a slave master,

trying to punish a slave, was assaulted by him.
convicted, and executed.

96

Belt overseer, was killed.
to a newspaper account.
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The slave was tried,

The following month Henry T. Gates, a Black
One or more slaves were involved according

Another overseer was severely wounded in

Butler County, when a reputatedly vicious slave suddenly struck him.
The slave, the account reported, professed indifference to death and

only regretted that he had not killed his victim.
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The testimony of former slaves, as recorded by the W.

P.

A.

slave

narrative project of the 1930 's, also confirms the mounting rebelliousness of Black Belt Alabama bondspeople.

Mingo White, born in Montgomery

County around 1848, recalled that in the 1850

's

bondsmen would run away

and "lots of times when de pattrollers would get after de slaves dey

would have de worse fight and sometimes

dt

pattrollers would get killed."
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Martha Bradley, who labored in the mid fifties on a Montgomery plantation,
remembered:

"On day

I

wuz workin in de field and de overseer he come

.
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'round and say sumpin' to me he had
no bizness sayin.

and knocked him plum down."

took my hoe

Amy Chapman, born in 1843 on a Wilcox
County

estate, related a gruesome incident.

woman "near 'bout to death.

I

The overseer whipped another bonds-

She got so mad at him dat she tuk
his baby

chile what was playin 'round de yard... an
th'owed
she was usen' to wash wid." 100

it

in a pot of lye dat

Thus while blacks were oppressed and

exploited, they fought back in a constant struggle
using all available

means
However, such deeds of defiance brought retaliation.

Butler County

slaveowners were furious when a slave charged with stealing
a piece of

chewing tobacco worth twenty-five cents was found guilty and
hanged.
Slaveholders confronted a dilemma:

they could not wantonly hang and

chastise every slave suspected of being rebellious.

After all, bondsmen

were a major financial investment that had to be protected.

Beyond

tightening slave codes, patrol systems, and punishing actual acts of
insubordination, whites for the most part could only deplore suspected

misdeeds of their retainers.

Alabamians living with massive numbers

of blacks had to constantly restrain themselves from indiscriminately

destroying their valuable property as the Butler county citizens had
done when they hung a bondsman for allegedly stealing a piece of tobacco.
However, sometimes they could not curb their frustration and immediate

punishment was forthcoming.
This was the case in July 1855 when Sumter County experienced a

devastating response of white terror.

A eiave was charged with allegedly

raping and killing a planter's daughter.

Over a thousand persons assembled

at the supposed site of the trial only to learn that the judicial proceedings
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would be held in another part of the
fcunty.

They then passed a series

of resolutions sustaining each
other in their actions, proceeded
to the
jail,

tied the slave to a pole and burned
him.

A local editor observed

that slavemasters brought their
"negroes with them for the example made

of this wretch [would have] a salutory
effect upon the two thousand
slaves who witnessed the execution. 101

Again, about ten days later in

the same County and despite "object lessons,"
two bondsmen were executed
for killing their owners. 102

One Black Belt slaveowner, by the end of

1855, was so distressed over potential slave rebelliousness
that he wrote

Governor John A. Winston informing him that "there are
a very great number
of slaves in our midsts and but few white people to keep
them in subju-

gation."

The planter complained about a "liquor shop, at which

it

is

believed our negroes can buy whiskey... by which they are greatly demoralized and made fearfully insubordinate."

He called upon the Governor

to use his influence to urge the legislature to pass a law that would

prohibit the sale of alcoholic "spirits entirely, in any quantity by
any person of any calling whatsoever

.

103
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This plea is especially in-

teresting because of its implication that slave rebelliousness could

only be attributed to alien forces--abolitionist propaganda or whiskey.

A commonly held assumption among slaveowners was that the slave left
alone loved his master and was compliant.

But this belief was shattered

by many examples of servile resistance not caused by outside elements
and Alabatoians were prepared to take new potion.

By the mid 1850's persistent slave violence coupled with traditional white apprehension created a garrison psychology in Alabama.
W. J. Cash and John Hope Franklin have cogently described one of the
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"side effects" of slavery, namely, a def
ensiveness that displayed itself
in a love of military posturing. 104 Alabama
was proud to be leading

the deep south,

in the fifties,

in military academies.

While not es-

tablishing a state military institute, Alabama co-operated
with private

military schools.

In many instances the legislature exempted such
schools

from taxation and occasionally authorized governors to
supply "as many
arms as shall be sufficient for its purposes."

Significantly, two mili-

tary academies which received full state support were located in two

counties whose black population far exceeded the white--the Eufaula Military
Institute in Barbour County and the Tuskeegee Military Institute in Macon
„

County.
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Alabama.

Even

m

the early fifties the martial spirit was aglow in

Volunteer military groups were springing up in the heavily

slave concentrated Black Belt.

In 1852,

the General Assembly authorized

the organization of such bands as the "Pike County Rangers" and the

"Montgomery County Rough and Ready Invincibles

.

"

The president of the

University of Alabama in the same year suggested that his board of trustees
might explore the question of instituting military training and discipline at the University.

Also in 1852 the legislature authorized the

governor to secure arms for four schools in the Black Belt that were
interested in providing military training.

In 1860 the Assembly authorized

the establishment of a Black Belt military academy at Wetumpka.
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Notwithstanding this state-sponsored and state-encouraged military
umbrella,

fear of bondspeople continued to be a daily reality for many

communities.

In the north-east town of Jacksonville in Calhoun County,

with a slave density under 25 percent, the town council met and passed
a series of revised slave ordinances which provided that a bell would
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sound at 9:00 p.m., an d all slaves and
freedmen found wandering were
liable to arrest.

Bondsmen were not allowed to visit free-blacks
and

the latter were not to have dealings with
slaves.

Violation of this

regulation would bring twenty-five lashes and
imprisonment.

Nobody,

white or black, was permitted to sell or trade
liquor with slaves, subject again to fine and imprisonment. 107

Reflecting a similar concern,

the General Assembly passed a law stating that not
more than six blacks

could reside on any plantation unless the owner, overseer, or
white agent

remained in the same place with them or within a distance of one
mile.

Any violation of this law subjected the owner to a fine of $100.
ing to a legislative source,

Accord-

"this statute performed the double function

of keeping the negroes in order and preventing undesirable persons from

loitering around."

10 ^

At the same time that more laws were being passed to promote firmer

mastery over bondspeople, an "abolitionist" panic broke out in Mobile.
One of the cities oldest booksellers, Strickland and Company, was accused

of "vending incendiary books causing for the past few days the citizens
...great vexation."

this matter.

A town meeting set up a committee to investigate

The Committee decided that the owners would be given five

days to leave Mobile.

10 ^

The reactions of Mobilians to suspected "subversives" typified
the increasing sensitivity of Black Belt and south Alabamians to rumored

slave and abolitionist conspiracies in mid and late 1856.

For example,

in Coosa County, on the edge of the Black Belt, the citizens were numbed

by "a conspiracy among the negroes."

At a meeting of planters and con-

cerned farmers, it was disclosed that several slaves, interrogated by
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patrollers, confessed that bondsmen in the
vicinity were planning an

insurrection.
tions.

A committee was elected and passed a
series of resolu-

Enough evidence was available, it was
determined, to confirm

that some slaves had been holding "incendiary
meetings ... involving the

safety of whites."

All whites-slaveholders and nonslaveholders-had

the same goal, the resolutions continued,
namely, the preservation of

order, and slaveowners should not arbitrarily
suspect nonslaveholders

of tampering with slaves.

However,

"the blacks have been encouraged,

if not instigated by abolitionists in our midst."

Thus, all those not

known by the community, the resolution maintained, should be
suspected
and questioned by the sheriff.

Furthermore, all patrol laws were to be

strictly enforced and gatherings of blacks for social purposes no longer

permitted.

Finally, reflecting the heightened agitation of the community,

one resolution called for the registration of all male slaves in the

county with local magistrates and stipulated that their names be turned
over to county patrol leaders.
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After these resolutions had passed,

an act was approved by the Wetumpka town council which made

it

unlawful

for black preachers to sermonize among their people unless five slave-

holders were present.
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In September,

closely following these events,

in neighboring Montgomery County, two bondsmen were hanged for killing

their owners.

112

Several weeks later a Montgomery newspaper alerted

its readers to guard against children's books entitled, Twilight Stories,

for they were "stuffed with rank abolition ... for the purpose of poisoning
the minds of Alabama children.
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The slave unrest continued.

In Henry County,

in December 1856,

a slave was accused of raping his master's wife and then killing the

A3

master himself.

He successfully avoided capture.

"We are as a general

thing opposed to lynch law," an editorial
commented, "but in this instance,

if the darkey is caught, we should
think burning would be too

good for him." 1U
all over the south.

Alabama newspapers reported insurrectionary
plots
Harvey Wish argues that the rebellion fright of

December 1856 can be attributed to a number of
factors:

the heated sec-

tional debates over Kansas, the Republican presidential
campaign of that
year, the Sumner-Brooks affair, and the impending
115
Dred Scott decision.

All these factors, no doubt, tended to irritate the south's
sense of

security.

Wish does not, however, cite the age old and often unfounded

fear that slaveholders held for their bond S people--at least in
Alabama.

Whites living in south-central Alabama feared being overwhelmed by an

ever-increasing black population.
Black Belt newspapers warned their readers to keep a watchful
eye for signs of discontent.
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The Dallas Gazette warned the male popu-

lation of Dallas county to perform patrol duty through all holidays.

Young men, the editorial advised, ought to consider forming a "detective

police" to ascertain if any "vile emissaries have been tampering with
our slaves.

night."

Patrols should be out all the time--at every hour day and

Officials were told to enforce strictly all patrol statutes.
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These injunctions, similar to the one noted earlier prohibiting slaves
from buying whiskey, reflected that recurrent and general southern view
that attributed all slave dissension, whether real or imagined,

siders,

to abolitionist incendiaries tampering with bondsmen.

it seems,

to ou(
S

-

lavemasters,

could not admit that slaves might possess the intelligence and

determination to struggle against their condition.

To admit as much
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openly would be conf Nation of the
Garrisonian attack upon the "southern
way of life." Therefore, the ideology of
the slave south-the positive
good of slavery for whites and blacks-was
based on a necessary selfdeception.

Throughout December 1856, conspiracy panics
continued to rock
central Alabama.

A planter in Autauga County declared that one local

plot involved "many hundreds of negroes," and that
"the instigators of
the insurrection were found to be "northern
incendiaries."

Advertiser of December

13 claimed,

The Montgomery

"We have found out a deep laid plan

among the negroes, it is general all over the County."

J.

J. Hooper,

editor of the Montgomery Mail, believed the numerous reports of
rebellion
schemes extending over such a wide area which "indicated that these plots

had been instigated by an organized band of Abolitionist emissaries.

1,118

The Tuskeegee Republican, in the eastern Black Belt, called upon the
General Assembly to implement the following recommendations:

a complete

abolition of "negro preaching; prohibition upon blacks slave or free
from engaging in any and all business transactions; prohibition on blacks
living alone without supervision."
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Slavemasters, one could say, pro-

bably felt that they had a "tiger by the tail" which they dared not let
go of.

Sumter County suffered a severe rebellion fright at this time.
In the central county the patrol interrogated a female slave who described
a massive plot against whites during Christmas 1856.

After a series of

investigations, about thirty bondsmen were arrested and upon questioning
--so it was alleged--conf irmed that a general outbreak involving five
to six hundred slaves was planned for Christmas day.

Every white in the
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area was to be executed.

Bugle blasts would signal the start;
guns would

be provided, and slaves in other parts
of the county were also implicated.

Slave patrols were then alerted throughout
the county, and suspected
slave ringleaders were jailed.
or ten pistols."

A search of their cabins revealed "eight

Moreover, a loaded pistol was found on the
"person

of one of them who denied to the last bitter
end" that he was involved.

The patrollers were praised for their diligency by
the county newspaper

which editorialized, "there is now a large patrol force
in active service
throughout the county and every man is on his guard." 120

Because of these threats, some newspaper editors again called for
prudence concerning slave importations.

A resolution to reopen the African

slave trade, it was noted, had been rejected in Congress with southerners

supporting the rejection.
declared,

Recent events proved, the Tuskeegee Republican

"that it is not considered safe to increase our slaves faster

than they will increase by natural means." 121

However, because of the

Kansas agitation and the continual rise in the popularity of restrictionism
in the north, as well as the persistent concentration of the ownership

of slaves in a few hands, some Black Belt editors, by 1858, came out for
the reopening of the African slave trade.

After the December 1856 scares the Black Belt and adjoining counties
demanded that slave patrols examine all strangers in the community.
Clarke County the patrollers caught a bondsman without a pass.

In

They were

about to kill him when the fugitive produced a knife, stabbed two members
of the patrol, and then made his escape.
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The consternation of some

militiamen was demonstrated in another part of the Black Belt when they
came upon a runaway who also bolted.

But one of the patrollers, without
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a warning,
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"gave him a mortal wound with his
rifle."

Another Black

Belt escapee, allegedly enticed into
absconding by a "northern man,"

was seized and confined.

himself.

Before his owner arrived, the bondsman
hung

Blame was placed upon "the northern man
who well deserves the

fate of the negro."

Then, the account cautioned,

"Southern masters cannot

be too much on the alert when these slippery
gentry are in the vicinity.
...Too much vigilance cannot be exercised to
prevent the recurrence of

such crimes.
In Washington County,

in the summer of 1857 a slave patrol pursued

two runaways into the swamps of adjoining Clarke County.

A fierce fight

took place— "Guns, pistols, knives, and clubs were freely used on
both

sides," before the rebels were overpowered.

The Clarke county Democra t

acidly concluded "Considering the high audacity of these runaways we
almost wish they had all been killed in the battle." 125

While such acts of defiance were occurring, Coosa County's press

campaigned against "negro preaching" in the region.
S pectator

The Wetumpka

wanted all black ministers outlawed because they excited "the

nature of the congregation, the whole mass soon moved by the devil rather
than the prince of peace."

The specter of Nat Turner was summoned up as

a contemptible example of black sermonizing.

Potentially dangerous,

as well, was the habit of "those negro crowds assembling around the meeting

house doors sabbath evening, they should be dispersed by the Marshal."
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Conversely, the Wetumpka D ispatch declared it was through Christianity
that blacks learned submissiveness

.

Black preachers should be encouraged

to "bring in the vicious class of negroes."

W. H. Henson,

editor of

the Dispatch, asked slaveowners to "give our negroes gospel light and

strengthen the influence of the good and
they will thwart the purposes
of the bad." 127

The Spectator replied that in the Black
Belt "negro

preachers were the principles in insurrectionary
movements among the
slaves."

Editor E. L. Mason called "negro preaching
in our community

an evil," and citizens in the County agreed
with him:
administer to slaves and halt all negro preaching."

"Let white masters

At one meeting of

the County's planters and farmers, a resolution
was passed that instructed

their state representative to introduce a bill
prohibiting all black
100

ministering in Alabama.
These fears of Black Belt whites concerning "Negro preaching"
are
confirmed by Alabama ex-slaves who recounted their impressions of
bondage
for the W. P. A. Slr.ve Narratives

.

For example,

Sidney Bonner, a former

slave who toiled on a Dallas County plantation, recalled "Some of de

niggers want to have dere own meetings .. .dem niggers get happy and get
to shoutin 'all over de meadow.

we was risen."

.

.Mas sa John quick put a stop to dat fearful

Cato Carter, who lived on a Montgomery County estate in

the 1850's, told how the slaves' religion was often prohibited and prac-

ticed secretly.

This,

in turn,

increased the apprehension of slavemasters

who usually grew more fearful when bondspeople exhibited cohesion.

Slave-

owner anxiety as to what transpired at private black religious meetings

was well founded.

The prayers of slaves were focused upon freedom.

Alice Sewell, born on a Black Belt plantation in 1850, remembered that
"we used to slip off in de woods... on Sur.^.y evening way down in de swamps

....We prayed for dis day of freedom.

We prayed together to God dat if

we don't live to see it, please let our chillen live to see a better

day and be free."

Mary Ella Grandsberry, born in 1846, told how irritated
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her owner would get when bondspeople
came together.

"Iffen we was caught

prayin to go to de free states... you got
one of the worst whippins of
your life."

Late at night in the cabins the slaves would
pray "for de

Lord to free dem like he did de chillen of
Israel/' recalled Mingo White

who spent his youth on a Wilcox County plantation.

If

'de marse or de

driver heard 'em de would come and start the whippin." 129

Thus, testi-

mony of former bondspeople verifies the suspicions of
the Weturapka
Spectator

:

religious practices of slaves did serve as yet another
form

of black resistance.
Pike County in October 1857 was shocked by a mass poisoning on

a plantation.

Thirty-seven people--family and friends— had been poisoned,

six fatally, by the Negro cook who was estranged from her master.

The

cook and a collaborator were taken from jail in collusion with the local
constable and burned alive.

Bruceville, where the incident took place,

was in turmoil for days, with town authorities examining all blacks about
the availability of poison in the slave community.
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At about the same time Richard E. Stewart, a Sumter County planter,

was slain by five of his slaves.
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A few weeks later, while tensions

were still high in the same County, two alleged agents of the underground
railroad were captured "in the very act of persuading some negroes to
leave for a free state."
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In early 1858 the Sumter County town of

Livingston found that a representative of De Bows Register and the New
Orleans Picayune held anti-slavery opinions.
views,

" J.

J. Hooper,

"Grant his right to his

editor of the Montgomery Mail asserted,

we deny the right of such sentiments here."

"however

Hooper demanded that the

New Orleans papers recall "this agent and in the future, employ trusted
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southern men to collect fro. slaveholders."

In reporting the affair,

Hooper reminded his readers to be
constantly on the "lookout for abolitionists in disguise." 133 Similarly
the

town of Selma in Dallas County

uncovered an "abolitionist" home economics
teacher who "on one or more
occasions... held conversations with slaves
well calculated to create a
spirit of insubordination and rebellion."

She was forced to leave the
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county and other communities were forewarned
about her.

These liber-

tarian infringements like the ones recounted earlier
in Barbour, Montgomery, and Mobile counties are another indication
that by the 1850'

Alabama had become a closed society.

Even before John Brown's raid, white

Alabamians responded to slave rebellion scares by tightening
their grip on bonds

men and reinforcing their faith in the institution of slavery.
The Assembly, bestirring itself, saw a remedy in closing all exits
to manumission.

A bill was introduced making

it unlawful to liberate

slaves by last will and testament, and declared all clauses or parts of
a will freeing slaves null and void; and it also voided any provision

providing for the removal of the slave of the deceased to a state or
country where slavery did not exist.

The proposition was tabled
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but

was later enacted on the eve of the Civil War.

Before 1858 the response of many Alabamians to slave importation

was that they might be overwhelmed by massive numbers of b]acks.
the 1850 's as observed earlier,

slave trade restriction.

In

important groups favored some kind of

By the late 1350's, however, violent and heated

arguments in favor of resurrecting the African slave trade were heard.
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These arguments were most frequently aired
at the annual meetings of
the Southern Commercial Convention.

In 1857,

for example, Alabama's

delegates at the Knoxville gathering voted with
six other southern
state delegations to ask their Congressional
representatives to abrogate
the 1808 prohibition of the African trade.

met in Montgomery, Alabama.

In May 1858 the Convention

The debates there revealed the growing im-

patience of the fire-eaters, those who favored secessionist
views, with
the non-secessionist attitudes in Alabama, and in the
south generally,

on the issue of southern rights.
In 1857 Judge Z. L. Nabers introduced a resolution in the Alabama

legislature emphasizing the need and advantages of reopening the slave
trade, not the least of which was building a consensus for secession. 136

William L. Yancey, Alabama's best known agitator, had been silent on the
issue prior to the Montgomery convention.

But in 1858 Yancey led the

campaign that favored resumption of the international slave trade and
captained the Alabama delegation to the 1858 Southern Commercial Convention,
The Montgomery Confederatio n, a unionist paper, observed as the

convention got under way:

"Every form and shape of political malcontent

was there present, ready to assent in any project having for its end a

dissolution of the union, immediate, unconditional, final."
assessment is not entirely accurate.
was present.

It
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This

is true a band of disunionists

They were determined to agitate all issues to embarrass

southern unionists and moderates in the Democratic party.

But to say

that the entire conclave was a disunionist scheme misses the mark.

Alabama only Yancey, Percey Walker, and

Mobile) talked of secession.

Walker,

F.

B.

From

Shepart (the latter two of

like other opportunistic lawyer-
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politicians in the state, was a small
slaveowner and changed his party

affiliation often.
a Democrat.
L. W.

F. B.

He was a Whig, then a Know-Nothing,
and, by 1859,
138
Shepard's party loyalty was equally
capricious.

Spratt of South Carolina was the chief
advocate of a revival

of the African trade at the Montgomery Convention
and presented a resolution in its favor.

Yancey rose in support and indicated that the
im-

portation of hundreds of thousands of Africans would offset
the flow of
labor from Europe to the North.

Such an increase would make slavery

more secure in the southern states and augment their voting
strength
in Congress.

A large increase in the number of slaves, Yancy said, would

mean a decline in price and more people could enjoy the "blessings" derived from bondage.

"If you increase the number of slave owners you

increase the basis of the institution."

Why should he pay Virginia

slavetraders $1500 for a slave, Yancey asked, when he could get them
in Cuba for $600 or from West Africa for one-sixth that sum.

Finally,

he emphasized, before passage of a law in 1808 the Constitution guaranteed

slavery by forbidding Congress to interfere with it.

The 1808 law was

unconstitutional because it discriminated against the south. 139

Yancey was countered by Roger A. Pryor, editor of the Richmond
Enquirer, and by two Alabama delegates.

Robert G. Scott, a national

Democrat from Madison County, an Alabama area of moderate slave density,
held that the ordinance prohibiting the slave trade was constitutional.
It derived from the power of Congress to regulate commerce with foreign

nations:

"Such had been the opinion of the framers of the constitution

...and also of John C. Calhoun who was a member of Monroe's cabinet when
the act of 1820 was passed declaring the slave trade to be piracy."
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Former Whig party leader Henry W.
Hilliard,
the same position.

from Montgomery county, took

From the beginning of the controversy
over slavery,

Billiard had been Yancey's most ardent
antagonist.

Since 1846 they had

engaged in numerous and bitter encounters
at times almost bordering on
violence.

Now, at the Commercial Convention, Hilliard
asserted that

Congress had the power to halt the African slave
trade through the com-

merce clause.

Gazing at Yancey, he predicted that if Spratt's
pro-trade

recommendation were adopted,

it

would be an invitation to every fanatic,

to everyone opposed to the institutions of the south,

view to overthrowing those institutions.

to agitate with a

Furthermore, Hilliard, an

ordained Methodist minister, still had a great respect for the
opinions
of the Christian world and rejected a measure that would "outrage
the

moral sentiment of Christendom upon an impracticability."

resolve itself was finally tabled.

The Spratt

1/4

A month after the convention Yancey began to vacillate on the
slave-trade issue.

A reading of his remarks, he explained in one letter

to a supporter, would show that he did not call for a reopening:
I

"What

did recommend was simply the repeal of the laws of Congress making the

foreign trade in slaves piracy."

He confirmed his real intention which

was "to strip the Southern ship of state for battle."

1/9
f

Yancey had

taken the most controversial issue and used it to force Alabamians, indeed
all southerners,

to choose sides.

His purpose was not to assail the

north but to harass those in his section who were "soft on slavery."
Moreover, as in the late forties and early fifties, he was again making
a "grab" at controlling the state's Democratic party.
It

is difficult to discern how much support there was statewide
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for the reopening issue.

In Lawrence County in the highlands,
with a

moderate slave population, the Moulton Democrat
came out in favor of
resumption,

insisting that abolitionists were forcing
the issue.

Mobile Mercury, was a lowland circulation, also
desired renewal.

The
J.

j.

Hooper's Montgomery Mail, in the heart of the slave
dense Black Belt,
agreed.

The Dallas Gazette called upon slaveholders to
disregard all

federal laws prohibiting the slave trade and to commence
importing slaves
from Africa.

This approach, said editor

the southern states.

C.

E.^Haynes, would unite all

But the Montgomery Confederation condemned the

whole project, calling it a fantasy devised by demagogues.

The Clarke

county Democrat also criticized the Southern Commercial Convention as
"a political debating club."

The trade would be resumed only at the ex-

pense of the union, it declared, and "the convention was not called to

dissolve the union, and we regard it as irrelevant, impolitic and even
unfortunate to discuss questions which can result in no good to the
South in the union."
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The Tuskeegee Republican by 1859 had reversed

its position on the slave trade.

Seeing the issue in class terms, this

Black Belt paper complained that slave ownership was getting to be a
monopoly of the large planters.

Wealthy planters, an editorial complained,

opposed reopening because it would "reduce the value of their negroes."
If this situation continued,

it warned,

then the future of the south would

be in doubt, because there "will no longer by any hope of a laboring man

ever possessing a slave.... The very existence of the South depends upon
the reopening of the slave trade."
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The Republican 's assessment of the concentration of slave ownership

was correct.

Alabama, according to the 1860 census, had 435,080 slaves;
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126,833 or 29 percent were owned by big
planters who by 1859 avera ed
8
84 slaves apiece.

Nor more than 25 percent of Alabama's
white popula-

tion in 1860 held slaves.
of slaves rose.

Moreover, throughout the 1850's the price

In northwest Alabama male slaves ranged
from $1035 to

$1450; women from $1250 to $1550.

from $1600 to $1800.

In the Black Belt field hands brought

This caused one editor to remark that "negroes

will sell beyond any other property."

In Clarke County the "average"

slave under 45 was selling for more than $1100,-1 ^ 5
Not only did the planter class have a greater percentage of
the

slaves but also much of the best land.

In the Black Belt counties two-

thirds of all acreage was held by 17 percent of the cultivators and
was

incorporated into plantations of 500 acres or more.
not merely more valuable land.

The planter possessed

A study of some of the most productive

counties shows that the land of those owning 50 acres or less was worth
$7.20 an acre, while that of planters who owned more than 2000 acres

was worth $29.50 per acre.

Furthermore, in a more recent study of the

Black Belt, it was found that the land of plantation owners was considerably more valuable because, by virtue of slave labor, it was better cultivated.

By the end of the 1850's however, there was a shift in the

wealth distribution of the Black Belt in favor of the "upper-middle deciles
at the expense [relatively] of both the richest and poorest groups."

Accordingly, the shift "seems to have had more to do with slaves and
slave value than with ownership of land... .The slave cotton regime in

Alabama was a highly unequal distribution of wealth."
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Interestingly,

it would be the "middle class" planter who owned 20 to 50 slaves who

avidly supported secession.

They deemed a Southern Confederacy as the
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only means of acquiring more land and
slaves.
According to the 1860 census, the total
wealth of Alabama was

$792,274,199 and the total wealth of large planters
was $222,600,997.
By the end of the fifties, the great
planters-those owning more than
50 slaves-possessed 28.19 percent of the declared
wealth of the state

—$140,371.51 per large planter.

Per capita wealth of major planter

families was $26,927, while the per capita wealth of
the average white

Alabamian in 1859 was $1,497.

Thus,

the big planters held 30 percent

of the state's slaves and owned more than 30 percent
of the real estate.

They commanded 28.1 percent of the total wealth of Alabama,
while com-

prising less than one-third of one percent of the state's total white
population.
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The graph below indicates the growth of slaveholding,

especially of large planters from 1850-1860.

Alabama in 1860 was 964,041.

1

The white population of

L9,
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24

10
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According to the 1860 census, Alabama ranked third in slave population in the cotton south.

was black.

By then 44 percent of the state's population

Slaves were concentrated in a few counties of the northwest

and the Tennessee Valley and the vast majority were in the Black Belt
--75 percent lived in ten Black Belt counties.

The number of slaves

in several Black Belt counties far exceeded the white population.

Eleven

of these counties in I860 produced 590,544 bales or six-tenths of the
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state's cotton crop. 149

Some of these counties vere hotbeds
of southern

nationalism during the crisis of 1860.
By mid 1859 some Alabamians began to engage
in the African slave
trade.

A correspondent saw "twenty-five or thirty
Africans pass through

Montgomery on their way down river." The reporter
defiantly added that
the bondsmen had been introduced into this country
"in spite of the cruisers

of both Uncle Sam and John Bull."

He had no doubt "that more will follow

suit.... This is a practical reopening of the slave trade
in spite of
Greeley and Co." 150 Several months later the Mobile Mercury
cheerfully

passed on a bit of gossip:

"We heard a gentleman who is up to snuff say

that another cargo of Africans had been landed upon our Gulf Coast." 151

Those who favored restriction of slave importations were now silent,
but this did not signify that the chronic fears Alabamians had of bondspeople had abated.

Many whites, especially those living in the east-central regions
of Alabama, felt that slavery had to expand.

Slaveowners should be able

to move their "property" westward and southward.

Few slavemasters,

moreover, wanted a growing black population confined to the narrow central slave belt in Alabama.

Slavery had to have room to spread if racial

control was to be maintained.
Thus, with a slave population approaching a half-million and the

Republican party demanding that slavery be confined to "its present limits,"

Alabama moved again to prevent the erosion of racial domination.

Between

1857 and 1859 the General Assembly acted to strengthen old slave codes

and approve new ones.

A statute was passed to prevent "unauthorized

individuals" from associating and illegally trafficking with slaves.
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A new law prohibited the slae of
liquor to slaves by river
boatmen.
Hoping to prevent the congregation

of bondspeople during
leisure hours,

another new measure made gambling
152
illegal.
slaves,

Anxious to manage their

finding black unrest frightening
and inexplicable, whites once

more focused upon the perennial "trouble
maker," the free-black.
It was inconsistent

for the south to oppose abolition
and at the

same time to permit free-b lacks-there
were only 2690 freedmen in Alabama
in

1859-to remain in the state.

I ndep endent

Thus a new viewpoint emerged.

The

Monitor of Tuscaloosa stated that freed
men should be forced

to leave Alabama or become re-enslaved,

"it was true that some of them

behaved well," admitted an editorial, "but even
the best of them were
in a constant, danger; because they could read
and write they were In a

position to poison the ears of slaves with the teachings
of abolitionists." 153
Sumter County's Gainsville Independent insisted that
free blacks were

an easy prey for "abolitionist emissaries":

to permit them to remain

in a slave state was nothing more "than sickly sentimentality." 154

The

Southern Advocate called free blacks "not only a nuisance but a loathsome pest."

An editorial asked the legislature to take severe measures

to check the "morbid growth of free niggerdom."

be forced to leave Alabama.

All freedmen were to

If all the slave states did this,

north would be overrun with blacks, much to their disgust.

then the

"We suggest

that the Alabama legislature at its next session pass a law forbidding

the residence of free negroes in the state... all other cotton states

will soon fo) low.

.

.

.By this course the South will add negro paupers to

the whites of the north, and thus inflict an everlasting curse upon all

intermeddlers with Southern slavery."
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.
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At its 1859 meeting the General
Assembly did not go as far as
Th e Southern Advocate desired.

It passed two measures:

One declared

void all wills which emancipated slaves
either directly or indirectly
and it also prohibited the removal of
slaves from Alabama for the pur-

pose of freeing them.

It

further provided that any freedman might volun-
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tarily select a master and return to the status
of slave

On the eve of John Brown's raid on Harpers Ferry,
an event that

would deepen southern fear of blacks as never before,
Alabama was still

wrestling with the chronic problem of slave control.

From Brown's "trauma"

through Lincoln's election the question of slave conduct and
white do-

mination would become inextricably joined with the politics of southern
rights.

CHAPTER

II

PARTY POLITICS IN ALABAMA,
1819-1845:

AN OVERVIEW

Fear of black rebellion was not
the only factor determining
secession sentiment. Political
factionalism and opportunism also
contributed
to disunionism.

Politics was another avenue of mobility
for the aspir-

ing lawyer-planter who came to
direct the state's destiny.

Those who

ran for office would either wait for
issues to arise or manufacture them

-even

at the expense of party unity.

turnover in office on the local level.

In this respect there was a vast

For example, many who were elected

to the legislature from 1850 to 1860 served
only one term.

1

This rota-

tion in office reflects a developing society
of restless status-seeking

opportunists.

Of course, there were those who claimed to
stand on the

high ground of principle, i.e., southern rights,
never wavering regardless of shifting political winds.

However, many Alabama politicians

habitually readjusted their southernism to changing public
sentiment.

When the slogan of southern rights was in ascendency, they would be
among
the most volatile southern nationalists, until unionist feeling
predo-

minated.

Moreover, many of these aspiring lawyer-politicians changed

their political affiliations with regularity.

Comprehension of the

history of party politics in Alabama will, it follows, illustrate an
important aspect of the secession movement.

Alabama achieved statehood in 1819.

Her constitution gave poli-

tical control of both state and county government to white males of

Alabama.

All adult white males who met a residence requirement of one

year in the state could vote or hold office; all property, tax-paying,
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and militia requirements were
abolished,

with the exception of the

judiciary, state and county offices
were made elective, and until 1842
the federal three-fifths ratio
was used for representation in
the state
legislature.

annually.

Elections and sessions of the legislature
were to be held

Members of the House of Representatives
served one-year terms,

and members of the Senate served for
three years.

By 1830 elections

and sessions were made biennial;
Congressmen served two-year terns and

Senators by 1845 served a four-year tenure.

cations for holding office existed.

No property or tax qualifi-

Both Senators and Representatives

were required to be white males, citizens of the
United States, and residents of the state for two years and of the county or
district for one
year.

Representatives had to be at least twenty-one years old and
Senators

twenty-seven.

The Constitution required periodic reapportionment of

the legislature.

2

The powers of the governor were limited.

Although he was given

the authority to grant pardons and reprieves, to issue proclamations,
to make interim appointments, and to command the militia, many of the

powers normally associated with the executive were in the hands of the
legislature.

Appointment of the Secretary of State, State Treasurer,

Comptroller of Public Accounts, and high-ranking militia officers was
reserved for the Assembly.

The governor was given the power to hold

up unfavorable legislation, but his veto was merely suspensive; the

legislature could override him by a simple majority of both Houses.

All of Alabama's governors, except Joshua Martin (1845-1847) and Reuben
Chapman (1847-1849), served second terms.

3

The majority of local officials were popularly elected.

Alabama's
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constitution provided that the commissioners
of revenue and roads,
sheriffs, county clerks, justices of the
peace, and constables be chosen

by the electorate rather than by
elected officials.

elected by the legislature until 1850.

County judges were

Because of the diffusion of po-

litical power, some chroniclers of ante-bellum
Alabama contended that
the masses of yeomanry had sufficient strength
to prevent passage of

legislation hostile to their interests.^

Although these nonslaveholders had such power, they
did little
to improve their socio-economic position.

In point of fact, most of

the nonslaveholding farmers in the Black Belt Owned the
less fertile,
less valuable plots.

The reason they never used their numbers politi-

cally to ease their lot was two-fold.

Nonslaveholding whites were per-

suaded that although they were of low status they still shared with their

betters the high rank of color--beneath them were black bondspeople.
Any movement which attacked economic arrangements could possibly destroy
slavery, thereby making poor whites and blacks socio-economic equals.

White Alabamians had a stake in maintaining the slave color line.

South

Alabama yeomen themselves dreamed of becoming slaveowners, the symbol
of upward mobility.

Nevertheless, it was always politically shrewd to

express anti-aristocratic sentiments and to show an acceptably egalitarian
spirit no matter what one's economic and social inclinations.

Willis Brewer cites the 1845 congressional contest between
Dargen and William

D.

E.

S.

Dunn as an outstanding example of the political

application of the "egalitarian spirit."

Washington county in their stumping tour.

i'he

two candidates had reached

When the public addresses

were over, a Colonel Prince, the wealthiest man in the vicinity, spoke
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to Dunn.

•'You

are going to be beaten," he
remarked.

asked Dunn; "didn't you write me
that

I

me,

that?"

was the strongest man in the

district and haven't we a majority
in it?"
looking furtively around,

Ws

"i know that," replied Prince,

"but here you are walking off
to dinner with

the richest man in the county,
and there sits Dargen in that
crowd

of one-gallows fellows,
Dargen. was elected.

pjLcJcing,

the ticks off his legs,

"

As predicted,

5

The history of party politics in Alabama
begins with two organizations confronting each other in 1819.

There was "the Georgia Machine,"

made up of a number of transplanted Georgia
planters and farmers who,

according to the Huntsville Democrat, "evinced
a determination to monopolize all power and to fill every office with their
own creatures."

They were challenged by the "North Carolina Machine."

Israel Pickens of

North Carolina, formerly of the Georgia faction, led
migrated North
Carolinians and others seeking power at the expense of the
Georgians.

Both cliques fought over patronage, bank charters, and elective
offices.

By 1825 the Pickens group controlled the state. 6
Most Alabamians supported Andrew Jackson in 1824.
ties voted against him.

Only three coun-

During the Jackson period political leadership

fell to planter- lawyer types like William R. King of Dallas County.

Becoming one of Alabama's first federal Senators, King held office from
1819 until 1844, when he was appointed minister to France.
in 1849, he was again selected for a four-year term.

Returning

He was the vice-

presidential nominee on the Pierce ticket in 1852 but died before officially taking office.

King always strove for a balance between southern-

rights and unionist opinion.

Considered Mr. Establishment by local and
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national party men, he owned two
plantations, covering over 1100
acres
of land, and 16 7 slaves at the time
of his death.

7

King's chief rival within the Democratic
party was Dixon Hall
Lewis.

In 1826 Lewis was elected to
represent Montgomery city in the

state legislature.

He served three years and in 1829 ran
successfully

for Congress from the Black-Belt third
district.

Remaining a Congress-

man for fourteen years, until 1844, he was then
appointed by Governor

Benjamin Fitzpatrick, his brother-in-law, to fill out
the unexpired term
of William R. King. 8

Another important Democratic leader was Hugh McVay a Party
manager
from North Alabama.

He sat in the Alabama territorial legislature from

1811 to 1818 and was then elected in 1820-1825 to the lower House of
the Assembly from Madison county, serving for five years.

he served nineteen years in the state senate.

After 1825

McVay controlled much

of the state patronage funneled into the hill counties of the Tennessee
Valley,

9

and belonged to that inner-circle of party regulars who con-

trolled the federal senate seats.
James Abercrombie, a planter- lawyer from central Alabama, wielded

influence in his region.

He took up residence in Montgomery County in

1819, he represented his district in the Assembly from 1820 to 1822, and

was elected to the state Senate in 1825, 1828, and 1831.

In 1834 he re-

moved to Russell County where he won election to the state House of Representatives.

He broke with the Democratic party two years later over

the candidacy of Martin Van Buren and allied himself with the Whigs.

Russell County had a heavy Whig plurality by 1836, which no doubt helped

determine Abercrombie

1

s

decision.

At times he dominated the Black Belt's
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Whigs.

Between 1851 and 1855 he won terms to the
federal Congress. 10
Established planter -lawyer politicians-men
familiar to state

voters from territorial days-did not exert
complete control over the
state.

Throughout Alabama's formative period, "new men"
came and

settled.

Having little economic substance, many arrived
as youthful

attorneys and ran for political office after establishing
residence.
Some attained both financial and political success and
challenged the

authority of the party leaders, or they co-operated and became part
of
the stewardship.

Clement Comer Clay exemplified this group.

After

achieving some success as a planter and publisher, he became a significant figure in the Democratic party in north Alabama.

He was selected

by party bosses in the legislature to the federal Senate in 1837 after
having served two terms in Congress.

Another, Reuben Chapman, moved

to north Alabama, became a lawyer and then a politician.

He was elected

to Congress from the upcountry sixth district and in the mid-forties

became governor.

Before his forced political retirement, he had become

a prominent real estate investor.

tained much welath but won

Moore was one.

Then there were those who never at-

some important political positions.

He became governor in the mid-thirties.

a federal Senator, was also prominent in this category.

Gabriel

John McKinley,
11

Before the

early thirties, then, those who entered politics were not initially divided
along ideological or party lines.

Most were opportunists who saw politics

as a means of enhancing their status or e?ne, like King's group, sought

and were used to preserve the status quo.
In the late 1820's Alabama's first major sectional dispute occurred.
It involved slavery and it fragmented the state.

North Alabama, an area
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of slight slave concentration (only
a few counties had soil
conducive
to cotton cultivation), voted in
favor of an 1826 referendum to
prohibit

the importation of slaves.

Most of the cotton counties of the Black

Belt and southern Alabama balloted in favor
of retaining the trade.

12

Henceforth, state sectionalism became a central
feature of Alabama politics.

This division was based on differences in
geography, topography,

and modes of agriculture:

the highland counties were more inclined to

small subsistence farming, while central Alabama was an
area of "black

silt" plantation agriculture.

The upper valley after 1824 could also be

counted on to give massive pluralities for the Democratic party.

Several

upcountry regions became known as the "avalanche counties" because of
their monolithic majorities for the Jacksonians.

Central and southern

Alabama, however, after the formation of the Whig party, was almost evenly

divided between Democrats and Whigs.
Stirrings of discontent with Jackson's party appeared in 1828.

An electoral ticket favorable to John Quincy Adams made its appearance.
Most of those on the ballot came from the Black Belt and the cotton counties in the Valley.

Planter-lawyer James Del let of Monroe County headed

He would be a leader of Alabama Whiggery during its early

the slate.

years and would serve two terms in Congress.

Other prominent men on

the list were Anderson Crenshaw, a planter from Butler County in south

Alabama who became a Whig manager in the south-central cotton areas,
and future anti-slavery advocate James G. "irney of Madison County.

Birney was elected mayor of Huntsville in the early 1820

's

but had to

leave the state because of his colonizing activities before the Whig
.

.

party organized.

13
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National issue, began to intrude upon
local questions after Jackson's initial victory. Manv in the
state opposed the doctrine of
nullification advocated by John C. Calhoun
and the state of South Carolina.

Gabriel Moore, who supported the 1828
tariff, was elected governor in
1829 without a contest.

A resolution which passed 46-16 in the
lower

House denounced the nullification ordinance.

Jackson then was supported

in his contest with South Carolina nullifies
by Alabama Democrats; but

the state party nevertheless had fragmented
on the issue.

Planter Demo-

crats, and there wa« a considerable planter element
in the Jackson party
in the Black Belt, were apprehensive about the
President's nationalism.

Indeed, there was a general uneasiness with the
"central Government's

federalizing tendencies across middle Alabama." 14

A faction of Calhoun Democrats emerged, initially led by James
A.

Calhoun of Dallas County, a nephew of the South Carolina nulllfier.

Born in Abbeville district of South Caroline, James Calhoun graduated
from South Caroliiia College in 1826, came to Alabama in the following
year, and had a long career in the state legislature.

he would appear as a nemesis to party regulars. 15

Like his uncle,

Boiling Mall, a planter

from Autauga County in the heart of the Black Belt, was also considered
an influential member of the states-rights splinter group; 16 so too was

Dixon Hall Lewis who came to dominate this faction.
Lewis,

from Montgomery County, was aware that important opinion

in his Black Belt district was hostile to

like William R. King and conversely,

strong.

T

nckson and to party managers

that nullification feeling was

Throughout Lewis' bailiwick, claimed the Mobile Register, there

was scarcely a village that had not been visited by some "emigrant from
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South Carolina inculcating the
heresy of nullification with
the zeal
of a fanatic and the perseverance
of a missionary." A nullification

meeting in Montgomery city proposed
the organization of a "states
Rights
and Free Trade Association." Lewis
himself attended an anti-Jack*
cson

gathering there and insisted that South
Carolina's cause" is "the cause
of the whole South.

liberty."

Her defeat would prove a death blow
to South,
iern

In 1829 he announced his candidacy for
Congress not as a

Jacksonian Democrat but as a nullification
states-rights Democrat.

He

carried his County by almost eighty percent,
defeating an opponent sup-

ported by the party regulars. 17

Significantly the most vocal protest against the tariff came
from

Black Belt areas of high slave density.
development in South Carolina.

William Freehling found a similar

Behind the nullification movement, he

discovered, was the fear that federal power, if unchecked, could one

day be employed to end slavery.

South Carolinian slave masters feared

that freed bondsmen would then turn the Palmetto state into another Haiti. 18

Alabamians living in similar surroundings may have been expressing the
same anxieties in their anti-tariff struggle.

During the nullification dispute, Alabama's Congressional dele-

gation was apprehensive over other forms of possible federal interference

with slavery.

When Kentucky's Henry Clay introduced his 1832 Land Dis-

tribution Bill, the public land committee, chaired by William

R.

King,

attacked the feature of Clay's measure providing that funds derived from
the sale of public lands be used to underwrite colonization.

King main-

tained that colonization was a "delicate question connected indissolubly

with the slave question."

He added that it was sure to rekindle the
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"fires of the extinguished conflagration
which lately blazed in the

Missouri question."

When the bill came before the House, Clement
Clay,

King's Alabama colleague, predicted that those who
accepted colonization

would eventually accept abolition and all its
"evils as necessary, nay
indispensable, to the general welfare." 19

While Alabama Democrats were colliding over nullification,
an

opposition party, the Whigs, emerged to compound their difficulties.
As Charles S. Sydnor has observed about the pre-Civil War south,

"ambi-

tious politicians were calculating their chances of advancement and were

throwing their influence to the party that held out the better prospects." 20
Consequently, some of these Alabama Whigs--especially those in east-central

Alabama--were not as interested in the Whig principles embodied by Henry
Clay's American system as they were in winning office and suppressing

anti-slavery agitation in the national Whig party.

Interestingly, many

of these eastern Black Belt Whigs were natives of South Carolina and

had been raised on the nullification doctrines so popular in the Palmetto
state.

Similarly, Democrats who lived in regions of Whig concentration,
such as west-central Alabama, where loyalty to the national Whig party

predominated, also trimmed their sails at the expense of national Democratic party principle.

Throughout slave dense east-central Alabama

there was little ideological distinction between the two parties.

were anti-Jackson.
Hall Lewis.

Witness,

for example,

Both

the political ascent of Dixon

He was keenly aware of the hostility to federal power among

his slave-holding east-central constituents and these Black Belt Whigs
and Democrats united to elect him to Congress for four successive terms,

beginning in 1829.

William L. Yancey, a rising young
lavyer-pub Usher

and Democrat from Levis' district,
considered Lewis as much a Whig
as
21
a Democrat.
Governor John Gayle, a Democrat
campaigning for re-elec-

tion in 1833, made a states-rights
appeal to east-central Black Belt

Whigs and Democrats (while privately supporting
Jackson in his struggle
against South Carolina) and won a resounding
victory.

A resident of

Greene County, a Black Belt constituency, he
was soon disputing the
federal government over the Creek Indian issue
in east-central Alabama.
He insisted on their absolute removal and found that
much of his support
came from states-rights Whigs of east-central Alabama.

fected to the Whigs.

Gayle later de-

22

The Whigs were a minority party during the 1830's.

Consequently,

coalition with disaffected Democrats became a standard tactic.

In 1835

a union of estranged Democrats and Whigs from south-east Alabama brought

election-day success to former Democrat Francis

S.

Lyon of Mobile in

his congressional campaign against the regular Democratic nominee. 23

A year later Senator Gabriel Moore, who sought a second term, did the
unforgivable and challenged William

R.

King for his seat.

the states-rights clique, he barely lost to King.

rejection, he then joined the Whigs.

intense pressure.

Upheld by

Smarting from the

Regular Democrats were now under

They held a slight majority in the General Assembly,

but found it difficult to enact their legislative program.

Indeed,

the

states-rights Whig-Democratic combination of state lawmakers was strong
enough to force through a resolution endorsing Hugh Lawson White for
president over Martin Van Buren.

24

After 1837 the Democratic leadership, fearful of losing its

.
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leverage, began efforts to win apostates back
to the fold.

friend of Van Buren, used this relationship
effectively.

King, a

He persuaded

the President to placate Dixon Hall Lewis and
James A. Calhoun, and both

agreed to cooperate with party regulars.

But there was still a residue

of eastern Black Belt Democrats who remained loyal
to neighboring Whigs.
25
To appease them the party leaders came out for strict
states rights.

By the end of the 1830' s, then, the Democratic party had consummated
an

uneasy alliance and confronted a formidable Whig antagonist.

Who were the Alabama Whigs?

Between 1836 and 1852, there was a

common saying there that where one found rich black soil, there one could
find a slave; where one found a slave, there one would find a bale of
cotton; and where one found a bale of cotton, there one would find a Whig.

Like many generalizations there was some truth to the observation.

How-

ever, recent scholarship has qualified the traditional notions of Alabama

Whiggery
To be sure, Whigs were powerful in the Black Belt; yet they had

"muscle" in other areas, indeed in every county.

Some of the largest

majorities given Whigs were polled in counties where there were few slaves
and conversely some of the heaviest pluralities gained by Democrats were
in regions of high slave density.

Therefore, previous scholarship not-

withstanding, Whig support was not based ;?lely on large-scale planters.

Covington and Madison counties illustrate this unexpected mix.

Covington,

with a slave population well under 50 percent, registered Whig majorities
in every presidential election except one.

Madison,

in the highlands,
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had a slave density over 50 percent
and gave Democrats huge victories
in every election.

two parties.

Central Alabama occasionally divided
between the

However, counties with a slave population
over fifty per-

cent of the total elected more Whigs than
Democrats to the legislature,

while more Democrats were elected from counties
whose slave populations
were less than 50 percent of the total. 27
Current research has also applied economic growth
theories to

voting behavior and party allegiance in ante-bellum
Alabama.
B. Alexander has concluded that

Thomas

in the economically more developed coun-

ties, those with the greater cash crop and the more eastern
commercial

contacts with the outside world, in short those counties more nearly in
the main streams of the national and world economy, Whig party appeals

were more attractive to all types of voters regardless of their personal
economic status.

It

is not that a planter with many slaves or an affluent

merchant was more likely to be a Whig than was a carpenter, or small
farmer or blacksmith; it is simply, Alexander asserts, that all these

men were more likely to be Whigs if they lived in well developed economic
communities rather than in frontier, or isolated, or more nearly selfsufficient communities.

28

Alexander's economic determinist argument for Whig partiality is
too simplistic.

He gives the impression that Alabama's ante-bellum

economy was dynamic, but a recent study by Robert Fogel and Stanley
Engerman offers a more realistic appraisal of the political economy of
the plantation south.

Although not specifically dealing with voting

motivation, both Fogel and Engerman conclude that the slave south de-
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veloped a highly capitalistic for, of
agriculture, and its economic behavior was as strongly motivated by the
profit motive as that of the north.
But cotton counties which had economic
intercourse with the outside world

were not similar to the progressive diversified
western economies of the
first half of the nineteenth century.

All profits were plowed back into

slaves and cotton, and there was little, if
any, economic variation. 29

By 1860 in Alabama there were 7,889 workers in
1,459 manufacturing plants
(most of them no more than shops) which together
had a capital invest-

ment of nine million dollars.
,

rxve employees.

The average "factory" had no more than

30, 31

A key factor for Whig support, unmentioned by Alexander, was opportunism.

Many Alabamians became Whigs because they felt their political

or economic ambitions were hindered by a Democratic Party top heavy with

chiefs and aspiring, restless subordinates.

The Whigs welcomed frustrated

Democrats and political neophytes into their ranks.

Significantly, the

Black Belt, a newly settled area, showed greater Whig influence.

North

Alabama, which was colonized first, had long been controlled by the Democratic party.

Its leaders were not about the share party leadership

with late comers from the south.

The mere longevity of the Democratic

party invited the suspicion that its members had become corrupted by

one-party rule.

Whigs effectively used this issue in their campaigns.

Moreover to many who voted for the Whigs in the eastern Black Belt the
Democrats were not sufficiently dogmatic on slavery.

It

was thought that

most upstate Democratic counties having srall black populations would
not stand firm on all questions involving slavery.

Understandably, then,

there were more southern-rights Whigs in east-central Alabama.

However,
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by the early 1840's many west-central
Alabamians came to support the

nationalist principles of the Whig party.

They formed a significant

Unionist faction when the slavery-territorial
debate peaked in 1846.

A modern statistical analysis of the status of Whigs and
Democrats
in the 1840's has also modified the orthodox view
of Alabama Whiggery.

Occupationally, the same percentage of identified Whigs
and Democrats

were artisans and farmers or planters.

Indeed,

there was a slightly

higher percentage of lawyers among the Democrats, and a higher
percentage
of farmers and planters among the Whigs.

More Whigs than Democrats were

merchants in those Black Belt counties that were studied; while Democrats
held a small edge among the professional and 'white-collar" classes.
In terms of real estate,

through the 1840's both parties shared equally.

In the highest category,

$20,000 and above, 21 percent of the Whigs and

27 percent of the Democrats were found.

But in the $10,000 to $20,000

level, Whigs made up 20 percent and Democrats 16 percent.

Slave owner-

ship, based on the census of 1840, also reflects these figures:

Whigs and Democrats Slaveholding
For Autauga,
Greene, Jefferson, Lowndes, Montgomery, and Tuscaloosa Counties 32
:

Percentage of Party Group

Number of Slaves Owned

Whigs (268)

100
50-99
20-49
10-19

Democrats (407)

3

7

12

11

22

1-9

27
21
28

23

None

9

21

Whig leadership came from every geographic region.

bellweather leaders, Arthur

F.

16

Two important

Hopkins and Nicholas Davis, were from
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north Alabama.

Hopkins, a Madison County attorney,
served two terms

in the legislature and in 1837 was
elected by the Assembly to the
United

States Senate, reflecting the state's
anti-Van Buren feeling in both
parties.

Hopkins' colleague, Nicholas Davis, a
planter-lawyer from

Limestone County, was elected consistently in
the 1840' s and fifties
to the state senate and served as president
of the senate five times. 33
In central and south Alabama, Whig management
was in the hands of James

Dellet of Monroe County.

Born in Pennsylvania, he moved to Alabama in

1819, was elected to the legislature four times and represented
the first

Congressional district in Washington in 1839 and 1843. 34

c.

C.

Langdon

of Mobile, editor of the Mobile Advertiser, was also a power
among Whigs
in the southern part: of Alabama, having migrated there from
Connecticut

in 1825.

He was elected mayor of Mobile in 1849 and, except for one

term, succeeded himself until 1855. 35

Another important Whig manager

was lawyer and Methodist minister Henry Hilliard.

In 1845 he became

the first Whig to be elected to Congress from the Montgomery district,

and in the late 1840

's

and early fifties he became spokesman for planter

Whig conservatism in the central Black Belt.
The Congressional elections of 1839 saw the Whigs dispute the

Democrats in most districts.

Both parties in the late 1830 's fought

over state banks and money problems.
1839 state elections.

These were prime issues in the

A focal point of the debate was the specie issue.

Whigs condemned Democratic financial policies which required collection
of all public monies in coin.

36

The Democrats did not stump against

Reuben Chapman from the "avalanche" sixth district.

Dixon Hall Lewis

^
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also received a "free ride."

Lewis was still popular with Black
Belt

Whigs in the eastern part of his "fief,"
and also had sufficient strength
in the central Democratic counties. 37

Nevertheless, Alabama experienced

its first major clash of parties in this year.

The Whigs von Tuscaloosa-

Greensboro and Mobile districts, the fourth and first,
respectively, as
George W. Crabb and James Dellet defeated their
Democratic opponents
by close margins.

Crabb' s victory in no small measure was due to Whig

pluralities in the Black Belt counties of his section.

Dellet's success

confirmed most opinion that the "first" would go Whig. 38

The Democrats

won in the two northern districts and the Whigs in the two south-central
regions.

Thus, on the eve of the 1840 presidential campaign, Whig strength

was established in the Mobile and Tuscaloosa districts and steadily in-

creasing in the Montgomery precincts of Dixon Hall Lewis.

After 1839 Montgomery district Whigs were piqued at Lewis for

his open support of Van Buren and were planning to run

him in 1841.

In 1840, however,

a candidate against

in state and local elections, a more

immediate test of political power was forthcoming.

The composition of

the General Assembly was at stake, and it was the key to future Whig

success.

If Whigs could capture a majority in the state legislature,

then Whiggery would control spoils and patronage for at least two years.

And if they could carry Alabama for William H. Harrison, then they would

have a mandate to take the "sacred" senate seat of William

R.

King.

39

Virginian John Tyler, Harrison's running mate, was especially popular
because of his reputation as a states-rights advocate and his long public
defense of slavery.

—
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Each party charged the other with being "soft
on slavery" during
the presidential canvass.

A Democratic paper claimed that Harrison had

favored "the whole of the surplus revenue appropriated
for emancipation"
and that he could see "no constitutional objection
to its being thus applied.

Harrison was also accused of "playing a double game to catch the
votes
of the abolitionists of the north and the slaveholders of the
south.

1,41

Harrison's alleged association with abolitionists cost him ballots in
/

some Black Belt precincts.

*"

2

East-central WW. g newspapers insisted that Van Buren opposed the

extension of slavery into new states or territories, and that he stood

with the "Missouri restrictionists in 1819."

Van Buren, one editorial

asserted, believed Congress had the constitutional authority to abolish

slavery in the District of Columbia.

Both parties proclaimed themselves

to be Alabama's only bulwark against the "abolitionist reptile."

By the spring of 1840 the press campaign had almost become a shooting war.

Whig editor Charles

C.

Langdon of the Mobile Advertiser was

so disturbed over the mysterious death of a fellow Whig that he and a

large number of his followers charged into the office of the Democratic

Mobile Register and threatened to destroy the building.

The acting edi-

tor of the Register, H. Ballantyne, pulled out a pistol and forced langdon

and his crowd to leave the office.

44

The Assembly election results in early August raised Whig expectations.

Democrats retained a majority of only eight seats in the House

and seven in the Senate.

45

These figures encouraged the Whigs because

they had reduced the opposition's combined majority from forty-seven In
the previous legislature to fifteen.

"The Whigs of Alabama have done
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nobly in this election/' wrote the
Alabama Journal and "will give a good
account of themselves at the great battle
46
in November."

The post-elec-

tion meeting of Democrats in Tuscaloosa
resolved to appoint a vigilance

committee to watch the ballot boxes of every
precinct in November. 47

Although the Democrats held a plurality in the
Assembly, some party members
felt that the Whigs had used fraud to manipulate
the returns.

district Democrats were especially agitated.

Mobile

After the Whigs had carried

the "first" by a small majority, the Mobile Register
declared that the

"Democrats have done all that men could do against packed judges, false
tickets, powerful exertions and a free flow of money." 48
In the November election Van Buren garnered over sixty percent of
the vote in nineteen counties carrying the entire area above central

Alabama.

He compiled a majority of 5,711 out of 62,279 votes cast.

Most

counties of southern Alabama were strongly against Van Buren, except
Henry County which gave him a plurality of sixty-six; Washington County
gave Van Buren a miniscule majority of thirteen and Clarke County only
a 366 margin.

49

It

was the "avalanch" counties of the north, particularly

those of the north east, which gave him the state.

The northern hill

precincts were recognized by Democrats in the south as having determined
the outcome.

Alabama Beacon

"All hail we say to north Alabama!" exclaimed the Democratic
.

"She has again spoken from her vallies [sic] and moun-

tains, to the friends of Democracy in the South... we say--well done thou

good and faithful servant.

"^^

Fradulent voting practices were also discovered in this election.
Six counties had a total vote surpassing the number of eligible voters,
and the voter turnout percentage, ranging from 88 to 99 percent, was
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high enough to arouse suspicion in twelve
counties.

Of the six counties

with obvious irregularities, five were
carried by Whigs, and in the case
of the twelve suspect counties, eight had
a Democratic majority.

The

clearly fraudulent counties were Lawrence,
Barbour, Greene, Marengo,
Shelby, and Tuscaloosa; and except Lawrence they
were carried by Harrison.

51

The Democratic leadership was well aware that its
state-wide ma-

jority had been reduced to less than 55 percent. 52

After 1840 the Whigs

prevailed in the first and fourth districts.

Democrats feared that Mont-

gomery—the third district— would also become

a Whig bastion.

after all, took 65 percent of the third district vote.

Harrison,

Consequently,

a Dixon Hall Lewis defeat in 1841 would tip Alabama's Congressional balance
to the Whigs

(three Whigs to two Democrats).

reflective and calculating about his future.

Lewis, however, seemed rather
In a letter to Benjamin

Fitzpatrick, he poked fun at his colleague Senator Clement Clay whose term

was also up in 1841:

"The Judge [Clay] appears to be in a feeling of

intense anxiety in relation to the political prospects of the Democratic

Party in Alabama.

I

imagine his apprehension of Legislative instructions

flit before him in dreams by night and thus unsettle his nerves by day...."
Clay, he further stated,

looked forward to Fitzpatrick's gubernatorial

election because it would give "a strong spoke to the Democratic wheel
in the southern part of the state, which could roll him through a long

period of Senatorial service...."

Realistically assessing his prospects,

Lewis believed his Whig -Democratic coalition might be in jeopardy, and
that he might "prefer to back out and quit a life of continued turmoil

and agitation."

He would "suffer as much as Clay appears now to suffer
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until August only for the Presidency" and
he cautiously added, "I shall

without committing myself keep the game in my
own hands."

Returning

to Clement Clay, his favorite foil, Lewis
exposed cynical disregard for

national party principle by ridiculing Clay as
the "only rabid Democrat

we have here and that not because he has been bitten but
because he fears
he

may_.

He thinks the Whig maddog is snapping close to his
heels in

Alabama land

"

litical survival:

Concluding, he advised Fitzpatrick on the art of po"an opposition party ought to be [an] uncommitted

party, and thus to draw in the strength of every disaffected faction." 53

These judgments guided him not only in 1840-41, but all during his singular quest for high political office.

Alabama Democrats began to make "arrangements" to forestall the
dreaded Whig Congressional victories.

In the closing days of the 1840

legislative session the Democratic majority devised a plan of electing

representatives to Congress on a general ticket:

Congressional contests

would take place on a general state-wide ballot instead of by districts.
This scheme was the creation of William
in the Wetumka Ar gu s

,

L. Yancey,

among others.

Writing

he urged action that would enable Alabama to pre-

sent a united front, one which would uphold "the rights of the southern

states and of southern institutions against the fury of fanatics and the

federalizing tendencies of the times."

Yancey's home was in Coosa county

on the edge of the Black Belt, and he recognized what impact such a general
ticket would have on his neighborhood:

"In three districts out of five

[all Black Belt and southern counties] the Whigs have the power of elect-

ing a majority of Congressional representatives while actually a minority
in the State.

Thus, the State is misrepresented."

He meant, of course,
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that offices controlled by the Whigs
in south-central Alabama would
be-

come Democratic after the general ticket
5
passed. *

Another rationali-

zation for this obvious violation of the
Federal constitution was that
it could be used as a device to expose
those who were not

inclined to

defending slavery.
Democratic editors insisted that the times were
ominous for the
south, since the nationalist and abolitionist
strength of the next Congress

was of "great magnitude."

They urged southerners to elect only candi-

dates who would be firm in defense of southern institutions.

Governor

Bagby invoked similar arguments in recommending passage of the
general
ticket in his annual message to the legislature in the fall 1840. 55

The state, senate passed the bill by a party vote of nineteen to
twelve.

Only one Democrat --from Wilcox County, which was a Black Belt

Whig const ituency--voted against the act. 56

House debate was intense,

with the Whigs using every parliamentary tactic that was available.
They even left the chamber when the question was called, and the Democratic whip then ordered two Whigs who were officially ill-at-home brought
to the hall,

thus obtaining a quorum and forcing a ballot.

Whig repre-

sentatives rushed back to their desks at this point, but the measure

was passed.

57

"Outrage," cried the Whigs!

George W. Crabb, the Whig

congressional representative from the Tuscaloosa district whose seat

was now doomed, characterized the general ticket as a "specie [sic] of

modern ostracism concocted and recommended more with a view to serve the
selfish ends of a clique of would be party leaders. .than to promote the
.

welfare of the state....

58

John C. Calhoun, on a visit to Montgomery,

also condemned the ordinance.

59

81

Three southern congressional
districts were carried by the
Whigs
in 1841, but Alabama sent not
two but five Democrats to
Congress.
Dixon
Hall Lewis decided, after the
passage of the general ticket, to
"chance
a canvass."

His opponent Henry W. Hilliard
outpolled him by a wide mar-

gin, but Lewis was returned to
Washington.

On December 17,

1841, however,

six months before the federal
apportionment act of June 25, 1842 (which

provided that every state populous enough
to be entitled to more than
one representative must be divided by
state legislatures into districts),
the Alabama general ticket scheme was
abandoned.

Inspiration for nulli-

fying the general ticket was motivated by
a fear of federal intervention. 60
The Democrats then turned to another stratagem
on the advice of

Benjamin Fitzpatrick, Democratic chief from Autauga
County.

The Democra-

tic majority in the legislature proposed to
reconstruct the Congressional

districts following the 1840 census on the basis of the white
population
only.

Characteristically, William

L.

Yancey, while making his maiden

effort to obtain a legislative seat, favored the "white basis."

He in-

sisted that he represented the "great mass of the people versus the
aris-

tocracy" and that the federal ratio had committed to "the hands of a slaveholding minority [the Whigs in the Black Belt] the whole power of the
state.
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Yancey was thus launching his political career by attacking

the "slaveocracy, " the same class whose interests a few years later he

would defend with unparalleled vigor.
North Alabama would dominate the south-central sections under
this new scheme.

To prevent it, the Whigs hoped for support from Black

Belt Democrats, who would no longer be allowed to count three-fifths
of their slaves when representation was apportioned.

Despite what they
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would lose if the "white basis" went
into effect, the Democrats of
southern Alabama remained loyal to
their upcountry partisans. They
preferred a weakened Whiggery to equality
of representation with the

highland Democracy.

According to one unsubstantiated source,
an arrange-

ment was made between Black Belt Democrats
and party leaders in north
Alabama.

The former would furnish the guidance and
the north would pro-

vide the numbers, thereby giving the Democrats
control of the state. 63
The "white basis" bill divided Alabama into
seven congressional districts

according to the white population, with each district
having one representative.

To make the arrangement even more effective, many
Whig coun-

ties were gerrymandered into two Congressional districts.

The remaining

Whig counties were merged into the other five districts to
give additional
advantage to the Democrats. 6 ^
In seeking popular support for the "white basis," Democrats used

what had become their most persistent argument, namely, that the Whigs

were aristocrats and far too moderate on the slavery question.

Democratic

editors implied and avowed that the "Democracy is the only reliable defender of southern institutions."

their "southernism,

"

Whigs were reduced to a defense of

a defensive position that hurt them until their

expiration in 1853.
The "white basis" won House approval by a vote of forty-six to

thirty-eight.

Almost every northern county representative voted for it;

the opposition included all the Whigs and six Black Belt Democrats who

had significant Whig constituencies.

Voting was along sectional-party

lines in the upper house when it balloted fifteen to thirteen in favor

of the measure.
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A Whig committee in the House formally
protested:

The "white

basis" was in violation of the provisions
of the federal constitution.
Moreover, though not intending it, they
charged that the ordinance aided
and abetted abolitionism by reducing the
political leverage of the slave

holding regions.

Now, the petition exclaimed,

south Alabama would be

67
forever under the control of the northern
districts.

made no impression.

Their protest

In 1853, after several Whig victories in
the Black

Belt in 1851, the Democrats again moved against the
Whigs.

Under a new

gerrymander law, Montgomery, always a stronghold of Whiggery
despite
the "white basis," was shifted along with two other
Whig citadels, the

town of Wetumpka in Coosa County and Talladega County--from the
second
into the third Congressional district.
the Montgomery Whigs.

This shift absolutely neutralized

The effects of this law upon state Whiggery, to-

gether with the fragmentation of the national Whig party, encouraged many

Alabama Whigs to join other political movements, primarily the Know-Nothings,
in an effort to challenge the almost singular power of the Democrats.

The slave issue crippled Alabama Whigs since it discouraged them from

seeking a reversal in the federal courts:

Bringing the "white basis"

to judicial attention might have reopened another national slavery debate,

a prospect that neither section of the Union desired.
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From 1843 to 1860, with the Whigs functionally impaired in Alabama,
the most notable political struggles occurred within the Democratic party.

Factionalism ^ad existed since the 1820's.

Dixon Hall Lewis, had until

1841, been a fusion congressman in the Montgomery district.

knowledge that he also coveted William

R.

It

was common

King's senatorial seat.

while, William L. Yancey, who fancied Lewis's congressional chair,

Mean-

.

84

habitually accused him of being a Whig,

m

addition, in the late thirit: e!

and early forties, some Democrats
residing in Whig precincts saw that

political survival required a change of
party or catering to local Whig
sentiment

While wrangling over the "white basis"
continued, another contro-

versy further splintered the Democrats.

attack during the late 1830's.

The State Bank had come under

It was charged with favoritism and
graft.

Bank funds had been loaned to Whigs and Democrats
alike without adequate
security.

In addition to favoritism, assembly investigations
also re-

vealed sloppy business methods.

One of the Bank's leading critics was
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the eager William L. Yancey still editor of the Wetumpka
Argus
.

Yancey was joined by three other ambitious politicians:

John

Erwin, a lawyer-planter from Greene County; attorney John
A. Campbell

of Mobile; and youthful firebrand John Cochrane of Benton County.

These

Bank reformers supported Benjamin Fitzpatrick for Governor in 1841, and

Fitzpatrick identified himself with the anti-Bank forces.

Conversely,

a representative group of Democrats felt that the anti-Bank charges were

exaggerated.
Fitzpatrick'

They collaborated with the Whig party in 1841, supporting
s

opponent, former Democrat James W. McLung.

Interestingly,

these pro-Bank Democrats were led by Dixon Hall Lewis and Nathaniel Terry

of Limestone County.

Lewis, seeking to resurrect his former Whig-Democrat

coalition, joined Terry in calling upon Democrats to bolt and to support
McLung, the "independent Whig candidate

"^
.

Fitzpatrick defeated McLung decisvely and Yancey, Campbell, Erwin,
and Cochrane won election to the lower House.

control of the House.

The Bank reformers gained

They made Erwin speaker and appointed Campbell
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chairman of the committee on Banks.

Assembly for the next three years.

Bank debates dominated the General
It was,

as well, a contest between

John Cochrane and William Yancey as to
who would lead the radical force
:es
among the Bank redeemers.

Cochrane went so far as to condemn all
banks

as "commercial volcanoes, constantly
casting out their damning contents

--sweeping prosperity from our land and desolating

it of

virtue itself." 71

Whigs and pro-Bank Democrats opposed liquidation
of the State Bank
on the grounds that it would destroy business in
Alabama.

More to the

point, however, Terry and many of his friends had
made several loans from
the Bank over the years.

Bank debts.

Likewise, some of the Bank's enemies incurred

Yancey, for example, owed the Bank $599.00, and he was known

to be distressed financially. 72

As Democrats fought among themselves,

Fitzpatrick and some of the more moderate reformers became acutely aware
that continual friction could create an unbridgeable gap in the party.

Nevertheless, before Fitzpatrick left office, the branch banks were put
in liquidation; and the parent Bank's charter, which expired on January
1,

1845, was not renewed.

But pro-Bank men succeeded in passing a reso-

lution in favor of nonliquidat ion before Fitzpatrick's term ended. 73

Democrats in 1845 met in Tuscaloosa to choose a gubernatorial
nominee.

While anti-Bank delegates from the western counties were tem-

porarily delayed in Mobile because of flooding there, pro-Bank representatives controlled the convention and nominated Nathaniel Terry.

After

the convention, anti-Bank Democrats refused to accept Terry and supported

former Congressman Joshua L. Martin who had announced himself as a Bank

reform candidate.
Elated by this further victory against the Democrats, the Whigs
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did not nominate an opponent.

Terry, author of the infamous
general

ticket, was considered anathema to
some.

But most Whigs "held their

noses" and voted for Terry and the
Bank.

Martin triumphed, however,

compiling a 5000 plurality.

He won in the upcountry counties;
while

most precincts south of the Valley stood
by Terry.

Pro-Bank Democrats

never forgave Martin for his opposition and
he served only one term. 74
Meanwhile, Dixon Hall Lewis realized a cherished
goal when he was

appointed to William R. King's Senate seat.

The post became vacant when

John Tyler appointed King minister to France.

Governor Fitzpatrick did

not let the inner party machinations of his
brother-in-law--Dixon Hall

Lewis— disturb him when he designated Lewis

to King's post.

ment caused John Quincy Adams to record in his diary:

This appoint-

"twenty score of

flesh have been transferred from slumber in the House to sleep
in the
Senate.

He takes the place of William R. King, a gentle slavemonger,

called by [Andrew] Jackson 'Miss Nancy'..." 75

Selected by the third

district Democratic Convention, Yancey campaigned and was elected to

replace Lewis.

According to a charge made years later, Yancey was selected

by securing the admission of unauthorized convention delegates committed
to him.

Alabama politics were in disarray on the eve of the Mexican War.
The Whigs had been eliminated as a serioi,c threat to Democratic hegemony;
-

yet discord governed the Democrats.

Highland and south-central Democrats,

seeking representation for their respective regions, pugnaciously contested for high state and federal offices.

Furthermore, southern-rights
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sentient predominated

In the south-central Democracy.

dent spokesmen were in the
Black Belt.

It. most .tri-

Lewis deftly led the ultras-

the Montgomery Chivalry-but
even before his death in

1M8 his leadership „as being challenged by
Yancey, the political outsider
oca outsider.
Extreme southern rights became
the ralson d'e'tre of Yancey
and
the other estranged "pols" who
llved outsldc
p(!rlmetcrs of

^

mise.

To Yancey, party regulars wore
"mere puppets in the show, made
to wheel and dance as the party
organists chooso to grind the music,

while others of ample ability and
individuality are absorbed in their
personal advancement, which invariably
requires a compromise of Southern
issues."

77

Yancey's condemnation of party loyalty was
the judgment of

a chronic political outsider who dreamed
of becoming Alabama's chief

party boss.

He and other "hotspurs" accused the party
faithfuls of being

"soft on southernism" as they opportunistically
sought high office.

The Democratic yeomanry of the upper valley were
more loyal to
the national party; their fidelity,

in part, was anchored in an agricul-

tural economy that was not dependent on slavery.

They were, it follows,

somewhat hesitant to stretch their "southernism" to the point of
secession,

There also were Democratic clusters of moderation in south-central
Alabama
led by King,

Fitzpatrick, and John Forsyth, the former minister to Mexico

and editor of the Mobile Register

.

Mr. Uilmot's resolution triggered a state-wide struggle.

Demo-

cratic regulars would spend the next fourteen years on the defensive,
as disruptionists sought to wreck an already brittle polity.

CHAPTER III
OF MR. WILLIAM L. YANCEY AND
THE WILMOT PROVISO :

HUNKER VS. CHIVALRY

The Mexican War produced the
Wilmot Proviso, which in

irn
tui

es-

calated the national slavery debate
to proportions that threatened
the
cohesion of the major parties. This
proviso, which declared that slavery
was to be prohibited in the whole
territory to be acquired from Mexico,
passed the House of Representatives.

Thus the lower House indicated

its readiness to approve a program
which the south deemed intolerable;

and it was only prevented from becoming
law by the failure of the senate
to act.

Already tested by state sectionalism, the bank
controversy, and
the sheer opportunism of its politicians,
Alabama's Democratic party

was in disarray when it confronted the restriction
issue.

Moreover,

the territorial question vaulted into national
prominence a gadfly-

William

L.

Yancey—whose career would be devoted

issue as a means of gaining power for himself.

poraries William
pivotal.

L.

to using the slavery

According to his contem-

Yancey's role in the southern-rights movement was

For example, the South Carolina Unionist Benjamin F. Perry

observed that "Yancey was the arch fiend in breaking up the .. .union.

1,1

For generations, William L. Yancey has been portrayed as the per-

sonification of secessionism in Alabama, although, as we shall see, there

were Alabamians more consistent in their disunionism.

Narratives about

"the young Demosthenes" generally note how he towers above most fire-

eaters.

Woodrow Wilson declared in 1902 that Yancey "split the ranks

of the Democratic Party at Charleston, made the election of Douglas

.
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impossible, and brought Lincoln in."

Calhoun has boon called the logician

of secession; Yancey, "the voice
of emotion."

Or,

as Joseph Hergesheimer

2
remarked, Yancey was "the pillar of
words.
1

It

is difficult to explain Yancey's
behavior or to assess his

motivation.
tories?

*

Was it only principle -the rights of
slavery in the terri-

Fredrick Jackson Turner attributed his
responses to the frontier,

to the climate of the deep South, and to
"the hot blood of its sons."

Ulrich B. Phillips asserted that Yancey's South
Carolina origins deter-

mined his behavior.

W. J. Cash saw him as an archtype Southerner:

"the

whole story of Southern politics from Andrew Jackson down—
through the

Yanceys..." to the "Klan...has been one of consistent demogoguerery

.

.

of the South in full gallop against the Yankee, and even
more, the Negro."

To other southern writers, however, Yancey reacted to an overbearing
north; he was defending an oppressive and exploited south. 3

It may be

rewarding to probe Yancey's early years in order to glean what prompted
so many seemingly diverse evaluations.

William Lowndes Yancey was born in his grandfather's home "The

Aviary," in Warren County, Georgia.

His mother, a Pennsylvanian had

moved to Georgia with his father in 1796.

His father, Benjamin Yancey,

an attorney from Abbeville, South Carolina, was a contemporary and confidant of John

C.

Calhoun.

He died in August 1817,

leaving his widow

with the three-year old William and a baby, Benjamin Cudworth.

Mrs.

Caroline Yancey was not only known for her good looks but, like her

husband and her own mother for a bad temper as well.
"The Aviary" and settled in Hancock County, Georgia.

4

Mrs. Yancey left

Young William was

enrolled in nearby Mount Zion Academy and came under the tutelege of
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Nathen Sidney Beman, a teacher who had
migrated from the north in 1812.
He is reported to have been a strict
disciplinarian who did not hesitate
to inflict corporal punishment.

Part of the second great awakening,

Beman was known for his arrogantly pious
religious harangues as well
as for intellectual eloquence.'5

Enchanted with Caroline Yancey's beauty, Beman
commenced a courtship of the widow which in 1821 culminated in
marriage.

By a complex

set of circumstances, Beman gained control of the
Yancey inheritance

and years later was accused of spending all the money
on himself and his

children of an earlier marriage.

In 1822 after selling three slaves

for $700--it can not be determined whether the bondsmen were
owned by

him or by Mrs. Yancey- -he made preparations to move his family north.
Years later, the Yanceys would accuse Beman of being an abolitionist

who had once sold slaves.

After accepting a Ministry at the First Pres-

byterian Church in Troy, New York, Beman was converted to anti-slavery

by Charles Grand ison Finney and became a friend of Theodore Dwight Weld,
Lewis Tappan, and Joshua Leavitt.
What effect these changes had on nine-year old William Yancey
is unknown.

manner,

A different climate from Georgia, a stepfather of stern

life in a growing industrial city, rather than rural, slave-

dominated south--these events and forces must have affected him.

Un-

fortunately, however, most of Yancey's personal correspondence disappeared
at the turn of the century so one may only surmise about the effect of

this move northward.

Caroline Yancey Beman, we do know, carried her volatile tempera-

ment with her.

The hired girls at her Troy home were particularly upsetting.
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Her anger at them would prompt Beman's
intervention, producing husbandwife encounters. Her two children by
Beman also became objects of her

wrath in moments of distress.

These outbreaks invariably led to more

hostility between husband and wife.

Beman, during these "bad times,"

would become "cold, arrogant, and sarcastic,"
and proclaim that Caroline

was mad or lacked virtue.

Sometimes he would threaten divorce. 7

Thus,

William Yancey's formative years were spent in an
unsettled and strained
household.

That household also throbbed with revivalist religious
doc-

trines, and Yancey later admitted the influence of
his stepfather's

missionary zeal.
Yancey was a devoted son and was not in the least ambivalent about
his love for his mother.

Beman provided him with a good education.

He attended some of the best academies, and entered Williams College
at sixteen.

While at college, Yancey co-edited a literary magazine,

became a member of the school's oratorical club, and studied with the
renowned rhetorician Mark Hopkins before entering his senior year. 10
For a variety of reasons,
left Williams in 1833.

including Beman's financial difficulties, Yancey

Hostility between Yancey's mother and stepfather

continued to grow, and it almost brought about a separation in 1833. 11
Rather than return to Troy, Yancey settled with his father's relatives in South Carolina.

At about this time Nathan Beman was emerging

as a major anti-slavery advocate in western New York.

He held biracial

services in his church and started a primly school for blacks in the
church basement.

In point of fact, he played a pivotal role in driving

a wedge in the Presbyterian church nationally over slavery.

12

His in-

creasing abolitionist sentiments only fueled the fires of resentment
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between husband and wife.
Both parties agreed that a brief
separation might be beneficial.

Yancey's mother left for a visit to South
Carolina and while there wrote
a bitter indictment of abolitionism to
her husband. 13

Caroline also

sent William all of Beman's letters while
she sojourned in the South.
She even admitted that Beman beat her, but later
14
denied it.

After

his mother returned to Troy, William Yancey entered
the fray and, according to her, he wrote to Beman "so dreadful a letter
that
it and not

let [Beman]

I

had to burn

see it."

William Yancey and his brother Ben, infuriated at Beman's treatment of their mother mailed him a provocative pro-slavery broadside.
They were also incensed that the abolitionist Beman had formerly sold
three slaves.

Preparing to publish the evidence in a Troy, New York,

newspaper, they even obtained a copy of the bill of sale. 15
The intrusion of the slavery issue into the Beman marriage pro-

bably hardened William Yancey against his stepfather.

His attacks on

abolitionists, especially after 1846, became more vicious than those
of most fellow southerners; and his hatred of them was in part a mani-

festation of his deep resentment for Nathan Beman.
In 1834 in South Carolina Yancey became a law apprentice to Benjamin
F.

Perry, one of his father's old cronies.

Unionist during the nullification debate.

Perry had become a staunch
His student, no doubt influenced

by him, entered the struggle on the Union side.

Yancey, becoming editor

of the Greenville Mountaineer, editorially attacked the nullification

movement and John

C.

Calhoun.

The controversy aroused passions on both

sides--and these were transmitted to Yancey.

On one occasion he and a
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fellow law apprentice ended a heated
disagreement over the tariff by

drawing their pistols.

Only Perry's intervention blocked a
duel.

16

Perhaps it is no coincidence that Yancey's
Unionism began to wane about
the same time his relationship with his
abolitionist stepfather grew

bitter.

On August 13, 1835, Yancey married Sarah Caroline
Earle, the

daughter of a wealthy Greenville planter.

He moved to Dallas County,

Alabama, to take up cotton planting there in 1836.

Two years later,

while visiting Greenville, he killed his wife's uncle
a scuffle.

R. M.

Earle during

Sentenced to a one year jail term, and fined $1500, he served

only three months when Governor Patrick Noble commuted his sentence and
two-thirds of his fine.

17

Back in Alabama, Yancey rented a plantation near Cahaba, and,
with his brother, bought the Wetumpka Argus in 1839.

Yancey also

bought

a farm near Wetumpka but had to suspend planting when most of his slaves

were mysteriously poisoned.

18
(A

neighboring plantation manager who

had had an altercation with Yancey's overseer was suspected of committing
the deed.)

He then left planting, opened up a law office, and began to

make public speeches on both local and national issues.

Almost immediately

he won recognition as a "spellbinder."

Yancey's frontier listeners were

enthralled with his eloquent rhetoric.

His oratorical ability and camp-

meeting methods now gave him a chance to be something more than an ordinary
lawyer-politician.

It

is difficult

to determine to what extent this

skill stemmed from having been brought up in a household dominated by

evangelical Christianity.

1
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During the "Hard Cider" canvass
of 1840, Yancey spoke at
barb,
>ecues
and public gatherings for Martin
Van Buren. Elected to Alabama's
lower

Rouse in 1841 and to the upper
House in 1843, he gained public
notoriety
by supporting liberal reforms.
He came out for free public education,
fair legal rights for married women,
representation apportioned on the

'

basis of the White population only, and
bank and prison reform. 19
In 1844 he was elected to Congress
to fill the unexpired term

of Dixon Hall Lewis, the leading Calhounite
in Alabama.

Reelected in

1845, Yancey served until September 1846 when
he resigned.

His first

debate in Congress over Texas annexation was
with Thomas Clingman, a

Whig representative from North Carolina.
on Clingman led to a bloodless duel. 20

Yancey's vicious personal attack
This was the first of numerous

instances of Yancey's ungovernable temper and emotional
harangues trig-

gering a passionate clash.

Alexander H. Stephens, the distinguished

Whig representative from Georgia, fell victim to one of Yancey's
forays.
In May 1846,

Stephens criticized the Administration's war policy.

In an

editorial appearing in the Congressional Globe. Yancey, the self-appointed
advocate of Polk, placed Stephens among the "horde of abolitionists who
infest this Hall, condemning the cause of his own country."

Yancey had

earlier opposed war over Oregon; now, however, anyone who opposed war

with Mexico was a traitor.

After Stephens read Yancey's pol emic, the

two southern Congressmen had a heated exchange in Congress, and only

the intervention of two other Congressmen prevented a duel. 2

Yancey did nothing in Congress to inspire a positive assessment.
He helped to widen the gulf between southern Congressmen and those in
the north and west.

He was a continual source of annoyance.

He had

scant knowledge of parliamentary
procedure and he was forever making

errors in form.

Nor were his proposals ever enacted.

James Polk never

included him among those Congressmen with
whom he discussed party policy
In sum Yancey's stature derived from
his insistance upon southern rights

though according to Alabama Whig Henry
Hilliard, the Calhounites were
22
foolish and shortsighted to put so much trust
in him.

When Yancey resigned his Congressional post, he
explained his
reasons in a letter to his constituents:

financial distress and press-

ing family responsibilities determined his decision.

These factors un-

questionably did play a role, but so did great disenchantment with
the
political process, especially as it affected southern delegates.

For

in his explanation Yancey insisted that northern Democrats got the
spoil

and southern Democrats were duped into paying for them.

He deplored

the compromises that Congressmen were always forced to make.

Thus, he

lamented that few southern Congressmen would adhere to principles--"the

only criteria of an honest politician."

Yancey's address was seen by

John A. Winston, an upcountry Democrat and perennial Yancy antagonist,
as a call for destroying the Democratic party and creating in its stead,
a purely southern-rights party.

Yancey admitted that there were some

northern Democrats who did "hold the right views."

David Wilmot was

one; and Yancey told how he fought the entire Pennsylvania delegation

with that one "brilliant exception."

23

This judgment preceded Wilmot

's

proviso.

Before giving up his Congressional seat, Yancey had begun colla-

borating with Dixon Hall Lewis.

Moreover, after championing southern

rights while in Congress, Yancey had won the esteem of John

C.

Calhoun.
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The South Carolina nullifier recommended
to the Lewis-led bloc of southe
rn

extremists in Montgomery~"the Chivalry
"-that they procure for Yancey
the editorship of the Mobile Register,
an anti-Calhoun paper.

It

was

edited and owned by Thaddeus Sanford, a
Democratic party regular and

antagonist of Dixon Hall Lewis and his Montgomery
faction.
agreed with Lewis

4

estimate:

"it

This faction

is a most corrupt and unsound

sheet,

deeply inimical to every sound man in the party." 24
But the Alabama Calhounites were unsuccessful and
Yancey returned
to the law.

He moved his family to Montgomery and went into partner-

ship with John A. Elmore, whose family, together with Robert
Barnwell
Rhett,

led an extremist states-rights clique in South Carolina. 25

Thus,

by 1846 Yancey had become thoroughly identified with Alabama's
southernrights ultras.

And there was no better place to begin his anti-party

campaign than Montgomery, home of the "Chivalry."

The country wagons

that always filled Montgomery's main square brought the two products

that embodied the forthcoming fire-eaters' crusade:

the cotton bale

and the slave sitting on top of it.

David Donald has attempted to define fire-eating motives.
ing to him, Yancey was typical of rabid proslavery ideologues.

Accord-

They

were unhappy men with severe emotional problems catalyzed by their estrangement from the established southern social structure.

Though ambi-

tious and hardworking, all failed in the careers normally open to enter-

prising southerners:

namely, planting,

the law, and politics.

Few of

them, Donald asserts, had any large personal stake in the system they

defended.

Most looked back with longing to an earlier day when their

ancestors, men like themselves, had been leaders in the south.

26

Yancey,
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then, van alienated because he could
not find a niche in southern
life

commensurate with the elite status of his
ancestors.

Clearly, Yancey's

life reflects some of the tensions
that Donald describes.

fathers had fought in the Revolutionary
War.

His mother's father had

helped establish the first ironworks in
Georgia.

was a law-partner of John

C.

in western South Carolina. 27

politics, and the law.

His grand-

Yancey's own father

Calhoun and wielded some political influence

Yancey tried planting, newspaper publishing,

But Yancey's "status anxiety" was not unique in

a frontier society in which men relentlessly sought
fame and fortune.

Yancey's experiences of adolescence also were of great
consequence in
establishing his later conduct.

His formative years, spent in the vola-

tile household of a short-tempered mother and a stern stepfather,
surely

had an effect on him not recognized by Donald.

When William

L.

Yancey returned to Montgomery, he found state

Democrats bitterly divided over state and National issues.

As the pre-

ceding chapter indicated, the Alabama Democracy was split into two warring
factions.

The Hunker segment

— national

party loyalists

— followed

the

lead of Senator William R. King and other Democratic regulars residing

in south and north Alabama.

The upcountry yeomen provided the numbers,

and loyalists like King contributed the leadership.

Jacksonian nationalism

was the hallmark of this faction and they looked to the national Democratic party for guidance.

The upstate Democratic fanners lived in

regions where slavery and the plantation system were relatively weak.

Thus extreme southern rights never flourished in the hill country. These

98

party regulars held the power in
the state party and controlled
federal
patronage and spoils. When the
territorial question appeared, their
policy, not always successful, was to
avoid fragmentation.

The other clique--"the Chivalry "--was led
by Congressman Dixon

Hall Lewis.

The center of their activity was
Montgomery,

the eastern Black Belt, and Mobile.

devotees of John
Carolina.

C.

located in

Most members of the "Chivalry" were

Calhoun, and many of them were natives of
South

Like the South Carolina nullifier, "they defined
southern

rights as the preservation of racial domination at
home and slavery's

expansion westward.

By the late 1830's, for Calhoun and his followers,

states rights had come to mean southern rights exclusively.

Moreover,

similar to Calhoun, many Chivalry men desired to turn the national
Democratic party into a vehicle only for the interests of slavery.

In this

respect they supported Calhoun's attempts to convert planter Whigs to
the southern-rights Democratic standard and thus elevate the South Caro-

linian to the Presidency.
in Alabama politics.

Most of the Chivalry were men of second-rank

Some,

like Calhoun, had yeoman origins and became

spokesmen for aristocratic landowners.

The vast majority were young

lawyers, minimal slaveholders, and persistent office-seekers who capi-

talized on southern rights in their assault on the Hunker leadership
in the state.

Many of these ultras were men of flexible principle who

would shift from extreme to moderate "southernism" depending upon the
public mood.
Not long after his return came Yancey's first act of disloyalty
to the Democratic party.

With his resignation as representative in

Washington, the Congressional district was without representation.

A
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special run-off election was called
for, and both the Whigs
and Democrats
nominated candidates. The Democrats
under Hunker control selected
at-

torney James

L.

Cottrell, a state senator, from
1838 to 1841; the Whigs

chose Samuel Beman, half brother of
William Yancey.

Samuel Beman had

left Troy for Alabama because of
an unhappy relationship with his
father.
He considered himself a pro-slavery
Whig and joined the east-central

Whig nullifies, an extreme southern-rights
faction In the Alabama Whig
Party.

Opportunistic Montgomery Whig managers hoped
some of Yancey's

popularity with eastern Black Belt voters would
rub off on his half
brother.

Yancey campaigned vigorously for Beman, but
Cottrell won by

a scant thirty-eight votes.

28

The Democrats took no reprisals against Yancey for
his brief

apostacy because they were too preoccupied with other
issues, especially
the nominee for Governor in 1847.

Party papers from both northern and

southern Alabama expressed a desire to dump the incumbent, Governor
Joshua
Martin, because of his success as an independent running against Nathaniel
Terry, the party convention's nominee in 1845.

"We go in for a Democratic

State Convention sometime in the spring of 1847," announced the Hunts-

ville Democrat organ of the influential Clay family, "But when the can-

didate is fairly chosen, we will support him.

We care not whether he be

from north or south Alabama, we care not whether he may be considered
one of 'the Chivalry' or an 'old Hunker.'"

Editor J. Withers Clay in-

sisted upon an open convention controlled by the "People (not a few sel-

fish deraogugues),

"

and he referred to Martin as one of those "disappointed

politicians who would sacrifice their party to elevate themselves...."

29

From central Alabama came a call for party unity by "extinguishing finally

100

and forever, this Martin and Terry feud
by selecting a candidate, one
not closely identified with it." 30
Black Belt Democrats expressed dis-

may at the control exerted by upstate
"hunkers" over the party.

Crawford

Jackson, a planter- lawyer from Autauga County
(which he represented in
the state legislature), queried,

"Who must beat Martin?

We [south

Alabama] have yielded to north Alabama once...
are we now under any obli-

gation to give them the candidate again, when we
have so many worthys
...in the South?"

Sanford,

31
"it

is an

"that with a majority

extraordinary fact," grumbled Thaddeus
..

.and a triumphant accomplishment of all

our great measures, we are torn into gragments and seriously
threatened
to be fragmented by a want of confidence and trust in
each other or in

the powers that be

"

32

Alabama's majority party then was still trying

to mend its wounds from the 1845 campaign debacle at the time that the

dispute over territorial expansion increased in bitterness.
It was the Texas question that

led to the impending territorial

imbroglio.

Opposition to annexation appeared at once, especially in

the north.

It

westward.

was based on an objection to the extension of slavery

Many northerners complained that the economically backward,

feudalistic south dominated the national government.

Southern votes

had hindered the nation's economic growth, and an increasing number of

northerners wanted to keep the territories of the south-west and farwest free for white labor.

Thus,

the growing popularity of restrict ionism

had intensified northern criticism of slc-V^ry.

Consequently, many slave-

holders were outraged at the growing opinion in the north that southern
"property" be excluded from the national territory.

Ironically, certain

southern Democrats and Whigs also opposed Texas inclusion because they

.
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knew what the slavery issue would do
to national party unity.

Likewise,
some Whig planters believed that
excessive southern agitation of the

territorial question could ultimately
cause the creation of a monolithic

northern party dedicated to the destruction
of slavery in the south.
In view of this feeling,

immediate annexation was not attempted, and

Presidents Van Buren and Harrison avoided the
explosive issue.
a complete reversal of policy came about when
Abel

P.

However,

Upshur replaced

Daniel Webster as Secretary of State in the
Tyler Administration.

Pro-

slavery expansionism became the driving force of the
State Department
and John Tyler's replacement, Tennessian James

K.

Polk, was a determined

expansionist
Even before 1846 Alabama favored slavery expansion.

To many in

both parties, Texas seemed indispensable for maintaining the balance
of political power between the free and slave states.

Southern Advocate, a strong Whig paper, asked:

For example,

the

"Would there be more danger

to the Union by remaining as we are, the South to become at no distant

day a prey to the iron and steady encroachments of Northern bigotry and
fanaticism, or by adding to our territory to secure ourselves such a

balance of power as will teach moderation to our persecutors and disarm
a false philanthropy of its incendiary effects?"

The Democratic Jack-

sonville Republican claimed that "if Texas were annexed to the Union,
the wealth, the power, the respectability and the glory of our country

and her free institutions would be greatly increased ... .The South would

acquire the strength to put their domestic institutions beyond the reach
of all assailments
debates.

.

33
"

Secessionist talk was expressed during the Texas

Ultras demanded annexation as a sine qua non of the south's

.
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remaining in the Union.

Lawrence County residents resolved in
a meeting

that "the possession of Texas is infinitely
more important to us of this

section of the Union than a longer connection
and friendship with the

Northern states...."

But in neighboring Franklin County a
gathering

of the Henry Clay Association, while favoring
annexation concluded "that

the sentiment

'Texas or Disunion' is revolutionary in its tendency,
and

destructive of the principles of our government"; and
sentiment

it

decried such

34

David Wilmot introduced his proviso in August 1846.
tion passed the House but was rejected by the Senate.

The resolu-

The Wilmot Proviso

served notice on the south that northerners intended to halt the
spread
of slavery; southerners regarded it as an attack on slavery itself.

The Proviso's doctrine was reintroduced in Congress whenever the terri-

torial question emerged.

In 1849,

for example, the House voted to or-

ganize the territories of New Mexico and California on the Wilmot basis;
and again the Senate prevented slavery restriction from becoming law.

Alabama newspapers were so filled with news of the Mexican War
that they gave the Wilmot Proviso scant notice.

When the press finally

turned its attention to the Proviso, it responded in moderate tones.
"The Wilmot Proviso is an amendment struck by the Northern democracy
at the South," asserted a Whig paper,

"a blow from the hands of those

who were said to be her 'natural allies' upon whom she could rely for
assistance and protection."
the measure."

5 "*

The editorial predicted eventual defeat of

North Alabama's weighty Huntsville Democrat recommended

a return to the " spirit of compromise between north and south."
J. W.

Editor

Clay requested that both sections recognize "a fundamental difference
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between their social organizations,
which

is

acknowledged by the federal

constitution, so neither of these
societies ought to claim wholly to
exclude the other by Federal legis lat
ion ... from a common acquisition
gained by common sacrifice and burden." 36
But feelings hardened by the end of
September.
in Russelville,

Franklin County, denounced the Proviso.

A group of ultras
Their meeting

was of consequence in that one of its key
resolves became part of the
1848 "Alabama Platform."

buted to William

L.

(Although the Alabama Platform has been attri-

Yancey, neither he nor his collaborators ever
acknow-

ledged their debt to the Russelville ultras.)

This resolution made can-

didacy for high office such as the presidency, contingent
on
to uphold southern rights.

Failing to take the pledge would deprive

the candidate of southern support and votes. 37

Of further significance

was the composition of the Russelville resolution committee:
man, George W. Lane,

a pledge

The chair-

later became conspicuous as an uncompromising Unionist,

while two members of the group, David Hubbard and Leroy Pope Walker,
led the north Alabama southern-rights radicals in the late 1850*s. 38

The Russelville meeting had political as well as historical import.
It

took place in the fifth congressional district and was directed against

the anti-Calhounite representative of that district, George S. Houston.

Sectional agitation, then, became a device to question Houston's "southernism."

To be sure, Houston had voted against the Proviso while in Congress,

but he consistently rejected the leadership of Calhoun and his followers.

Hubbard and L.

P.

Walker were notorious Calhounites, and the former also

had a reputation as a "sly political opportunist."

Beaten by Houston

in 1845, Hubbard raised the Proviso issue in preparation for another
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try at Houston's seat in 1847. 39

Almost from its inception, therefore,

the territorial question became another
scheme for ambitious politicians.

Houston, meanwhile, seriously considered elevating
his sights by running
for the governorship or for the United States
Senate.
In the early spring of 1847 both parties prepared
for the forthcorning local elections.

At stake were local legislative and federal

congressional seats, the governorship, and both senatorial
posts.

Be-

cause the electoral power of Alabama Whigs was in the densely
populated
slave counties of central Alabama, they were crippled by the "white
basis"

which had destroyed the foundation of their control.

Consequently, the

Whigs were divided over running a gubernatorial candidate.

"The elec-

tion of a Whig Governor is clearly impossible at present," claimed the

Eutaw Whig .

But other Whig papers, calling for a convention, maintained

that Democratic factionalism could mean a Whig victory.

An east-central

Alabama journal recommended that Whigs reject a convention "and let the
Democrats have the field to themselves.

They claim to be 'Harmonious'

and we long for the Music to while away the dullness of summer.

The

Whigs did not hold a convention but in the late spring announced (district by district) support for Nicholas Davis, a planter- lawyer from

north Alabama, for Governor.

41

As Whigs made preparations for the summer canvass, the Democrats
planned to meet in Montgomery in May to select their gubenatorial nominee.

A party majority had decided not to endorse Governor Joshua Martin.
In 1845, he ran on a Bank reform platform against the convention's choice-

Nathaniel Terry, a pro-Bank candidate.
struggle between the two major cliques:

Most delegates expected a titanic
the "Chivalry"--the Calhounites

led by Dixon Hall Lewis--and the "Hunkers "--national Democratic Party
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loyalists led by William R. King.

broadened its base.

The "Chivalry" by the mid-1840« had
s

These ultra "southernists,

"

operating out of Mont-

gomery, now included John A. Campbell,
Joseph Lesesne, and Percy Walker,

all "new Men" from Mobile. 42
in furthering their careers.

Many of these Calhounites were interested
They were young lawyers, and becoming part

of a factional movement could provide a means of
political advancement.

Moreover, knowing John

C.

Calhoun and Dixon Hall Lewis was politically

useful.

On May

3,

1847, these two factions came together in Montgomery

to choose a gubernatorial candidate and respond to the slavery
restric-

tionists.

The "Chivalry" wanted to take an unequivocal position against

Wilmot, but they knew that in order to get their way some fence-mending

was required.

Moreover, Senator Lewis's sights were fixed on the Decem-

ber 1847 General Assembly nomination for United States Senator and any
trading in May could improve his chances later.

"Chivalry" tactics became apparent at the opening session when
James Belser of Montgomery introduced a resolution calling for the no-

mination of William

R.

King as the presiding officer of the convention.

King was elected by acclamation.

The "Chivalry" had purposed selected

King, hoping to placate the "Hunkers," but a majority of the latter felt

obligated to their 1845 gubernatorial choice of Nathaniel Terry.

Then

William L. Yancey, acting for the "Chivalry," proposed Reuben Chapman
of Marshall county as the gubernatorial candidate.
attempts, Chapman won after nineteen ballots.
next to the territorial issue.

44

43

Despite the Hunkers

The convention turned

Yancey helped write the resolutions which

demanded that all Democrats withhold their vote from any presidential

i
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candidate "who shall not, previous to the
election [1848] distinctly,
unequivocally, and publicly avow his opposition
to federal interfere,
ince

with the question of slavery in the territories."

Opposition to mea-

sures like the Wiltnot Proviso, the resolve
further declared, was the

duty of every slaveholding state.

The delegates also approved the "ad-

vanced position" set forth in the Russelville meeting
of the previous
September.

All these items received unanimous endorsement. 45

After

adjournment and even before the Democrats returned home,
opposition to
the party's gubernatorial selection developed.

Governor Joshua Martin, who did not attend the convention, declared
that "in order to secure my defeat a convention is attempted to be re-

sorted to, although uncalled for... by the people."

Martin said two-thirds

of the county representatives were not there and threatened to run again
--"once more against the 'King Caucus* nominee."

But, by 1847 Martin

had become a victim of the "new harmony" between the party factions,
and so he lost most if not all the renegade, south-Alabama support he
had commanded in 1845.

Party harmony, however, faded within a month.

It

fractured on

the issue of whether the Democratic 1848 presidential aspirant would be

acceptable to the "Chivalry."

Martin Van Buren, frequently mentioned

as the Democratic candidate, was still supported by Alabama Senator A.
P. Bagby.

Among most of the contenders for the 1848 Democratic presi-

dential nomination there was a desire to eive the Wilmot Proviso the
"go by."

All the Democratic hopefuls, except Van Buren and Calhoun,

wanted to neutralize the slavery issue.

However, hostility to the ex-

tension of slavery into the territories was widespread among northern
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Democrats in 1847.

New Yorker Van Buren, for example, was
disqualified

from running because Democrats from his state
took a rigid pro-Wilmot

Proviso stand.

To Alabamians most of the Democratic party
hopefuls--

James Buchanan, Lewis Cass, and Levi Woodbury- -seemed
too uncertain on
slavery.

Congressman Franklin Bowden from the Fourth District assessed
the chances of some of the Democrats mentioned and also examined
the

perennial Whig challenger Henry Clay.

The Whig party in 1847 was splin-

tered into an anti-slavery conscience wing and a southern cotton faction.

The leaders of the Party sought a man with no political record or political views on the territorial question.

Democrat Bowden claimed that

Henry Clay "is against Polk, against the War, against territory, against
further extension of slavery and for anything and everything that by
any manner of means may lift him into the Presidential seat.
he will

..

.stagger and fall as he did in 1844.

slavery question is rather too mum.

But

think

I

Mr. Van Buren...on the

His political days are numbered."

Bowden predicted the forthcoming storm by noting "the young democracy
(the ferraentors of the masses) [the Chivalry] will want a younger and

more racey leader--either Woodbury, Dallas or Buchanan."

He did not

object to any of them if they were "right on the slavery question."

47

By June some Alabama Calhounites began flirting with the idea
of endorsing Zachary Taylor.
in Mobile.

A nonpartisan meeting for him was held

Resolutions applauding Taylor as the people's candidate for

the presidency were passed unanimously amid "thunders of approval."

John A. Campbell of the "Chivalry" addressed the delegates and denounced
party loyalty.

He called on the people to take the matter of electing
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their rulers into their own hands.

"No man can view the present con-

dition of relations between the northern and
southern states without

apprehension for the safety of our government."

Admitting that he knew

nothing of Taylor's opinions on expansion, Campbell,
nonetheless, sum-

moned Alabamians to support him for the Presidency
as a means of suppressing the sectional conflict.

Taylor, Campbell emphasized, was a southerner,

a planter, and a war hero, three positive qualities. 48

Like Campbell, Yancey showed party disloyalty by speaking
at a

pro-Taylor gathering outside Montgomery in the following month.

He con-

demned "this foul spell of party which. .binds and divides and distracts
.

the South."

He asked,

"Who could lead the South out of Party loyalism?

If he shall be, as I fondly hope,

Zachary Taylor, honored be his name!" 49

In the spring of 1847, Dixon Hall Lewis parted with Calhoun on the Mexi-

can War and soon toyed with the possibility of supporting Taylor.
to Balie Peyton,

Writing

former Tennessee Congressman and friend of Taylor,

"in

regard to certain questions in which the States-Rights party [has] a

deep interest," he expressed a hope that Taylor would take a public stand
against the Wilmot Proviso.

Peyton replied evasively.

Lewis was dismayed,

and when news of his Taylorism leaked out, he publicly criticized Taylor."^

Taylor and slavery in the territories obviously played
cant role in the gubernatorial campaign.

a signifi-

Whig managers tried to use

Taylor and the Proviso to exploit the hostilities of the "Chivalry" toward
the "Hunkers."

They believed that the Democratic ultras could be lured

into Taylor's camp.

Whig gubernatorial candidate Nicholas Davis came

out for Taylor, and accused Reuben Chapman, his Democratic opponent, of

being anti-Taylor.

In fact, during his Congressional tenure,

Chapman
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had voted to uphold Polk in his clash with
Zachary Taylor and Winfield
Scott.

Davis equated support of Taylor with southern
loyalty, stress-

ing Taylor's Louisiana background and his
ownership of slaves.

But Taylor

was publicly silent, not even declaring party
preference, which caused
one upstate Democratic party regular to proclaim
"I am not one of the

number willing to vote for old Taylor without knowing
anything of his

principles/

1

He praised Taylor's generalship,

"but I am not disposed

...to make him President without at least knowledge of the
principles

which would control his administration...." 52
During the campaign, a new extreme southern-rights clique made
its appearance in the eastern Black Belt.

partisan, meeting on June 19, 1847.
of Barbour County.

It held an initial,

non-

Thus was born the "Eufaula Regency"

Those who attended later became some of Alabama's

most consistent southern-rights agitators.

They passed a series of re-

solves urging presidential candidates of both parties to uphold slave-

holders' rights in the territories.

53

Meanwhile, two bitter congressional battles were taking place in
the upcountry as election day August 2 approached.

Calhoun Democrats

and southern rights in the territories were involved in each.

In the

highland fifth district, ultra David Hubbard contested Hunker incumbant
George Houston.

Because Houston's district was an area of few slaves

and subsistance forming, Union sentiment tended to predominate.

Hubbard

demanded an explanation for Houston's vote to exclude slavery from Oregc^.
At the time of the 1845 Oregon vote all of Alabama's Congressmen, in-

cluding William

L.

Yancey, voted to restrict slavery in Oregon along

lines specified by the Missouri Compromise.

In point of fact,

in 1845,

—

"
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before the territorial dispute became central,
Robert Barnwell Rhett,
Yancey, and Houston had voted for a bill which
would have organized

Oregon without slavery and without the 36-30
54
principle.

Unlike other

southerners, Houston-representing the views of his
yeomen constituency

-voted for

a more flexible public land policy.

His support of cheap

land and his nationalist policies won substantial
acclaim in his dis-

trict.

Thus Hubbard was not able to gain enough votes with
allegations

of Houston's deficient "southernism. 55
In the other Congressional race in the upcountry seventh district,

"Hunker" Williamson R. W. Cobb defeated a Calhounite.

One of the few

Alabama politicians who forthrightly used class appeals in his campaigns,
Cobb would open his speeches with a song,

give us all a farm."

"Uncle Sam is rich enough to

He attacked the "Planter Aristocracy" and promised

to introduce a bill which would secure indigent whites from foreclosures

for debt.

Understandably, given his district's yeomen and low slave con-

centration composition, his adversary's attempts to raise the slavery

southern-rights issue did not carry comparable appeal.

5^

The Democrats took the five Congressional districts in north and

west-central Alabama, and the Whigs took the Montgomery and Mobile districts of east -central and south Alabama.

Two of those who were among

the Democrats elected— Sampson W. Harris from the slave dense Black Belt

third district and Samual W. Inge of the plantation fourth district which

overlapped the Black Belt— stumped as radical southern nationalists.
Reuben Chapman defeated Whig Nicholas Davis by a wide margin for
the governorship.

Moreover, the Democrats carried the state senate and

the lower House by a plurality of thirty seats.

57

During the fall and

Ill

winter session of the legislature preparations
were made for the senatorial elections.

Rut the questions as to who would he the
Democratic

1848 presidential nominee still caused factional
disputes.

Governor-elect Chapman privately confessed his willingness
to
support Taylor if "his principles were sound." 58

in so

declaring Chap-

man voiced the feeling of many Democrats in Alabama and across the
south.
They would vote for a Whig if he was sound on slavery.
for example,

lamented party loyalty and talked of fracturing the national

parties for thwarting southern unity. 59
DiiTly.'

U
•

•

t

Chivalry members,

one ultra pronounced.

"The South has no hope in any

"The sooner our people learn this, the

sooner they will find themselves standing on firm ground." °

In November

A nonpartisan gathering convened in Montgomery for the purpose of con-

structing a Taylor electoral ticket.

Both William L. Yancey and Whig

Congressman Henry Milliard sat on the platform.
clared,

Taylor, Hilliard de-

"is the only southern man who could be elected" and, he predicted
1

Taylor would run as a Whig/

*

By mid-November all attention focused on the upcoming Senate election.

One Democratic party paper alleged "a conspiracy between Whigs and

a portion of the democracy,

for the immediate benefit of one of the pre-

sent candidates, and for the ultimate purpose of securing a Whig Senator
in 1849"; and Dixon Hall Lewis was singled out as the "wire puller."

The plot, claimed the editor, was concocted by the Whigs only to sow
"distrust, dissatisfaction, dissension, division among democrats....

This is the sum total of Whig tactics in this state, here
"We cannot beat the democrats in solid phalanx,

is

the maxim--

let us undermine their

confidence in their best leaders, and we beat them in detail.

More
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charges appeared as the legislative caucus
approached.

Yancey was accused,

by a Whig editor, of hypocrisy for denouncing
party conventions when he
resigned his Congressional seat but "we still
see him drawing kindly
in the administration harness.

Nay, he and other gentlemen of the Lewis

clique were prominant in saddling us with Governor
Chapman."

predicted that Lewis would be re-elected for six years.

The editor

He stated that

Lewis had gained favors by his alliance with the Polk administration:

"observe the number of offices [federal jobs] held now by the Lewis
con-

nexion [sic] in this State... can anyone give the exact amount of public

money that has gone into their pockets recently?
them titles and pensions at once?"

Hadn't we better give
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Stories persisted that Lewis and his bloc had "arranged things"

with the Whigs.

A Hunker correspondent said, "I was told that the friends

of Mr. Lewis had, intimated that they would not object to seeing the
Hon. Arthur F. Hopkins [a Whig candidate for Senator] the colleague of

Mr. Lewis..." in 1849 when the other Senate seat would be vacant.

highlander concluded by saying "For myself

I

The

have not for a moment since

doubted the intended treachery of the Whigs, or the Chivalry Democrats."
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Many of the party regulars were hostile to Lewis because of his
"confounded disloyalty"; that is, his suspected "Taylorism" and machinations with the Whigs.
R.

They turned to their leader, former Senator William

King to oppose Lewis.

Lewis had originally been appointed to King's

Senate seat when King accepted a ministerial position to France.
King returned and wanted his "old job" back.

In 1847

William Bibb Figures, an

"old school Whig" and editor of the Southern Advocate, shrewdly assessed

the operations of the fragmented Democrats on election eve.

Within the

:
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State, he observed, were cliques composed of
"prominent, ambitious, and

office-loving men, who have banded themselves together
for mutual aid
and assistance.
for the common

They divide offices among themselves and then
strive

cause— assist each other and oppose all intruders or

poachers upon what they conceive to be their private and
exclusive right
Look for instance at the list of the clique of the Lewis 'family'

who have been quartered upon the State by means of a combination to
secure office.

Dixon Hall Lewis confronted an enormous task in his quest for
re-election.

King had the backing of upstate Hunker Democrats and, one

source contended, he "is the choice of three fourths of the democracy
of the State."
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strategist Arthur

Both candidates also faced a third contender, Whig
F.

Hopkins.

Some weeks before the election, Lewis,

in a new maneuver, asked his supporters to follow national Democratic

party policy.

One upcountry Hunker, seeing deceit in this latest tactic,

observed
I have fears of the result of the Senatorial
election now pending between Mr. Lewis and Col.
King. Many of the Calhoun men (Mr. John A.
Campbell for instance) who. .repudiated all
party ties are now trying to cousin our plain
members (at the request of Mr. Lewis) into the
support of Lewis--they say now our party-- our
cause-- our administration—when they care nothing for us and our cause and are as much sold
to John C. Calhoun as ever a sorcerer was to the
devil.... The most strenuous efforts are now being
made by the Chivalry to break down our democratic
standard....! am afraid we are too late to save
.

Col. King. 67

"The election for United States Senator is creating a vast deal of excite-

ment.

Col. King, Mr. Lewis... are here [Montgomery] making desperate
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efforts/' reported one onlooker,
tell."

"what the result will be time can only

A Montgomery eyewitness observed "unless
there be concessions of

some kind, a wider breach will be created ...
the knowing ones seem to

think King will be elected with ease." 68

Lewis led after one day of

balloting but could not achieve a majority.

T. B.

Cooper, a Whig legis-

lator, describes the factional manipulations:

The King men stand at twenty five to twenty seven
in number and will not yield, the Whigs vote for
Hopkins and while this state of things goes on an
election will never be made; both [cliques] want
the Whig votes, the King men bid high for it, one
proposition was to elect Hopkins if the Whigs would
help elect Bagby [Senator whose term expired in
1849] and let King withdraw—that trade could not
be effected some of the Whigs would not vote for
Hopkins. McClung [a Whig] is figuring to be made
Senator in Bagby 's place and holds to the Lewis
faction, the feeling is getting pretty high, every
other election is lost sight of, and somebody is
going to be sacrificed in this race, it may be me,
God only knows, the friends of King bid high for
help--but the Chivalry is the strongest clique here,
Lewis and King are both here, the wires are continually moving.... If the Whigs and Hunkers unite I do
not know what will be the result. ^9

While reported deals were whispered about, Hunker Thaddeus Sanford spread
tumors that Polk himself favored King. ^

And party regulars prepared a

questionnaire asking if all Democrats endorsed the Administration's war
program,

favored Calhoun for the Presidency, and pledged themselves in

advance to support the nominees of the Democratic national convention
to be held in the spring of

1848.^

Now under pressure, Lewis came to an agreement with the Hunkers.
He publicly rejected his mentor John C. Calhoun for the Presidency, pledging to back the Democratic party nominee for President in 1848.

promised to endorse a northern Democrat.

He even

Actually Lewis' agreement to

.
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support a northerner was not spontaneous,
since he had already considered

backing Federal Supreme Court Justice Levi
Woodbury of New Hampshire.
Woodbury, a northerner with "southern principles,"
had privately made

known his opposition to the Wilmot Proviso.

Lewis also promised to

uphold Polk's war policies regardless of Calhoun's
72
position.

Such

measures brought nomination to Lewis, as he defeated King
for the Senate
post

Hunkers were elated with the bargain.

T,

We have a precious docu-

ment on file from the pen of our friend Dick," [Dixon Hall Lewis]
exclaimed

James E. Saunders.
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Another humorously confided that "a certain dis-

tinguished Senator of enormous propostions has agreed to a position perhaps
a little thorny to himself."

soon became evident.
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Displeasure in the ranks of the Chivalry

"Mr. Lewis... has made pledges which will greatly

embarrass him and estrange his friends in this section," John A. Campbell

wrote to Calhoun:

"He pledged himself,

I

learn, to abide a National con-

vention for the selection of a candidate preferring a northern man." 75
Campbell later complained of highland Alabama's political power which
forced south Alabama to "perpetual surrender."

7^

Yancey also adopted

Lewis' compromising stratagem, and also like Lewis, Yancey appeared to

be over his "Taylor fever."

He claimed to be disillusioned by Whig guile

--using Taylor as a standard bearer to attract Democratic support for
the Whig party.

Yancey's anti-Whig stand hardened when he discovered

that Whig Congressmen Henry Hilliard and John Gayle, who ran on a "no-

party" platform in 1847, helped elect Robert

C.

Winthrop, a Massachusetts

Whig of "abolitionist sympathies," as speaker of the House of Representatives.

77
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In December 1847, while
speculation persisted as to who
would

be the Democratic presidential
candidate, the Alabama General
Assembly
debated a series of resolutions
introduced by Calhounite Percy
Walker
of Mobile. These resolutions
maintained Alabama's slavery rights
in
the territories and her unwillingness
to vote for any candidate from
any party who would not uphold those
rights.
During the debates Tuscaloosa Whig Robert Jemison offered an
amendment that Alabama not act with

delegates in any caucus or convention to
elevate any President or VicePresident, unless the delegates took an oath
to uphold noninterference

with slavery in the territories and to use their
influence to get compliance on this principle from their respective
state legislatures as

veil as from Congress.
1848.

This amendment passed both Houses in February
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Meanwhile, Democratic leaders met in Montgomery on January
3.

Yancey introduced several propositions which sought to heal the
wounds
opened by the senatorial clash of December and to lay the groundwork
for the February 14 state Democratic nominating convention.

This con-

vention would choose delegates to the national Democratic Convention
meeting in Baltimore to select a presidential ticket.
The list of Democratic hopefuls being considered at the Conven-

tion was long, and included both a vice-President and former President.
Van Buren, who had served as President from 1836-1840, was in disfavor

with party regulars from his own state because of their adherence to
the Wilmot Proviso.

George Dallas, from Pennsylvania and vice-President

under Polk, was vying with James Buchanan, also from Pennsylvania and

Secretary of State in Polk's cabinet.

Lewis Cass, Senator from Michigan
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who had been extreme in demanding
the Oregon territory, also
sought the
Presidency. The favorite of the
Lewis-Yancey .'chivalry., faction
in Alabama was Levi Woodbury. Woodbury
had been a Senator from New
Hampshire
before Polk appointed him to the
Supreme
Court in 1848.

Yancey's main address at the Convention
praised Polk's Administration,

"our democratic allies of the north,"
George Dallas, and James

Buchanan.

"There is no reason why Democrats should
abandon their party

organization, but on the contrary as strong
a Reason as ever they should
abide by the time honored usages of party,"
Yancey declared.

Ke denounced

the Wilruot Proviso and urged "all Southerners
to oppose it at all haz-

ards and the last extremity."

The delegates,

not to support any candidate who would not,

in the same spirit,

agreed

"previous to the election

distinctly, unequivocally, and publicly avow his opposition"
to the Wilmot Proviso.
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Yancey's role as peacemaker had an ulterior purpose.

He was trying,

with Lewis' approval, to build southern support for Levi Woodbury.
and Lewis corresponded with Woodbury,

oppose the Wilmot Proviso.

He

in an effort to get him to publicly

Woodbury, of course, confronted a northern

constituency who deemed slavery restriction fundamental to their interests.
Thus, Justice Woodbury was extremely circumspect in making public pro-

nouncements on the territorial issue.
Referring to the Alabama Chivalry Calhoun could only lament what
seemed to be the "defection of the southern rights faction in and about

Montgomery."

His depression deepened when he noted a favorite student,

Dixon Hall Lewis, led the betrayal which

grief to me.

I

'Tias

been the cause of much

had hoped... our friends at Mobile and Montgomery would
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ultimately p!ace our principles
and policy in the ascendancy
in the State.
Calhoon believed that Lewis
"appears ashamed of his course,
as he ought

to be; but

I

do not see how he can ever
disentangle himself from his

new association or how he can ever
recover the confidence of those
he
80
has forsaken."
The o!d "nullifier"

had no knowiedge of the new
scheme

--the Woodbury move-or of the resourceful
Lewis-Yancey combination.

Although Calhoun had been their ideological
mentor, both Alabamians were
bypassing him in their attempt to play
"kingmaker" within the Democratic
pai-ty.

The brief lull between the factional storms
would end on the eve

of February 14 with news of the free soil
position taken by many northern
Democrats.

Buchanan and Cass, John Campbell claimed, had gone
over to

restriction of slavery in the territories.
bamians that New York's Hunkers adopted

a

Percy Walker informed Ala-

resolution declaring slaves

would be prevented from going into the territories both by
local law
81
and by geographical conditions which were not conducive to
slavery.

However, Alabama Hunkers still favored Buchanan owing to his public
state-

ment against the Wilmot Proviso and his long friendship with William
CO

R.

King whom party men wanted to make Vice President.

of Lewis, Yancey, and Campbell by now had matured.

The position

They were determined

to get an Alabama delegation elected that was committed to nomination of

Justice Woodbury.
The Democratic state convention got under way on February 14.

Immediately a struggle ensued.

"By a trick at the outset," James E.

Saunders reported,

"we [the Hunkers]

ment amongst our

iends

fr

.

.

lost the inside track.

.was to make

The arrange-

[Nathaniel Terry] chairman which
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vould have secured the nomination
of electors and delegates
of the purest
water!" By a clever parliamentary
tactic the Chivalry defeated
Terry,
replacing him with one of their own.
But the Party faithful-the
"Hunkers"

-won on

two issues:

Most of the delegates would be
selected by Con-

gressional districts rather than by
the convention itself (despite
some
grumbling from the "Chivalry")and William
R, King was unanimously
recom83
mended for the Vice Presidency.
The delegates next turned to the platform,
and the instructions
to those it would send to the Baltimore
Convention.

Despite the reluc-

tance of some party loyalists, they accepted
Senator Bagby's suggestion
that Alabama Democrats not support anyone
who was for the Proviso. 84

While the delegates debated, the Montgomery-Mobile
ultras were

preparing a coup.

Yancey and Campbell collaborated in putting together

a series of six resolutions,

"The Alabama Platform."

It

demanded that

slavery be positively and legally guaranteed either by a
statement in
the forthcoming Mexican treaty or by Congressional fiat. 85

Two planks

pledged Alabama's delegation to the Baltimore Convention not to
support
for the "pffices of President and Vice President" anyone who was in favor

of excluding slavery from the territories.

The concluding resolution

called upon the convention to accept the Platform "as instructions to
our delegates to the Baltimore Convention...."

But there was no reso-

lution passed demanding that the delegates bolt the Baltimore Convention
if the "Alabama Platform" was rejected.

Yancey introduced these resolutions to the state Convention at

an opportune time

— at

a late hour,

just before the Convention adjourned,

while many representatives slumbered and others were out for a "scent
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of air."

He also claimed to have a
letter from Levi Woodbury
(given

to him by Dixon Hall Lewis),
excerpts of which seemed to
sustain the

principles of the "Alabama Platform."

The Woodbury letter gave the

Chivalry a mechanism to discredit
Buchanan, Dallas, and Cass.

Only
Buchanan had spoken out on the territorial
question recommending the
extension of the 36-30 line to the Pacific. 87
The weary Democrats, a majority of
whom were mesmerized by Yancey's

oratorical flourish, unanimously endorsed
the Alabama Platform.

Party

regulars accepted it because they desired
the continued backing of the
Chivalry in order to get King nominated as
Vice President.

Many Hunkers

felt that it was "nothing more than an
expansion of opposition to the

Wilmot Proviso and a declaration against General
88
Cass and Mr. Dallas."
But another eyewitness to the events saw a more
diabolical intent.

"I

have now talked with Yancey about the resolutions";
Governor Reuben
Chapman suggested that Yancey was attempting to take over the
party
leadership:

"His object was no doubt to instruct our delegation (in

effect) to vote for Woodbury but in that he did much more .. .mischief
than that.

The resolutions must help him [Yancey]."

Chapman, moreover,

found that the resolutions on Congressional authority over slavery in
the territories were contradictory.

was being hatched:

An upstate Democrat knew a cabal

"I am of the opinion that the Calhounites are deter-

mined to rule the State and let nothing be done that does not stop them." 89

A Whig, H. B. Jones, saw clearly the conflicting constitutional principles of the Alabama Platform:
a beautiful

"You will discern in their resolutions

'consistency' in one they declare that Congress has no

authority whatever over the subject of slavery in the territories."
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On the other hand, they insisted
that because Congress had

treating

powers it could devise a slave code
for the territories.

"Wouldn't that
be a valuable clause if they
have no authority whatsoever in
the matter?" 90
Hunker James Saunders, after giving
the resolutions a close reading,

doubted "whether Mr. Yancey himself
would now insist upon the South pursuing the suicidal course of writing
resolutions. Were I a member of
the Senate or the House

principle."

I

should disregard them as fatal to policy
or

91

A sober account of the state Convention came
from Felix Grundy
Norman, a party regular, who insisted,

"the resolutions are all things

to all people..." and Yancey "has unwittingly
sanctioned a principle

he does not believe correct and one he never dreamed
of advocating."

Norman said the whole design "was to shut the door against
Buchanan,
Dallas, and Cass" thus boosting the Presidential ambitions
of Levi Wood-

bury.

Of all the presidential contenders, Woodbury came closest to
Cal-

houn.

"The convention was strongly scented with Calhoun vagaries which

accounted for the Woodbury groundswell.

If Woodbury and his adherents

are successful his administration would contain ... that peculiar clap

Of political non-descripts,

[who] hope to foist themselves into office.

In fact, with Woodbury in office the Calhounites hope to play the part

Clay had played in 1841 before Harrison's death "The power behind the
thrown, greater than the thrown itself."

Norman concluded by emphasizing

that "nobody in Alabama does believe or will admit" the federal governtnent's "authority over slavery."
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Clearly, Yancey was using the "Ala-

bama Platform" as a device not only to play "kingmaker" in the national
Democratic party but also harness the Alabama Democracy to his design.
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in all this it is difficult
to discern what role Dixon
Hall Levis wou Id

Play.

Except for giving Yancey the
alleged Woodbury letter which
he
read at the State convention,
Lewis was typically silent.
Although the
Senator was pro-Woodbury, it was
not clear at that time whether
or not
he would take a back seat to
Yancey.

Yancey claimed sole authorship of the
"Alabama Platform."

But

those close to the Convention attributed
it to "a slippery politician

of Mobile." 93

«1 wrote the resolutions offered by Mr. Yancey
to the

Montgomery Convention," disclosed John A.
Campbell.

He then pointed

out that Congress did have the authority
to prevent slavery from the

territories.

He told Calhoun that the Northwest Ordinace
of 1787, the

Missouri Compromise of 1819, and the admission of
Texas with slavery
restricted above 36-30 offered enough constitutional
precedent.

The

Constitution, Campbell also asserted, did not specify
that slaveholders

were to be shielded in the territories. 94

Campbell never made public

his position on the legality of the "Alabama Platform."

member of the Supreme Court, he would use
Scott brief.

it as the

Later, when a

basis of his Dred

How does one account for such intentional deception?

A

recent analysis finds the answer outside the framework of legal theory:

Sheer ambition guided him.
Court.

In 1848 Campbell's sights were on the Supreme

He needed support from southern senators for the appointment,

and his course was obvious. 95

Speculation among Democrats centered on how Zachary Taylor would
react to the issue of slavery expansion.
a north Alabama Democrat noted,

"General Taylor is popular,"

"but all parties seem to be some-what

uncertain as to his real sentiments touching the great questions....
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If he can get a no-part^
nomination he will be very hard
96
to beat."

Before the warring Democrats left
for their convention, a
further
issue divided them.
Senator A. P. Bagby, a south
Alabamian, announced
his retirement to accept a foreign
mission; and many highland Democrats
argued that the vacancy belonged to
them.
However, party men in the
hill country suspected that Governor
Reuben Chapman had been co-opted
by the Montgomery Chivalry. Chapman
tried to avoid a confrontation by

appointing Hunker manager William Refus
King to Bagby's seat.

King,

Chapman surmised, would be acceptable to
north Alabama, and south Ala-

bama could not complain because King resided
there.
But the choice of King produced more distrust.

Some Democrats

believed that King had made a deal with the
Chivalry which obligated him
to them.

Others believed that Governor Chapman needed the approval
of

the Montgomery clique before selecting King. 97

All this was conjecture.

Obviously King's selection did nothing for party harmony.

Baltimore

would fragment it further.
Yancey still could not get a public commitment from Woodbury on
his position on slavery extension.

He had talked freely--at the time

that the Alabama delegation arrived in Washington (on May 19)--of having
& letter confirming Woodbury's support of the "Alabama Platform."

delegate disclosed that he would only reveal
keep the contents confidential.

it

to those who pledged to

Other Alabama delegates said that Yancey

had no letter, that it was just a ruse.

a.

Solomon, an extreme southern-

rights advocate, affirmed reading the Woodbury letter and found

acceptable.

One

The delegates caucused upon arriving in Baltimore:

voted for Buchanan and six, led by Yancey, for Woodbury.

98

it

un-

nine
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In the Convention Cass and
popular sovereignty triumphed
overwhelmingly, but Yancey tried to
get the Convention to
veto ..local con-

trol" over slave extension with
a minority resolution to
the party platform.
Yancey urged the delegates to
sustain southern rights in the
territories; otherwise, he declared
he would not work for the
ticket. His

minority report was buried by a 216
to thirty-six vote.

Then, obeying

what he conceived as the dictates of
the "Alabama Platform," Yancey
bolted
--but only one Alabama delegate followed."

Yancey stopped in Charleston, South
Carolina, on his way home
and delivered a bitter indictment of
the southern delegates at Baltimore.
He called upon "Southrons" to construct
an independent movement built

upon the principles of the "Alabama Platform."

Summoning them to meet

in convention and select a southern President
and Vice President, he

then qualified this most extreme suggestion by
noting that it might still
be premature.

After his address, the Charlestonians passed a resolution

denouncing Cass and popular sovereignty. 100
Even before Yancey returned to Montgomery, he came under fire.
Party loyalist A.

C.

Mathews had only scorn for Yancey's "non sensical

resolutions," which made a "John Donkey" of him.

himself conspicuous by his gabbing

"He was trying to make

A few more conventions for him to

figure in, will make him so ridiculous as to render him perfectly harmless. ,,101

i

„
One

Montgomery party paper castigated fellow Democrats for

not stopping Yancey at the state Convention in February.

"Yancey can

always insist that he was obeying the instructions of the Convention
thus giving him his only vantage ground in defending his course at the

Baltimore Convention."

Nevertheless, it "only remains now to sing

125

Yancey's requiem and write his
102
epitaph."

A large Montg0mery raUy

for Cass and Butler denounced
Yancey's "anti-democratic,
antagonistic"

activities.
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Yancey spoke before a Democratic
gathering in Montgomery on June
19,

1843.

He condemned the Alabama delegation
for violating their commit

ment to the "Alabama Platform" and
disregarding southern interests.

Furthermore, he added, "popular sovereignty
is

[a]

more objectionable

form of the free-soil doctrine than the
Proviso itself, since
the

it

gave

'Mexican negroes' presently living in the
territories the right to

decide the slavery question."

Concluding, he proclaimed his loyalty

to the Alabama delegation's instructions and,

therefore, he could not

"support General Cass for the Presidency." 104

Yancey's listeners did

not endorse his bolt at the Convention.

However,

the next evening, Mont-

gomery Democrats met again and praised him for consistency,
but also
decried those who sought to "misrepresent Cass's opinions and
disorganize
the party."
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Yancey confronted more criticism at a Wctumpka meeting.

Democrats there listened to his appeal and then passed resolutions which

complimented him for his honesty but censored him for his judgment.

They would canvass for Cass. 106

Meeting again in Montgomery toward the end of June, Alabama Democrats condemned Yancey's course.

John Cochrane of Eufaula, an "old

hunker of the first water" (who would become a southern-rights member
of the "Eufaula Regency" in 1851) told the audience that popular sover-

eignty "provides the South with a solution to her rights in the Mexican

cessation."

F.

S.

Jackson, a party regular, attacked Yancey for his

inconsistency in not assailing the Baltimore Convention and Cass until
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"his own pet resolutions were
rejected by that body..

.at would be better
for the democratic party if all
such disaffected, inconsistent,
impracticable factionalists as Mr. Yancey
and the few who adhere to him,
could
go over to the camp of the enemy." 107
Yancey was almost alone, for only a
few members of the Chivalry
identified with his position.

Ostensibly this meant that they could

not vote for Cass and that they too
had shed their Taylorism a few months
108
before.
Dixon Hall Lewis made himself unavailable;
not a word, either
.

of encouragement or disapproval, came from
him.

Thus, William L. Yancey's

plot to play Democratic "kingmaker" had failed,
and he was deemed antathema by Alabama Democrats- -both Hunkers and
most Chivalry.

The state of the Whig party was significant especially
to some
of those Alabama Whigs who were disaffected by the
results of Whig reso-

lution meetings in Alabama.

Pre -convent ion Whig meetings in Alabama

had errupted into struggles over the Wilmot Proviso and over
Taylor's

candidacy.

For example, at a Whig meeting in Athens, Alabama, a "small

fight over the Wilmot Proviso erupted." 109

Whigs held meetings through-

out the state to appoint delegates to district meetings to choose a slate
for the Philadelphia Whig Convention.

In late May Alabama Whigs prepared

to embark for Philadelphia to join in naming the "sphinx like" Zachary

Taylor.

With the Whig choice made, some southern members, including

a

contingent of nullifying Whigs from east-central Alabama, looked to Yancey.

These Whigs said they were estranged because of Whig Vice Presidential
nominee Millard Fillmore's Congressional votes of 1838-1839 in favor of

anti-slavery petitions.

Former Alabama Democrat James Belser told a
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Montgomery Whig audience
not exactly the

'W

are free to admit that he
[Fillmore] is
for Southern Whigs." 110

'right stripe'

Encouraged by these Whig defections,
Yancey began to organize
a third party based on the "Alabama
Platform."

He wanted to hold a

Convention in Montgomery to pick "true
Southrons."
started," Yancey buoyantly announced to
Calhoun:

"We have at last

"Taylor's position

in the late Whig Convention has thrown
into our arms all those Whigs

who were for him.
ticket.

.

.

.Belser resigns his place on the Taylor
electoral

Campbell of Mobile quits his Taylor ground and
is with us."

Yancey speculated as to who "shall we rally for
President?
and Jeff Davis are suggested here.

week ago,

I

am now hopeful."

Will they do?

I

Tazewell

was despondent a

111

As more Democrats fell into line behind Cass, Dixon Hall Lewis
came under constant pressure, from Hunkers and Chivalry alike, to
make

a public statement.

Yancey.

Finally Lewis broke his silence with a letter to

He urged Yancey to drop all plans for a third party.

of South Carolina an independent nominee has no chance."

"Outside

If Yancey could

not vote for Cass, Lewis wrote, then he "should remain neutral and await
the reformation of the state party."

Concluding, Lewis recalled his

obligation "to the party which required him to support its nominees";
and a few days later he came out publicly for Cass. 112

For himself,

Yancey replied to Lewis, there was no thought of personal advancement;
only "the best for my country...
far above the lure of party."

I

was striking for rights and purposes

Nevertheless, he wrote bitterly and sar-

castically, the "power of party ... could drive men so completely from

their position and cause them to curse a friend."

Yancey asked whether
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his cause at Baltimore and his
subsequent speeches justified
"the destruction of the present organization"
which Lewis' pro-Cass position
would bring about. Lewis had approved
the "Alabama Platform" and Yancey
felt that he was under obligation
to support it.
Lewis, however, was
under a new obligation to his "political
friends." "This," Yancey asserted,

"is extraordinary."

Lewis had been his mentor in exposing
"that

system of party organisations. ..in the hands
of. ..drill sergeants."
Finally,

"in great sorrow," Yancey wondered,

"will we ever gain strength

by yielding to the north and by submitting
to encroachments and by breaking our pledges?"
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The "Chivalry," then, was splintered.

Lewis led one faction for

Cass; another under Yancey dedicated itself to the defeat
of the Demo-

cratic ticket.

Only two Democratic newspapers, the Montgomery State

Sentinal, suspected of being financed by Yancey, and the Eufaula
Democrat,

organ of the recently formed Eufaula "Regency", upheld Yancey.

The iso-

lation of this Yancey bloc is fundamental in understanding the emergence
of secession sentiment.

It

is only

when the extremists found themselves

outside the Chivalry, their "southern-rights home," that some members
turned to dissolution of the Union as the southern solution.
as a result of this split,

those who supported the national Democratic

ticket joined forces with the Hunkers.

valry ceased to exist.

It

Consequently,

Henceforth, the Montgomery Chi-

became known as the Montgomery "Regency" and

emerged as the leading regular Democratic, organization in the state.
On July
the.

5

Joseph Lesesne, a Mobile ally of Yancey, argued that

south must soon "be prepared to say whether we will withdraw from

the Union, or purchase a further fraternity in it by giving up our slaves
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and consenting to social ruin and
114
disgrace."

Later in the month

Sampson W. Harris, an Alabama Congressman
and Yancey's law partner,

warned the House of Representatives that
"the wrongs already threatened
have weakened, in many a patriotic bosum
the sentiment of attachment
to the Union of the States.

Men now use familiar words which twenty

years ago would have been deemed treasonable."' 115

At this time Yancey himself had not yet
considered secession.
In August, he published a seventy nine page
polemic that defended the

Alabama Platform and his course at Baltimore; and, shocking
his readers,
he also recommended that Alabama Democrats vote for
Taylor as the lesser
of two evils.

1

16

Alabama Whigs were delighted.

at yet another example of his insubordination.

Democrats lashed out
John A. Winston accused

Yancey of trying to destroy the Party, while editor Thaddeus Sanford
charged Yancey with a "ruling appetite--a thirst for notoriety

n117

Yancey's influence on the presidential election is difficult to
determine.
members.
Houston,

Regular Democrats minimized the import of his advice to party
C.

C.

Clay, Jr., a perennial office seeker,

told George S.

"I do not know of a single democrat who will support Taylor

or Fillmore ... in north Alabama.

I

do not believe Yancey can reduce the

democratic margin one hundred votes in the whole state." 118

Montgomery's

foremost "Hunker" newspaper expressed elation at Yancey's defection:

"We

would rather see him going over bag and baggage along with other opportunists to the Whigs.

can.**."

Yancey has done Cass and Butler all the harm he

Editor John Cragin predicted "that [Yancey and his collabor-

ators] will be trying to sneak back into the democratic ranks soon enough.
As the campaign progressed, some former bolters and neutrals re-
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turned to their old parties.

Former Democrat James Belser
joined the

Whigs and later came out against
Millard Fillmore whom he characterized
as an abolitionist.
Still later he changed his mind
about Fillmore again
noting that "now there is much in his
character to commend him to thie
£

favorable consideration of his fellow
citizens."
R.
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August Willi,
.iam

King, who was silent previously, threw
his support to the Democrat!,Lc

nominees:

"Every Southern man who loves his country,
should give a de-

cided support to Cass and Butler."

Their election, he hoped, would force

a compromise on the troublesome question of slavery
in the territories."

Felix G. Norman, a confidant of George S. Houston,
shrewedly commented

upon some fellow Democrats:

"Leroy Pope Walker cannot be trusted.

is too much on the... Elmore and Yancey string
hira

I

He

can never forgive

for the manner in which he palmed Yancey on us as a delegate
to

Baltimore."

Although Walker came out for Cass, Norman found that "he

can't be trusted," and he further suggested that Yancey be thrown out

of the party along with other Democrats "who are out for Taylor."

Nor-

man also predicted that the dangerously overweight Lewis would die in
office opening the way for a north Alabamian to fill his senate seat.
However, he would have preferred a south Alabamian in the Seante to

"opportunists like
tioned,

L.

P.

Walker or David Hubbard."

Norman further cau-

that if the Senate vacancy were to occur soon that Reuben Chap-

man would probably seek the position for himself.

Most of all, Norman

warned against Walker getting the senatorial seat for "his ambition
too much."
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Norman's prophecy about Dixon Hall Lewis proved correct,

and his death in October had important consequences.

It

opened up another

Senate appointment, thereby placing Governor Chapman in a very sensitive
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position.

It

exacerbated antagonisms between north
and south Alabama.

In November the Whigs nearly
accomplished the impossible.

Cass

carried Alabama by only 881 votes
out of a total of 61,000 ballots.
Only five counties in south Alabama
went for Cass, almost causing
the

Democrats to lose the state.

That they did not was due to the
majori-

ties Cass ran up in the "Avalanche"
counties of north Alabama. 122

Democrats stayed home in November.

Many

They did not trust Cass, and Taylor

never took a specific stand on the Proviso.

William Dickson, from

Buzzards Roost, a traditional "Hunker" stronghold,
asserted, "not

a single

Democrat that voted here, voted for Taylor they
done [sic] the mischief
by not voting at all.

I

believe Alabama is as democratic as she ever

was, but there was so many misrepusentations of
Cass, being a northern
123
man and would turn out like Van Buren, was what done the
business."

What effect Yancey had on the outcome cannot be determined.

Clearly,

his support for Taylor did not bring massive numbers of Democrats
out
for the Lousianian.

As noted above by William Dickson, more Democrats

stayed home than crossed party lines.

Governor Reuben Chapman, after the election, selected former
Governor Benjamin Fitzpatrick to fill the Senate post of the late Dixon
Hall Lewis.

A wealthy planter-lawyer from Autauga county in central

Alabama, Fitzpatrick was the second south Alabamian in the Senate.
state Democrats expressed irritation.
that Reuben Chapman

,f

Up-

Clement C. Clay, Sr., demanded

be denied the nomination again [for Governor]."

1

2A

"I have this week seen men from all northern counties," Joseph Acklen

stated:

"the dissatisfaction of the appointment is universal, not against

the man, but as slighting the upcountry."

He heard rumors of a deal

132

whereby

metric*

would -resign in two years
and give chapman a chance.

As to the future of the
Governor,

"Pope Walker and [je re]

Clemens will
give it to him smartly from
the stump... but it is now
my best information he will be killed off by
a convention and pass into
a state of

'reticancy' without knowing how he
got there." 125

state senator Daniel

Coggin discovered a conspiracy
between Chapman, a north Alabamian,
and
the "Montgomery clique"; all he
declared should "be turned out of
office.
"Gov. C. chooses Fitzpatrick," the
sagacious upstate Hunker James E.

Saunders stated,

"because he did not want to offend all
those from North

Alabama who wanted the seat.

The Montgomery Regency was instrumental

in getting B. F. the post." 127

Controversy over the Fitzpatrick appointment
persisted into 1849.
The specter of conspiracy continued to hover
over Chapman's decision.

"Chapman is in league with the Montgomery Regency
which is becoming as

odious as the Albany Regency which for years has
dominated New York,"

wrote highland Democrat

R.

C.

Brickell.

He continued, Fitzpatrick had

128
been a long-time member of the Chivalry which explained
his elevation.

One upcountry Whig claimed that Chapman told him there were
"Twenty-five

direct and indirect applicants in north Alabama for the appointment."

Fitzpatrick was chosen because of his central location and because of
Chapman's desire not to alienate these twenty-five contenders.

The same

Whig noted Chapman's unpopularity upstate and "judging from some Democratic papers in south Alabama it seems that his support there will be
lukewarm.

,|12 ^

The charge that Fitzpatrick received a Senate seat because both
he and Chapman belonged to the "Chivalry " is not easily disposed of.

The
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"Chivalry" or Montgomery Regency
had always contained two
segment,
:s-southern-rights extremists and
moderates~and an Alabama Governor
would
have to be sensitive to their
pressures if only because they, too,
were
at the state capital.
Chapman, furthermore, rarely
stood with the extremist faction.

Indeed, his "Southern credentials"
had come under at-

tack by a radical Black Belt journal
which suggested "it would be as
veil for him to retire and for the
people to elevate some of our dis-

contented patriots." 130

Benjamin Fitzpatrick, brother-in-law of the
late Dixon Hall Lewis,
Was considered a Montgomery Regency leader by
Alabamians, but he was
no Calhoun ideologue.

public.

He was circumspect and seldom made his views

During the dispute over his Senatorial selection,
Fitzpatrick

Stepped out of character and published an explanation
of his designation
in several highland Democratic newspapers to placate
upcountry hostility.

He recognized the claim of hill-county Democrats to one of the
Senate
posts, but William R. King, although from southern Alabama, had had

northern support in getting elected.

The north then, if they were not

satisfied with King, should fill his seat with a northerner. 131

Thus,

Fitzpatrick was trying to shift public criticism from himself to his
fellow Black Belt Democratic colleague.

John C. Calhoun also contributed to the fracturing of Alabama's
party structure.

In December 1848 he began a last effort to smash the

traditional party system and fashion souTb°rn unity.

Inspired by the

growth of free-soilism and driven by presidential ambitions, he issued
"The Southern Address."

It

pictured the horrors of Black domination,

which would befall the South unless the section was united and firmly
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opposed to abolitionism.

The two races, he warned, could
not "live to-

gether in peace and co-operation.
.except in their present relation."
.

If the northern anti-slavery
cabal gained ascendancy,

then emancipation

would take place and the south would
become the permanent home of "disorder, anarchy, poverty, misery, and
wretchedness." The south had to
unite, if not, the people must prepare
their defenses and use all means

"without looking to consequences" to protect
"their property, prosperity,

equality, liberty, and safety." 132

Calhoun's appeal of negrophobia was

an attempt not only to stir secessionist
sentiment among white Alabamians
but, more importantly,

to erode southern loyalty to the national
Whig

Party.

Calhoun's polemic went before the entire southern
Congressional

delegation for endorsement.
signed it:

Four of Alabama's seven representatives

Sampson W. Harris, S. W. Inge, Franklin Bowden, all Democrats,

and John Gayle, a Mobile Whig.

All came from areas of dense slave popu-

lations.

Two Democrats from north Alabama dis-

Three were holdouts:

tricts of slight to moderate slave concentration, and Whig Henry Hilliard
from the Montgomery second district in the heart of the Black Belt.

Both Senators Fitzpatrick and King assented. 133

This Address rekindled the hopes of Alabama's ultras and indeed
of all politicians who saw it as the issue that produced votes and victory.

The most favorable reaction came from the eastern Black Belt.

Those

who attended a Montgomery mass meeting e.:~ressed a willingness to cooperate with all Southerners "in open and manly resistance."
of citizens in Russell County resolved:

One group

"There are evils far greater

than that of a dissolution of the Union; and among these are submission
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to wrong,

Jority

My

to injustice, and the
degrading

seek to force upon us."

ter™ which

a tyrannical ma-

Another gathering in

tto bil e

re-

affirmed the "conduct of the
Southern delegation in the
adoption of
the Southern Address." 134
Governor Chapman, sensing that
support of Calhoun's Address
might
salvage another term for himself,
recommended to the legislature that
a convention of the people of
the State be called and
provision be made

for a general Southern convention,

in the event Congress passed
any mea-

sure "having to exclude slavery from
the territories.

Alabama ardently

desires to perpetuate the Union but not
at the expense of the rights
of her people."

State Representative John A. Winston,
once an ardent

enemy of the ultra doctrines of Calhoun,
caught the fever and introduced
a resolution in the lower House:

"That in the event of the passage by

Congress of any act contemplated by the Congress
against the institutions
of Alabama, Alabama's Representatives should
not participate in the

action of that body." 135

Meanwhile, Robert T. Scott, an upcountry Hunker

and confidant of Governor Chapman, expressed dismay at
Calhoun's Address.
"I fear that it

[the Southern Address] will injure our party.

already heard it assimilated to the Hartford Convention

I

have

When politi-

cal leaders undertake to lead the masses to disunion they will find them-

selves mistaken, the people love the Union
sleep.

Scott

s

It

is best

to let the Lion

evaluation of Alabama sentiment would prove correct.

For example, many planter Whigs in west-central and south Alabama who

remained silent during the agitation over the "Southern Address" would

vote overwhelmingly for restraint in the Congressional elections of 1849.
Moreover, Hunker Democrats made their Unionism known, forcing some out-

.

136

spoken southern-rights candidates
to m oderate their Calhounis..
But
before the elections, other
Alabarca politicians began
exploiting the
Southern Address

Congressman George Smith Houston of
the upstate fifth district,
as previously noted, had a
constituency inclined toward
Jacksonian nationalism.

Thus, Houston's highland yeomanry
living in counties of low

slave density, were fervid national
Democrats.

Moreover, they had always

resented the control Black Belt Democrats
exerted over the state party.
Houston,

furthermore, always voted with northern and
western Democrats

on land and debtor measures which directly
involved the self-interest
of his upcountry supporters.

Now in 1849, Houston eyed a Senate seat

—both of Alabama's Senate posts were

up for renewal in the

fall— and

he tried to use his refusal to sign the "Southern
Address" for political advantage.

Consequently, he fueled the ready made resentment of his
consti-

tuents against south Alabama and ultra southern rights by
espousing the
cause of north Alabama and the Union.

and hopefully win the Senate. 137

This tactic would divide the state

However, upon returning to his baili-

wick, Houston found a disenchanted electorate.

"I find

very general

discontent amongst my friends for not signing the Address," he confided
to Howell Cobb.

He successfully fought off an attempt by a local Demo-

cratic bloc to pass resolutions in favor of Calhoun's Appeal.

The slavery

issue was continually being stirred for selfish ends, Houston asserted.
Calhoun, he claimed, had revealed to Stephen A. Douglas that continued

agitation over the slavery question was necessary to the success of the
Democratic party in the South.

Houston, however, was unable to carry

137

out his strategy:

Address."

138

The fifth district seemed
persuaded by the "Southern

He then dropped out of his
Congressional re-election at-

tempt and devoted his time to
behind-the-scenes activity for his
Senatorial bid.
But Alabama was momentarily
drawn to Calhoun's latest

maneuver; and Houston consequently did
not have a chance for election
to the upper House.

Feeling isolated, Houston reproached
Governor Chap-

man and Senator King.

The former, he charged, played a
perfidious game

by spreading "Calhoun fever" into
north Alabama.

And the latter, with

the help of some of his Hunker allies,
had a "childish overweening desire"
to stay in the Senate.

That is why King "signed the address; and
his

friends taking their cue from it, are pressing
the address with more vigor
and zeal than even the Calhoun men, if possible.
to get him back into the Senate.
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They are

..

.determined

With Houston out of the Congressional

race, David Hubbard, a perennial antagonist and a radical
Calhounite,

filled the vacuum.

Hubbard won election to Houston's post by default.

In the late spring this call for southern unity struck a respon-

sive chord in other parts of Alabama.

"The soundest minds in the Southern

States are forced to the conclusion that either slavery or the union
must give way," announced the Montgomery Flag and Advertiser, a Democratic organ whose bent had been moderation.

1^0

Typically, the most vehe-

ment advocates of Calhoun's "Address" were in the eastern Black Belt.
The ultra clusters in Montgomery and Barbour counties had set their hopes
on defeating second district Whig Congressman Henry Hilliard, who did
not endorse the Calhoun statement.

In the spring radical southern-rights

Democrats and Whigs joined with second district moderate southern-rights

Democrats for the sole purpose of defeating the common enemy-national

138

Whig Henry ttiUtar*.

HIUW,

namely, Yancey, hi s l(w partner
John A

Williams--all lawyers.

^^^^

opponents were led by the ex tr
e m ist s;
.
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These ultras villified Hilliard:

his motives,

in not joining

his Alabama colleagues who supported
Calhoun's protest, "must be seen
as his anxiety to occupy a 'National
position'..."; by his action he

deserted his homeland. 142

Henry Hilliard was a national Whig
on most

issues, and his chief support came from
the Whig planter conservatives
in the west-central counties of his
district.

These wealthy planters

considered any agitation of the slavery
issue harmful to their interests.

They believed the national ferment over
slavery could produce a consensus
that would eventually destroy slavery in the
South.

But Hilliard's

refusal to sign the "Address" was motivated by more
than conservative

Whig principle.

He desired a federal foreign assignment and wanted
to

stay in the "good graces" of the Taylor administration.

John M. Clayton,

Zachary Taylor's Secretary of State, advised Hilliard to run
for re-election on Taylor's policy that a territory could choose its own
position

on slavery as it achieved statehood.

If successful with Taylor's policy,

Hilliard would have a good chance for an overseas appointment. 143
In their assault on Hilliard,

group of allies.

John

C.

the Montgomery radicals found a

These were disaffected Whigs in nearby Barbour County.

Calhoun's nephew John A. Calhoun accepted responsibility for

breaking up the County's Whig party.
of this state," he told his uncle,

"I declined a seat

in the Senate

"in order to effect a certain end,

the amalgamation of the old parties with a view to the formation of a

new one," based upon the "Appeal."

John A. Calhoun turned his Assembly
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seat over to Jefferson Buford
"a Carolinian, a nullifier,
a whig" who
aided in bringing likeminded
Barbour County Whigs into the
Calhoun catnp.^

Many of these southern-rights
Whigs lived in or near the town
of Eufaula
and became part of the "Eufaula
Regency. " Jefferson Buford,
at 42, was
the oldest; most of the Eufaula
nullifiers were in their thirties.

were attorneys, small planters, and
owned under fifty slaves.

They all

came to political maturity in the
crucible of Alabama politics.
of them considered party loyalty
paramount.

Some of them,

They

Few

like a number

of their Montgomery counterparts, were
consistent in their pro-slavery
and secessionist ideology; 145 others, however,
mainly saw the territorial

clash as a means of "feathering their own nest."

The latter were not

ideologues but would compromise whenever the
political winds shifted.
In May Yancey and the Montgomery extremists
held a nonpartisan

anti-Hilliard meeting.

They issued statements denouncing the Wilmot

Proviso, demanded federal protection of slavery in the
territories, and

called upon Reuben Chapman to convene the General Assembly if
the slave

restriction clause should pass Congress.

These measures were seen as

an attempt by the "hotspurs," along with some radical Whigs, to embarrass

Hilliard.

John Cochrane, Cass elector in 1848 and now part of the Eufaula

clique, said of Hilliard:

"sooner than go out of the Union, he would

surrender our dear rights to the anti-slavery armies." 146
Hilliard, however, won the approval of the regular Whigs who were

controlled by the conservative planter-Whigs from the west-central cotton
counties of the second district.

After gaining the district Whig nomina-

tion, Hilliard asked Senator John M. Berrien of Georgia for an endorse-

ment.

Berrien, a Whig, had written a much milder criticism of the slave

.
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restriction clause which was
addressed to the whole nation.
Milliard
wanted to publicize his ratification
of Senator Berrien's address
and
obtain the Senator's support.
mented,

"The Democrats," Milliard uneasily
com-

"are about to make a desperate
effort to defeat me." 147

Montgomery southern-rights radicals
organized another assembly
in Montgomery before the end of
May.

Yancey took the occasion to lash

out at Billiard as a traitor to the
south.

According to a Montgomery

reporter, a great number of yeomen farmers
were present and heard Yancey,
and they proclaimed their fidelity to
"southern rights." 148

however, was not above attempts to compromise.

Yancey,

Even before the May

meeting, he made overtures to party regulars
by attending "a supper for
Mr. Polk" and made favorable remarks about the
President's term in
149

office

Hilliard still lacked an opponent when the state
Democratic Con-

vention convened in Montgomery on June 11 to select a
gubernatorial candidate.

Governor Chapman knew that most of north Alabama was arrayed

against him because of the Fitzpatrick nomination and because of his
suspected collaboration with the Montgomery Regency.
him; so did other southern-rights cohorts.

Yancey endorsed

But Chapman, to avoid yet

another inner party collision, dropped out of the running.

Alabama's

Chief Justice, Henry W. Collier of Tuscaloosa, emerged as a compromise

candidate and south Alabama Democrats agreed to support William
in the November Senatorial election.

R.

King

Presumably, King agreed to co-

operate more fully with the Montgomery Regency.

The Convention then

passed a series of resolutions directed at Henry Hilliard, denouncing
those Alabama Congressmen who did not sign Calhoun's Address.

Word came

'
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out of the gathering that a
fusion candidate would challenge
Milliard;
and his close friend, Jama L.
Pugh, was chosen.
a
Pugh, a nullifying

Whig member of the Eufaula faction,
was a Taylor elector only the
year
before and he had campaigned vigorously
150
for the Whig ticket.

Yancey, the obvious choice to contest
Hilliard, a Whig Unionist,
did not want to run.

He was probably aware of Milliard's
popularity in

most of the plantation precincts of his
district.

The district's plan-

tation regions had been Whig turf since the
late thirties, and Hilliard

strength posed too formidable an obstacle
for Yancey.

s

Yancey then did

not take a very active part in the second
district campaign, although

Pugh's advisers called him back from South Carolina
(where he was settling
a family dispute) to debate Hi! .Hard —who
declined to meet him. 151

Alabama newspapers labeled the Pugh-Hil 1 iard confrontation
"The
War of the Roses/' and like the dynastic struggles of fifteenth-century
England,

it was a

Whig family brawl.

Pugh and his spokesmen condemned

Hilliard for his opposition to the southern unity movement and for his
initial refusal to sign the "Clayton resolutions."

Clayton Whig! in

"hotspur" Barbour County, issued a series of resolutions sustaining
Calhoun's position and asking Alabama Whigs to get "behind the Southern

Address."

They also accused Hilliard of opportunism, bargaining slave-

holders rights for the promise of

a

foreign mission.

As election day

neared, Hilliard's Methodism became an issue when Pugh inveighed against
the pro-abolitionist position of the northern Methodists.
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Hilliard, after hesitating, publicly ratified the Clayton platform

insisting upon his loyalty to the south.

But later he rejected it again,

noting that the pre-requisite for southern unity was imperiled by the

.
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dismantling of southern Whiggery
implied in CaXhoun's Address.
He also
charged Pugh with being a chronic
office seeker who had made a deal
with
the "Montgomery clique" in yet
another attempt to destroy Black
Belt

Whiggery

"*
.

When the election results were tabulated,
Hilliard had carried
his district by 795 votes.

He won by getting large majorities
in tra-

ditional Whig strongholds in the west-central
and upper part of his
district.
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Hilliard

Black Belt Whiggery.

«s

victory reflected the strength of conservative

As noted earlier, many central Alabama
planter

Whigs had almost as much scorn for the extreme
southern-rights men as
for the Abolitionists.

Hilliard's supporters wished to conserve the

Union and viewed themselves as moderate southernists

.

Although they

were seldom outspoken, they were vehement in their accusation
that Calhoun's tactics were merely a device to destroy their Party and
get himself elected to the Presidency. 155

They had remained quiet during the

turmoil over Calhoun's "Southern Address," but they made their sentiments

known by rejecting the "crisis mongering" of the Montgomery and Eufaula
ultras
In the Mobile district the Administration's territorial policy

was a major issue.

Whig Congressional nominee Judge W. J. Alston defended

Taylor's territorial policy and accused his Democratic adversary, planterlawyer C. C. Sellers,, of duplicity.

On the one hand, Sellers had defended

Polk's Oregon position outlawing slavery there, and on the other, he

had demanded slavery protection in the newly acquired Mexican territory.

Alston defeated Sellers by a 231 majority, and moderation triumphed in
another Whig stronghold.

15 ^

143

The Democrats took the
refining

f ive

districts with only two

Pf the successful candidates
maintaining their Calhouni sm
throughout
the campaign:
Sampson W. Harris from the
upper-central Black Belt third
district and incumbent Franklin
Bowden from the seventh district,
an

original signer of the "Southern
Address."
W. R. W.

W

The other candidates,

like

Cobb from the upstate sixth
district, either attacked Calhoun's

eal or remained curiously silent
about southern unity.

For example,

David Hubbard, who replaced George
Houston in the fifth district,
observed
his constituents moved from support
to opposition of the "Southern
Ad-

dress."

By election day the hill country
yeomenry returned to their

traditional Jacksonian nationalism faith.

Thus Hubbard kept his "ulta-

ism" at "low profile" during the campaign.

Unionist George Smith Houston writing Howell
Cobb of the defeat
of "Calhounism" in the August elections,
declared
David Hubbard is my successor, an old nullifier
[he] had nothing to say about Calhoun's address.*
I once during the canvass heard he did,
but when I asked him about it he denied it; he
however is of that stripe . The Address men ran
at Cobb very hard, with a talented man... and yet
he has triumphed by about 1000 majority .. .all of
the anti-Calhoun Address men have triumphed in
these parts or hereabouts.... 157
tho'

Regardless of the nationalist turn in the elections, some Alabama

politicians still talked of the necessity of radical resistance to "northern aggression."

The November legislative session reflected these

divisions over "southern resistance."
the Assembly got under way that,

The Mobile Register noted, as

"the issue will be nothing short of

ultimate emancipation and only immediate united action could preserve
the rights which are dearer still than the Union."

1

S8

Lame duck Governor
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Reuben Chapman, who had been in
touch with John

C.

Calhoun, sent a mes-

sage to the House recommending
that it make provision
at once for convening a state convention if
Congress should pass the Wilmot
Proviso
or any law excluding slavery
from the territories. 159
Jo hn A. Winston,

Yancey's implacable foe, also struck
an ultra note when he urged
southerners to unify "regardless of all
party consideration.. .at all
hazards
to secure our rights of property
in the African Race." 160
Democratic
.

conservative Henry Collier, upon taking
up his gubernatorial duties,
asked the Assembly to formulate a
position on slavery extension.
Senate responded boldly:

The

"Alabama would never submit to any act of
the

United States government which prevents
her from taking Slaves into the
territories.

If federal restriction is passed then
the people of the

slave states should call a convention to defend
their common rights." 161

That a group of moderates were now so aggressive
is a reflection
of important national developments.

In mid-November Alabama newspapers

reported California's constitutional Convention had barred
slavery; here

was yet another free-soil state.

On the heels of this event, the Missis-

sippi legislature issued a call for a southern convention.

It

would

convene in Nashville, Tennessee, and would determine a slave state reply
to California's constitution.
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Though most of Alabama's legislators

had either campaigned against Calhoun's "Southern Address" or had re-

mained silent on the issue, none desired to have their "southernism"
questioned.

Events and public opinion could nudge a southern-rights

moderate or even a Unionist into the Calhoun camp, especially if he was
concerned about his political future.
While the Assembly debated the territorial issue, the scheduled
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Senatorial election intruded.

Some Democratic newspapers
had been pre'

dieting that because of a Whig
resurgence "a dee* and

wen

piaced con-

were suspected of making agreements
with Democrats "whom they
suppose
to possess higher political
aspirations than love of principle or
party..
The two incumbents, central Alabama
party regulars William

Benjamin Fitzpatrick, were up for renewal.

R,

King and

Upcountry Democrats displayed

strong resistance to Fitzpatrick and a
number of them sought Fitzpatrick'
post; chief among them were Jere Clemens,
David Hubbard, and Leroy Pope

Walker.

Former Governor Reuben Chapman and Whig
Arthur

tested for King's job.
server,

party."

F.

Hopkins con-

"The Whigs are in high spirits," reported
an ob-

"and hope to profit largely by the
dissensions in the opposition
164

On November 30, 1849, the General Assembly halted
its legislature

proceedings and commenced balloting for the two Senatorial
posts.

easily won election after a second ballot. 165

King

Fitzpatrick, however, was

seriously challenged, especially by Jere Clemens who stopped him on the
fifth ballot.

Ironically, lawyer Clemens, a perennial upstate office

seeker, had written George S. Houston several months earlier denying he

had formed a "cabal with...L.
Furthermore,

P.

Walker to. .make .. .both Senators."
.

"so far as I am concerned I am no candidate for anything

Clemens said he would vote for a north Alabama man "but who

possibly L.

P.

Walker,

"if he wanted the nomination."

want the post, but was eliminated in the early voting.
The session adjourned after the fifth ballot.

caucused.

I

1

don't know";

Walker did indeed
1 (if.

Then the Whigs

Rumors circulated that Clemens had contacted Whig managers
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and

consulted

the Whigs

a deal.

withdrew^

crats for Cleans. 167

Events supported this talk,

f or

the next day

their candidate and voted
with highland Demo-

South Alabama Democrats, angry
over Fitzpatrick's

defeat, charged Cleans with
making a bargain with the
Whigs.
Low country Democrats clawed that
Clemens, in exchange for Whig
votes, proved
to support the Taylor Administration.
North Alabama Democrats were also

arraigned for championing a candidate
who "colored his water a little
too deeply and had numerous other
unsavory habits." 168

Eighteen forty-nine ended with the
Democratic party in its "natural

condition," namely, fragmented.

I„ upstate Alabama, an area of low slave

density, the vast majority of voters were
Unionists or southern-rights

moderates with a very small bloc of ultras.

In south Alabama, home of

the slave-dense cotton kingdom, radical
southernists, were a significant

segment in the Montgomery and Mobile districts.

Black Belt Democratic

party regulars found it difficult to sustain their
control of the south

Alabama Democracy after the elections of 1849.

These were years of in-

tense slavery-territorial agitation and the Democratic
regulars fought

off attempts by the ultras to displace them as party managers.
However,
in the early fifties pro-Union sentiment continued to predominate
in

Alabama, and many Calhounites were forced to veer to moderation.
The Whigs were also splintered.

Planter Whigs in central and

west -central Alabama stood with Zachary Taylor and the Union.

They felt

that continual agitation of the territorial slavery issue could endanger

the existence of slavery at home would would not only spell economic ruin
for them but a racial calamity for the entire South.

There were Whigs

in the far east-central counties, small planters and lawyers, however,
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who held extreme southern
nationalist views which included
an insist ence
on federal protection of slavery
in the territories,

m

col laceration

with like-minded east-central
Democrats, these Whigs formed a
new combination, the Eufaula Regency,
and hegan co-operating with
Montgomery
Democratic ultras.

Eighteen-f ifty, therefore, promised
to be a water-

shed year, the building of separate
southern-rights and Unionists parties as Alabama confronted the
Nashville Convention and Henry clay's

Omnibus Compromise bill.

CHAPTER
SECESSION OR SUBMISSION:

IV

ALABAMA AND THE COMPROMISE OF
1850

The end of the Mexican War
presented the United States with
a
dire proposition. Would the
territory gained fro. Mexico
enter the
Union slave or free? By 1850 some
of these new territories
affirmed
their status. Not only would
California enter the Union as a free
state

but New Mexico would as well.

Southerners were aware this would
destroy

the Senate balance of fifteen free
and fifteen slave states.

em

To south-

leaders this balance was their last
bulwark in Congress, for their

strength had already ebbed in the House.

The South's political means

of protecting slavery from northern
encroachment was collapsing.

Be-

hind California and New Mexico, stood Utah,
Oregon, and perhaps Minnesota in line for statehood.

Since most southerners conceded that any

State could control its own position on slavery,
they could not oppose
the admission of a state merely because it was free.

politicians— many of them political

* ,

Some southern

,,

outsiders -opportunistically fixed

upon the issue of slavery in the territories and used it to
assault national party loyalists in the south by accusing them of compromising

southern interest for party unity, patronage, and spoils.
From 1850 to 1852 ultra southern rights men in Alabama

capitalized on the question of slavery in the territories.

Most of them

Were Democrats, living in the Montgomery and Mobile districts who desired
the districts' Whig controlled Congressional seats.

If successful,

they

then hoped to divest the Democratic regulars who controlled the Montgomery

Regency of their power in the state.

The pro-Union Whigs of Alabama

149

also tried to profit by the
events of 1850.

They attempted to make a

political comeback by forming a
coalition with north Alabama
Union Democrats.
Consequently, Alabama's brittle
party system experienced another
searing struggle which would leave
the Whigs prostrate and the
national
Democratic Party loyalists supreme.

Through January 1850 the Alabama
legislature debated what kind
of action to take to meet the
territorial crisis brought on by California
free soil constitution.

The lower House urged a state convention
to

discuss "appropriate measures":

the Senate wanted to follow Mississippi

to a slave state convention in Nashville,
Tennessee.

Governor Henry

Collier informed the General Assembly that
most southern states had

agreed to convene in Nashville to determine a
proper response to "free

soilism."

Collier also asked the lawmakers to decide upon
a method of

selecting delegates to the forthcoming convention.
R.

1

Senator William

King typified the anxiety of many Alabamians when he
lamented that

•'the

slavery question is the all absorbing subject

terminate God only knows."

..

.and how it is to

While in Washington, all his efforts would

be exerted, as they had been in the past, to winning a compromise on
"the dangerous question"--an outcome eastern Black Belt ultras would

consider treasonable.

King insisted upon his devotion to the Union.

The present difficulties must be ironed out, King asserted, so that the

country could reach its "high destinies."

King warned, however, that

the south would have to stand together as one if the fanatics and "un-

principled aspirants for political power of the north were to be stopped."
tn early February state representative L. P. Walker presented
a measure in the Alabama House sanctioning the Nashville meeting and

"
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suggesting a method of selecting
the delegates:

four at

i

arge were to

be chosen by the General Assembly,
two from each Congressional
district
3
to be elected by the voters.
The delegate selection proposal
was referred to a special committee,
chaired by Thomas H. Watts, a Whig
planter,

lawyer from Montgomery County.

Watt's group had a Whig plurality on

and they adopted delaying tactics.

it

They reported back that no conven-

tion should be held unless and until
Congress adopted the hated Wilmot
Proviso, and a state convention rather
than

states would suffice.

a

convention of all the slave

The tactics of Alabama Whiggery was to
take the

pressure of the territorial slavery agitation
off the Whig Administration
in Washington and keep the slavery restriction
onus on the Democrats.

Disregarding Walker's bill, the House adopted thc Whig
sponsored alternative.

4

Two weeks later, state lawmakers met in an unofficial
session

and selected eight delegates to represent the state
at large and four
to represent each Congressional district.

methods in choosing delegates.

5

Whigs attacked the Assembly's

"If it were necessary to hold the con-

vention," William Figures declared, "the Alabama delegation should be
"clothed with power by the people"; and he predicted electorate indig-

nation.

The Macon Republican, a planter Whig journal,

insisted that the

Convention delegates should be elected by the people even though those
selected were overwhelmingly moderate and conservative. 6

One Democratic

paper could not understand why the people were denied a "hand in the

outcome

.

To add to the growing controversy, Henry Clay, on January 20,
1850,

introduced in the Senate a series of resolutions with all tht

major questions at issue:

admit California as

a

free state; establish

territorial governments in the remainder of the Mexican cession without
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any restriction on slavery,
slaverv establish
P«f-Ahit.*h a
reasonable western boundary for
Texas; assume the part of
Texas' public debt contracted
prior to annexation, provided Texas give
up her claim to part of
New Mexico; abolish
slavery in the District of
Columbia only if the people of
both Maryland
and the District consent, and
then only with condensation
to slaveholders;
prohibit the slave trade in the
District of Columbia; enact a new
and
effective fugitive slave law; affirm
that Congress has not the power
to
deal with the interstate slave
trade.
The Alabama press became a source
of polemics triggered by Henry
Clay's compromise measures and the upcoming
Nashville convention.
crat Thaddeus Sanford of the Mobile
Register proclaimed,

Demo-

"the compromise

resolutions just introduced into the Senate
are precisely what we anticipated ... .They call on the South to concede
everything ... leaving us
the shadow of what We are contending for." 8

After surveying national

developments, a Eufaula Whig ultra said, "if

I

were certain

it

was not

an infringement of the constitutional rights of the
South to admit California into the Union, at this session; yet

an opinion."

Continuing, he cautioned,

I

would not volunteer such

"who does not know that the North

will go just as far as she may count on our submission.

..

the north de-

clared war against our institutions, we are demented, and bent upon
Buicide> if we submissively allow her to go on

"9

The Whig-Unionist

Macon Republican answered those who demanded disunion:

"In the substan-

tial assertion and maintenance of southern rights we will go as far as

he who goes farthest; but we are only less attracted to the Union... and
we will not give it up, we will not aid in dismembering

it

and breaking

it into fragments until the South's position in it is absolutely unten-
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able...."

The Republican, speaking for
the conservative planters
of
central Alabama, further cautioned
"the people against the
designs of
demagogues, alarmists and agitators"
whose only ambition "is to

office. „10
The Macon R e publican's assessment
of the motivations of "agitators"
who glibly talked of disunion is
« perception not to be ignored.
Clearly,

Clay's bill provided Alabama's political
outsiders-the Calhounites-

with yet another issue in their onslaught
upon the state's national party
faithful.
If all national party men could
be shown to be untrustworthy
because of their desire to compromise the
territorial imbroglio, then
their accusers could replace them as the
chief "wirepullers" in the state.

The south Alabama extremists, however, found
public sentiment unwilling
to rubber-stamp the dismantling of the
Democratic stewardship in Alabama.

As a result of Clay's recommended resolution of the
territorial
muddle, Nashville convention ratification meetings
convened throughout
the state.

Most of these meetings, with national Whigs in charge, showed

a conservative bent.

A volatile nonpartisan gathering was held in Greene

County, a Whig -planter stronghold.

It

passed a resolution demanding

that the delegates to Nashville be instructed by the people before making

any drastic resolutions even in Congress should pass anti-slavery measures.

In upstate Limestone county a group of citizens said "we cherish

...our federal union; and we are wholly opposed to a dissolution of the

present federal union."

But,

they forewarned,

"as patriotic Southerners,

we should look upon such a calamity as second only —but still second -to the ruin of Southern institutions." 12~

In Mobile, Whigs and Democrats

resolved in favor of the Nashville meeting and disclaimed any purpose

153

of disrupting the Union. 13

While Unionist sym a thies
p
state,

predated

throughout most of the

the eastern Blac k Belt
became the center for

-Wspur"

Extremism became the hallmark
of the Montgomery
Advertiser
the inscrutable Colonel
J. J. Seibels.
Seibels,

f rom

,

agitation.

edited by

South Carolina,

was vying with William L. Yancey
for the leadership of the
Montgomery
firebrands. Both men had, as
well, . transcending ambition
to become

"king-maker" within the state Democratic
party.

Each would endeavor

to fuel public opinion against
Alabama Democrats who would compromise

slavery's rights in the new territories.

For example,

Seibels publicly
accused Alabama politicians who
cooperated with "northern party men"
in seeking a solution to the
expansion issue of being traitors to
the

South.

The Tuscaloosa Monitor, a Union-Whig
organ, replied to Seibels

by noting that the editor of the
Advertiser seemed to regard "every man
as an enemy to the South, who has not
got his coat off and his sleeves

rolled up for a fight; or in other words,
every man is a traitor who
thinks that this great sectional struggle
may yet be amicably and honor-

ably adjusted.

w

Talk of secession, as the test of "manly southern
resistance,"
became common among east-central Alabama Calhounites.

In their attempts

to incite public opinion, they were led by the
"Eufaula Regency" and not

by Yancey who was momentarily preoccupied with his law
practice.

They

tried to commit the Alabama delegates go?rg to Nashville to disruption,

circulating a pamphlet which maintained that compromise could not reconcile the differences between the north and south.

16

In May, Yancey took part in a Montgomery nonpartisan ratification
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meeting.

He served on the resolution
committee, and authored a rela-

tively mi ld resolution:

^he .. .agitation

of anti-slavery doctrines...

has had the effect of disquieting
the public mind of the South/'
and
"has engrafted the doctrine of
the
Proviso upon the California

WiW

constitution."

The federal government is bound
by the constitution to

protect property.

Thus Congress "should excise the
slave restriction

clause from the California constitution
and resolve slavery in the territory in favor of the South." 17 Yancey
made no call for "manly resistance"

against "northern aggression."

Because the vast majority of Alabama

voters had refused to follow his lead, Yancey
in the late forties,

was cautiously "feeling his way."
Ralph Draughon, Jr., observed that "secession
sentiment was strong
in the Spring of 1850 in Alabama," 18 but the
secessionist!) of some chronic

"crisis mongers" was not to be taken as general state-wide
opinion.

evidence presented here

— the

The

conservatism of those delegates chosen for

the Nashville Convention, the Unionist-to-moderate tenor
of the ratifi-

cation meetings, Yancey's bland protest at the May Montgomery gathering,
the persistence of Whig-Unionism--all of these factors testify to the

political moderation of pre-Nashville Alabama.
The state's attention shifted to Congress, where Alabama's repre-

sentatives were taking an active part in debates on Clay's compromise.
Calhounite David Hubbard from the upstate fifth district was an exception.

His only action was to send a lef-^r to his constituents warning

of the dangers to the south and to the country if the free-soilers tri-

umphed.

Hubbard's address suggested a massive abolitionist conspiracy.

Northerners were uncanny; they "would use every weapon at their disposal
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to obtain their objectives...."

threaten."

The North would "deceive, coax
and

He admonished his readers not to
be hoodwinked by

^pro-

mise, for the northern strategy
was to "divide and conquer" by producing

party unrest in the south. 19

Conspiratorial appeals became the stock-

in-trade of most ultras whenever the
territorial issue gained prominence.
For example, Sampson W. Inge of the fourth
Congressional district, in

upper west-central Alabama

(a

region that overlapped into the Black Belt)

condemned the "California Proviso" and complained
that the north was
intent on subjugating the south.

California would be one more abolition

State for the south to contend with; therefore he would
oppose the "ad-

mission of California under the present plan." 20
It should be noted that most southern Democrats
were constantly

under pressure in Washington to follow the lead of John
nized as the spokesman Of southern-rights Democrats.

C.

Calhoun, recog-

However, there

were southern Democratic representatives who endeavored to steer clear
6f "Calhounism.

"

Those who did usually represented districts which were

yeOman in character, where the soil was not conducive to a plantation
ecO'nOmy >

and where Jacksonian nationalism prevailed.

Wv Cobb,

from Alabama's upcountry sixth district, an area of few cotton

Congressman W.

plantations, clearly typified the southern Democrat Unionist.

R.

During

the California debates, Cobb introduced a resolution that called on all

parties to settle their differences.

tion" quickly resolved.

Cobb wanted this "bone of conten-

He recommended the formation of a joint committee

of six Senators--three of them from each section--and twenty House, members

with ten from each section.
raise.

Their task would be to work out a compro-

The Cobb measure was tabled.

2]
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Senator Clemens called for equal
treatment of the south in the
territories, attacked northerners as
despoilers of the Union and of

southern institutions. 22
ultra press in Alabama.

Clemens' belligerance won admiration
from the
J. J. Seibels hyperbolically wrote,

"what Murat

was to Napoleon's Grand Army, Clemens
is to the Southern host." 23

Ironi-

cally, King initially denounced all
compromises and then voted for the

Gott resolution which would abolish the
slave trade in the District of
24
Columbia.

Whig Henry Hilliard, from the Montgomery district,
spoke on both
sides of the issue.

Seibels also praised him for his condemnation of

"Northern aggression."
teJJJ^ejncer,

But Hilliard in a letter to the National In -

the journal read by his conservative planter -Whig
consti-

tuency, maintained "if there be within the United States
a class of
[those] who aim to desire to break up the Union...

stood that I do not belong to that class." 26

I

wish

it

to be under-

Whig Congressman William

J. Alston from the Mobile district was less equivocal.

He discoursed

on the economic and social benefits of slavery, and concluded that the

north had just as much to fear from the Abolitionists as the south:
"Awake I" he warned,

"Or the Philistines will be upon you."

27

Regardless

of these doomsday predictions, Alston joined his Whig colleagues in

voting for all the measures in the Omnibus compromise bill.
The speeches of Alabama's Congressional delegation were widely

reported to the state press, but newspaper attention as June approached
centered on the coming Nashville convention.
about its necessity.

Misgivings still persisted

Two leading Whigs, C. C. Langdon and Congressman

Henry Hilliard, argued that no convention should be held prior to an
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act of aggression by the
federal government

.

Hilliard, thinking the

meeting unnecessary, feared it
might frustrate efforts to
save the Union. 28
In Madison County a nonpartisan
meeting was divided between
southern
nationalists and unionists. The former,
led by C. C. Clay, Jr.,

urged

resistance of "every invasion of southern
rights short of secession,"
while the unionist forces, led by Whig

George B. Beirne, came out against

the southern convention and
succeeded in getting their resolutions
adopted

by a two to one margin.

Not intimidated,

Clay harangued his listerners:

the only salvation for the south was
a unity movement like that promised

by Nashville.

Most of the Unionist -Whigs and Democrats
had departed

by the time he introduced a pro-convention
motion.

Overriding the pre-

vious resolution of the unionist camp, the
pro-convention measure was
carried unanimously. 29

Thus, the Madison county meeting was no barometer

of upstate sentiment.

A further indication of Alabama's conservative mood on the eve
of the Tennessee gathering was the outspoken position of
some of the

delegates.

For example, before leaving for Nashville, delegate John

Erwin, from slave-dense Perry County, declared "that a dissolution of
the Union, or a desire to dissolve it did not once enter the minds or

the heards of the upright men" representing Alabama.

But apprehension concerning the Nashville meeting persisted.

These fears were especially pronounced among first and second district

planters who were among the most consistent Union advocates in Alabama.
The editor of the Alabama Whig

,

located in the heart of planter central

Alabama, asked whether all those who had been selected for Nashville

would in fact go.

William H. Murphy, a Whig delegate from the west-
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central counties, said he
would attend and urged
other appointees to
aid him there if the
Convention's purpose was
dissolution of the Union.
He hoped the delegates would
elaborate ways to protect
southern rights
31
and property.
whig editor William Figures
estimated "if the people
of the state would speak out,
we believe four fifths would
be found in
favor of the Compromise and thus
settle the vexed slavery dispute."32

The apprehension of these
planter-Whigs was based on the conviction that continued irritation of
the territorial issues could
build
a broad consensus in the north
and west that would eventually
lead to
the demand for extinction of slavery
in the south.

However, in the 1850's,

some of these great planters came to
support slavery expansion when they

saw that their slave population was
increasing at a massive rate.

safety valve,

A

in the form of more slave territory,
would have to be pro-

vided in order to maintain racial control at
home.

On the other hand,

by the late fifties, the smaller planters
all over south Alabama were
the most strident among the slaveholders demanding
more slave territory.

They were just then beginning to see that their hopes
of acquiring more
cotton land in Alabama was hindered by the land monopolizing
tendencies
of the greater planters.

Inevitably, the Nashville Convention and Clay's Compromise became
Strict party issues.

Whig politicians were opposed to the Convention

and Democrats assaulted the Omnibus measures, though upstate Democrats

were more temperate:

They considered the Tennessee meeting a gathering

Of ''southern minds," no more.

In June, William L. Yancey and southern-

rights radicals were restrained, sensing the voter reticence.

moreover, suffered a bss of leadership:

Ultras,

John C. Calhoun died on the
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eve of Nashville.

Only twenty-one of the thirty-six
Alabama delegates went to Nashville.

Of these fourteen were Democrats
and seven Whigs.

Six came from

north Alabama, and three resided in the
Mobile district. 34
John A. Campbell, who captained the
delegation, led no secession
revolt at Nashville and the conservative
element carried the day.

The

convention contented itself with harmless
resolutions, chief of which

was the extension of the Missouri line
(36-30) westward to the Pacific.
Sounding the only radical note, Robert Barnwell
Rhett attacked Henry
Clay's Compromise bill, pleaded for southern unity,
and criticized the

delegates for not speaking out against submission.

A resolution was

passed condemning the Omnibus measures pending before
Congress.

But

the vote on this was clearly partisan with Democrats voting
in favor

of the resolve and Whigs against. 35

Seven Whigs and one Democrat in the Alabama delegation voted
against the Nashville resolutions because of their anti-Compromise position.

36

Whigs considered the Democratic maneuver directed against the

Omnibus measures as one not wholly based on principle.

It

was part of

Democratic Party strategy against their traditional opponents in the

White House and in Congress.

Significantly, southern Democratic ultras

and moderates joined together, for the time being, in their opposition
to the proposed Congressional Compromise.

When news of the Nashville resolutions reached Alabama, ratification meetings were organized across the state.

Thomas H. Watts, in-

fluential Montgomery Whig, chaired one "nonpartisan" gathering in the
state capitol.

He urged support for Clay's measures.

Yancey, who shared

"
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the platform, demanded
ratIflcatlon of Rhett s Nashvine
,

the

meting broke up everyone agreed,
however,

Missouri line to the Pacific was
acceptable.

^^^^

^

that extension of the

But nobody, Yancey in-

cluded, could suggest what kind
of action to take if "southern
rights
m37
were not protected.

Like the Omnibus bill, as noted
above, the acceptance or

tion of the Nashville Platform became
a partisan question.

rej,
jec-

Regard!,
Less

of the noncontroversial aspects of the
results of the Tennessee meeting,

Alabama politicians, especially the eager
office-seeking southern-rights
ultras, tried to stir public sentiment on
the Nashville resolutions.

Thereby they hoped that heightened voter
concern for slavery's rights
in the territories could bring electoral
success in the 1851 state elec-

tions.

For example, the north Alabama Clay family,
through their family

newspaper the Huntsville Democrat, had been particularly
emphatic in
demanding southern resistance to all compromising schemes.

Although a

Democrat, Clement Clay, Jr., had his sights set on running
against sixth

district Democratic-Unionist Congressman W. R. W. Cobb in 1851.

Clement

Clay, Sr., chaired a Huntsville assembly that endorsed the Convention's

Work, especially the resolution condemning Henry Clay's compromise scheme. 38

Later When the Compromise bill passed Congress, the Clays urged opposition*

Whig editor William B. Figures clearly saw the motivations behind

the Huntsville meeting when he commented,

"the whole gathering was just

a maneuver to make political capital at Whig and Democratic unionist

expense

.

„39

Significantly, some Democrats had misgivings about the events
that transpired in Nashville.

Although the Mobile Register sanctioned
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the Nashville Platform,

its astute editor Thaddeus
Sanford, a party

regular, privately disapproved
of the resolutions and
it in the paper."

Wd

not say

The essence of his charge
dealt with the Platforms

denial of California's right to
exclude slavery:
tical proposition to which the
Southern Democracy

"If there is any poliis

committed, it is

to the doctrine that slavery
is exclusively a state
institution, and

that the people of a state have a
right to institute it or to abolish
it, at their discretion." 40
Sanford was speaking for Democratic
party

loyalists and not for the extreme southernist
wing in the party.

A group

of these southernists gathered together
in Barbour County and paid no

attention to constitutional subtleties.

They asserted that the south

Should insist upon "a constitutional guarantee
or an undoubted equivalent,
that the subject of slavery will not be again
interfered with by the

Federal Government in any manner whatever." 41

Conversely,

in neighbor-

ing Macon County, planter-Whigs met and voiced
loyalty to the Union while

condemning the Nashville proposal to stretch the Missouri line
westward.

They endorsed the Compromise bills pending before Congress and condemned
"agitators at home who would rupture the tranquility of the Union."
In late August, eastern Black Belt ultras began to bestire them-

selves as they saw that political capital might be gained out of fermenting opposition to the Omnibus bill.

Montgomery and Barbour County

'^hotspurs," meeting at an all-day barbecue in Montgomery, heard speeches

pledging resistance if Congress passed the Clay ordinance.
ing, Yancey wrote,

"took moderate yet firm ground."

Journal correctly ascribed the small attendance to
in the agitation of this moment."

44

This gather-

The Whig Alabama
"a want of

sympathy

Not even the eastern Black Belt,
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an area known for its ultraism,
could be provoked into

resistance" in the summer of 1850.

Wy

southern

Before the meeting was over,
Yancey

was nominated by the gathering
to represent Alabama
extremists at a
southern-rights assembly to be held in

Macon, Georgia, at the end of

August.

Robert Barnwell Rhett of South
Carolina would give a major ad-

dress and Georgia radicals were to
make known their readiness for
seces45
sion if the Compromise bills became
law.
This meeting was significant
in other respects.

With John

C.

Calhoun dead, Rhett and Yancey would

try to fill the leadership void in the
southern nationalist movement.

Nearly 2000 attended the Macon meeting.

Rhett urged Georgia to

secede pending Congress's recognition of
slavery's rights in the territories.

Yancey also called for disunion, asserting that
"the argument

is exhausted and we must stand to our arms."

up in the emotionalism of the moment.

No doubt Yancey was caught

This was one of the rare public

occasions in which William L. Yancey openly advocated secession.

His

overture had a great deal to do with the temper of his audience, the

majority of whom were predisposed to disunionism.

It

was at this meet-

ing that Whig James A. Meriwether reported to Howell Cobb that the "godlike Rhett and his adjutant Yancey preached most eloquently in behalf

of treason...."

Although this first convention of southern-rights

agitators was so highly charged as to earn its members the title "fire-

eaters,"
R.

it

failed to stir Georgia or any other slave state. 46

William

King best represented Alabama feeling, as well as that of most of

the south, when he declared,

nor am

I

"one thing is certain,

I

am no disunionlst

prepared to sustain the extremism of the hotheads."

King would

consent to secession only when all hope for safeguarding the "southern

163

states of their essential rights
is gone... God forbid
that such a neces47
sity should ever be forced upon
us."
King was funda ra entall a modery
ate on southern rights and would
remain so until his death in 1853.
After all, for King, secession would
mean forfeiting all political po-

sitions in the Union:

personally it would mean beginning
an uncertain

political career under a new government
controlled by possibly unreliable politicians.

Furthermore, as noted above, King
was expressing the

sentiments of the vast majority of southerners
as Congress prepared to
vote on the Omnibus bills.
In Congress, as the summer wore on, the
polemics over the Compro-

mise measures once again engulfed the Alabama
delegation.

Senator King,

who had been appointed to the Foote Committee of
thirteen to work on
the Clay measure, continued to display constraint
48
in all his remarks.

Others,

like David Hubbard, accused the north of pretending
love for

southern Negroes; Just so they could cheat their "own white working
men.'
Sampson W. Harris denounced all the Compromise bills and declared the
south could not accept them.

Reserving his most bitter invective for

the fugitive slave law, he charged the north with disregarding the old

one and predicted it would do the same with the new measure. 50

Reacting against such tirades, Democrat W.

R. W.

Cobb admonished

his partisans to accept the compromise, "In times like these there is

no New York, no South, no West--just the United States.

union of these states without communion of the people." 51

What is the
It should

be emphasized that ultra Alabama Democrats were ignorant of public sen-

timent at home which was not susceptible to "hotspur" rhetoric.

During the senatorial debates, Senator Jere Clemens was all sound
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and fury.

He censured northerners for
"circulating Incendiary publica-

tions among our slaves...."

During a night session
Clemens announced,

"I do not know what Alabama may
do but If she determines to
resist this

[Compromise bill] by force, by
secession, by any means,

vice.... If this be treason,
the name."

52

I

I

am at her ser-

am a traitor-a traitor who
glories in

The loquacious Clemens soon found
himself involved with

South Carolina "fire-eater" Robert
Barnwell Rhett.

Clemens was critical

of "Southrons" who could compromise
with northerners.

of having too many Unionist companions.

He accused Rhett

Rhett responded by observing

that Clemens' real motives in defending
southern rights was a desire to

be re-elected. 53

Significantly, when Clemens finally found out the
true

opinion of the majority of his constituents he
voted for the Compromise
items and wrote his supporters that the final draft
would strengthen the
54
south.
Furthermore, two days before the bills had passed, Jere
Clemens

presented to the Senate a set of resolutions drawn up by
Montgomery fireeaters.

These pronouncements predicted civil war if the territorial

issues were not settled to the satisfaction of the south.

But Clemens

admitted, these resolutions did not represent over one-tenth of the

people of Alabama.

He said that he wanted southerners to resist incur-

sions on their rights but wasn't willing to light the torch of civil
war.

55

Clearly, Clemens was now more in line with public feeling in

his section.
Clemens' colleague Senator William R. King, by mid-September,

was yearning for a settlement.

He stated that he would support the bill

calling for the abolition of the District of Columbia slave trade on the
grounds that the public sale of slaves in the capitol, violated every-
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one's good taste.

Furthers,

a fugitive slave ordinance,
he claimed,
56

would be advantageous to both
sections.

Quite obviously by September

1850 most moderate southern Democrats
had dropped their opposition to
the Whig sponsored settlement of
the territorial impasse. Without
question, the general conservative-to-moderate
tenor of their partisans

back home was a major factor in determining
their acquiescence.
By the end of September, the Compromise
measures had passed.
As signed by President Fillmore, the final
version had the following

provisions:

New Mexico was created a territory without
the Wilmot Pro-

viso, and Texas' claim to part of New Mexico was
vacated for an indemnity

of $10,000,000; California was admitted as a
free state; Utah was created a territory without the Wilmot Proviso; a more
stringent slave law

was enacted; the slave trade was abolished in the District
57
of Columbia.
Both Alabama Senators voted for the Omnibus acts along with
Con-

gressmen Cobb (D), Alston (W), and Hilliard (W).

Voting against the

measures were Franklin Bowden (D), Sampson W. Harris (D),
(D),

and David Hubbard (D).

S. W.

Inge

All those who voted against the compromise

acts had built their political careers on southern militancy and probably

thought that massive radical pro-slavery sentiment would peak when news
Of the passage of the Congressional Compromise reached their constituents.

However, when the four Democrats returned to their districts--upper-

eentral and northwest Alabama--they found the franchised either apathetic
or backing the Congressional settlement.

But opposition to the Compromise appeared significantly in the
two districts represented by the Whigs.

As noted previously, Henry

Hilliard of the Montgomery district and W.

J.

Alston of the Mobile
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district had voted for the
Omnibus measures.

This inspired opportunis-

tic Democratic ultras in the
first and second districts,
with their si ght!
set on the Congressional elections
of 1851, to hold public
actings and

and compose petitions rejecting
the Compromise in an attempt
to create
a public mood favorable to
secession.
In Lowndes County in the heart
of Hilliard's bailiwick, protests

against the Compromise began to take
place.

Southern nationalists called

an anti-Compromise meeting and invited
William L. Yancey to make an address.

Yancey could not attend but sent a letter
decrying "this great

fraud on the South... the issue then
is before us.

tended it-submission or secession."

Congress has boldly

58

Anticipating another southern

Convention that would recommend "manly resistance,"
he advised the Lowndes
ultras to petition Governor Collier toward
preparation for Alabama's

participation in a slave state Assembly.

Yancey also urged those gathered

to construct "Southern Rights Clubs" wherever 100
men could be gotten

together:

"We shall know each other and we shall know,

too,

our foes."

He concluded by emphasizing that Alabama had been disgraced "by a
base

submission to the unconstitutional act of a free soil Congress." 59

Thus,

through the creation of Southern Rights Clubs, Yancey was attempting,
as he did in the late forties, to build a movement to propel himself

into the position of power broker in both state and national politics.

On the heels of the Lowndes meeting, the Eufaula Regency met and

drew up a request to Governor Collier.

It stated that a special

legis-

lative session should be called that would take steps to protect Alabama

from Congressional assaults.

60

Ultra editor J. J. Seibels wrote Governor

James Hammond of South Carolina asking him what his state would do with

1
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respect to secession if Georgia
backed out of supporting
secession.
Georgia legislators, however, meeting
at the end of October declined
to lead any disunion movement. 6

Governor Henry Collier cautiously remained
neutral, neith er sanctioning nor rejecting the Congressional
Compromise.

The Governor' s

office was in Montgomery where the
"fire-eaters" were most active in
li
trying to build a consensus for resistance.

Thus, Collier was undier

pressure from ultras to make a pronouncement
against the Omnibus ordinance and issue a call for a "Southern Convention."

He was opposed to

calling a southern meeting unless the people demanded
one.

Alabama's

Nashville Convention delegates decided to gather
again to discuss the
present crisis and Collier did not want to move until
they, as well as

Other southern states, had acted.

While Collier watched and waited,

the Atlas, Montgomery's most radical newspaper, did not.

The paper,

Which was allegedly financed by Yancey, rhetorically asked, "Why should
we not secede?"

62

Seibels, vying with Yancey for control of the

J. J.

Montgomery firebrands, pronounced in his Montgomery Advertiser

:

"Sub-

mission or resistance are now the only alternatives .. .we shall not hesi63

tAte to use the latter."

John A. Campbell, meanwhile, pressured Go-

vernor Collier to announce a state convention or publicly announce his
refusal to do

so.^

In the east-central counties of the Montgomery district pockets

of secessionist feeling were on the rise.

John Cochrane of the Eufaula

eiique did not think there could be immediate secession, but rejoiced
that Alabama "hotspurs" engineered a gradual increase in disunionism

which by a "more or less rapid, but perfectly certain process would leaven

.
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the whole lump." 65

One Barbour County southern-rights
gathering peti-

tioned the Governor for an Alabama
Convention to decide upon secession.

Russell and Macon Counties formed southern-rights
clubs and sent unsigned

petitions demanding that the state take action
against the recently
passed Compromise measures. 66

is significant that no figures were

It

published as to how many people attended these
meetings.
The Mobile district, home of another Whig
representative, also

Witnessed a rise in ultraism.

A fire-brand newspaper appeared in first

district Dallas county and declared:

"We believe the late compromise

measures will warrant the secession of all slave holding states from
the union.,.. We believe it the duty of every Southern State,
collectively

or alone to secede from the union."

68
'

in early November 1850,

Go-

vernor Collier received a disunion petition from forty-two Dallas County
extremists.
ing,

Frustrated in efforts to take over a local Whig-Union meet-

they had formed a southern-rights organization.

They passed reso-

lutions prescribing secession as the "ultimate remedy" for the south.

George W. Gayle, a state legislator and former United States District

Attorney appointed by Van Buren, was one of the leaders of these Dallas
f ire'eaters

Under pressure from these firebrand cliques, Governor Henry Collier

finally answered that public opinion had not agreed on what measures to
take and that he would not impulsively decide because the consequences

might be "irreparably disastrous."

reading of the public pulse.

dominated Alabama.

69

The Governor had taken an accurate

Unionism and southern-rights moderation

For example,

C.

C.

Langdon, Connect icut -born Whig

editor of the popular Mobile Advertiser, was a strong Unionist, and his
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stents
trict.

were shared b y the vast
majority of Whi gs in the
Mobile dig .
He told his readers that
Hn comparison with the African Union,

the institution of slavery
is not worth a groatand "all other objects
70
Sink into insignificance."
A niassive meeting of Monfcgomery
led by lawyer-planter Ja.es
Abercrombie and Howell Rose,

the co.pro.ise had to have a
chance to work. 71

^

insisted that

In early November,

in

Marengo County, one of Henry Hilliard's
important Whig-planter fiefs,
a ratification meeting was held
in which Whig planters predominated,
and bitter debates ensued.

John Wittenley, a Whig lawyer-planter,
intro-

duced a motion sustaining Congress.

Union camp.

72

It carried,

and Marengo was in the

Senators William R. King and Jere
Clemens returned from

Washington to drum up further support for
the Congressional settlement.

After arriving in Montgomery, King commended
the Whig meeting in Marengo,
the Whig Macon Republican praised Alabama's
two Democratic Senators for

Voting for the Compromise and said that the issue
"is not a party question but of national loyalty." 73

Unionist meetings under Whig leader-

ship were organized in Macon, Mobile, and Pickens
Counties in mid-October;
and all claimed hundreds attended. 74

Nearly 2000 flocked to a nonpartisan

Union assembly in Mobile in late October. 75

Moderate southern-rights or Unionist Democrats from south Alabama,
politicians like Benjamin Fitzpatrick and Thaddeus Sanford, did net participate in the Union movement because of its decidedly Whiggish character.

With the Congressional elections a year off, the ultras in the

south Alabama Democracy were stirring up support in the lowland Democracy.

They had hopes of replacing the two Whig Congressmen representing the

Montgomery and Mobile districts.

Meanwhile, Sanford' s Mobile Register,
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a Democratic moderate
southern-rights Journal, steered
a middle course

between approval of the
Compromise and disunion.

By October 15, however,
Sanford could "see in secession
nothing that will add one
iota of additional security to our property
in slaves.
He who advocates disunion
should be prepared to show some
stronger reason for it than the
abstract
right to resist wrong. He should
be ready to show, firstly
that it can
be made effective, and secondly
that it gives reasonable
promose of

remedy...." 76

Except for pockets Qf secessionist
sentiment

^

Madis<
son

County, bailiwick of the Clay family,
the overwhelming majority of
north

Alabama Democrats were against "Rhettism.

»

Through the upcountry, Demo-

crats and Whigs held Union meetings
which sustained the Compromise. 77

By October, Senator Jere Clemens came
under attack by the radical
south Alabama press for his "newly found
unionism."

Whig editor William

B. Figures could not understand the
controversy over Clemens when Col.

King "is permitted to pass unquestioned."

King published letters in news-

papers contending that the Compromise did nothing
to dampen the "honor
of the South" which stands in all its "original
purity."
tion, he claimed,

attacked?

"has not been violated."

Why,

The Constitu-

Figures asked, is Clemens

The answer "is because Mr. C.'s term expires first and
there

will be a chance sooner for somebody to fill it.

attack on the one, and the sparing of the other?"

Does this prompt the

King voted for the

Compromise measures, Figures noted, and was a member of the Foote Committee
of thirteen which drew up the final draft.

"His role must be embarrassing

to the Democratic agitators in south Alabama."

The attacks on Clemens

like the stirring of extremist sentiment in south-central Alabama were

being done to build a movement that would topple the state's political

:
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insiders-both Whigs and
Democrats-especially those of

a moderate or

Unionist cast.

Former Governor John Ga yl e
believed that secession was
being mandated by "the
madness of fanaticism in
Alabama, b y those
office-seekers who are practiced
political Demagogues." 78

Both Figures and Gayle correctly
saw that many in the south Alabama Democracy were using extreme
rhetoric for political gain. But
by
November, because of the strong
sentiment in the state for the
Compromise, the Democratic Congressmen
who voted against the Compromise
were
wavering.
Figures assessed this shift of
position on the part of Alabama

Democratic southern-rights Congressmen who
voted against the Omnibus
bill but after arriving home and
testing public opinion now had second

thoughts
Harris and Inge are restrained by a wholesome
fear of the ballot box and are thus
openly fearful of confessing treason.
Bowden ind ividually
is for secession, but goes with his
district which
is not.
Hubbard was a rank Rhettite while in
Washington; but during his stay among his constituents, he was mute as an oyster--he is an old
fox and knows the political currents too well
not
to see nullification, disguised under the
soothing name of secession, will not go down with
his
people. He has, however, sinned enough to secure
his defeat by some good old Andrew Jackson Union
Democrat in his district. 79
George Smith Houston, aware of Hubbard's difficulty, made
a strong Union
speech in the yeoman fifth district at the end of November.

He asserted

that Alabama "should hold herself amenable to the laws of the Union how-

ever trying the circumstances or delicate the duty to perform." 80

Houston

would have no trouble unseating Hubbard in the forthcoming Congressional
race.

While Unionism reigned supreme in north Alabama, the second session
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of the Nashville Convention
got under way.

Alabama attended:
Sr.

Only five delegates fro m

Reuben Chapman (D); George
Williams (D);

(D); John A. Calhoun (D);
Jefferson Buford

C.

C.

Clay,

(nullifying Whig).

The

Alabama delegates who did not attend
may have agreed with Whig William
M. Byrd of Marengo County who
announced, "I am against all unnecessary

agitation-the country wants peace and quiet
and cannot hope for such
81
a result by reassembly of the same
delegates."

The southern Conven-

tion adjourned after condemning the
Compromise and reaffirming southern

resistance to aggression.

It

was a dismal affair.

secessionist*, the Georgia legislature

Georgia Platform:

resist— even
South.

82

To further deflate

(in December 1850) approved the

"The state would abide by the Compromise but
would

to a disruption of the

Union— any more assaults upon the

During the Alabama state elections of 1851, this
Platform be-

came a rallying device for southern-rights Democrats
who were still equi-

vocal on the Congressional settlement.

Also some ultras supported the

Georgia Platform and posed as conditional Unionists in order to
appease

public sentiment.
There were fundamental economic causes for the lack of secession
sentiment in 1850.

Cotton profits made a comeback in 1850.

Its price

had risen from a low in 1848-1849 of 7.5 a pound to a profitable 12.3
cents a pound in 1850.

83

In September 1850 at the height of the turmoil

over the Compromise, a Sumter County planter wrote Governor Henry Collier
that "some of us here have good crops some of the best ever... how grand
the crop is...."

84

This prosperity, remarked the fire-eating Spirit

of the South, explained the reluctance to undertake resistance "because
there is plenty to live on, because we are out of debt, and cotton brings
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to shut their eyes.. .in
the consoling reflection
that the future cannot
85
hurt

the.."

The Whig Alabama

j^nal

implored secessionists to
ponder

whether "disunion will not give
us a better price for
cotton-will not
increase the value of slave
property-will not render them more

secure

-will

not diminish taxation but
will be likely under the best.
..state

of affairs to double taxation,
diminish the price of our staples
and
reduce the value of slaves and land
fifty percent." 86 Former Governor
James Hammond of South Carolina,
visiting Mobile in the fall of
1850,
noted that disunionism had little
chance against the high price of cotton
Thus, south Alabamians living in the
cotton regions of the state, pleased

with high cotton prices, were not ready
for disruption in 1850.

Through-

out the turmoil over the Omnibus bills,
north Alabama especially reaf-

firmed its traditional loyalty to the Union.
As a result of the pro-Union sentiments of the
vast majority of
the electorate,

few Democratic party regulars-the Montgomery
Regency-

in south Alabama took part in the disunion
gatherings organized by Mont-

gomery, Barbour, and Dallas county ultras.

Most of those who did were

relatively young status-seeking lawyers and small planters.

Montgomery

Regency party loyalists, except for Senator William

generally

R.

King,

remained quiet and allowed the "hotspurs" to agitate the secession issue.
The Whigs of south Alabama claimed the Union issue for themselves.

Thus

they left conservative-to-moderate lowland Democrats isolated while

"firebrand" Democrats tried to provoke secessionism among the voters.
Some of these Democratic ultras knew by the end of November that the

electorate could not be moved; nevertheless, they continued to call for
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the manipulation of the
disunion issue>

blyman and future secession
fided,

^

of

before the common people will
be prepared

^ ^
perry

^

^
^

to resist insults and

injustices, in the proper manner,
they must be made to know
and feel
that they have been thus
treated and this can only be
done by the press,
and public description...." 88

As noted earlier
,

^

J

motivations q£
east-central Alabama ultras was not
based on southern principle
exclusively: The firebrand definition
of southern rights in the fall
of 1850

meant not only noninterference with
white racial domination at home
but
secession unless Congress abrogated
the Compromise of 1850 and replaced
it with federal protection of
slavery in the territories. Many of
these
crisis mongers were agitating southern
rights for the purpose of unseating the two Whig Congressmen in the
Montgomery and Mobile districts whose

terms expired in August 1851.

Since both Whig representatives had voted

for the Congressional settlement, the
Democratic ultras of the first

and second Congressional districts were
trying to fashion enough seces-

sion sentiment to topple the Whig mastery of the
two lowland regions.
If the radical southern-rights men could
achieve this political goal,

they could then possibly replace the Democratic
party regulars in south

Alabama— men like King, Benjamin Fitzpatrick and Thaddeus Sanford--as
the power brokers in the Alabama Democracy.

Union Whigs saw the dilemma of Democratic conservatives and viewed
the Union issue as a means of making a political comeback in the state.

They could gain control of

the.

state, by aligning with Union Democrats

in north Alabama, and possibly win over Democratic regulars in south

Alabama.
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The Democratic firebrands
in the Montgomery and
Mobile districts
were paying little heed to
the public mood of their
regions in their
use of disunion rhetoric to
discredit the Whigs. At a
January 7 meeting
of ultras from Henry and
Barbour Counties, resolutions
were passed condemning the Omnibus bills, which
"ultimately could force the South
to
secession, we believe the public
mind and resources of the
South should
be prepared for that alternative." 89
These radical opportunists had
almost a total misunderstanding of
the disposition of the citizens
they
addressed their appeal to. For example,
W. H. Crenshaw, a Butler County
planter, declared that, "I am not with
the ultras.... My doctrine is to
fight the issue in the Union and under
the Constitution...." 90

B y the

end of January, some radicals finally
began to see the necessity of

tempering their message.

These ultras began broadening their appeal
by

insisting the southern rights clubs were not
designed to destroy the
Union, but to save it by thwarting abolitionism.

looking toward the August elections.

They were, to be sure,

Consequently, Eufaula firebrand

Jefferson Buford assured an audience that rather than
dissolve the Union
they intended to maintain it "by putting an end to
this war upon the

Constitution and upon our rights

We do not declare an intention to

dissolve; we make no threat that we will secede in any contingency.

1,91

While some eastern Black Belt ultras began shifting ground, Whig-

Unionists began to organize.

Some of the foremost Whig leaders in south

Alabama gathered in Montgomery on January 19.

The vast majority from

west and south-central Alabama were lawyers, doctors and smal 1 planters,
and there were also prominent slaveholders:

Robert Jemison from Tusca-

loosa; Thomas H. Watts from Montgomery; R. M. Patton from Lauderdale,
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all of whom owned over 100
92
slave*
siaves
-

The n
Convention sustained the Con-

gressional Compromise and denied
the right of secession,
with their
sights set on the August
elections, they endorsed the
following slate
for Congress:
editor C. C. Langdon in the
Mobile district, rather than
W. J. Alston; and James
Abercrombie of Russell County,
who took Henry
Hilliard's place in the Montgomery
district when the latter decided
not
to run.

The campaigns in the Montgomery-Mobile
districts promised to
be bitter, and quite possibly
Hilliard and Alston did not want
to go

through distressing canvasses.
crombie.

Hilliard did agree to stump for Aber-

Judge William Mudd was selected to
run in the third district;

William R. Smith ("little Billy"), a
former Whig editor who became a
Democratic legislator in 1843 and a Unionist

in 1850 to 1851, was selected

for the fourth Tuscaloosa district;
George Smith Houston and W. R. W.

Cobb in the upstate fifth and sixth districts
were endorsed-their selec-

tion represented a fusion effort with
upstate Democrats.

neither Houston nor Cobb rejected the Whig endorsement.

Significantly,

Alexander White,

erstwhile Democrat who became a Union Whig in
1851, was selected for
the seventh Talladega district. 93

The Whig slate was formidable causing more Democratic
Southern

Rights Clubs to temper their plea.

Furthermore, additional ultras began

to recognize the moderation of the vast majority of south
Alabama voters.

Thus the Lowndes County Southern Rights Association maintained that secession Was onlv the last resort and offered to cooperate with those favoring other means of resistance. 94

*

i

A convention of Southern Rights Clubs opened
February 10th.

in Montgomery on

Only eleven counties sent delegates, ninety-seven in all.
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Almost all of the. were
Democrats from the Montgomery
and Mobile districts, again indicating the
relative weakness of secessionist
sentiment. Willi** L. Yancey, who
wrote the Convention resolutions,
defended
the right of disruption by
any state. However, he
modified a call fox-

Alabama secession and in so many
words said that Alabama should
take
this step only if another slave
state seceded. The resolution
in its
final form read:

"the question of the secession
of Alabama is reduced

to that of time and policy only."

m

a dramatic mood,

confirmed "hot-

spur" delegates went beyond Yancey and
amended his plank, to read, that
Alabama secession "is only a question of
95
time."
Yancey obviously was
aware of the popular disposition in the
state for tranquility but he

was out "Yancied" by southern nationalists
who wanted to go beyond his
equivocal stand.
The secession resolution that emanated from
the Montgomery meeting splintered Alabama's southern-rights movement.

Three Democratic

newspapers, all claiming to be resistance organs,
asserted that the term

"time" (in the modified Yancey resolution) was too extreme.

If "time

only" would determine Alabama action, Thaddeus Sanford
declared, then
he did not believe in the right of secession.

Sanford, essentially a

southern-rights moderate and party regular, insisted that Southern Rights
Clubs must repudiate the recommendations of the Montgomery convention:
"Let Us reject such ultra and quixotic schemes."

The Mobile Calhounite

John A* Campbell agreed and opposed single state secession, advising
instead a boycott of northern goods.

The Mobile Southern Rights Asso-

ciation under John A. Campbell later affirmed the right of disunion but
considered it "unwise for any state to secede by itself."

Its meeting
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was the scene of a violent
dispute between fi re -eater
Percy Waltcer and
Party-regular Thaddeus Sanford,
editor of the Mobile
Register, who wanted
an outright denial of the
96
right of disunion.
Reflecting the Democratic rift,
party newspapers in north
Alabama wanted to purge "stright
outs" from the party:
and

'Wey

now known-their purposes are
revealed.
them.

Nothing but rebellion by Alabama.

Union is yet precious to us." 97

Co. are

Nothing but disunion will
satisfy
We accept the issue.

This

Yancey's reputation as a consistent

secessionist partly resulted fro.
this press characterization,

clearly,

his behavior at the late southern-rights
convention in Montgomery reflected more caution than "fire."
Contributing to the internecine Democratic party conflict, Senator William
R. King added an element of conspiracy.

He saw a plot being hatched and told
friends that his eyes

had been opened to the objects of the
"self styled Southern Rights men"

whose real goal was to carry out "their
disunion project" after promoting
themselves "as the bold defenders of Southern
Rights.

Good and true

men will abandon them to the fate that awaits
them-the condemnation
of every patriot in the land." 98

King's observations were politically

inspired; he had his hopes on the 1852 Democratic
vice-presidential

nomination.
Understandably, the Whig press in particular presented Yancey
as the chief "secession culprit."

The Alabama Journal and the Macon

Republican assigned the final version of the Montgomery southern-rights
resolutions to him, despite the fact that

it

was extremists who had

amended his resolutions in favor of separate action by Alabama. 99
While Democrats splintered over which "Southern" policy to pursue,
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district leaders in
ft, spring of 1851 began selecting
their
for the forthcoming state
and Congressional elections.
Governor Henry
Collier was the unchallenged
nominee for a second term
of the party
regulars. However, throughout
the spring, Union
Democrats confronted
challenges from southern-rights
Democrats; in some instances
southern
rights or secession Democrats
disregarded the Congressional
nominations
of district party men and
contested the regular selections.
For example,

Democratic-Unionist George Smith Houston
wrested the fifth district nomination from incumbent ultra David
Hubbard who persisted in running
against
Houston as a secessionist Democrat.
Williamson Cobb, another upstate
Democrat-Unionist, had no trouble in
retaining support from district

party men in the sixth district but
confronted Robert Murphy, a southernrights Democrat who stopped short of
advocating secession.
C.

C.

Clay, Jr., who had planned to run
against Cobb, declined to con-

test giving up the challenge to Murphy.
trict,

Significantly,

In the fourth Tuscaloosa dis-

incumbent S. W. Inge, who refused to vote for
the Compromise,

declined to run.

He was replaced by planter John Erwin, a former
Whig,

who stood as a southern-rights Democrat but was
"utterly hostile to disunionism in any of its phases."

In the Montgomery district, east-cen-

tral "hotspurs" were able to nominate John Cochrane,
a Democratic legis-

lator from Barbour County, who had been a state elector for
Lewis Cass

and advocate of squatter sovereignty in 1848.

Now in 1851 Cochrane

adopted the mantle of Democratic secessionist.

In the third district

Sampson W. Harris ran for a third Congressional term as a southern-rights
Democrat.

Compromise

He stood on the Georgia Platform even though it sustained the

which Harris had voted against.

In the seventh district
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rank opportunist Samuel

F.

Rice thought that he could
gain a Congressional

seat by campaigning as a
secessionist Democrat.

Congress as a regular Democrat
in 1845, became a

.gain a Democrat in 1851.

He was defeated for

^i 8

in 1848,

and once

Jo hn Bragg, a moderate
southern-rights Demo-

crat, gained the Mobile
Democratic Congressional nomination. 100

Before the Congressional campaigns
got under way, news reached
Montgomery in mid-Hay that South
Carolina southern-rights organi
2 ation S
had gathered to consider forcing
their state into disunion as the
only
means of combatting the Congressional
Compromise.
Palmetto state radicals

maintained that with California and New
Mexico accepted as free states,
the political doom of the south had
been determined.

Hence, at the end

Of May 1851 Montgomery southern-rights
members also convened.

Yancey

again wrote resolutions encouraging South
Carolina secession and stated
that all slave states had a duty to come
to her aid if the federal govern-

ment Used force to prevent it.

If "South Carolina should fail to secede,

euch failure will be the death knell of all hope
of resistance to federal

Oppression... it will crush the spirit of the South and tend
to consolidate this government upon the ruins of States Rights." 101

Significantly,

Yancey did not propose intervention by Alabama on behalf of South
Carolina but cooperative defiance by the entire south.

Editor J. J. Seibels, meanwhile, had reached the end of his patience with Yancey.

He had contended that sectional unity was a pre-

requisite to secession, and urged another southern convention.

His

proposals were tabled by the Yancey-led assembly, whereas all of Yancey's
were adopted.

Seibels then condemned Yancey and "his group of extremists."

He also attacked them for not fraternizing "with any man or set of men
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who will not now advocate a
secession of Alabama fro, the
Union."
who suggested a course short of
secession of Alabama
to

W

All

all intent,
and purposes submissionists or
in other words, there could
be but two
positions secession or .submission." 102
This was an unfair reading of

Yancey's resolutions.

He was not proposing Alabama
secession but co-

operative action by all slave states if
South Carolina should secede
and if the federal government should
use force to prevent it. Henceforth Yancey's and Seibels' violent enmity
became notorious.

The actions of the Montgomery southern-rights
men did little to

resolve the stance of south-central Alabama
Southern Rights Clubs; es-

pecially with the summer campaigns underway.

Should Alabama ultras in-

sist that all radical candidates for office take
a disunionist stance

or a more moderate position?

To resolve this predicament, ninety repre-

sentatives from nineteen Clubs attended a June state-wide
Southern Rights

Convention in Montgomery.

As they had four months earlier, south-central

and east-central counties dominated.

The Mobile organization under John

A. Campbell ran the meeting, and Yancey authored a set of moderate
reso-

lutions.
the state.

Carolina.

All were now well aware of the temper of public opinion in
Consequently, they did not advocate the secession of South
Alabama, like all southern states, should defend the right

of any slave state to secede and if the federal government acted coercively, then force should be employed by her sister states.

Yancey's and Campbell's moderation extended to the gubernatorial
candidate.

Although critical of the Compromise, Governor Henry Collier

had maintained a conservative position.

He never endorsed South Caro-

lina's position, did not speak in disunionist terms, and refused to call

)
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a state convention to
deal with the

Democratic ultras opposed him.

tectorial

Under CarapbeU

crisis.

^

,

s

Therefore ,

_

^

y

ever, and Yancey's compliance,
the Convention came
out for Collier.
One reason for the endorsement
was the position of Benjamin
Shields,

Collier's opponent.

A Marengo County Democrat and

Shields was running with Whig
support.

a planter-lawyer,

He began his campaign with
the

motto,

-Union right or wrong, at all
hazards, and to the last
extremity."
Campbell's strategy rested on the
assumption that an outright
secessionist
would have no chance against a
party regular like Collier or
against
an avowed Unionist like Shields
who had Whig support. 104

Campbell's stewardship of the
Convention,

it

should be noted,

was a fascinating contrast to the
erratic, demagogic, and discordant
guidance of Yancey's at past Southern
Rights Club meetings.

Unlike

Yancey, he tried to improve the
prospects of ultra southern-rights can-

didates.

Because of the prudent guidance of John
A. Campbell, Alabama's

Southern Rights Clubs rejected the radical
scheme of separate state
secession proposed by South Carolina Rhettites.

Rather they proposed

a united action of all cotton states only
if the federal government were

to use force on a seceding state.

Despite Campbell's attempts to improve the position
of ultra

southern-rights candidates, they were in political trouble
as the Congressional campaigns heated up in July.

The most bitter campaign occurred

in the Montgomery district, where ultra John Cochrane contested
Whig-

Unionist James Abercrombie.

(Abercrombie had replaced incumbent Henry

Milliard who had refused his party's re -nomination.
In the early spring Cochrane had come out for secession.

He "prayed
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God that the South may
fm m i-v,
nerself from
y tear her<?Plf
the power of the Monster
which
does not conceal its purpose." 10 *
John

^^

^^^

cal Barbour County hotspurs"
who had been agitating the
disunion i ssue
since the fall of 1850 while
aiming at the Congressional
seat of Henry

Milliard.

However, after the June Southern
Rights Convention, Cochrane

"stopped breathing fire" and
was circumspect on secession.
Second district Whigs desperately
wanted to retain their hold on
the Montgomery district
Congressional seat, and they prevailed
upon Hill
iard, an outstanding debater,
to take the stump for Abercrombie.
Mont-

gomery district Democrats confronted
with the prespect of answering one
of the state's most outstanding
polemicists turned to William L. Yancey

whose reputation as a stump speaker was
renowned.

Thus, Cochrane and

Abercrombie had little chance to debate.
In the first clash between Hilliard and
Yancey,

the former tried

to put the secession onus on Yancey and his
"client" Cochrane.

maintained that no state had a lawful right to secede. 106

Hilliard

In a debate

at Union Spring, outside of Montgomery, Yancey
scrupulously avoided the

Secession question and railed against Hilliard
bills-

's

vote for the Compromise

He also noted that his opponent had "too friendly an attitude

towards leaders of the North." 107

Hilliard replied by reminding his

audience that Yancey, while a Congressman, had voted for the Oregon bill

With its slavery exclusion amendment.

He also cited "Yancey

to dissolve the union" announced at the Macon, Georgia,

assembly in 1850»

'

s ..

.des ire

fire-eaters

Both Unionists and southern-r ighists in attendance

agreed that Yancey had failed to deal with the real issue, namely secess

ion.

108
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In their next encounter,
Yancey confronted the disunion
issue,

following a long-winded, three-hour,
account of the constitutional
relationship between federal and state
government.
"Action must be taken,"
he declared, "to reduce the power
of the central government
which pre-

vents the spread of slavery into the
territories, and if that action
failed Alabama would have a
constitutional right to secede." 109
Hilliard
responded that secession was revolutionary
and not constitutional.
Secession "was the best way to destroy slavery.

If the South left the Union

all remaining options of slave migration
in the United States would close." 11
In their last clash, Yancey returned to
Hilliard 's southernism.

He charged

the former Congressman with making
speeches to "Abolitionists and Negro

thieves" in Boston and "wondered where Hilliard's
true sympathies lie." 111

Yancey's ad hominem tactics caused the remaining debates
to be canceled.
He had not addressed himself to the question of
single state secession,

but had only insisted on the theoretical right of
secession.

When the election results were tabulated in the Montgomery district
run-off, Abercrombie triumphed by a 1600 margin. 112

These results con-

firmed the moderate-to-conservative mood of second district voters.

The election outcome, to some degree, was a triumph for Whig-planter con-

servatism.
However, in the Mobile district Democrats won a Congressional

victory only because of the sagacity of their standard bearer.
Bragg,

John

following the lead of the June resolutions of the Alabama Southern

Rights Convention, recognized the right of secession but opposed separate
state action.

He also claimed to be a better "Southron" than his Whig

adversary, editor

C.

C.

Langdon (who was born and reared in Connecticut).
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Bragg was able to unite all factions
hostile to Langdon and he won by
1523 votes.
In the upper-central third district
incumbent Sampson W. Harris,
a rabid southern-rights advocate who
had voted against the Congressional

Compromise, restrained his ultra impulses.

He was criticized for his

moderation by local fire-eaters who refused
to go along with the June
resolutions of the Southern Rights Convention.

They condemned Harris

as "one of the most dangerous conciliators of
the South because he opposes

separate state secession."

Harris' tactics worked, however; he stood

on the Georgia Platform—conditional Unionism--and
defeated Whig William
114
Mudd by 538 votes.

Two former Whigs and sometime Democrats squared off in
the fourth
(Tuscaloosa) district:

John Erwin, a wealthy planter with 169 slaves,

and Judge "little Billy" Smith.
the Compromise of 1850.

Both opposed secession and sustained

Smith took only two of the five counties but

won by a slim edge--fifty ballots. 115
Southern-rights ultra Democrat David Hubbard in the upcountry
fifth district was silent on the disunion issue and had to defend his

vote against the Compromise.

George Smith Houston had the support of

regular Democrats as well as Whigs and beat Hubbard in a landslide victory.

116

Democrat Unionist W. R. W. Cobb in the sixth district had a vic-

tory over Robert Murphy his Democratic southern-rights challenger by
a majority of 3605 votes.

11

Samuel F. Rice, the ultra southern-rights standard bearer in the

seventh district, shifted to endorsement of the Georgia Platform when
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voters did not respond to his
radical secession plank; he
lost to Alexander White, his Whig-unionist
opponent, by a 373 plurality. 118
Thus the seven elected
Congressmen-five Democrats and two
Whigs

-campaigned as outright Unionists and
conditional Unionists.

These

Congressional results, in sum, reflected
the Unionism of Alabama voters
regardless of their section,
1851, cotton prices persisted over

m

twelve cents a pound.

Few Alabamians wanted to jeopardize
that.

Governor Henry Collier defeated Benjamin
Shields, a Democrat who

was running with Whig support.

Shields dropped out of the race because

of poor health in July, but his name
remained on the ballot.

Stepping

out of character, Collier spoke to the
compromise and secession ques-

tions.

He did not approve or disapprove of the
Compromise.

And he as-

serted that no slave state convention would be held
unless the southern

people demanded one.

He also came out against "all secession schemes." 119

A significant feature of the campaign was the fusion of north

Alabama Union Democrats and Whig Unionists.

This was part of a Whig

stratagem to gain political ascendancy in the state.
regulars understood this Whig ploy.

Democratic party

Three regulars, in a letter to the

Huntsville Democrat, rejected this tactic because

it not

only threatened

Democratic control but also gave credence to Democratic ultras.

"The

amalgamation of Whiggery and Democracy we regard entirely unnecessary
as the dissolution of the Union is threatened only by small numbers of

persons in this state."

If the firebrands were left

"to their own re-

flections without being treated as a party demanding the combined oppo-

sition of Whigs and Democrats they would have to change their tactics
in order to be elected."

120

t
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Despite the air of conciliation
manifested by the electic
Lon returns, some newspapers continued
their attack on those opposed to
"straight

out" secession.

Foremost among them-all east-central
papers-were The

Spirit of the Sout h, journal of the
Eufaula clique; the Hayneville
Chronicle

;

and the Dallas Gazette, mouthpiece of
the Dallas County ultras.

After the 1851 outcome, they believed "all

is

lost-life, liberty, lands,

slaves, all is lost -overwhelmed on the torrent
of anarchy, which abo-

lition will pour upon our glorious land." 121

Or as another lamented,

"The proposition [election results] then amounts to
a total surrender
122
of ourselves and all we have into the hands of an abolition
party."

The Whig press responded to the ultra journals by accusing eastern

Black Belt southern-rights leaders of disunionism and opportunism.

A

Whig paper identified the leaders of "the traitorous bands of Disunion
in the state."

Yancey and his law partner John Elmore, both from South

Carolina, led the list followed by "George Goldthwaite an old Cass man;

John Cochrane, also a late Cass man; George Williams, a nullifying Whig;

Jefferson Buford, a nullifying Whig; Mr. James Pugh, a former Taylor
elector and South Carolina nullifier; Col. Seibels and John A. Campbell,
devoted followers of Mr. Calhoun and no one else."

The account further

Stated "nine times out of ten they will prove to have come from South

Carolina (whether calling themselves Whigs or Democrats of late) they
are nullifiers."

Their all-consuming "wish is to ride both the old parties

to the devil and to control the Governme^*

-

for themselves."

123
It

is

Interesting to note that the disunionists on the list had all been quiet
on secessionisin during the 1851 election.
the Montgomery ultras.

Seibels parted company with

Campbell maneuvered himself into a centrist
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southern-rights position.

After his defeat, Cochrane tended
.ore to

his law practice and suppressed his
secessionist sentiments.

Yancey
did not come out for immediate
secession while stumping for Cochrane.

After the August outcome, Yancey was
particularly despondent.
He indicted all traditional party
organizations, observing that "the

Southern Rights cause, per se, has no organization
here"; and he also
perceived the motives of most southern-rights
extremists:

"One half

of those who were its advocates in name, are
as much submissionists as
the Union men.

I

look on merely and will take no part in aiding
a re-

organization of the old Democratic party.

A Presidential election would

effectively kill off all that remains of Southern Rightism if its
friends
Were to go into it, under old party colors." 124
would prove correct.

Yancey's prediction

In 1852--a Presidential election year--there was

an exodus of southern-rights men back into the Democratic party.

Students of Alabama's secession movement have affirmed the leadership role Yancey played in the events of 1851.

Henry Meyer contends

that Yancey led "a strong faction in Alabama, the 'Yanceyites

exhibited a zealous devotion to the idea of secession.

1

,

"

which

Alabama ultras,

according to this interpretation, unwaveringly adhered to principle.
But, as indicated, Yancey's political behavior in 1851 was erratic.

At

the February southern-rights meeting in Montgomery his cooperative seces-

sion resolution was amended from the floor by a "hotspur" bloc.

In June

he yielded to John A. Campbell and the Mobile Southern Rights Club.

Campbell swung the delegates into line behind a mild resistance resolution that supported collective southern action.

Yancey also joined

the Convention in endorsing conservative Governor Henry Collier for re-
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election.

He carefully shunned instant
secession while debating Henry

Milliard and talked only of the
abstract right of disunion.

From the
time of his resignation from
Congress, states Ralph Draughon,
Jr.,

Yancey usually was consistent in
refusing to cooperate with Democrats
unless they lived up to what he regarded
126
as correct principles.

But

as noted above, his correct principles
included evasion and often a re-

fusal to commit himself to outright
secession.

consistent southern nationalists.

Clearly, there were more

George W. Gayle of the Dallas County

ultras displayed a more determined adherence
to unqualified secession
than did Yancey.

Yancey's most consistent characteristic was an
immo-

deration which alienated those around him.

His antagonists were legion.

Bellicose rhetoric, a hot temper, and an overweaning
ambition for political power and notoriety, seem to have been his most
distictive traits.

After the 1851 election, Alabama Democrats began reorganizing
their party with Governor Collier, Senator King, Benjamin Fitzpatrick,

Thaddeus Sanford, and Secretary of State William Garrett among the prime
movers.

All of these party regulars came from south-central Alabama

and, as noted earlier, they played a minimal role in the acrimonious

political struggles of their region in the campaign of 1851.

Whig edi-

tor William B. Figures remarked that Democratic reorganization means

"putting the State back under the Montgomery Regency."

127

Editor J. J.

Seibels helped out by boosting the stock of William R. King for the

Vice-presidency in 1852.

Admitting that he had formerly been at odds

with King, Seibels now declared that past differences should not fore-
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#3®*e the necessity for party harmony. 128

In addition to being a
unity

«a,.ure, reorganization would have
other functions; namely, bringing
Dem° crat
^ especially upstate Unionists who collaborated with the

m

Whigs, into line in time for the
forthcoming Presidential campaign.
As to Democrats who by choice
remained "outside the pale/' Democratic

loyalist Vhaddeus Sanford felt that it
would be "a Godsend to our party
if Yancey and the hotspurs no longer
curse our councils by their trai-

mm*

alliance."
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Similarly, Senator John Slidell of
Louisiana praised

Alabama's regular Democrats for their leadership
in putting the party
back into the national Democratic ranks and
advised, "As to the Rhetts,
Yanceys, and etc., the sooner and more effectively
we get rid of them
the better,...."
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On .January

8,

1852, the Democratic party held its state Conven-

tion and adopted a resolution standing on the finality of the
Compromise.
"The south Alabama Democrats and their newly found Union allies
[upstate

Democrats] met," an observer to the caucus reported, "and the former pushed
the latter forward by giving them the promise of offices."

unanimously endorsed William
presidential nomination.
timore were chosen.
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R.

The meeting

King for either the presidential or vice-

Delegates to the national convention in Bal-

By early spring the traditional shaky alliance

between Alabama Democrats had been re-established.

With the re-united Democrats controlling the General Assembly, they
turned on their opponents.

They pushed *« ordinance through the state

legislature which redistricted Congressional districts in order to give

themselves an advantage.

It

gerrymandered Black Belt Whigs counties

and, increasing the number of Democratic upcountry counties, gained three
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more legislature seats for the
132
Democrats.

Alabama Whigs, besides being electorally
crippled in Alabama,
faced another dilemma when they met
to select a delegation for
their

presidential nominating convention to be held
in Philadelphia.

Many

believed that Millard Fillmore was the only
viable Whig candidate outside the south, und instructed delegates to
vote for him.

The Whig

leaders, Judge Arthur Hopkins of Mobile and
Thomas Hill Watts, the rich

planter of Montgomery, deplored the national party
schism into cotton
and conscience factions.

abolitionized.

They felt that the northern wing had been

The fear of Congressmen Alexander White and James
Aber-

crombie that abolitionized Whigs could control the convention
and that,
therefore, Fillmore did not have a chance, prompted them to
decline nomi-

nation as delegates.

Both believed that a candidate not committed to

the Compromise would be chosen.

Winfield Scott's selection confirmed

their suspicions and they refused to campaign for him. 133

During the presidential contest of 1852 Alabama Democrats went
great lengths to point out to all Unionist s--Whig and Democrat--that

their party nominee, Franklin Pierce, could be depended on to uphold
the 1850 compromise.

Meanwhile, Scott was depicted as a tool of the

anti-slavery [Conscience] Whigs of the north.

Taking advantage of

the vast pro-Compromise sentiment in Alabama, William R. King, who was

selected as the vice-presidential nominee on the Pierce ticket, publicly
stated,

"I was

probably the first individual in the slave holding states

who publicly took ground in favor of acquiescence."

He made it known

that if he became President he would veto any attempt to repeal the

Fugitive Slave Act.

Senator King expressed satisfaction at sharing the
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ticket with Pierce.

Though possibly lifted in
"information and poli-

tical experience/' Pierce was a "firm
and decided supporter of the con-

stitutional rights of the South." 135

With the presidential campaign heating up,
"last ditch" ultra
southern-rights delegates, sixty-two in all from
eight east-central
counties, met in Montgomery on September 13 to
decide whom to support
for the Presidency.

This was part of a growing movement throughout

Black Belt counties in the Gulf states (particularly
Mississippi and
Alabama) to nominate fire-eaters for the 1852 presidential
election.
They endorsed two southern-rights extremists, George Troup
of Georgia
136
for President and John A. Quitman of Mississippi as his running
mate.

Troup was a radical southern nationalist and former legislator from
Georgia, and Quitman was an ex-governor of Mississippi.

Yancey remained silent on the Presidential question.

Dallas

County firebrand George W. Gayle asked him to quell the uneasiness of
the ultras, who had heard that he would campaign for Pierce.

"If my

vote were at all necessary," Yancey replied, "to give the vote of this
state and to elect General Pierce in order to prevent the election of

General Scott,

I

should feel it my duty to vote for General Pierce."

13 7

Yet he insisted Troup and Quitman were his first choice; but he did not

campaign for them.

He did not even cast a ballot in this election, and

justifying it, he claimed that legal business had taken him away and he
couldn't vote.

138

Since 1846, like his intellectual mentor, John C.

Calhoun, Yancey had condemned national party loyalty for its temporizing

effect; but in 1852 he began a flirtation with the Democratic party

which would ultimately effect his entering its ranks again.
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In Alabama,

to 14,713.

Pierce and King defeated Scott and
Graham, 26,637

The Troup-Quitman ticket received 2175
139
votes.

The turn-

out percentage was 47; that is, less than
half of Alabama's eligible

voters, 53 percent, did not vote. 140

—all

in south-central

tages.
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The Whigs carried seven counties

Alabama— and four of them had high slave percen-

Troup took two Black Belt counties-Lowndes and
Barbour-home

of the Eufaula Regency.

The meager showing of ultra southern rightists

was restricted to the Black Belt:

slightly ov^r 200 votes in Autauga

and Dallas Counties and nearly 150 in Wilcox County.

They collected

ten votes in north Alabama; and five each in Franklin and Lawrence Counties.
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Significant numbers of east-central Whigs,

C.

C.

Cole affirms,

cast ballots for Troup and Quitman because they felt Pierce and Scott

were too northern in orientation. 1

A3

Certainly, Barbour County's "nulli-

fying Whigs," led by Jefferson Buford and James Pugh, voted heavily for

Troup.

Pierce swept the highland Democracy and twenty-seven counties

in south-central Alabama.

The total vote was 23,000 less than the entire

vote cast in the Congressional elections of 1851.
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For a majority of Alabamians, then, the issue had been settled
in 1851.

Union sentiment predominated.

this was anti-climatic.

Pierce?

Scott?

Troup?

All

Of greater importance was that Democratic party

regulars maintained control.

And of even greater consequence was that

the Whig party began to disappear after 1852.

Thereby the strongest

Union bloc in south-central Alabama was eliminated and new political
opportunities opened up for these aggressive "hotspur" cliques in eastcentral Alabama.

CHAPTER
THE SIMMERING FIFTIES:

V

FACTIONALISM, OPPORTUNISM, AND SOUTHERN RIGHTS

By the eighteen fifties most central and south
Alabama Democrats
as well as some Whigs from east-central Alabama
referred to themselves

as southern rights advocates.

In the fifties southern rights meant main-

taining the economic benefits of slavery along with preserving
the only

system of racial adjustment that could effectively keep blacks
controlled
and subordinate.

westward.

Southern Rights also intended the expansion of slavery

The more strident among these Southern extremists, also in-

sisted that Congress pass a federal slave code insuring slavery's existence in the South and its rights in the territories.

bama Platform" first proposed in the late 1840's.

This was "The Ala-

Many south Alabama

politicians also considered southern rights challenged by northern cri-

ticism of slavery, and went so far as calling for a halt--by statute-of all criticism of the south's peculiar institution.

Most of these

southern extremists, throughout much of the 1850' s, did not call for
secession.

They still saw their political future tied to the national

Democratic party.

The vast majority of their constituents did not find

disunion to be a rational solution to the national debate over slavery.
These south Alabama politicians were obsessed with gaining high
office.

Consequently, while southern rights advocates, they would often

challenge each other in local and congressional elections, and by acusing
each other of being "soft on southernism", they would manipulate the

southern-rights issue to their own advantage.
However, by 1853 southern-rights agitation had subsided, although
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some residual Black-Belt southern rights
associations did continue to

operate.

These clubs functioned as pressure groups within
the south-

central Alabama Democracy.

Leading fire-eaters tended to be inactive

in the mid-fifties and southern rights receded
in importance.
L. Yancey,

William

for example, became a full-time lawyer for three
years, sel-

dom taking part in politics.
Another manifestation of waning sectional tensions was Alabama's
initial response to the Kansas-Nebraska Act of May 1854.

Illinois Sen-

ator Stephen A. Douglas chairman of the Senate committee on the territories confronted the territorial question.

He had supported the Compro-

mise of 1850, but he reopened the slavery issue in 1854 when he sponsored
the Kansas -Nebraska Act which, superceded the Missouri Compromise.

This

act endorsed the popular sovereignty doctrine--all questions pertaining
to slavery in the territories were to be left to the people residing

there.

Upstate Alabama, which had areas of lowest slave density, un-

derstandably endorsed the measure with enthusiasm.

South-central Alabamians,

who lived in areas densely populated by slaves, first expressed concurrence with and only later resentment toward the act.

One reason was

simply indifference to matters so remote from the State.

Indeed all

of Alabama was preoccupied with such issues as bank reform, temperance,
and state aid for railroads; by 1853 local issues preoccupied Alabamians;
so did Whig attempts to forestall Democratic gerrymandering.
In 1853 Governor Henry Collier selected Benjamin Fitzpatrict to

complete the senatorial term of Vice President-elect William

R.

King.

King had died in the spring of 1853, and with his death leadership of
the Alabama Democracy passed to Fitzpatrick.

King's death not only re-
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moved the leading exponent of unionism
in south Alabama's Democracy
but
also a party manager whose ability in
pulling disparate elements together

was unmatched.

When the territorial controversy heated
up after 1856,

Fitzpatrick's skill in uniting all factions of the
party-ultra, moderate and unionist --would be severely tested and
found lacking.

Eighteen fifty-three also marked the last gubernatorial
term of
Governor Henry Collier, and the State confronted
congressional, legislative and senatorial elections as well.

Temporary silence on the issue

of slavery did not bring to an end the factionalism
within the Democratic
Party.

Nor did it stifle the opportunistic scheming among southern rights

politicians—and the jockeying for position.

Witness,

for exanple,

the

political opportunism of Democratic State Representative Boiling Hall
from Autauga County in the third Congressional district who sought high

political office.
Hall considered himself a defender of southern rights; so did

Sampson W. Harris, the third district Democratic Congressman.

But Hall

began in January 1853 a private campaign to wrest the third district
Congressional nomination from the incumbent Sampson W. Harris.

Hall,

a Montgomery Regency political boss from Autauga County, joined his

"advance man" newspaper editor John Hardy, in planning to pave the way
for his own elevation by securing the gubernatorial nomination for Re-

presentative Harris.*
Even though Hardy learned that Harris himself rejected the guber-

natorial trade off,

2

there is evidence that most of the Montgomery Regency

were also behind Harris' removal from his present post.
in Dallas County, Hardy wrote Hall that "the Democrats

3

I

While in Selma,
have talked to
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...are disposed to give aid to any
respectable man other than Harristhe Southern Rights men are opposed
to his running, to a man,
while the

Union portion are disposed to try somebody
else."

Furthermore, Hardy

confided that a district convention would
be forthcoming and "if the
thing is discreetly managed you can be
the nominee for Congress...." 4
In sum,

although Hail like Harris was a Democratic
southern rights advo-

cate Hall's appetite for high office did not
deter him from contesting
a fellow "Southron."

The Democratic state convention got under way in
Montgomery on

May

2,

1853.

Only thirty-eight of the fifty-two counties sent
delegates

since northern and south-eastern regions of the state failed
to do so.

John A. Winston, an opulent and flamboyant planter-lawyer from
Sumter
County, was considered the frontrunner for the gubernatorial post.

Win-

ston had publically taken a stand against state aid for railroads and

other internal improvements, thus receiving support from anti-internal
improvement Democrats all over the state.

Winston had three contenders:

Judge Thomas A. Walker of Benton County, his most serious challenger;

Sampson W. Harris of Coosa, placed in nomination by Boiling Hall's supporters; and J. L. F. Cottrell of Lowndes.

By the seventh ballot Winston

became the unanimous choice of those assembled, and Hall's strategy to
get Harris nominated was thwarted.^

After Harris' defeat in the Democrat caucus, John Hardy revealed
to Boiling Hall that he had been unable to get support for Hall in the

various district Democratic meetings, and advised him to try and retain
his Assembly seat.

A Montgomery Regency worker told Hall that the Southern

Rights Club of Mulbury in Autauga County was "prepared to nominate a
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southern rights candidate for his seat."

Hall's correspondent also said

that he would try and control "the
Club at Battville and appoint such

delegates to the proposed County caucus
as will certainly attend and
6
oppose any nomination being made except
yours."

Southern-rights ultra W. D. Smith soon emerged
as Hall's chief opponent, and C. M. Jackson, another key Montgomery
Regency campaign worker,
sent a party loyalist to see Smith and try to
prevent him from challenging for Hall's seat.

Finally, however, Jackson advised Hall not to con-

tinue obstructing Smith's candidacy for, he concluded
"it would be more

pleasant for you to meet and contend openly against a tangible
opponent,
than to be antagonized.

you."

.

.continually by those who are disaffected towards

He was sure of Hall's success, he

added, despite the fact that

"90 per-cent of the Whig party in this County will vote for your
Demo-

catic Southern Rights opponent." 7

This information indicates that even

though many Whigs in Autauga County were vocal unionists they were willing to put principle aside in order to defeat a hated member of the Mont-

gomery Regency.
Seeking help from any and all during the canvass, Hall agreed to

uphold temperance reform if elected and received support from the chair-

man of Alabama's Temperance Society.
of the race,

9

By July W.

D.

Smith dropped out

and Hall was informed by a Regency member that "scarcely

any Southern Rights Democrat" would vote against

him.^

As to the Whigs, they held their convention in Montgomery--in

order to select a gubernatorial candidate and fashion

a party platform.

Alabama Whigs, ever fearful of the growing fragmentation of the national
Whig party--the struggle between Cotton and Conscience Whigs in the North--
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came out against the further annexation
of the territories unless
the
rights of slave states could be provided
for.
They chose as their can-

didate Richard W. Walker of upstate
Lauderdale County.

Referring to

the growing dissent within the national
Whig party, he told the dele-

gates that Alabama's politicians should stop trying
to manipulate national issues that really had no effect on the
State; and he called instead for a vast program of internal improvements.

gubernatorial campaign got under way he

became^m

However, before the

retired from the race

11
and was replaced by William S. Earnest of Jefferson
County.

Democrats nearly swept the congressional and gubernatorial
races.

John A. Winston easily defeated his Whig opponent for Governor;
and

Boiling Hall succeeded in holding on to his legislative seat.
Other local elections of 1853 illustrate the growing opportunism

exhibited by Alabama's politicians.

In Montgomery second district, Whig

Congressman James Abercrombie confronted southern rights Democrat David
Clopton of Tuskegee, Macon County.

Abercrombie had been an outspoken

nullifier and states rights Democrat in 1832; by 1844 he was a Whig nationalist.

In 1849-1850 he advocated a rigid defense of southern rights,

but was a union Whig again after the Nashville convention.

In yet another

in 1852, he rejected the Whig presidential candidate as being

switch,

too "northern."

This reversal caused the Democratic fire-eating Spirit

of the South to endorse Abercrombie as a more forthright southern na-

tionalist than Clopton and this in turn helped to secure Abercrombie

's

victory.
In the Huntsville sixth district the redoubtable Democrat unionist
W. R. W. Cobb confronted the influential southern rights Democrat C. C.
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Clay, Jr.

In previous challenges Cobb
defeated a distinguished array

of fellow Democrats including William
Acklin, a north Alabama party

manager, and Senator Jere Clemens.

Now in 1853 he won overwhelmingly,

receiving massive unionist support, both
Democratic and Whig, and carrying every county in the district
except one.

announced:

After his defeat, Clay

"The time is not far distance when an
advocate of southern

rights instead of being reviled as a disunionist,
will be respected in

north Alabama as maintaining the Union." 13
Democrats won every congressional race except one.

Three of the

victors were southern rights Democrats and three were
considered prounion.

James Abercrombie, the only Whig elected, campaigned as

thern rights Whig.

a

sou-

With the exception of William Smith in the fourth

Tuscaloosa district, all those who were victorious in south-central Ala-

bama—a region

of dense slave population—campaigned as southern rights

advocates regardless of their party.

Such advocacy would presist in

south Alabama and provide a congenial home when secession sentiment re-

turned in the late fifties.

However, some conservative Whig-unionist

planters from west-central Alabama would reappear during the presidential

campaign of 1860 and make a last effort to keep the State in the Union.
During the fall of 1853 Boiling Hall served as a clearing house
for political news on the forthcoming senatorial election.

Democrat

Jere Clemens was up for reelection, and Benjamin Fitzpatrick, who had

been appointed to William
mation.

Fitzpatrick

'

s

R.

King's seat, required legislature confir-

election by the Assembly was assured.

however, faced certain defeat.

Clemens,

All of south Alabama stood against him

since he had antagonized the Democracy by supporting the Taylor-Fillmore

.

.
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administration.

C

C.

Clay, Jr., a keen observer of
political maneuvering analyzed

the candidates and left the door
open for himself:

Clemens swears he will be elected
as he was before
...if he can t be elected by the
Dem. party he
will be by the Whigs... I do not think
he can be
elected by either party. L. P. Walker
will be
urged forward by some friends; but
as his Democracy
only dates back to
the old men of the party
think his probation not long enough
... .Genl
Houston[ s] claims are urged by the Union
Dem S ...and
favored by the Whigs.... And last and perhaps
least
of the list of patriots who are willing
to serve
their country is your humble servent
I confess
to you that I desire an election because
I feel
that I have been beaten by an ass for the H. of
Rep. [Cobb] because of my state rights principles
and thro' a combination of Whigs and pseudo Dems.,
who falsely represented me as a Disunionist
It would be best to elect one Senator from this
region.
It would tend to harmonize the party, to
remove sectional strife, and if chosen from the
states rights wings, to revive the sinking fortunes
of the party [southern rights segment of the Democratic party] in this region. You see the Whigs
here are determined to unite with the Union Dems.
...and thus crush the States-rights men who aspire
to any office.
Without some help we will be
crushed
.

.

. .

^

It

is unlikely that there was a cabal of upstate union Whigs and Demo-

crats to "crush

11

Democratic southern rights candidates.

But Clay pointed

to the 1853 gubernatorial returns in order to show that John A. Winston

had been beaten by A. Q. Nicks--the choice of upstate union Democrats

who had boycotted the 1853 convent ion- -in Dekalb and Marshall Counties,
that Winston had received a slight plurality in Madison and slim margin
in Blount, Jrrkson, and St. Clair Counties.

15

According to Clay, this

meant that unionism was ascendent in the highland counties owing to
plot between Whig and Democratic unionists.

a

Clay failed to note that

8
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north Alabama, the region of
lowest slave density i„ the
state, had
strongly pro-union since Andrew
Jackson's presidency.

b,
>een

Upstate unionist Nathaniel Davis
was, he told Hall, "of the opinion that two Senators cannot be
elected from the South or North
Alabama
nor can two be elected from the
Southern rights Democracy nor two from
the Union Democracy, the only safe plan
at this time will be to take one

from north and one from the south and one
from the
from the Union side."

Smith Houston.

S.

R.

Dem. and one

He recommended Benjamin Fitzpatrick and
George

16

However, there were south Alabama southern
rights Demo-

crats who, when confronting north Alabama Democratic
aspirants for federal
office, would insist upon candidates espousing southern
rights principles.

This Democratic party leader agreed upon Fitzpatrick but
recommended
L.

P.

Walker, a sometime southern rights agitator from North Alabama,

for Jere Clemens senatorial seat.

A month later, however, George Yel-

verton wrote Hall expressing his support for Eufaula ultra and Democrat
John Cochrane who was seeking the same senatorial post.

In support of

his brief for Cochrane, Yelverton cited Cochrane's pro-Buchanan stance
in 1848.

17

In sum,

it

is

difficult to determine ideological consistency

among many southern rights advocates.

They praised national party re-

gularity and at the same time embraced "devotion to southern rights."
At the end of November 1853 the General Assembly met to select

two senators.

With little opposition Benjamin Fitzpatrick was elected

for the term which was to expire in March 1855.

C.

C.

Clay Jr.'s appeal

to southern rights partisans in south Alabama coupled with upcountry sup-

port gave him enough votes to unseat Jere Clemens and to become senator.

A Whig paper lamented that two "fire eaters had been elected."

1

This
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is somewhat exaggerated since
Fitzpatrick had never identified
with the

extreme southern rights faction in
south Alabama.

Likewise, Clay never
carried his southern rights convictions
so far as to mean disunion.

With the territorial question
quiescent during this period, the
Democrats again turned to their
opposition. Alabama Whig strength was
centered in the east and west-central
Black Belt region of massive slave
density.

The Whigs tried to repeal the 1843
'white basis "--which abolished

the federal ratio, the three-fifths
compromise^ and excluded blacks in

reckoning population in the formation of
congressional districts.

On

January 20, 1854, the Alabama senate defeated this
Whig maneuver in a
strict party-line and sectional vote:

The Black Belt Whig counties voted

for it and the Democratic counties of north and
south Alabama opposed. 19

The Democrats then took the advice of G. T. Yelverton
and gerrymandered
the Whig Black Belt counties.

Montgomery, Macon, and Russell Counties,

which were formerly in the second Montgomery district, were placed
in
the third district.

This district would be carried by the Democrats in

the 1855 congressional election.

Lowndes and Butler counties were moved

into the second district which also tipped that traditional Whig enclave
into the Democratic column in 1855.

These maneuvers confirmed the Mont-

gomery Regency's control over the Black Belt second and third districts. 20
The elimination of Alabama Whigs had dire consequences for union
sentiment in the State.

around the Whig party.

Most unionists in south Alabama had grouped

With it gone, the only effective union organi-

zation in south-central Alabama disappeared.

The area fell under the

control of a Democratic party dominated by southern rights defenders--

either moderates or radicals.

By the late fifties, it was hazardous to
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be an outright unionist in south
Alabama.

Although, as noted earlier,

during the crisis of 1860 some old
conservative planter Whigs tried
to
make a comeback with the Constitutional
Union Party in order to preserve
the union and slavery.

The 1854 Kansas-Nebraska Act compounded
the problems of Alabama

Whigs.

Whig leaders like Henry Hilliard and
Thomas Watts saw the popular

sovereignty doctrine embodied in the Kansas
-Nebraska bill further erode
the principles of the Compromise of
1850-- considered a Whig solution.
For conscience Whigs in the North now lined up
behind absolute prohibi-

tion of slavery in the territories and began
aiding in the construction
of a national party to that end.

By 1854 some Alabama Whigs joined the

Democrats, but the majority moved into the Know-Nothing
party.

Kansas -Nebraska, which superceded the old 36-30 line established

by the Missouri Compromise, committed the Democratic Party and
the executive branch to popular sovereignty.

To Alabama ultras this measure

meant that, with a preponderance of northern migrants already in Kansas
slavery could not extend westward.

But Alabama's congressional delegation,

except for Whig James Abercrombie hewed the party line and voted for the
measure.

They did so for a few apparent reasons.

Alabama's Congressional

delegation's support for the Kansas-Nebraska bill derived from the belief
that the federal government was legally bound --what ever the territorial

governments did--to protect property in slaves.
Register was also willing to endorse the measure;

The influential Mobile
it

said both north

and south had mutually agreed to "repeal the unjust restriction of 1820
and to refer the whole subject of slavery in the territories and States
to the people there of, under the controlling restrictions of the
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Constitution."

21

Another motive was northern
anti-slavery opposition to the
Kansas
Nebraska Act which inspired Southern
congressmen to support the measure.
For example, the Alabama Beacon
declared,

" in

view of the violent oppo-

sition it [the Kanasa bill] encountered
from the

.

. .

.Abol it ionists the

South especially, and the true friends
of the country have a cause for

congratulation."

22

A Democratic organ noted "that the Southern
people

are unanimous in support of the measure." 23

A claim that was not as

unequivocally accurate as this paper declared.

For example,

in the Ala-

bama Assembly firebrand David Hubbard presented
a resolution in 1854

which maintained that if the southern interests were
jeopardized by federal anti-slavery acts Alabama would resist these
ordinances.

State

representative James Belser, occasionally a Whig and a Democrat and
sometime fire-eater and sometime unionist asserted that if the
Kansas bill

were passed and if

it

threatened southern rights he would recommend "re-

sistence to the uttermost."

Hubbard's resolution passed 42-14. 2 ^

Perhaps the state political scene seemingly so contradictory on
this territorial issue is best explained by J. L. M. Curry.

Curry in

the late fifties would wear the mantle of southern-rights extremist and
be elected to Congress from the seventh Talladega district.

But in 1854

he wrote to Senator Clay and congratulated him for his vote in favor of
the Kansas-Nebraska bill:

"Men here universally approve your action

but there is no excitment--no fever, on the subject it is seldom allude'
to in private or public--and so far as the introduction of slavery is

concerned, such a consummation is hardly hoped for."

25
"

In sum,

David

Hubbard's resistance resolution to Kansas-Nebraska apparently reflected
a minority position.

Most Alabamians, it seems, approved the Douglas

206

ordinance or greeted it with apathy.
Meanwhile, in the summer of 1854
Alabama Democrats began to prepare for the 1855 congressional
elections.

Writing to Clay, J. L

.

M.

Curry declared that "the division of
our state into North and South
Alabama, and the election of candidates
according to degrees of latitude
...begin now to work their own cure...."

An upcountry Democrat, Curry

informed Clay, that Clay was not the unanimous
choice of north Alabama.
But Curry also told his correspondent that
the^Senator was considered
an outstanding southern loyalist.

Indeed Clay had earned his "southron" credentials by
opposing
the latest Homestead bill which he, along with Black
Belt southern na-

tionalists, maintained would draw poor southerners to rich
northern lands.
Not only would the south lose a good deal of its population if
the bill

were to be enacted but, he added, "it will prove a most efficient ally
for Abolition, by encouraging and stimulating the settlement of free
farms with Yankees and foreigners precommitted to resist the partici-

pacy of slaveholders in the public domain." 27
We may speculate as to why Clay opposed the Homestead bill while

two upstate Alabama congressmen favored it.

Clay needed the good opinion

of south-central Alabama Democrats, most of whom were southern rights

advocates, since they held the balance in the legislature.

Coming from

the highland Democracy, he had to prove his "southron" credentials to

Black Belt southern nationalists.

[Later, this collaboration during th»

1860 crisis, was to prove very advantageous for Clay who looked forward
to high office in the southern confederacy.]

As Democrats prepared for the 1855 contest, William L. Yancey saw

.
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little future for himself in Alabama
politics.

"Do you not wish to

to practice law?" he despondently
asked his brother,

"if

8o

out my premises to you and my practice
at a low price and
to California."

28

I

I

c ome

will sell

will remove

His depression would disappear as the
territorial

question and the end of Alabama's Whig party
revived opportunities for
advancement
For active politicians, however, the
disappearance of the Whigs
and the rise of the American party only created
problems.

For example,

attorney A. B. Meek, a Mobile Democrat saw the new party
thwarting his
return to the legislature.

"The Know-Nothings, " he wrote,

hereabouts embracing many Democrats

'

non plupia

'

"are numerous

all our calculations.

They will certainly draw a candidate of their own... and so large
a body

would no

doubt elect any one man as there will be many candidates in

the f ield.

..

.almost our whole Bar are aspirants...."

bama Democrats, eager for advancement would agree.

Many south AlaImpeded by a Demo-

cratic party bulging with incumbents, they joined "homeless" Whigs in
the American party and a new political alliance developed.

Know-Nothing power made itself felt in the fall of 1854 when a
Mobile mob nearly beat a Catholic priest to death.

That same autumn

"American" mayors were elected in Mobile and Montgomery. 30

Various

prominent Democrats were alleged to have joined the Party which advocated
a policy of "America for the Americans."

Among them were John Cochrane

of Eufaula Regency fame, new editor of the Mobile Register, John Forsyt'
and William L. Yancey.

The complete list of converts to Know -No thing ism

represents a '•who's who" of Democratic outsiders.
group had held elective office before

31

At

least four of the

and had been defeated in elections

.
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Among them, too were chronic office
seekers who felt little loyalty
to
the Party.

The State political situation,
however, was fluid.

finds important

them was William

Whig,

One

affiliating with the Democrats after
1854.

Among

Figures, editor of the Southern Advocate 32

B.

A caucus of Know-Nothings met

in January 1855 in Mobile and
con-

sidered four candidates to run against
John A. Winston for Governor.
All four candidates-J. M. Withers
(mayor of Mobile), R. A. Baker, George
D.

Shortridge, and James L. Price-were

f

M«fe~BM»e*«e«

33

Since Demo-

cratic Governor Winston was strongly opposed
to state aid to railroads,
the Americans took a pro-State-aid position
in an attempt to attract Whig

nationalists and upstate Democrats partial to internal
improvements.
The Whigs, meanwhile, were hopelessly divided.

Some wanted to

maintain the Party and select a Whig candidate for Governor;
others talked
of fusion with the Americans.

A Whig faction from east-central Alabama

favored Winston's negative stance on internal improvements but
could not

vote for a Democrat.
Some dedicated ultras still considered southern rights foremost

among all questions affecting Alabama, and they could be induced to cam-

paign on that issue.

However, the rise of the Know-Nothings and the

attendant issues of state aid, temperance reform, and foreign influences
in Alabama sometimes overshadowed Southern nationalism and the growing

controversy over Kansas and popular sovereignty.

Governor John A. Winston,

a southern rights extremist in 1850 made only slight reference to squar^r

sovereignty in his first campaign speech.
attacking state aid.

34

He spent most of his time

Southern rights clubs seldom met.

Ultras from

Montgomery, Eufaula and Dallas Counties turned their attention to other
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issues.

George W . cayle, leader of
the Southern

^

^

Dallas county chaired a
Democratic County feting
and composed a series
of resolutions sustaining
Governor Winston and his
antl-state-ald policies.
None of the resolves referred
to southern rights or
35
secession.
In June 1855 the Know-Nothings
gathered

In Montgomery.

Two-thirds
of the delegates, according to
the Montgomery Advertiser,
were former
Whigs. They nominated conservative
Democrat Judge George D. shortrldge
of Selhy county for Governor.
Southern rlghtsT sentiments received
passing notice In a resolution calling
for non-intervention by the federal

government with slavery. 36

Shortridge was selected because he would
be

all things to all men for state aid,
it and

for railroads in regions that
favored

critical of it in areas that were opposed.

temperance reform and immigration restriction.

Shortridge also favored

He rarely mentioned the

"abolitionist menace" and the need to combat it.
The Know-Nothings came to pose a great threat
to Democrats.

In

fact Black Belt southern-rights Democrats were
more concerned with local

defections to the American party than with the struggle for
power between
southern moderates and ultras within the Democratic party.
C. M. Jackson,

For instance,

Montgomery Regency power broker advised Boiling Hall that

Lewis McWhorten, Black Belt Democrat legislator, was ready to bolt to
the Americans.

Jackson outlined Regency strategy to forestall desertions

and Know-Nothing endorsements of Democrats:

"Our policy

it_

appears

to_

is plainly indicated to be first to prevent through our friends still

me

in

the Order [Know-Nothings] the nomination of a democrat by the K-N's....
If the K-N's nominate him [McWhorten]

as a Democrat the defection from

their [Know-Nothing] ranks might not be sufficient to ensure us success."
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However, he continued,

"the

^

^^^

party and the

with the Americans would defeat
37
us."

^

„ lnnlng local

serving the State's Party
organization was clearly m0 re

i m portant

pre _

than

proselytising southern rights to many
southern rights Dcnocrats in
tral Alabama.
During the summer, charges and
countercharges of Know-Nothing

membership reverberated among the
candidates.

Congressman George Smith

Houston, a union Democrat running
for re-election in the highland
fifth

district, was accused of joining the
American Party.

He denied the charge

but did not discourage Know-Nothing
support of his candidacy. 38
0. H. Bynum,

Democrat

formerly Houston's ally, condemned him
as being "neither fish

nor flesh, trying to hold with the hare and
run with the hounds ...."

Referring to Houston's refusal to attack the
American Party, Bynum maintained that "the Democratic party cannot
support a man who will take
to his hole in times like the present."

He asked Democratic fire-eater

David Hubbard, Houston's perennial antagonist,
to oppose the Congressman. 39
In the fourth district congressional race,

William R. Smith, a

former Whig and occasional Democratic representative
failed to get either
a Democratic or a Know-Nothing endorsement and ran
as an independent.

His opposition, southern-rights agitator Sydenham Moore accused him
of

being a Know-Nothing and of collaborating with "the order at the North"

which is "thoroughly abolitionised ... .Their [Northern Americans] presses
do not conceal their hatred of slavery and their contempt for the 'slavp

aristocracy'!"

This fourth district congressional campaign was acrid

with Moore accusing his opponent of being "soft on southernism,

"

but in

spite of Moore's accusation he was easily defeated by Smith in a district

that still had a traditional
Whig electorate.

Percy Walker, once a Whig then
a radical Southern rights
Democrat,
now found it expedient to stand
as the African party
congressional candidate in Mobile's first district.
His Democratic adversary James
Stallworth, a planter-lawyer, condemned
his apostasy which was attributed to

Walker's "sheer desire for office."

Stallworth wondered whether he still

"professes to hold to his states-rights
faith or did he give that up as
well as his old party?"40 Walker, in
turn, insisted that he had not

parted from his "Calhoun faith" and received
the support of a large bloc
of first district southern-rights
advocates.

Walker also emphasized his

support of state-aid, which was understandable,
since the Mobile district
had for years been a stronghold for internal
improvements.

(He defeated

Stallworth by five hundred votes.) 41
The congressional contest in the second district
is of particular

interest.

Because of the Democratic gerrymandering- -Montgomery, Macon

and Russell Counties had been taken from the district, and
Butler and

Lowndes had been added—regional leadership fell to the Eufaula Regency
in Barbour County.

This leadership—composed of Whig nullifiers and

southern rights Democrats— had supported ultra southern rights candidates

with little concern for party loyalty since 1849.

They backed Whig con-

gressman James Abercrombie in 1853 when he discovered "southronism"—
after running as a unionist in 1851.

Eli S. Shorter, a

Eufaula leader,

won the district Democratic nomination and confronted Julius
the American candidate.
a Know-Nothing.

C.

Alford,

During the canvass Shorter was accused of being

He admitted having taken some of the initiation rites

but said that he had declined membership upon learning the American's
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position on non-Protestant*
ocestants.
rights cast."

Rnt-h
Both

,
men claimed
to be of a "pure Southern
i

Alford, a unionlst in

^^

q{ dlgruption

^

^

if the federal government
did not admit Kansas a,
a slave state and re-

peal the Fugitive slave act.

Nonetheless, toward the end of the
campaign,

he indicted Shorter for being
a secessionist,

shorter responded by dis-

claiming the disunion label and
contending that he stood by the
Compromise of 1850. But in the territorial
disputes of 1850-51 Shorter had
called for secession at various times.

Now in 1855 he maintained that

if he were elected he would sustain
the Franklin Pierce administration.

He further deflected interest from the
secessionist issue by concentra-

ting on local issues, and was elected with
a 1200 vote plurality. 42
The campaign in the Montgomery third district
pitted James

F.

Dowdell former seventh district congressman,
against Thomas H. Watts

Montgomery planter-lawyer.

The two major issues were both local:

state

aid, and Watt's earlier attempt in the Alabama
legislature to block illi-

terates from sitting on juries.

Many southern rights Whigs from

the east-central counties voted against Watts
because of his new affili-

ation with the Know-Nothing Party which nullifying Whigs thought unsafe
on southern institutions; and Dowdell outdistanced the once powerful

Whig unionist by a majority of 534 votes.
Despite misgivings on the part of some erstwhile allies George
S.

Houston was re-elected without opposition in the fifth district.

In

the neighboring Huntsville district W. R. W. Cobb was accused of being
a member of the Know-Nothings by his independent challenger James M. Adams.

Cobb denied the charge but said nothing to offend the Americans and de-

feated Adams by more than 2500 votes.

44

.

.
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In the seventh district,

to complete the political
picture,

In-

cumbent Democrat Sampson W.
Harris retained his seat
against former Democrat William B. Martin who
was running as an independent
with Know-Nothing
support
The Democrats, then carried five
districts and the Americans with

Whig support netted two congressional
seats in the Tuscaloosa and Mobile
districts. Democratic Governor Winston
outpolled George Shortridge by
12,000 ballots.

His party, as usual, controlled the
legislature:

there

were sixty-one Democrats and thirty-nine
Americans seated in the lower
House and twenty Democrats and thirteen
Americans in the senate. 45

Most

Whigs had aligned with the new party as they
saw their national organi-

zation hopelessly crippled and their local party
organization gerrymandered into political powerlessness
As significant as the emergence of the American party
in this
1855 campaign was the manipulation of the southern rights issue.

The

habitual tendency of some Alabama politicians to shift from unionism
to

southernism and back again reflected their political opportunism--the
desire for office.

Many Democrats and Whigs had joined the Know-Nothings

simply because their ambitions had been frustrated in their own parties.

Equally frustrated were the small slaveholding lawyer-politicians--men

who lacked a meaningful economic stake in the status quo.

Black silt

lands and slaves were selling at a premium in the mid fifties, and con-

sequently these small slaveholders found their economic advancement blocked,
they turned to politics in their endless quest for status.

Cynically

using any and all issues to vault themselves into office, they frequently

became outspoken Southern nationalists.

Percy Walker is a prime example.
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A small slaveholder and marginal
planter , Walker had
as a radical Whig and Calhounite
nullif ier

.

^

^ reputation

He served in the General

Assembly but, having ambitions for
higher office, he left the Whigs
and
aligned himself with the Democrats.

But his progress was blocked
there,

because the Party had too many aspirants,
and he then joined the Ameri46
cans, thereby gaining a congressional
seat.

There was another group

of chronic Southern chauvinists in the
Black Belt who confined their

activities to planting.

Some entered politics and continually
agitated

for more cotton and slaves.

These were the small planters who could

not afford to pay the rising costs of new
cotton land in Alabama and

by the late fifties were agitating for the
re-opening of the African
slave trade and federal protection of slavery in the
territories.

However,

the 1855 campaign,

to repeat, was marked by an almost

total lack of interest shown in the Kansas question.
the scramble for office dominated.

Local issues and

After the election, however,

Haynes of the Dallas Gazette reopened the old wound.

C.

E.

He declared that

"the only reliable hope for the Southern people can have of securing

their just rights is to depend and rely upon themselves."
the territorial question, he thought, was "impossible.

solution of the Union."

He continued:

.

— no

.short of a dis-

"We are as much as one solitary

individual can be a secessionist of the strictest sect.
peace

Settlement of

We can see no

quiet--no rest to the South short of the adoption of this remedy."

Acknowledging that

"a

majority of our people are in favor of the Union,"

Haynes nonetheless predicted that "the slave states would not receive the
slightest injury by seceding from the free states."'^

Still like his

.
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DaHas County fire-eating collaborator,
George
with the local Democrats.

„.

Gayle , he c00perated

Both endorsed and campaigned
for regular party

nominees

By late 1855 other south Alabama
papers also re-discovered the
Kansas question and a menacing new
political combination in the north:
free soilers who combined politically
in favor of slavery restriction.

What would become the Republican Party
prompted the West Alabamian to

proclaim "the object of the coalition

is to

concentrate all the anti-

slavery strength against the Democratic party
... .They threaten vengence
against the South."

This was an "attempt on the part of free soilers

and Abolitionists," the editorial concluded,

"to assume the time honored

name of Republicans .. .to wage a crusade of Abolition
fanaticism against
48
the Southern. .states."
.

In Barbour County,

traditionally a hotbed of southern nationalism,

a Kansas meeting was held in November 1855 and from Eufaula
Regency fire-

brands Alpheus Baker,

E.

C. Bullock,

Jefferson Buford, and L. L. Cato

issued a series of resolutions denouncing the Massachusetts Immigrant Aid

societies for "flooding the Kansas territory with settlers hostile to

Southern institutions."

The final resolve called upon the Alabama legis-

lature to finance an Alabama slaveholders expedition to Kansas to check
the "Abolitionist menace."

Editor C. E. Haynes praised the Eufaula action

and complained that "Dallas County with her twenty odd thousands of slaves
is still silent while this great issue is at stake.

ment with a feeling of shame."

Southern County in the South."

We make this state-

Haynes called Barbour County "the truest
49

A week later Assemblyman Richard W. Walker offered another set of
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resolutions --"That no restriction or
prohibition of slavery shall

he
iere'

after, by any act of Congress be
extended over any territory of the
United

States."

Walker recommended that Congress implement
the John A. Camp-

bell-William L. Yancey doctrine of federal
protection of slavery in the

territories. 50

On November 30, 1855 a bi-partisan petition
signed

by Governor Winston, Benjamin Fitzpatrick and
seventy-seven other legislators summoned Democrats and Americans to a
Montgomery non-partisan

Kansas meeting on January

8,

1856.

51

Jefferson Buford, announced in

mid-December that he would lead a contingent of Alabama
slaveholders
to Kansas to help win the territory for slavery. 52

Meanwhile Senator Benjamin Fitzpatrick came under attack for his

moderation on the Kansas issue.

Eufaula clique radicals and George W.

Gayle of the Dallas County "hotspurs" considered Fitzpatrick too much
the Democratic Party regular.

The Spirit of the South, organ of the Bar-

bour County ultras, asserted that "the lines must be put aside, and men
must resist the inclination to vote for party interests and must unite
in defense of Southern rights and we await Senator Fitzpatrick's views."

53

Now, unlike before unqualified "southernism" did not confront organized

opposition in south Alabama.

The traditional Whig-union party in south-

central Alabama had disintegrated with many Black Belt Whigs joining the

Know-Nothings who labored assiduously to avoid the territorial issue;
and many nullifying Whigs of east-central Alabama had become Democrats.

Significantly, there was also a bloc of Know-Nothing ultras in and around
the Montgomery district.

Thus, the major political structure in lower

Alabama was controlled by Democratic southern rights moderates and extremists.

As one political reporter observed in late 1855,

"many of the
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states rights Whigs joined the democracy ...
.On southern rights they stood

with the democracy in the lowlands." 54

From 1855 to the spring of 1860,

therefore, for a union faction to survive in south
Alabama it would have

had to recreate itself within the inhospitable
south-central Democratic
Party or capture the Know-Nothings whose majority, both
nationally and
locally, labored to avoid the issue of sectionalism.

By the mid-fifties south Alabama's newspapers pictured the contest
over Kansas as an anti-slavery revolutionary force working for the violent overthrow of constitutional government.

They claimed that "Black

Republicans" in Congress plotted to expel all slaveholders from Kansas
at whatever cost.

The Montgomery Advertiser proclaimed all members of

the Kansas Aid Society swore to violate any law and sacrifice their lives
if necessary in order to maintain the territory as free soil. 55

Often conspiratorial imagery served in lieu of analysis of the
territorial conflict.

According to Congressman William R. Smith, the

treason of the emigrant aid societies was "dark and hidden and sly."
People complained of the brutality of the so-called 'border ruffians"
from Missouri but, he declared, at least there was a manly openness in

their violence.
a bully."

56

'*There

is more devil in a sneak," Smith said,

"than in

These remarks were published in numerous Alabama newspapers.

Much of the information Alabamians received about events in Kansas
came from reporters on the scene.

These journalists as Bernard A. Weis-

berger has observed, helped to make the sectional issue, for many, one
of absolute rights and wrongs.

incidents.

They deliberately invented and embellished

They made stories of torture, murder, and fire standard copy

in the Alabama press especially in the Black Belt.

57
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A call for moderation and self-restraint came
from a most unlikely
source.

On January 8, 1856, Democrats held a caucus in
Montgomery.

William L. Yancey, who had been in political retirement
since 1852, attended the meeting and was called upon to make a speech.

group of anti-Know-Nothing Whigs were also there.

A substantial

Yancey pleaded for

a permanent union of the anti-Know-Nothing Whigs and
Democrats,

to be

known as the Democratic and Ant i- Know-No thing Party, and asked for cooperation with conservative northern Democrats.

The gathering adopted

Yancey's Alabama platform of 1848--federal protection of slavery in the

territories—but so modified, with Yancey's approval, as to enable both
the southern-rights ultras as well as Alabama Democratic moderates to

accept it.

The resolution followed the lead of Stephen A. Douglas's

popular sovereignty doctrine.

It

specified that the people of a terri-

tory could exclude slavery when they met in convention to draft a state

constitution for admission into the union.

To retain the allegiance

of slaveocrats, however, one plank reaffirmed property rights protection
in the territories.

But east-central Black Belt fire-eaters were not

pleased, and denounced him for accepting "squatter sovereignity."

58

Yancey, finally, was willing to co-operate with conservative Democrats
in leaving the question of the authority of a territorial legislature

to the courts.

Alabama's ultras protested.

The State ought to resist even if it

meant a disruption of the Union, any action by Congress impairing the

rights of slaveholders.

The Montgomery caucus selected a slate of nine

presidential electors with south and north Alabama equally represented.
Eighteen fifty-six was a presidential election year and Alabama Democrats
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were solidifying their ranks before the national
convention.

The elec-

tors chosen from south Alabama were all southern
rights advocates of

varying degrees.

Interestingly, two of the upstate electors, Yancey's

brother, Benjamin, recently moved from Georgia, and Leroy
Pope Walker

of Madison County were ultras, and they were moderate to minimal
slaveholders."*

William L. Yancey's proposal at Montgomery was, according to some
of his contemporaries motivated by a desire to take over the Democratic
Party.

According to James Peebles, political confidant of Senator

C.

C.

Clay, Jr.,

both electors for the state at large [Yancey and
Walker] are as distasteful to me as they are to
a large majority of the Democracy of Alabama, but
at a time when expediency, rather than acceptability, was the controlling power with the nominating
convention, they were obliged to cast about for
those men whose speaking powers alone would be
most effectual in persuading the masses. Neither
of the gentlemen referred to are not popular now;
never have been, and never will be. Both have
occupied positions which usually indicate promotion, both have used these positions to effect
higher preferment, and both have signally failed.
Yancey has always wanted to be the drum master.
...They have been unable to command the popular
approvation, the electorship for the State, with
all its popular and fickle demonstrations, cannot
subserve the aims of a daring ambition....

A recent biographer of the Clay family agrees that Yancey in 1856 was
seeking control of Alabama

s

Democratic party.

60

Clearly, Yancey's earlier tactics in the late forties and early
f ifties--ref lected

overweaning personal ambition.

Now in the mid-1850

he was using the Party once condemned by him as a traitor to Southern

rights in order to stage a political comeback.

By 1856 the political

i
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situation was propitious for Yancey.

The Whigs had disintegrated and

southern rights Democrats reigned supreme
in south Alabama.

What better

time for the "Young Demosthenes" to
make his move:

Meanwhile in February 1856, the Know-Nothings
met in Montgomery,
endorsed Millard Fillmore for the presidency,
and selected a delegation
to attend their national convention in
Philadelphia.

The caucus leaders

were all former Whigs; and with three exceptions, 61
all lived in the Black
Belt and all were among Alabama's largest
planter-politicians.

cantly two of the leaders, Thomas H. Watts and

C.

C.

Signifi-

Langdon had been

Whig-unionists— until 1856 when they followed the leadership of Whig
nullifiers J. J. Hooper and James Belser and adopted a resolution
that
firmly approved the extension of slavery in the territories. 62
The Alabama delegation to the Philadelphia convention refused to

approve a Know-Nothing platform which said nothing about extension nor

protection of slavery in the territories.

This platform when accepted,

inspired an exodus of Whig -Americans from south Alabama, especially from
the Mobile district, into the State Democratic organization.

Such old-

line Whigs as Alexander White, Arthur Hopkins, and B. F. Porter, all

agreed to stump for the Democratic presidential ticket.

By 1856, therefore, lower Alabama was becoming a bastion of southern

nationalism as disenchanted Know-Nothings and Whigs saw the slavery extension issue as more consequential to their political futures than allegiance to the national Party ticket which ignored it.

There is, to be

sure, no conclusive evidence of mass conversions to secessionism at this

time.

Most Alabama politicians of Whig -Know-Nothing persuaism walked

that thin line of all measures short of disunion.

There was, of course,
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a combination of conservative Whig-planters
from west-central Alabama

who were in political retirement through most
of the fifties but reemerged as Constitutional Unionists in the spring
of 1860 and campaigned
for old-line Whig John Bell of Tennessee.

Jefferson Buford one of Alabama's most fanatical
fire-eaters,
heaped more fuel on the Kansas fires by persisting in
his plans for an

expedition that would affirm the rights of slaveholders.
soon became a cause, celebre for other fire-eaters.

Buford' s quest

Alpheus Baker,

a

Eufaula ultra, crusaded in Georgia and South Carolina in search of funds.
Yancey took the stump in Alabama.

So did former Whig -unionist Henry

Hilliard who castigated the Massachusetts Emigrant Aid Society as a har-

binger of abolition.

State Representative F. K. Beck, from slave-dense

Wilcox County, introduced a bill in the legislature to appropriate $25,000
for Buford 's journey.

But the measure sobered the law -makers "Kansas

fever" and they referred it to committee where it died.
The legislators did issue a report on Kansas.

It

called for non-

intervention by Congress, and it demanded that the federal government
recognize Kansas' pro-slavery legislature.

"The hope of receiving jus-

tice at the hands of our Northern brethren has long since expired," it

declared "we will meet upon that common territory which shall be dyed

with the gore of thousands of Southern patriots, who are willing to die
64
in defense of their rights in the States and territories."

Such an

assertion could only intensify Alabama militancy in the lowlands.
Understandably it would sharpen the ultra spirit and power in

east-central Alabama.

In Eufaula,

for example, on March 31,

1856 Luford

and his adjutant Alpheus Baker, brought about a hundred men together at
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Eufaula and then journeyed to Columbus, Georgia and
Nashville, Tennessee
looking for more recruits.

They went on to Montgomery and on April 4

Buford counted 350 men of whom one -hundred were from South Carolina,
fifty were Georgians, one each from Illinois and Boston, with the
balance

from Alabama.

Buford promised these volunteers free land in Kansas. 65

On the eve of their departure Judge William P. Chilton, a Whig

from Montgomery, addressed the expeditionary force.

He was still a "un-

ion man," he insisted, yet he declared that every Southerner's rights

had to be maintained in the union if possible, if not, then out of it.
'*The

South had compromised too long," he asserted,

too much for harmony.

it

"had sacrificed

By this course the North had been encouraged to

new acts of aggression.

For the future the South must suffer no infringe-

ment of her Constitutional rights but must assert and maintain equality

with the North."

6

Chilton's remarks represented yet another conversion

in the continuous passage of important Whig-lawyer nationalists to the

southern rights position.

These Black Belt Whig power brokers were, at

least in part, responding to the loss of party structure and to the im-

peratives of political survival.
On April

6

the Buford contingent left for Kansas under banners

proclaiming "The Supremacy of the White Race, Kansas The Outpost."

Such

publicized objectives notwithstanding, those who joined were clearly as
interested in Buford' s promise of forty acres of Kansas land and support
for a year as his commitment to make Kansas a slave state.

To be sure,

Buford himself, as Paul Gates has observed, "seemed as much interested
in his land activities as in the slavery question."

67

A man of modest

circumstances he, too, looked upon the Kansas adventure as a means of
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personal gain.
To Southern rights extremists the fact that few
if any slaves

were being brought in to Kansas made little difference.

Senator

C.

C.

Cltty—With an eye towards his ultra support in central
Alabama-addressed
the Senate about the "policy of Black Republicans and
Kansas." Referring
to the New England Emigrant Aid Societies, he proclaimed
"an army with

banners is preferable to a Trojan horse."

And, consonant with this con-

spiracy view, he claimed that all free-soil measures restricting the

expansion of slavery were simply a cloak for total abolition.

"Whenever

Black Republicanism shall take possession of this Government..." he predicted,

"the South... will not pause to expostulate but will boldly throw

her sword into the scale and assert her natural privilege of self-defense.'
Similarly, Eli Shorter of the Eufaula ultras told his fellow congressmen
that if Massachusetts did not repeal her personal liberty law, which

offered protection to Negroes seeking to evade or resist slave catchers,
and if the banner of "Black Republicanism triumphs, it will be the signal
for the destruction of the.

.

.government

.

"

Both speeches were hailed by

southern-rights newspapers, one of which declared that the responsibility
for disunion would rest with the "abolitionized North."
It should be stressed, however,

69

that when men like Clay and Shorter

indulged in disruption rhetoric they did so in order to retain their

ultra credentials and their ultra constituency.

For at this period,

because of the Kansas issue, southern-rights sentiment predominated.
However, Alabama Democrats as a whole still considered national party

loyalty foremost and were wary of accepting the secessionist label.
In May 1856 the Alabama Democrats held a convention for the purpose
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of appointing delegates to the national Party
caucus.

For the first

time in years old Party leaders such as Benjamin
Fitzpatrick and J. j.

Seibels did not attend.

Not having to contend with such Montgomery
Re-

gency power brokers, Yancey had little trouble gaining
the chairmanship
of the resolution committee.

Senator Benjamin Fitzpatrick before this

convention met, had been proposed as a vice-presidential candidate.
But his moderate southern rights position and his conservative
Regency

leadership irritated Party firebrands.

Yancey, however, was silent on

his candidacy, seeing his own future as that of a Party regular.

The

Democratic delegates adopted the "Alabama Platform"--foderal protection
of slavery in the territories—and instructed their delegates not to vote

for a candidate for president who favored slavery restriction and popular

sovereignty.

However militant these instructions were, they were not followed
by the requirement that Alabama's delegates bolt the national convention
if the caucus failed to endorse the Alabama Platform or an anti-squatter

sovereignty presidential nominee.

Thus, the State Democratic organiza-

tion seems to have made a rhetorical gesture to east -central Southernrights advocates, no more than indicating that they were not "soft on

southernism.

"

Moreover, the Democratic convention had met in Montgomery

—

the heart of the eastern Black Belt--where extreme southern-rights senti-

ment was still prevalent among vocal blocs like Fufaula and Montgomery

County ultras.

The results of the later national meeting, which

in Cinncinnati, and which did not confirm the Alabama Platform,

eotlVtl

reflects

the willingness of the Alabama delegation to support the national party

platform and ticket.

It

confirms the opportunism that motivated the

I
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earlier resolutions passed by the
Montgomery delegates.
On the eve of the Cinncinnatti
convention .est Alabama Democrats

were favorably disposed to the
^nomination of Franklin K. Pierce.

Ed-

itor J. F. Grant said Pierce could
lead northern Democrats "to yield
to
the South.... They ought to meet
us in a noble, generous, national
spirit,

and say,

'Brethren, we know your all is at peril,
but not so with us.

We will not, to appease a fanatical feeling
sacrifice those very demo71
cratic principles, we have met here to
sustain'. "

Grant's views-total

northern acquiescence to southern demands-had
become the south's version
of compromise.

The national Democratic convention in Cincinnati
took a definite

pro-southern stance.

The platform stood on the principle of non-inter-

ference by congress with slavery in state and territory.

The delegates

rejected Pierce because he proved incapable of bringing together
all the

disparate factions in the Democratic party.

They also rejected Lewis Cass

and Stephen Douglas and in effect rejected popular sovereignty as the

solution for the problem of slavery in the territories.

And Alabama

Democratic delegates in following the national convention thereby eli-

minated Benjamin Fitzpatrick's vice-presidential bid.

Alabama's dele-

gates reflected a spirit of conciliation in light of the forthcoming

nomination of James Buchanan.

As minister to England from 1853 to 1856,

Buchanan was removed from the increasingly bitter debate over slavery
and thus became an ideal compromise candidate in 1856.

James C. Breckin-

ridge of Kentucky was selected as Buchanan's running mate.

Although the convention did not endorse the Alabama Platform,
Democrats in Alabama greeted the Cincinnati platform and ticket with
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enthusiam.

"We will support Buchanan, of
course,

cheerfully, said Z. L.

Nabers of the West Alabamian, "His name
is a tower of strength for the

preservation of republican principles."

Senator C. C. Clay, Jr., told

his father that "the nomination of Buchanan
and Breckinridge will,

I

think prove very strong, probably, as any
that could be made.... As to
the South it will be a safe ticket on the
Slavery issue

" 72

Probably no Democrat toiled harder for the ticket
than William
L.

Yancey.

dozen years.

Yancey we have seen, had changed his tactics, over
a half
"I have adjured all sarcasm-invective and all
allusions

that will irritate or arouse a partisan feeling," and
he declared, and
"I endeavour to be entirely conciliatory."

form to be a "constitutional one."
as Col. Durr of Mobile.

.

He found the Democratic plat-

Moreover, he noted, many Whigs "such

.William G. Jones, Robert Smith--all of that

city--Judge Hopkins too, Judge Ormond, John Whiting...," and they were

"irreconcilable Whigs [and they] are with us."

Yancey, it is obvious,

now sought favor with all segments of the Party.
Yancey's analysis of the situation illustrates the transition of

Whig -Americans into Democratic ranks.

These converts from south Alabama

held that the American party candidates ignored the slavery question.
The Alabama Know-Nothing electoral ticket was riddled.
all from the southern part of the State

— had

deserted.

Five electors-

Luke Pryor, in

breaking with Fillmore, declared that the slavery question was the "paramount cause for my defection."
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Yancey now the bell weather of the Party traveled the State.

In

north Alabama he pointed out that the Cincinnati platform had been adopted
by all southern parties and should be considered a settlement of the
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slavery issue.

Southerners, then, should unite behind
the Democratic

party which now endorsed protection for
slaveholding whether in the State
or the territories.

union.

He avoided ultra phrases and all
references to dis-

His restraint produced political dividends.

editor of the upcountry Southern Advocate
and a

Wit

William B. Figures,

ig -unionist convert

to the Democrats observed in a letter to
Yancey's brother, that "Col.

Yancey is receiving golden opinions from our people
which will be useful
to him

I

hope."
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Yancey's antagonist, Whig -Unionist -American Henry Hilliard,
gave
an address in Huntsville, while campaigning for
Fillmore, that was far

more extreme than anything Yancey said during the campaign.
urged southern resistance to further aggression by the north.

Hilliard
John C.

Fremont's election by the "Black Republicans," he declared, would initiate a series of attacks against the south which would have to be opposed.
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Hilliard

's

newly-found extremism can be explained by the recent

gerrymandering of his district.

Now no Whig-American could ever hope

of winning high State or federal office except by affirming one's southernism, in alignment with the south-central Alabama Democratic Party.

Percy Walker's tactics also illustrate the political expediency
of conversion to the Democrats.

The one time Whig, then Democrat, and

then Know-Nothing, had favored Fillmore until Fillmore accepted the

American platform which Walker considered weak "in its southern rights
expression."

This position left him vulnerable vis-a-vis his Know-Notlv'ng

colleagues in Congress and he agreed to resign if sufficient county con-

ventions met and requested him to do so.

Walker was hung in effigy in

Mobile and called a vicious traitor by diehard Know-Nothings, but he
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served out his term before joining the
Democratic Party. 78

Yancey and Walker were not the only
mavericks in the Democratic
Party among southern-rights men to surface
in 1856.

Democrats sought admission into Democratic
ranks.

other anti-regular
James L. Pugh of the

Eufaula Regency also stood as a Democratic elector.

This inspired a

Know-Nothing newspaper to trace Pugh's rather
capricious political career.
This gentleman is quite a young man and yet he
has nearly boxed the political compass. First
he was a Whig, a Taylor and Fillmore Whig elector.... On the 8th of January 1849 he gave an expression of his principles in language following
'that I am decidedly opposed to any declared intention to resist this side of the passing of*~a
law restricting slavery.'
In the next place we
find him what he was pleased to style a southern
rights Whig, a candidate for Congress declaring
that he was sounder on the Southern question than
the regular nominee of the Whig party... he ran
being supported by the eastern Black Belt Democracy. Next we find him dead against all National
parties and an out and out southern rights man,
going the rounds with Col. Cochrane who was hard
pressed to defend his disunionism.
In this organization he had a sort of name and place for a
year or two, but in the meanwhile he showed evident signs of distress and it was discoverable
that he was inching off towards the Democracy.
And when the Know-Nothing question was gotten up,
his disunion proclivities enabled him to take a
good hearty state at the Union plank in its platform and he never stopped running until he was
completely submerged in the slough of Bogus Democracy [the state Democratic Party] and as a
reward for his chivalric act, they placed about
his neck the Bogus collar [Democrat] and named
him as the candidate for Elector for the second
In the face of his former objections
district.
to national parties, he is now a right smart
captain in the Bogus army [Democratic] doing
battle side by side with Martin and John Van Buren,
Thomas Hart Benton, and the balance of the other
national Democratic free soilers.^^
. . .

This partisan attack reiterates a central theme:

namely the unhesitating
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opportunism of Alabama politicians.

There are so many-in addition
to

Yancey, Walker, and Pugh-who shifted
from one party to another, from

southernism to unionism and to southernism
in the course of seeking public office.

Clearly, such men as Yancey and Pugh,

in 1856, bear little

resemblance to the southern-rights anti-party
extremists of a half dozen
years earlier.
In November, the Democrats carried Alabama
by a vote of 46,000

to 28,000.

They won in forty-four to fifty-two counties; and
Buchanan

received 62 per-cent of the vote cast in the State.

The Democrats made

inroads in traditional south-central Whig enclaves.

Mobile and Tusca-

loosa districts went heavily for Buchanan.

In Mobile an American majority

of about 500 in 1855 shifted to a Democratic majority of
about 1500.

Tuscaloosa's 1700 vote majority for the Know-Nothing's in this same year

became a Democratic majority of about 500 in 1856.

Democrats made sig-

nificant gains in the western Black Belt counties--areas of traditional
Whig strength.

Only the strenuous efforts of a cadre of old Whig Know-

Nothing managers— Hilliard, Thomas Watts, William

P.

Chilton, and R. A.

Baker kept the recently gerrymandered Montgomery district in the Fillmore
column, and just barely.

All of north Alabama went for Buchanan.
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The Democrats, with one-time Party spoilers Yancey and Pugh doing yeo-

man service, succeeded by urging loyalty to the national party as the
only defense against abolition.

Eighteen fifty-six witnessed the emergence of a new generation
of lawyer-politicians who would play a consequential role in the power

struggle of 1860-1861.

Most of these "new Men" identified themselves

as southern nationalists.

After 1856 they saw the Democratic Party as
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their chief means for advancement,
though some would flirt with
small
"opposition" factions before 1860.
Most important among these
political
novitiates were J. L. M. Curry, David
Clopton, Sydenham Moore, John
T.
Morgan, Alpheus Baker, Jere N. Williams,
and William F. Samford. 81 C
.C.
Clay, Jr. who was Senator in 1853,
could also be considered one of
the

"new men" of the fifties.

With only him as the exception, all
of them

case from central Alabama; all came to
political maturity in the 1840's;

all consequently, were nursed on pro-slavery
politics; all were members
of a new generation of pro-slavery zealots.

Offices— from sheriff to Assemblyman.

All first ran for local

Moore, Clopton, and Curry were

elected to Congress in the late fifties as militant
ultras.

Clay cam-

paigned for Congress twice and eagerly sought a Senate
seat as a southernrights Democrat.

John T. Morgan sought numerous local offices in Dallas

County while competing with George W. Gayle for the leadership of the
Dallas County ultras in 1860.

Alpheus Baker achieved notoriety as Jeffer-

son Buford's lieutenant in the Kansas expedition.

William

F.

Samford

tried to play Black Belt "king-maker" and as a Democratic opposition

candidate for governor in 1859.

Furthermore, all were small slaveowners,

except Samford; all fit the model of the frustrated "man on the make" who
found their economic advancement blocked.

By the late fifties much of

the best land and slaves were selling at prices that only the most pros-

perous planters could afford, and so these thwarted small slaveowners
turned to politics as a means of upward mobility.

Eighteen fifty-seven,

then, would mark their arrival on the national political scene.

After the 1856 election many Alabama Democrats, having been thwarted
in their efforts for higher office, sought federal appointments.

Congress-
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man George Smith Houston wrote Clay to
see what the Senator could do
to procure a cabinet post for him.

Benjamin Fitzpatrick and former con-

gressman John Bragg were also mentioned as
possible cabinet appointees. 82
C. M.

Jackson of the Montgomery Regency bitterly
complained to John W. A.

Sanford, who dispenced patronage to the party
faithful that he had not

been rewarded for loyal service to the national Party. 83

Another cen-

tral Alabama southern-rights Democrat Sydenham Moore,
asked Senator Clay
to use his influence to procure the Charge d'affaires
vacancy to Belgium

for him.

Moore, however, learned that a member of the Montgomery
Regency

had already been promised the post.

Later Moore wrote that although

his "sensitive nature shrinks from the idea of being one of the vast

crowd who will swarm the streets of .. .Washington in pursuit of office,"
he would consider the trip if another "honorable" position were avail-

able.

84

Moore did not get such a position but was elected to Congress

in 1857.

Yancey was the most intriguing of office seekers.

His elevation

to Buchanan's cabinet had been recommended by the Dallas Gazette as well
as by fellow Democratic electors before the election.
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Yancey disclosed

that "the college [Alabama electors] unanimously wrote a strong letter
to Mr. Buchanan urging my appointment to a place in his Cabinet."

He

also noted that Howell Cobb of Georgia was about to reject a cabinet
post and asked his brother--who could exert considerable political pres-

sure--"^ use his influence with Cobb and other Georgians and

the South

Carolina delegation" in order to procure a cabinet job for himself.
"Waste no time in asking where you can use a favor, write Dowdell [Ala-

bama Representative from Yancey's district]

I

cannot within propriety.

,.86
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In late December Georgia unionist
Howell Cobb advised Benjamin

Yancey "with your Brother my acquaintence
is more limited but sufficient
to make it with me a most agreeable
duty to advance his promotion...." 87
But Yancey did not get the post because
his past disruptive activities

might be, it was deemed, embarrassing to
Buchanan and other Democratic
regulars.

Moreover, one can only speculate, J. J.
Seibels, whose enmity

for Yancey dated back to 1851 possibly used
his influence with Buchanan

and other national party leaders to forestall
Yancey

*

s

elevation.

Yancey hiding his disappointment, thanked Clay, for his
aid and
told him "let Mr. B. [Buchanan] be disembarrased of all
considerations

respecting me," he told Clay.

Yancey felt that "I should have prevented

my friends urging my name in connection with a Cabinet appointment."
Finally, as if to confess his own inadequacy as a party loyalist, he

revealed "I feel now, crippled for future usefulness, if ever we shall
go

be forced to act against Mr. B...."

The 1856 outcome reflected the inability of many Whigs and those

Democrats of south-central Alabama who were alienated from their Party
to construct a lasting political organization opposed to the Democrats.

By the end of 1857 a vast exodus of Whig -Americans entered the Alabama
Democratic organization, creating a one-party State.

An absence of ac-

tive state-wide organized party resistance meant that disunion would be
fought out within Democratic ranks, which for years had been sectiona-

lized and factionalized between upstate national party loyalists parti'

1

to the union and downstate southern-rights extremists and moderates--

surrounded by a massive slave population--who resisted restrictions upon

slavery and slave holding.

By 1860,

secession would become a malleable
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issue between these sections and political
cliques as they struggled
for ascendancy.

Alabama Democrats began maneuvering as early
as the fall of 1856
for the 1857 elections.

Ambition for office and a desire to manipulate

took priority over discussion of southern
resistance to "Norther aggression" in Kanasa.

William

F.

Samford is typical of many Alabama Democrats.

A southern-rights man, he was willing to overlook political
affiliations
in the candidate he supported.

For example, he concluded that southern

rights ultra and former congressman Sampson W. Harris was unfit
to be
governor.

Rather he preferred James Dowdell, a moderate southern rights

man, or J. J. Seibels, whose pronouncements were placing him in the union

faction of the Democratic party, for the governorship.

Before January

1857 Samford was himself mentioned as a replacement for John A. Winston

who was ending his second and final term as Governor.

Samford excitedly

informed the Montgomery postmaster that "except for Shorter [John Gill
Shorter] I have the best chances

.

"

But he thought his aspirations might

be frustrated by "the Clique that shoots from behind the stalking horse,
of the Advertiser " [The Montgomery newspaper that was the organ of the

Montgomery Regency].

89

Accordingly, he endorsed all the anti-Montgomery

Regency men including Yancey, Clay, Dowdell, and Pugh.
Other Democrats entered the gubernatorial lists while Samford
fretted about his prospects.
E. Moore, a party regular,

From upstate Lauderdale County Judge John

and Judge A. B. Moore a sometime southern-

rights man from Black Belt Perry County, threw their hats into the ring.

John Cochrane was the Eufaula Regency gubernatorial candidata.

Ex-con-

gressman and upstate firebrand David Hubbard was also casting about for
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support.

Publishing a letter that announced his
candidacy, he insisted

that the South was in a dual war-with
the North, which had Great Britain

for an ally, and with its own political
leaders who did not put "southernism"

first as a test of party loyalty. 90

Hubbard's strategy for attaining

the Governorship was to appeal to the extreme
southern-rights wing of

the Party in east-central Alabama, a course which
had proven

Bo

success-

ful for Senator C. C. Clay, Jr.

Legislative elections also were pending,
ing for re-election to the Senate.

C.

C.

Clay began campaign-

From two sources he learned that Leroy

Pope Walker a fellow highland southern rights defender was attempting to

unseat him.

"One thing he [Walker] has not forgotten,

Caldwell, editor of the Sunny South, related,

I

am sure," J. H.

"to wit: the plots and

counter plots in Alabama, for your seat in the Senate."

North Alabama

party manager 0. H. Bynum also confided to Clay that highland politicians

were planning to back pro-Walker men for the state legislature. 91
There were also senatorial stirrings in the Black Belt.
F.

Samford, trying to play "king -maker,

Clay's Senate post.

"

William

suggested another ultra for

"If we ever intend to make Yancey Senator it will

not do to sacrifice him on the antagonism which his selection for the

Governorship would excite...."

92

In other words, Samford was trying to

organize a Montgomery district clique of Democratic outsiders hostile
to the control of the Montgomery Regency.

Yancey would serve as "drill

master" of this clique in their quest for power and prestige.
Senator Clay, recognizing the need to firm up his support in central Alabama, wrote friends in the Eufaula bloc, reminding them of his views

on southern-rights.

93

o
Clay received thanks from Eufaula ultra E. C.
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Bullock who told him,

-'you

have made hosts of warm friends
in this part

of Alabama... by vindicating the
claims of cotton against Cod fish." 94
One month before the State Democratic
nominating caucus John Co-

chrane reassured Clay that a central
Alabama rumor "that

bargain with Judge L.
and

I

P.

I

had made a

Walker by which he was to go for me for
Governor

was to go for him for your successor in the
U.S. Senate" had no

foundation.

Clay,

increasingly anxious, asked Gabriel DuVal of the
Mont-

gomery Regency for information regarding a Black Belt
cabal to replace
him.

DuVal did not think it possible "that such a combination
as that

suggested by you exists

Yancey, Cochrane, Winston, and L. P. Walker

can scarcely by any combination of circumstances unite either with
the
other, or all together,

health."

for any object ... .Yancey at present is in bad

DuVal then recommended a source of action which reflected the

art of political management as practiced in ante-Bel lum Alabama.

Like

so many other politicians, he wanted to play "king-maker" and increase

his political power and influence in the State.

On this occasion, he

suggested to Clay that he unite all supporters for his re-election without

any concern for ideological considerations.

"Would it not be well for

you to procure from some friend in the counties the names of six or a

dozen of the leading men in each?
in

I

do not mean of those who are known

their counties as prominent men but of those who at the different

precincts are the working men at elections, and who control their little
centers of county politicians.

County."

95

I

will willingly do so in Montgomery

This kind of advice bears witness to the fact that the "chi-

valric" south practiced the same political "arts" as the ward "boss" of
the north.

236

While the Democrats prepared for their
convention, the Know-Nothings decimated by defections-changed
their name to the "Whig-Americans"

with the emphasis on Whig.
a major loss in April 1857.

This remmant of an opposition party
suffered

Henry W. Hilliard, the State's most renowned

Whig-unionist, announced his conversion to the
Democrats.

The Democrats,

he explained, were the only remaining bulwark
against "the freesoil and

Abolitionist combination at the North."

wary of their latest disciple.

Democrats, to be sure, were

A Black Belt editor warned Hilliard that

"there were Democrats enough to fill all of the state offices
iard is thus notified to 'stand aside'."

Mr. Hill-

Hilliard, however, did have

plans for running for congress in the second district, which evoked the

following from another editor:

"Let it be understood

..

.that we are not

in favor of hustling any new adherent into position and office, especially
to the exclusion of old members of the party whose talents and services

entitle them to preference."
Hilliard.

96

Meanwhile, his old Party colleagues attacked

The Whig organ, The Alabama Beacon accused him of helping to

destroy the Whig party and J. J. Hooper of the Montgomery Mail ascribed
Hilliard

's

motives to opportunism.

"Seeing high office closed to him

under the banner of a wounded party,
foe in hopes of winning office."

"

Hooper asserted,

"he joins the

But Gabriel DuVal a chief tactician

of the Montgomery faction was elated by Hilliard

's

conversion and main-

tained that "it will help us wonderfully in this district and County."

97

DuVal also evaluated the chances of various gubernatorial aspir-

ants:

"Judge A. B. Moore has probably more friends than any one else,

but they are by no means zealous.

Col. Samford,

I

think, has no chance.

...Even those who admit his intellection superiority suspect a want of
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administrative capacity in him, and make
his occasional hypochondria
a
grave political objection. .. .Cochrane
>. votes in the legislature
will
beat him. Hubbard is still unsure." 98
The Democratic caucus meeting in June
1857 seethed with intrigue.

John A. Winston and John E. Moore a political
trimmer-a chief characteristic of Alabama politicians-combined
to press the latter for governor,
and thereby reconcile north Alabama to the
loss of a senatorship by the

gift of the governorship.

Thomas A. Walker, a former Whig and recent

convert to the Democratic Party, revealed that
John Moore and Governor

Winston "have of late been as thick as runnaway negroes
[sic]."

Judge

A. B. Moore of Perry County was selected on the twenty-sixth
ballot,

as a result of the efforts of the Montgomery Regency.

The Party plat-

form endorsed the national Democratic resolutions passed in
Cincinnati
and hailed the Dred Scott decision.

No fire-eating speeches were made.

Some newspapers contended that the defeat of Samford and Hubbard was a

victory for conservatism over "uncompromising Southern rights."

And

George T. Yelverton, Democratic "king-maker" from west-central Alabama

who worked closely with party regulars in the Montgomery Regency told
Senator Clay, "I have been tried hard at by gentlemen from N. and

Alabama to join a war upon you and

F.

[

Fitzpatrick]

.

"

S.

He claimed that

John Cochrane blocked his endorsement of Clay and confirmed that a deal
had been made between John E. Moore (the defeated gubernatorial nominee)
and Winston "to make Moore Gov. and W. Senator."

99

All this was planned

to put lameduck Governor Winston in the United States Seante and elevate

upstate Judge John E. Moore to the Governorship.

Winston was from central

Alabama and John Moore from north Alabama thus both sections supposedly
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would be placated by this John Moore-Winston
scheme.
John E. Moore, after the convention,
complained that his strategy
for the nomination had been undercut by
"the factions."

In other words,

Moore was attributing his defeat to the clusters
of Democratic cliques-in Barbour, Dallas and Montgomery Counties who
disregarded ideological

considerations when it came to supporting someone from
their own section.
Selected nominee Judge A. B. Moore was from Perry County
in the Black
Belt

.

He received support, in other words, from both extreme
southern

rights blocs in Barbour and Dallas Counties and the moderate to conser-

vative southernists in the Montgomery Regency.

John Moore said he had

determined "to disappoint the factions who were aiming for a breakup

activated by a rule or ruin principle.
the harmony of our party... so

I

I

was unwilling to jeopardize

withdrew after the twenty-fifth ballot." 100

He made no mention of his and Winston's alleged deal.

Thus, the 1857

Democratic caucus became another example of that factionalism and oppor-

tunism characteristic of Alabama politics.
As the 1857 political campaigns heated up, south Alabamians began
to worry over the Buchanan administration's "southern rights policies."

Inverse causation is involved.

Slavery in the territories increasingly

occupied Alabamians as local issue receeded in importance.

The latter,

like state aid to railroads, bank and temperance reform, and the anti-

foreign issue generated by the Know-No things, no longer inspired concern.
Slaveholders' rights in Kansas provided more excitement.

Buchanan ap-

pointed R. J. Walker of Mississippi as Kansas' third governor.

During

the 1856 campaign Walker had written a pamphlet predicting Kansas would

surely become a free state; geographical factors and emigration, he thought,
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made it inevitable.

"I do not believe Kansas will
become a slave state,"

he stated, and his pamphlet, selling
a million copies gave such
views
national prominance. 101
Some Alabamians feared Walker would
oppose a pro-slavery consti-

tution for Kansas.

At a Montgomery meeting of June
27, 1857 second dis-

trict Democrats led by William L. Yancey and
some "Americans "-what one

observer called "only a slim gathering" debated
resolutions on Buchanan's
Kansas policy.

Yancey still conciliatory, presented a number of
reso-

lutions calling for Party harmony, urging "undiminished
confidence" in

Buchanan, at least until it could be proved that
Buchanan and Walker

were acting in collusion to undo the pro-slavery constitution
in Kansas.

Yancey was criticized from the floor for such moderation and

P.

H. Brittan,

co-editor of the Montgomery Messenger, offered an amendment condemning
Walker.

Brittan 's amendment was eventually tabled. 102
In response to the Montgomery meeting on Kansas, William F. Sam-

ford from his position at Tuskegee complained that "the more
the Montgomery anti-Walker meeting the less

I

I

think of

like it, and especially

in the view of its utter disregard of Dowdell's [the district congress-

man who supported Buchanan] position and fortunes." Samford wanted to keep
Buchanan's Kansas policies from becoming a major issue among Alabama
Democrats.

The debates at the Montgomery meeting could play into the

hands of the Know-Nothings who then could take advantage of Democratic

differences over the President's Kansas schemes and damage the chances
of Congressional Democrats in the forthcoming elections.

Thus,

Samford

foresaw problems for the district in the oncoming congressional elections:
'*There

was no such exigency in our affaires that our Montgomery friends
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needed to rush into demonstrations
that might and may cost us
the Dist." 103
Party success still motivated
William Samford, and like him,
other
ultra southern rights demagogues.
Buchanan's Kansas policies found
their

way into the congressional races.

Percy Walker, in the Mobile
district,

had little chance for re-election
because of his refusal to support the
National Know-Nothin gs in Congress. When
he declined to campaign, Democrat James Stallworth defeated Whig
-American James J. McCaskill by 1000

votes.

Mobile Democratic party worker Colin
Mcrae confided that "the

course of the Administration in reference to
Gov. Walker and Kansas has

also weakened us very much in this Congressional
district.
not had a popular candidate

..

If we had

.we could not have canvassed the district."

Then he asked Mobile post-master John A. Sanford to
let Buchanan know
"the opinion of the people here on this subject and
that Walker's course

will not be sustained by them." 104
For Congressman from the Montgomery district, Whig
-Americans

pitted the old Whig attorney Thomas J. Judge against incumbent James
Dowdell.

F.

Judge, known as a union-Whig in the early fifties, now ran as

a "nullifying-Whig."

He attacked Walker's appointment as well as "Bu-

chanan's refusal to sustain slavery in the territories."

He pronounced

the national Democratic party soft on southern rights and along with
J. J. Hooper the Whig nullifying editor he denounced the Demoracts.

They were the "free soil Northern Democratic party."

Hooper affirmed

"the man whose vote is given to those who stand by the Administration,

repudiates our rights in the territories and consent the restriction
of slavery."

Democrat James Dowdell faced by this strong Whig-American chal-
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lenge, needed help.

He got it from William
L. Yancey and Henry Hilliard.

Both stuped the district for hi m

.

Howell Cobb and Robert Too.bs fro,

Georgia were imported to lend their
support.

Central Alabama Democrats

realized that the southern-rights
issue was being exploited by a ^on-

grel-faction-Whig-Americans-which had no allegiance
to a national party
organization.

Toombs declared that Walker's conduct
in Kansas was a

lesser evil than an American Party victory.

Yancey was worried.

He

acknowledged the new turn of events as district
Democrats responded favorably to Thomas Judge's criticism of Buchanan's
maneuvers in Kansas.
He blamed Walker for the Kansas dilemma but
implored third district con-

stituents to temporize their criticism of Buchanan
until "all his views

on the territories are made public." 106

Dowdell won a narrow 100 vote

victory but a significant shift was in progress.

Almost a plurality

of the district which had one of the largest concentration
of slaves
in Alabama--perceived Buchanan's Kansas conduct as a threat to the south.

Democrat Eli

S.

Shorter, backed by the Eufaula clique, won an

easy victory over Whig-American Batt Peterson in the second Eufaula district.

Again there were straws in the wind.

James L. Pugh, John Coch-

rane, and E. C. Bullock, three Eufaula stump speakers, attacked Buchanan's

evasiveness on Kansas.

But they nonetheless supported Shorter who avoided

open criticism of the Administration.
political criterion of opportunism

107

— of

They did so because of the old

winning an election which still

governed their motivations.
In Tuscaloosa's fourth district Democrat Sydenham Moore having

failed to get a federal appointment, challenged "little Billy" Smith

who had represented the district as a unionist, Whig, and American since
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Moore, a southern ultra campaigned
against Smith's congressional

1851.

record.

Smith, he charged, voted to
censure Preston Brooks for canning

Charles Sumner and opposed Jefferson
Buford's Kansas scheme.

Moore also

questioned Smith's devotion to the South
and condemned his erratic politics citing his many party shifts.
Moore, by contrast, campaigned as
a "fire-eater of 1850" who had not compromised
his principles and he

defeated Smith by over 1400 votes. 108
Democrat David Hubbard-the enduring upstate
ultra contested George

Smith Houston the union -Democrat Congressman,
his old antagonist.

Hubbard

attacked his nationalism, at times implied that Houston
was a traitor
to southern institutions.

The fifth Florence district, however, sent

Houston back to Congress with a majority of 900 votes. 109

Thus, affirm-

ing again the unionism of the fifth highland district.
J. L. M.

Curry, also a Democrat,

faced no ppposition in the seventh

district because incumbent Sampson W. Harris had died in the spring of
1857.

Like Sydenham Moore, Curry prided himself on being both an ultra

and a "new man."

Politicians like them would help edge Alabama toward

disunion after 1859.
Nor was A. B. Moore opposed for governor.

Democrats, moreover,

elected twenty-eight of the thirty members of the state senate and eightyfive of the 100 representatives in the lower House.

110

Moreover, for

the first time, they had made a clean sweep of all the congressional
seats.

Alabama was becoming a one-party state, a situation which cause

southern nationalists to announce the arrival of the millenium--a southern

party based on southern principles.

111

However, factionalism and intra-state sectionalism combined with

s
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the ambition of political aspirants
still frustrated Party unity.

cratic hegemony did not imply
agreement on purposes.

inconsequential as a political cement.

De mo-

Principles were

Party loyalty remained capricious

inspired more by a voracious hunger for
office than anything else and
it made for a brittle and capricious
unity.

After the dust of the 1857 contest had
settled,
the foremost anti-Administration Democrats.
C.

J.

j. Hooper listed

They were State Senator E.

Bullock, Jim Pugh "and a few other individuals
scattered through Mr.

Shorter's Congressional district/' home of the
Eufaula Regency. 112

William

F.

Samford, acting as Black Belt "king -maker,"
appraised

the results of the 1857 Congressional contests and
proclaimed he was

"for Clay's re-election to the Senate this winter."

Also, he preferred

Yancey to Fitzpatrick as Senator when the latter 's term was up.

Samford

himself considered retirement from public life unless "Mr. Buchanan
should
send me to Europe as a Minister."

Standing in his way were "Seibels and

Fitzpatrick and their Montgomery Regency" who are "my enemies .. .and Yancey's
and everybody else's except a few of their special friends."

Samford'

antagonism toward the Montgomery Regency had more to do with political
ambition than with differences over Southern Rights.

The Fitzpatrick-

Seibels led Montgomery Regency never recognized Samford as a significant
force in the State Democratic party.

They never game him patronage and

this disregard irked Samford.

Samford

's

a Black Belt Democratic ultra,

also hostile to the Montgomery group sta. ad,

"In all you [Samford]

correspondent William

say regarding the subtle,

policy of the Montgomery clique

I

P.

Browne,

selfish and monopolizing

heartily concur...."

Yancey was preferable to Fitzpatrick for the Senate.

He agreed that

But Yancey, he
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warned,

"i s not the man to keep
always in that position.

ambitious.

I

He is very

could say much .ore but it is
needless now.

been unstable in some things." 113
spired by Yancey's

Yancey has

Browne's doubts obviously were in-

opportunist.

The politicisn who first sought
power

outside the Party (in the late
1840's and early 1850's) who then [in
1856] became a loyal partisan again,

the politician who was clearly
seek-

ing to manage party policy, was not one
to evoke absolute confidence.

Talk of the forthcoming senatorial contest
inspired lame-duck
Democratic Governor John A. Winston, who desired
to replace C.
Jr., as Senator,

C.

Clay,

to advocate readoption of a reapportionment
law having

the Black basis—the federal ratio.

Such a measure would return to the

slave counties in the Black Belt of west-central
Alabama representation
for their slaves.

Winston's Democratic opponents in north Alabama charged

him with trying to build a voting base for the senatorial contest
in
this area.

This was the region of the great Whig-planters many of whom

had abandoned politics in the fifties as they saw their old party dis-

integrate.

Winston, no doubt, was trying to build support with this

quiesient political bloc.

Henry D. Clayton of the east-central "hotspur"

Eufaula faction home of the small planters where ultraism always held
sway, relayed to Clay that Winston's suggested change back to the "black

basis got a cold reception in east-central Barbour County."
feared "that a Montgomery [Regency]
in your place [Clay]

after....

while

I

I

Z.

L.

Naheny

influence is at work to elect Yancey

so as to leave a clear field for Fitzpatrick here-

told thern [Montgomery Regency leaders] with some feeling that

admired Yancey as much as any man, yet

would sacrifice you for any man in the state."

I
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would be

d

— —d

if I

All these feared plots
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dissipated by November.

Clay was the only candidate
put in

notation

and was re-elected to the Senate
by acclimation by the
115
legislature.

With Clay's re-election confirmed,
the Alabama Assembly again
took up the Kansas question.

It

condemned Kansas governor Robert
J.

Walker for being against the introduction
of slavery in the territory
and thereby aiding "the cause of free
soilism."

Both houses passed a

resolution calling on Buchanan to force Walker's
116
resignation.
Kansas continued to dominate Alabama politics
in late 1857.

Con-

gressman James Dowdell, writing from Washington,
reported that Douglas
"differs with the President on Kansas affairs and
goes the whole length

with Walker.

We loose Douglas with all his inf luence--we hope to
be

able to get along without his aid, but it will be by the
skin of our
teeth.

Douglas will loose forever the confidence of the South."

Gabriel

DuVal also concerned by Douglas' conduct, reporting a rumor that
Douglas
"was going over to the Republicans if true... it will have one good result
in materially weakening the confidence of the South in Northern politi-

cians and in requiring from them a more consistent adherence to principle
In December the Alabama senate unanimously passed resolutions requiring

Governor Moore to call an election for delegates to a state convention
which would determine what steps Alabama should take to protect its rights
and honor in the territories; the lower House approved with only two

dissenting votes.
Much of the nation's sectional conflict in 1857 was also animate^

by the depression of that year.

Northern businessmen believed that the

depression was the inevitable consequence of low tariff policy sponsored
by the southern-controlled Democratic Party.

In the south itself the

1,1
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eotton prices were affected and new
demands for Southern economic
independence were heard in Alabama.
Calls for direct trade with
England
also circulated.
Direct trade would permit the South's
cotton growers
to bypass

"Northern brokers thus relieving both
producers and manufac-

turers from three or four extraneous
profits and per-centages

Alabama planter declared,

.

»

One

"We have already paid humiliating
tribute to

others too long, and it is high time we announced
ourselves commercially
free and independent and acquire more
slaves and cotton territory if we
so desire."
a

pound.

By November cotton dropped from fifteen cents to six
cents

In December cotton sold for eight cents a pound
in New York

and at six cents per pound in Liverpool.

that

William

F.

Samford complained

"the money crisis of the last year came just in time to make
my

loos of a crop... so severely felt as to render the sale of my
Tuskegee

property [necessary]
rich central Alabama,

"

The Tuskegee Republican,

in the heart of cotton

summed up Alabamian reaction to the cotton situa-

tion by reporting that "the low price of cotton has engendered a spirit
of discontent among many of our planters." 119

Owing to the panic of 1857 there were renewed demands for reopening
the slave trade which had been prohibited in 1808, and State represen-

tative William Nabers introduced a measure urging as much.

While south Alabamians debated the merits of re-establishing the
slave trade, meetings were held endorsing the attempt of William Walker
to take Nicaragua for slavery.

Walker, who was from Tennessee, had ac-

hieved a reputation as a soldier of fortune in the cause of expanding

Southern power into the Carribean.

Arrested by Captain Hiram Paulding,

on Buchanan's orders he was later discharged by presidential order.
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Walker made his first public appearance
in Alabama.

He was welcomed

by the Alabama Assembly which turned
the Hall cf the House over
to a
public meeting to honor him. After an
overflow crowd, had heard him,
it called

upon Yancey to assess Buchanan's Latin
American policy. 120

Since 1856 Yancey had been a Party loyalist,
a Buchanan elector,

and campaigned vigorously for the Democratic
ticket.

Although his hopes

of obtaining a Buchanan cabinet post had
been frustrated, he avoided an

open break with the Party over Kansas.

He had" attacked Robert L. Walker's

published anti-slavery position, but that had been
the extent of his

anti-administration position.

Now, with the growing ultra sentiment

in south-central Alabama, Yancey opened "fire."

of our government

"

He denounced the "course

He criticized the conduct of Paulding as "tyrani-

cal and unjustifiable and the old woman policy of the Administration."

Walker's Nicaragua enterprise was, in Yancey's words, "the cause of the
South."

Yancey doubted that the south could ever again depend upon the

national Democratic Party.
rhetoric:

A familiar theme crept back into Yancey's

Northern Democrats could not be trusted to protect southern

institutions.

Not all Alabama Democrats reacted favorably to Yancey's

revived ultra position.

J.

J.

Seibels, editor of a new Democratic Party

organ, the Montgomery Confederation, heaped scorn on Yancey for being in

league with free-soilers and Americans in trying to destroy the adminis-

tration and the Democratic party.

121

During 1857 the struggle for control of Kansas intensified with
the controversy over the Lecompton constitution esacerbating matters.

The constitutional convention held at Lecompton had been chosen by less
than a fourth of those listed as entitled to vote; and the free-state
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element refrained from participating in
what they regarded as a pro-

slavery maneuver.

After a struggle within the convention

it

was decided

not to submit the constitution to an
untrammeled popular vote:

the people

were merely permitted to vote for the
"constitution with slavery," or
for the "constitution with no slavery."

If the free-state clause was

approved, slavery would not exist in Kansas "except
that the right of

property in slaves in this territory shall [in] no
measure be interfered

with."

It

is obvious that only the pro-slavery element
dominated the

voting and, predictably, 6000 favored slavery and 600 opposed
it.

Free

state men as well as all those who opposed the constitution
boycotted
the ballotting.

But Buchanan recommended that Congress admit Kansas

with the Lecompton constitution.

Douglas then broke with Buchanan and

was read out of the Party by Administration supporters. 1

All Southern

Democrats considered the Lecompton constitution a matter of Party loyalty
and none of them could now fault Buchanan.
In Alabama J. J. Seibels in January 1858 issued a call for a public

meeting of Montgomery Democrats "to sustain the Administration and the
Lecompton Kansas constitution."

Henry Hilliard, the Whig-American who

recently joined the Democratic Party, was the chief orator.
sembled heard him defend Buchanan's present Kansas policy.

Those asYancey, who

was in the audience was asked by spectators to respond to Hilliard.
had not originally been invited to speak and now,

He

"flushed with temper,"

he alluded to "the singular fact that Mr. Hilliard preceded me in addressing a Democratic meet ing--that a yearling should take precedence of a

Democrat of forty years."

Yancey insisted that he had always upheld

"that great principle of popular sovereignty in the territories."

His
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candor or memory can be questioned.

Ke had refused to support
Lewis

Cass in 1848 because, among other
things, Cass had come out for
squatter
sovereignty, and Yancey; with John
A. Campbell, had favored federal
protection of slavery in the territories.
Yancey concluded by demanding
that a Southern man replace Robert
J. Walker in Kansas,

"Mr. Yancey,"

Hilliard responded, "might be an older
soldier in the cause of Democracy
than myself, but it remained for the future
to disclose which [sic] was
the better one."
old,

In sum, Yancey served notice,

like the Yancey of

that party loyalty would not guide his actions.

Apparently Yancey's tirade was inspired less by Buchanan's
Kansas
policy than by the personal affront of Seibels, who had
ignored him in
organizing the meeting; and by Hilliard, who was selected by
Seibles as
chief speaker and who was one of Yancey's bitterest foes.
State senator E. C. Bullock thought "the speech of William Yancey

was a most magnificent exhibition of his intellectual and combative powers,
but as a matter of discretion, there are variant opinions.

I

am sure

that he inflicted wounds, which even time the great comforter, cannot heal."

There are now evidently two sections of the democracy in Montgomery,"
the Tuskegee Republican reported.

"One may be called the Yancey section

and the other the Seibels-Fitzpatrick.

The former is represented by

the Montgomery Advertiser and the latter by the Montgomery Confederation
[J.

J.

Seibels newspaper].

other...."

Neither

I

suppose has any love for the

"A bitter feud has arisen," the Pickens Republican pronounc

"between the party regulars [Fitzpatrick and Seibels] and the per se,

Southern rights schools, or factions of the Alabama Democracy."

Accord-

ing to this account "the gut of this feud is the merit or demerit of
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James Buchanan."

William L

.

Yancey , in othgr

^^^^

the conservative pro-Administration
leadership of the Montgomery Regency.

The conflict was not only a struggle
between Alabama's national party
loyalists and Yancey's ultra southernism
but it was a personality clash
as well.

As noted earlier Yancey and Seibels had
an abiding enmity for

each other dating back to 1850-51.

It

was almost inconceivable that

these two enemies could long co-operate together
in the same party.
The Kansas issue continued to agitate south
Alabama Democrats.
In late January 1858 the lower House passed a
resolution which provided

for a convention to be called by the governor, which
would "take proper

action" if congress refused to admit Kansas into the union with
the Lecompton constitution. 125

Responding to the possibility that Congress

would not approve this constitution, the Clarke County Democrat warned
that "the South should at once put her house in order and prepare for
the worse; for come what may we cannot see how we are much longer to

remain in this union as equals...."

Allen Henry, editor of the West

Alabamian advised that "Southern men should reflect...

if the Democracy

is overthrown, we shall be in the power of Black Republicans."

The divisive oratory employed by Alabama newspapers and politicians

played a pivotal role in providing the psychological climate for considering secession as a rational option by 1860.

Analysis of the slavery

CY*-°.n~

sion issue by ante-bellum Alabamians reflects what Richard hofstadter and David

Brion Davis have called the "paranoid style."

Davis contends that pro-

slavery rhetoric was generated by conspiratorial delusions that bore
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little resemblance to reality.

In this respect J. L . M. Curry,

in hi;
La

maiden congressional speech, evoked
conspiratorial demons as the cau,ise
for sectional tensions.

Admission of Kansas as a slave state,
he insisted,

was "prevented by a abolition menace of cunning
mammoth proportions."
This meance also involved "mobocratic misrule
and plunder, manifested
in Millerism, Mormonism,

spirit rappings, and socialism:

Secret watch-

words pass readily from mouth to mouth; organized
bands wait but for an

occasion to despoil and divide; burglaries
tions fill the columns of the newspapers."

and"

garroting and assassina-

Similarly,

firebrand Repre-

sentative Sydenham Moore said "the thirst for power of those
Black Republicans leaders, in whose hearts, as

I

believe, there lurks treason as

dark as ever activated the blood-hound associates of cateline's conspiracy."
Black Republicans, Moore asserted, like the ancient Roman cabal seek
"an insurrection of the slaves to despoil and destroy the South."

To

Alabamians living in slave-dense counties such conspiratorial rhetoric
struck a responsive chord conditioned as they were by a chronic fear
of slave rebellions.
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There were, however, Alabamians who did not see the Kansas struggle
as Armageddon.

In a letter to the Tuskegee Republican, an anonymous

writer observed that if "Kansas be rejected now,

it

would simply be a

triumph of the advocates of the partly Northern and Southern construction of the Kansas -Nebraska act, over the advocates of either of which

would result in no real benefit to the South, since slavery can not possibly exist in Kansas."

William

F.

Samford privately confided that "the

Lecompton prohibition was not Republican and the Senate
well to provide for its abrogation.

It

I

think has done

was just nonsense for the South
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to insist on it."

union,

I

Union if

samford announced,

have done with tt....lf
I

can."

I

»I am a Buchanan .nan!

fight !

„m

As to

du_

flght hence£orth ln
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^

Others viewed the Kansas debate
as an issue contrived for political gain. John Sanford, a planter
expressed unconcern with Kansas.
The cause of the turmoil, according
to him, rested with
politicians.
He characterized them as "designing
knaves" who "rave and rant about

ideal rights and abstractions...."

And, he added,

the idea of Kansas

"remaining a slave state with few slaves
is too ridiculously absurd to
be entertained for a moment.... Is it
not an outrage upon common sense

ever to think about breaking up the Union"
over the Kansas question?

Southern politicians have kept the "country in
a perpetual ferment and
excitment upon the subject of slavery and appears
to have been their

chief employment until they have worried their
constituency into a compliance with their designs which some of them long
entertained-— that of

breaking up the Confederacy in order to project themselves
into power."
Sandord's view on Kansas was confirmed by the 1860 census which
showed

only two slaves residing in Kansas. 1 29
In the United States Senate Lecompton passed by eight votes.

It

then went to the House, where an amendment providing for resubmission
of the constitution to the people of Kansas passed 120 to 112.

now moved toward compromise.
H.

Congress

Under the adrcit management of Alexander

Stephens, an accomodation was struck in the "English bill" (after

William H. English, an anti-Lecompton Democratic representative from Indiana), which received the support of both Houses and became law on May
A,

1858.

Under its terms, the Lecompton constitution was to be resub-

mitted as a whole and connected with a federal land grant, contingent
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upon its adoption.

Alabama opposition to the
Conference decision came
from the east-central agitators,
while the overwhelming majority
of highland Alabamians sustained the
decision. Many southerners who
were at
first recalcitrant fell into line
after unrelenting Administration
pressure.
Alabama congressman James Dowdell
found that the English compromise "is acceptable to the great
body of southern-rights men of
the South.
It

is in some aspects better than
the original Senate Bill and
there is

no doubt of its passage and a quieting
to the liansas agitation at least
for the present.

1 '

1

Compromise critics were initially led by
J. j. Hooper, the whig-

American ultra who called for resistance and
condemned the Alabama delegation for selling out the "South's interests."

Yancey, now in full

revolt from the Democratic Party asserted that
all southern congressmen

except for two who had voted against the measure,
were either traitors
to their section or incapable of understanding the
principles of the
131

"English bill."

Senators Fiztpatrick and Clay wrote long public letters explaining
their support of the Conference compromise.

Concerned for his south

Alabama southern-rights allies, Clay addressed a letter to the citizens
of Mobile.

He argued that if Kansas rejected the terms of admission,

the south would lose nothing, because as long as Kansas remained a territory,

state,

federal law would protect slavery; whereas, if Kansas became a
she would send two Black Republicans to the senate and another

to the House and soon exclude "slavery and slaveholders by law from her

limits."

132

Eli Shorter,

from extremely pro-southern Barbour County, came
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under severe attack by the
Eufaula Regency and by the radical
press in
the eastern Black Belt for
supporting the comprise bill.
Defending
his vote, Shorter stated,
-every Abolitionist and Black
Republican in
both houses of Congress voted
against and fought the Conference
bill
to the last."

James Dowdell, attacked by ultras in
his Black Belt con-

stituency, also defended himself by saying
"I am satisfied that the con-

elusion at which we arrived in the Kansas
question is correct

... .Our

honor is saved... no ground has been abandoned,""™
principle conceded to
in the Bill."

133

Shorter and Dowdel l--both claiming to be
southern right

advocates-destroyed their reputations by voting for the
Lecompton compromise and gave office-seeking ultras in their
districts enough 'evidence
to successfully challenge their congressional
seats in 1859.
At this time, when contravery over the compromise
bill was raging,

Yancey was preparing for his attempt to dismember the State's
Democratic
Party organization.

The Southern Commercial convention,

May 1858 at Montgomery was announced.

to meet in

A series of these conventions,

under the leadership of southern nationalist James DeBow had been meeting
since 1837 to discuss common Southern economic problems.

By the 1850 's

they had become forums for southern independence and helped to widen the

gulf between the sections.

The May 1858 meeting which would convene in

Montgomery, was Yancey's opportunity to agitate the slavery issue.

assault would focus on the re-opening of the African slave trade.

general his argument went as follows:
owners,

His
In

non-slaveholders and small slave-

frustrated in their attempt to buy slaves, had to be tied more

firmly to southern institutions.

Consequently, importations were needed

in order to bring down the price of slaves.

It

was clear that no future
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slave states could be created
without the slave trade.

For Yancey and
other political aspirants, this
issue was a symbol of southern
loyalty.

Significantly, Alabama planting interests
were divided on it.

Those in

opposition, usually the major planter
from the west-central counties,
felt that any increase in slaves would
lower prices and thus depreciate
the value of their own slave holdings.

more,

feared

that,

Some cotton capitalists,

further-

new acres meant a larger crop and lower
cotton prices.

Others contended, using a familiar argument
as old as slavery itself,
that importations were dangerous because new
slaves would be savage,

hard to handle, and likely to spread discontent
among those already in
bondage.

However, the small planters of the eastern Black Belt
knew

their position rested on cotton and slavery.

The great landowners steadily

encroached on the lands of the less wealthy.

Thus, the small operators,

desperately trying to edge their way up the social ladder sought relief,
by the late fifties, in demanding the re-opening of the African slave
trade and suppression of anti-slavery sentiment everywhere.

Their situ-

at ion by 1858 was becoming desperate. 13 5

Interestingly, not all southern radicals were favorably disposed

toward rescinding the 1808 prohibition, and even some of its advocates

admitted that chances of success were remote.
support for it in congress.

There was virtually no

Of the fifteen Alabama delegates to the

Southern Commercial convention Yancey could carry only Percy Walker and
F. B.

Shepard,

two Mobile extremists.

Yancey, a month later, claimed that he was misinterpreted on tht

African slave trade question.

A reading of his remarks, he explained,

would show that he did not call for re-opening the trade.

Despite such
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denials and equivocation,
political observers reported
that Yancey "as
the Yancey of old" had also
hoisted the disunion flag at
the convention
in preparation for destroying
the Democratic party.

This charge is cre-

dible in the light of Edmund
Ruffin's private conversation with
Yancey
toward the end of May in which both
agreed that diminished loyalty to
the Democratic Party was needed
before the South could strike for
in-

dependence.
F. B.

Ruffin also talked to Percy Walker's
close friend, attorney

Shepard of Mobile, "who was equally
zealous for separation...."

He wrote a declaration for a "League of
United Southerners," and showed
it to Yancey,

Shepard and Judge George W. Stone-associate
justice of

the Alabama Supreme Court; and, he reported,
they "all seemed to approve
the plan."

Thus was born an organization which, according
to its founder,

would "endanger the national Democracy, to undermine
the South' s loyalty
to the party."

William L. Yancey published Ruffin's proposal in the Montgomery
Advertiser, which was under a new editorship, one hostile to the
conser-

vative and pro-Buchanan Montgomery Regency leadership controlled by
Yancey's
old antagonists J. J. Seibles and Senator Benjamin Fitzpatrick.

League members, according to this proposal, would combat all further compromises of southern rights in either party platforms or national

legislation.

The League would not run candidates for any office but

would demand that members use all honorable means to secure the nomination
of only southern rights men.

In other words,

the League intended to

purge the parties of all those who were "soft on southernism.

"

But its

real aim--which was disunion- -was not revealed until the unauthorized

publication of Yancey's June

15,

1858 letter to James H. Slaughter of
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Atlanta, Georgia.

Therein Yancey confided -no
national party can save

us," he continued,

"no sectional party can do
it.

as our fathers did, organize

Wttees

But if we could do

of Safety' all over the Cotton

States (and it is only in them that
we can hope for any effective
movement), we shali fire the Southern
heart-instruct the Southern mindgive courage to each other, and at
the proper moment, by one
organized

concerted action, we can precipitate the
Cotton states into a revolu-

_

tion.",,137

In speeches during July at Benton Bethel
Church and in Montgomery,

Yancey and Percy Walker, the Mobile ultra, urged
their listeners to or-

ganize leagues, William
fire-eating ways.

F.

Samford was convinced and returned to his

He wrote three articles entitled,

the Intriguers," in which he attacked party loyalty,

"Leaguers against
in general, and the

Party bosses of the Montgomery Regency, in particular.

Samford playing

the idologue, clearly advocated disruption of the national
Democratic

Party:

"The League will unite all those who are willing to fight for
the

South.

The South will then be the league!" 138

Democratic Party newspapers responded with the charge that the
League was merely a combination of former Whig-Know-Nothings and disaffected Democrats whose purpose was to topple the traditional Party leader-

ship and to take power for themselves.

The Clarke County Democrat noted

this fusion of political outsiders and opportunists in an editorial entitled,

"The Fire-Eaters of 1858."
In 1855 the know nothings gloried in the doctrine
that the Union was the 'paramount political good.'
Now in 1858 they are 'terrible fire-eaters' and
can with difficulty be persuaded to remain in the
Union.
Democrats of the Dowdell, Shorter, Stall-

,
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worth type [all south-central
Democratic Congressmen]^ 6 tame submissionists compared
with them.
...They are strong for Southern
Rights only so
long as the Democratic Party
i s in power.

William

F.

Samford,

in a most revealing letter,

countered charges

made against the League by questioning
Senator Clay's failure to support
..

it.

140

„,
I

never doubted your sincerity/'
Samford wrote, "and did not

much regret your failure to connect
me officially with this Administration....! am free to do what

I

should have done in any situation, cri-

ticize it.... It does not come up to my
idea of a Southern Rights Admin-

istration."

From the beginning, Samford claimed, he
had approved of

the Lecompton constitution.

He had long called for a Southern rights

party and he now proclaimed, "You know
I

I

am for Yancey for Senator...

now think we shall have to make Yancey take the field
as an independent

democrat candidate to the Senate." 141

A scheme was set in motion that

would topple the Montgomery Regency leadership by having
Yancey challenge
incumbent Benjamin Fitzpatrick for the Senate.

Fitzpatrick's term did not expire until March
supporters began organizing in the spring of 1858. 142

4,

1861, but Yancey's

Their first efforts

became apparent with an editorial on "The Treachery of Douglas," in the

Montgomery Advertiser

.

Condemning Senator Fitzpatrick's support of Douglas

it declared "Alabama required a more forthright defender of Southern

institutions than Senator Fitzpatrick." 143

The Montgomery Confederation,

the Regency newspaper, alleged that the Advertiser had been purchased

by G. H. S. Shorter and N. B. Cloud to prevent "a certain man [Benjamin
Fitzpatrick] from being re-elected United States Senator."
the Gainsville Independent

Another paper,

claimed that the Advertiser had zealously

"
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championed <*r. Y[
the Democratic

's]

party-

Senatorial ambitions with the
purpose of dividing
The Dallas Gazette hoped to
see Mr. Yancey in

the Senate but thought his
position on the slave trade and
Walker's fili-

bustering would "seal his political
doom..'

By the end of December the

AdV6rtiSer Ceased backin S Yanc
*y and gave as a reason his "connection
with the League of United Southerners.
With this association we have
nothing in common.... We are Democratic
from principle .. .but we deny that
Mr. Fitzpatrick has any better title
to the office of Senator than
any
144
other Democratic leader."
Yancey did not take an active part in the

initial scheme to make him senator.

He suffered from "weakness,

conse-

quent want of energy.../' he wrote his brother
referring to his chronic

back trouble which he believed had worsened

.

Moreover, he

believed that the national elections were "disasterous to
145
the South."
Yancey's estimate, however, was not shared by Democratic Party
organs
in south Alabama.

Some Democratic papers, rather than endorsing Yancey and his views

lamented the growing sectional strife and made thinly veiled allusions
to who and what was responsible for party and state turbulence.

For

example, the Montgomery Confederation pointed out in July 1858 that sec-

tional tensions were being manipulated by "self seeking factionalists

.

Alabamians were not "going to be precipitated into secession for past
aggressions.

..

.Some might have been driven to believe the two great sec-

tions of the Union were divided beyond reconciliation..." but, and it
continued, this government "if rightly administered .. .was the noblest

government ever devised by the wit of man."

Its citizens would tell

the world "that the day had not yet come" when this Union could be dis-
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solved -upon the frivolous
matter of the rejection of
the Lecompton Constitution." The Dallas Gazette
found that most of the
grievances of
the factionalism were imaginary.
The South had not as yet
suffered
any very serious injury. Alabamians,
if the truth were told still
enjoyed their lands and their slaves.
Party journals, then hoped that

Alabama voters would have little
enthusiasm for struggle against anticipated evils, or that they would be
"in favor of a string of abstrac-

tions so contradictory and impractical
that it~would puzzle the shrew146
dest metaphysicians of the age to expound
them."

Senator C. C, Clay, Jr., however, was less
sanguine about the
future of the south.

em

He excoriated Stephen A. Douglas for
opposing South-

rights in the territories.

"The enterprising and acquisitive Yankees

will flock... there, with their notions," he grimly
forecast, and "buy
lands and silver mines and prepare" these lands "for
non-slaveholding

states before Southern men" could arrive with their
slaves.

was already too strong for "the South in the Union."
cluded,

The North

Indeed, he con-

"the South has no slaves to spare for acquired territories,
unless

the foreign slave trade can be re-opened." 147

But Benjamin Fitzpatrick,

always the moderate, did not share his colleague's apprehensions when
he reported from Washington that "Kansas has hardly been mentioned, it

has had its day,

I

suppose."

148

Clay sought the re-opening of the African slave trade, something
he shared with Yancey.

As the Kansas question receded in importance ir

early 1858, Yancey and other southern ultras renewed their agitation of
this issue.

Yancey wrote another series of pro-slave trade letters to

various ultra newspapers in Alabama.
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The African slave trade
controversy kept the "pot boiling"
into
1859. With congressional and local
elections imminent and a variety
of opportunists vying for political
office, the southern-rights
issue

heated up.

Congressman James Dowdell, an
Administration Democrat, from

the third Montgomery district,
believed the Yancey-Samf ord
opposition
149
forces were too well organized
for him to win and decided not
to run

again.

After disclosing his decision, Dowdell
commented on the ease

with which Black Belt voters could be
stirred by sectional polemics.
Events like the north's denunciation of
Dred Scott and William Seward's

declaration of an "irrepressible conflict" readily
angered these southern

voters who lived in the slave-dense cotton
counties.

Dowdell noted that

many old local questions, such as bank and
temperance reform and stateaid, no longer inspired much interest:

"I fully agree... that southern

rights principles are in the ascendent in this District
and all that
is necessary to success is the consolidation of the
Democratic party's
It should take the highest Southern Rights position..." 150

full strength

Dowdell

's

perception of heightened Black Belt concern with southern rights

was valid.

Sectional defiance peaked in early 1859, and with it came

aspiring politicians willing to exploit such sentiments for political
gain.

Samuel Rice was one.

Whig,

southern-rights Democrat, and then

Know-Nothing he announced his availability for the first district congressional seat.

dissolution .

Rice maintained the union stood on the verge of immediate

He denounced both the Democratic Party,

for bargaining

avv

slaveholders' security, and Buchanan as the unwitting tool of the "freesoilers.

William

F.

Saraford also moved toward the extreme position.

He had

»
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Planned to run for Congress fro™
the third distrlct> but
change<J
mind and instead announced
his candidacy for Governor.
Running as a
"Democratic opposition Southern
Rights Patriot," he inaugurated
hlis campaign by taking over the editorship
of the Auburn signal and
coupled
his name for Governor of Alabama
with that of Governor Henry
wise of
Virginia for the presidency in I860. 152
In concert Kith other east
:ern
Black Belt anti-Administration
Democrats of the Yancey-Samf ord
clique,

^

Samford charged that Governor A.
B. Moore had

fleeted

Southern interests

when he failed to call a state convention
after Congress refused to admit
1

CO

Kansas under Lecompton.

Governor Moore defended himself against
Samford

a

allegation that

he was "soft on southernism" by
asserting that Southerners should do

everything possible to secure their rights in
the Union, and should not
submit to any more compromises.

The fate of the South and the Union

would probably depend on the next presidential
election, he believed, and
it

would probably be between a "Black Republican" and
a Democrat.

The

Democrats, Moore continued, would not nominate anyone not
sound on Southern
Rights, and Southerners must support the candidate in order
to prevent

the election of a Republican.

He believed that a divided Democratic

party in 1860 would be a calamity nationally.

Moore triumphed by almost

an 18,000 majority over his eccentric challenger.

Samford's 2500 votes

came from the ultras of Alabama's eastern Black Belt counties. 154

Moore's pleas for remaining in the union had brought him victory
at the pools, but anti-union feelings were growing nonetheless in the

spring of 1859.

Congressman J. L. M. Curry was,
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amazed to find the growth of
the disunion sentient among our people. Many in south Alabama
absolute y desire such an event,
.any would not
resist it, while nearly all
seem to regard it but
a question of time.
[Stephen] Douglas's disaffection has demoralized us and
we cannot persuade
the South to confide in any
Northern Democrat.
'

Stephen Douglas had, in the minds
of many Alabamians, tied the
national
Democratic party to Squatter Sovereignty.
The identification of Squatter
Sovereignty, embodied by Stephen Douglas,
with the national Democratic

«-

party, caused the Mobile Mercury to
advocate a "Gulf confederacy
d lately."

1 5 5

Administration Democrats had to beat back
challenges from Southern ultras as well as maintain their
"Southron" credentials.

In the

first Mobile district Representative James
A. Stallworth confronted Mobile

fire-eater

F.

B.

Shepard,
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who labeled himself a "secession Democrat

and a denouncer of national Democracy."

The Mobile Register, now under

the editorship and ownership of John Forsyth the former
minister to Mexico

was behind Stallworth' s attempt to retain his Congressional
post.

For-

syth believed that only through a strengthened Democratic party
could
the South be assured of its rights.

He led a district convention of

regular Democrats which selected Stallworth and which passed resolutions
sustaining the Buchanan Administration. 157

F. B.

Shepard

's

support came

from firebrands led by George W. Gayle, John T. Morgan, and erstwhile

Democratic-unionist Judge George Stallworth--all part of a revived clique
of Dallas County ultras.

This clique was characterized by the Clarke

County Democrat as follows:

"Two or three years ago the Union with some

of them was the greatest good.... Now their greatest desire is to dissolve
the Union.

..

.They are actually uproarious and defiant and will do anything
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shortly unless paid (with elected
office) to hold." 158
F.

B.

Shepard attacked Stallworth for
his vote on the conference

(English) compromise bill and promised
not to "vote for any man North
of the Mason-Dixon line in I860."
Jame s Stallworth, in turn, accused
the Shepard/Gayle combination of being
revolutionaries by insisting on

secession, and he won by 3,094 votes. 159
But moderates did not always carry
the day.

With James Dowdell

out of the second district Congressional
racef other Democratic leaders

began maneuvering to gain the nomination.

The former Whig-unionist Henry

Hilliard, made his bid at a Democratic Montgomery
caucus.

Though he

had the backing of J. J. Seibels and some other
Montgomery Regency con-

servatives, Hilliard failed, which was a defeat for
Montgomery's old
party regulars.
in Auburn,

Another district caucus was announced.

in Macon County,

Regency party worker W.

H.

away from Montgomery control.

It

would convene

Montgomery

Northington wrote John Sanford that "Hilliard

may receive the nomination at Auburn.
ing of the democracy here abouts.

I

I

concluded

I

would test the feel-

found the opposition in our ranks

against him intense ... some saying they will not vote at all if he
the candidate.

Others say they will vote for his opponent [Thomas Judge,

Southern Rights Whig-American candidate]."

nomination Northington warned,

Should Hilliard receive the

"I am fearful that old Autauga [a third

district County] will be lost to the democracy in this canvass.
therefore

it

is

I

think

will be the part of wisdom as well as prudence to use all

1
honorable means to defeat him in the caucus... for the good of the party."

Many Montgomery region Democrats opposed Hil liard--and he did not win
at Auburn either.

Democrats there selected attorney David Clopton a
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Macon County resident who owned
seventeen slaves and who was
known for
his strident Southern Rights
sentiments. The Auburn caucus,
however,
also adopted resolutions supporting
Buchanan and cautioned:

That the only general party
organization which
professes to respect the rights of
the South in
negro [sic] property is the Democratic
party
that the overthrow of that time
honored party
Will ensure the triumph of Black
Republicans
under whose rule it is impossible
for the Southern people to live without moral
degradation
and imminent peril to social order;
and that
therefore, we believe it is the imperative
duty
of every patriot to labor zealously
for the success of Democratic nominees, and the
carrying
out of Democratic principles in the administration of the Federal Government. 161

Consequently, Seibels and other Patty conservatives
may not have been able
to nominate Milliard, but the Auburn resolutions
reflected their control.

Party regulars still exerted great power within the
third district Democracy.

David Clopton confronted the ultra, Thomas J. Judge, who
was run-

ning for a second time for the Montgomery district congressional
post.
Judge, a former Whig-unionist, in the early fifties, now told
east-central

voters that Alabama's Democrats could not be relied upon to "take the
state out of the Confederacy if a Black Republican was elected in 1860."
Clopton, conversely,

insisted "that only the Democracy affords Southern

institutions the hope of protection and deserved support of all Alabamians."

But he conceded,

"if a Black Republican were elevated to the

Presidency then Alabama should consider disruption."

Little different-.

therefore, existed between the candidates on steps to be taken in event
of a Republican victory in 1860.

162

In the third district contest the tactics of Yancey's friends

-
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were significant.

They tried to pressure David
Clopton into an endorse-

ment of Yancey for Benjamin
Fitzpatrick
in his columns in the Montgomery

s

senatorial seat.

MaU, demanded

finite stand with Yancey or
Fitzpatrick.

j.

j.

Hooper,'

that Clopton take a de-

Moreover, two Democrats in the

district opposed each other for the
state senate and their differences
rested upon the forthcoming senatorial
clash between Yancey and Fitzpatrick.

The Montgomery Confederation, a
Fitzpatrick journal, found

the pro-Yancey candidate for
Assemblyman guilty of factionalism and

wondered if Yancey would vote for Clopton,
the district's Democratic
,
nominee.

163

Blocs of radical Whig -Americans and
anti-Montgomery Regency Democrats in Montgomery, Lowndes, and Dallas
Counties running for the legislature announced their support for Yancey in
mid-July.

Thereupon, Yancey

wrote a public letter in support of Thomas Judge the
Whig-American ultra
Southern Rights candidate.

This action, according to J. J. Seibels, was

another example of Yancey's traitorous activities, dating
back to 1846,
"He [Yancey] will use any and all factions—even the
Know-Nothings to

defeat the Democracy and break down its organization:

All for his own

ambition.

During the summer, Yancey accepted an invitation from Robert Barn-

well Rhett to speak at Columbia, South Carolina and present a program

which all southern-rights men could agree upon at the forthcoming national
Democratic convention scheduled for Charleston, South Carolina.

Yancey

recommended that if the convention failed to uphold the slaveholders'
rights in the territories, southern-rights delegates should withdraw and

organize a new convention that would select southern candidates.

If

.
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the Republicans won at
the polls the southern
bloc was to secede before
the inauguration.
Both Yancey and Rhett~who
also spoke-carefully avoided
the q uestion of separate
state secession,

since 1850 secessionists had

debated this issue of a single
state going its own way.
It was a patentially dangerous tactic, since
there was no guarantee that
the rest of
the south would follow.

The alternative was co-operative
action by all

southern states Meeting together
in convention.

Southern legislatures,

Yancey suggested, should instruct
their governors to call state
conventions in event of a Republican victory. 165
Yancey's strategy was now
twofold:
(1) to gain control of the Alabama state Democratic
organization by forcing a showdown with Party
chief Benjamin Fitzpatrick over
the latter's senate seat and
(2) to destroy any vestiges of southern-loyalty

for the national Democratic Party by
making impossible demands upon

northern and western Democrats convened at
Charleston; namely, constitutional guarantees for slavery in the territories.
if Charleston delegates failed to comply,

Yancey hoped that

then all southerners would

bolt the convention and form a southern-rights
Democratic presidential
ticket.

A Southern candidate might garner enough votes to prevent

a

majority for any candidate thus throwing the election into
Congress where
southern nationalists would bargain their votes for a territorial slave
code

Secession was now the foremost issue in the congressional campaigns.
Incumbent Eli Shorter of the second Eufaula district, home of the most

radical ultras in Alabama had been much criticized for his vote in favor
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of the Kansas conference bill.

Barbour County ultras,

in particular,

tirelessly assailed hi. and Shorter
wisely declined to seek re-election.
His place was taken by James L.
Pugh, a former Southern-rights
Whig,

then Democratic Party regular.

Pugh campaigned as a regular:

tional party was the only hope of
southerners.

the na-

His position split

Eufaula Regency ultras, some of whom
endorsed Pugh's opponent J. E

.

Sappington a union Democrat in the early
fifties who now ran as southernrights Democrat, who urged a federal law
outlawing all anti-slavery agitation.

The Democratic Party, he argued, was no
longer a bulwark upon

which southerners could depend.
of the Eufaula clique's organ:

His campaign used the masthead epitith

The Spirit of the Sou th.

in the Union or Independence out of it."

Samford,

"Southern Rights

With a nod toward William

F.

Sappington proclaimed "I protest, like Samford, against any

national party affiliation."

When the ballots were counted, James Pugh

had 500 votes, and won the office he had sought since 1849. 166

Southern rights dominated elsewhere.

Sydenham Moore in the fourth

district and J. L. M. Curry in the seventh, both of whom voted for the
Kansas Conference bill, told the voters that that was the last compro-

mise they would make with "free soilism,

"

and faced only slight compe-

tition, and were easily re-elected to Congress.

North Alabama's two

persistent Union Democrats, George Smith Houston and W.

R.

returned to Washington, thereby going against the trend.

W. Cobb were

Both confronted

ultras at the polls, but were confirmed by secure pluralities in districts
that had long histories of party regularity and Unionism.
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According to Lewy Dorman, the results of the 1859 election indicate that Alabamians accepted the national Democratic party as the defender
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of Southern rights and rejected
the ultraism of the Yancey
and Samford

adherents.

This evaluation is doubtful.

A further assessment is in

order.

The Congressmen elected from
south-central Alabama were all relatively young men; all under forty-five.
Except for Pugh, they were all
small slave-owners as well, and none
were planters. Thus their stake
in Southern Rights were political
rather than economic.

They were all

eager to "get ahead" politically and they
utilized politics as their

means of mobility.

Moore,

Curry and Pugh have al ready been discussed.
'

Ambition for office-elective or appoint ive-they
had tied their fortunes
to the South 's "Hennenvolk" Democratic

ethos-one white man

is the equal

168
of every other white man-regardless of
status.

Pro-slavery politics

was then, fundamental to their future advancement.

South Alabama Con-

gressmen, regardless of their committment to the Party,
were potential

fire-eaters in 1859:

they could afford to endorse the moderate National

Democratic party at this time, since John Brown's raid and Lincoln's

election were yet to come and since a pro-Yancey position was not to
their political advantage.

Suggestive of the search for status in politics was the Mobile

organization "Young Man's Southern Rights Democratic Association," a club
committed to the preservation of slavery.
the first Mobile district of "260 young

It

claimed a membership in

men— mostly

lawyers," which in-

spired a critic to observe "that the continued growth of lawyerism in

Alabama had produced a class of demagogues always on the scent for office^
In 1859,

in south-central Alabama, we have seen,

Party regulars

were being pressured by political outsiders who talked freely of secession.

Governor Moore was attacked by firebrand William

F.

Samford; David
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Clopton had to modify his statements
of national party loyalty
under
Thomas Judge's disunionist assault.
F. B. Shepard and F.
S. Sappington
campaigned as ultras and forced their
rivals, who were Party regulars,
to concede that secession could
become a reality if a Republican
were

elected in 1860.

Meanwhile George W. Gayle founded a rabid
secessionist

journal-The^Slaveholder, which attacked Democrats
who remained loyal
to the national Party.

In sum,

these were outsiders and malcontents.

They were frustrated in their desire for
power^and prestigue by, in part,
the conservative leadership of Benjamin
Fitzpatrict and the Montgomery

Regency which controlled much of the federal
patronage and spoils coming
into Alabama.
In the fall of 1859 William L. Yancey and his
south-Alabama col-

leagues-William

F.

Samford, F. B. Shepard, J. E. Sappington, George W.

Gayle along with Barbour County ultras led by State Senator
E. C. Bullock,

continued their assault on Fitzpatric and the Montgomery Regency which
he controlled.

Their object was to push Fitzpatrick out of the United

States Senate, replacing him with Yancey.

Toward this end they were

aided by the Montgomery Advertiser which, reversing its stand, again
came out for Yancey as Senator.

The Eufaula clique's Spirit of the South

and J. J. Hooper's Montgomery Mail also provided editorial support.

Fitzpatrick was not a loyal "Southron," these newspapers insisted.

He

coveted the vice-presidency and would even serve with "the enemy of the
South, Stephen A. Douglas."
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Fitzpatrick's high standing among national

Democrats and his support for Douglas assisted the ultras who had gathered
around Yancey.

It

furnished them with ammunition in their offensive

against the Montgomery Regency and its Party chieftan.

Fitzpatrick, under
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pressure, wrote C. C. Clay, Jr.,
that »I am as much opposed
to Squatter
Sovereignty [the Douglas doctrine]
as you or anybody else."
He believed
that former Governor John Winston
would be his most serious
competition
for the Senate, obviously minimizing
Yancey and his faction.
a newspaper interview Fitzpatrick denied
that he favored Douglas as the
Demo-

m

cratic nominee, but said he would vote
for the Convention choice.

He

emphasized further his refusal to sanction
any platform that did not
secure "our rights and equal justice to
all sections of the Union." 171
In 1859,

then, Alabama Democrats were on the
verge of one of their

classic "blood letting" feuds-reminiscent of
the earlier struggles between Dixon Hall Lewis and his south Alabama
"Chivalry" and William

King and his north Alabama "Hunkers."

R.

The hostility between Yancey and

Fitzpatrick soon pulled their sons into conflict.

The Tuskegee Republican

reported that the young men had gone to South Caroline to
fight

a duel

over charges which had been printed regarding the Senatorial election. 172
Yancey's grab for power was opposed not only by Fitzpatrick and
Seibels.

John Forsyth, editor of the Mobile Register and a newly elected

representative to the Alabama House, was an outspoken Douglas Democrat.
He delivered no less than fifteen speeches against Yancey's attempt to

gain the Senatorial candidacy.

rhetorically asked:

Calling it a "disorganizing plot," he

"what Democrat wishes to play into the hands of

Yancey who is trying to bring ruin... on the organization for his own

ambition?"
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In early December 1859 Alabama lawmakers debated a resolution

to hold the senatorial election.

State Senator E. C. Bullock, Yancey

stalwart and Eufaula clique manager, described what would be the abortive
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effort to topple Benjamin
Fitzpatrick.

1

do not think therg

probability that any further effort
will be made to bring
tion] on this winter."

it

^

^

[the el,
Lec'

Fr i en d s of Senator
Fitzpatrick resignedly to>ld
1

Bullock they too would not renew
their attempt.

Yancey, desparate to

force a decision, was checked by
new developments which
frustrated beyond question his election attempt.
Montgomery fire-eater M. J. Safford
was the immediate cause of this
frustration. The Montgomery Regency
had used its patronage power to
procure a political job for Safford.

Returning the favor, he came out for
Fitzpatrick.
on our list as certain," stated E

.

C.

Bullock,

Safford "was put down

"and the fact that two

members from Dale County could not be induced
to go for Y.

One of them

came out at one time for Yancey, but had not
the backbone enough to

resist the local [Montgomery Regency] pressure." 174
tion, therefore,

took place.

No Senatorial elec-

Both factions knew they did not have the

necessary majority for a victory.
Yancey's bid, then, was stalled, but the overriding
significance
of the aborted senatorial contest was the failure of
the Montgomery Regency
to re-elect Fitzpatrick.

The Regency simply did not have enough legis-

lative votes to return him to Washington.

A special session of the le-

gislature would have to be held before March 1861, when Fitzpatrick's
term expired, in order to determine his fate; none was convened, a rebuff
that can be attributed to the heightened opposition in south Alabama
to national Democratic Party loyalists, which in effect meant to the

Montgomery faction, increasing antagonism toward this clique was triggered by John Brown's raid.

Harper's Ferry was ascribed not only to

Abolitionists and "Black Republicans," but also to northern Democrats
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vho were not sufficiently "southernized
throughout the South came under
attack.

.

"

Democratic Party ioyalists

Consequent!^ the Fitzpatrick-

Selbels faction was on the defensive.

The failure to have a "showdown"
did not deter Yancey and his
managers in their quest to take over the
State Democratic organization.
The events of I860, as the subsequent chapter
will show, would offer

new opportunities to these Black Belt agitators.
One view, that of Charles Denman, of
Yancey's political behavior
in 1858 had it that he realized the Democratic
Party under Northern con-

trol would not protect Southern Rights.

His actions, according to this

interpretation, were determined by consistent
adherence to principle
175
as opposed to politics.

But we have also shown that his political

course can be attributed to personal ambition and pique as
well.

Yancey's

dioenchantment with the national Party, after stumping and serving
as
Democratic elector in 1856 and after sustaining Buchanan's Kansas
policy,
wao caused by his failure to obtain a federal cabinet post and, later,
a Senate seat.

These frustrations, coupled with insults from old anta-

gonists like J. J. Seibels and Henry Hilliard, heightened his alienation.
Furthermore, Yancey's hostility toward the Fitzpatrick-Seibels-dominated

Democratic leadership in Alabama was intensified when this bloc welcomed
Hilliard.

Frustrated and bitter toward those who he felt had prevented

hie deserved elevation to the Senate, Yancey co-operated with Ruffin and
Rhctt in the formation of "Leagues of United Southerners."

And then ho

tried to smash the State's Democratic party organization and its loyalty
to the national Party.

In point of fact,

Southern Rights agitation be-

came the means by which Yancey sought the fulfillment of his political
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aspirations-which was to lead the Alabama
Democracy.
South Carolina Governor James
Hammond, commenting upon such
ambitions, enjoined, "We must be
guarded and warned of the
impracticable,
radical and provincial partisanship
of such schemers and ambitious
demagogues as... Yancey and Co. or the
country will drift into either
ruin
or disgrace or both." 176 But Governor
Hammond described only half of the

equation:

Yancey's actions can best be characterized
by dedication to

Southern principle as well as by
self-aggrandizement.

CHAPTER
NEGROPHOBIA AND POLITICS:

VI
ALABAMA SECEDES

The sectional trumoil that
inspired Alabama's decision to
secede
is clear enough.
The existence of slavery, the
rise of abolition!™ in
the north, agrarianisra versus
industrialism, and differences in
consti-

tutional interpretation all contributed
by I860 to an explosive
situation
in which war between the sections
might breakout at any moment.
What
this explanation lacks, however, is an
appreciation of the multitude of
local factors which animated individual
slave states to disunion.
In Alabama, as we have seen, many
internal forces were at work

which contributed to secession.

For example,

intrastate sectionalism

between north and south Alabama dominated the
State's ante-bellum political history.

Upstate, where the soil was not conducive to cotton

cultivation, slavery never took hold.

Therefore, the region's yeomen

farmers supported the national Democratic Party and the
union.

South

Alabama --especially its Black Belt--contained the richest cotton
lands
and highest slave concentration in the State.

alism predominated.

And here southern nation-

Both sections, we have seen, fought to control the

governorship and United States Senate seats.
In addition to the chronic factionalism based on the State's

north-south division, there was also severe fragmentation among Democrats
in central and south Alabama.

by the
age.

Montgomery Regency

Those in central Alabama were controlled

which dispensed the State's federal patron

By the late eighteen forties the Montgomery clique was factional ized

between extreme southern-rights advocates led by Dixon Hall Lewis, and
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national Party regulars under Senator
William Refus King.

These two

sections of the Alabama Democracy
bitterly contested Senate seats and
federal patronage.

After the death of Lewis and King,
conservative Senator Benjamin
Fitzpatrick managed the Montgomery organization.

However, the searing

territorial disputes of the late forties
and early fifties produced new

Black Belt ultra blocs-the Eufaula Regency
and the Dallas County "hotspurs "-which challenged the moderate leadership
of the Montgomery Regency.

The Whig Party throughout Alabama's Cotton
lands was also frag-

mented.

Whig-Unionists, composed of conservative Whig planters,
held

sway in many west-central counties and in the Mobile
district.

Until

their end in 1853 these Whigs provided the major structure
for unionist

sentiment in south-central Alabama.

But, there was also a southern-rights

Whig element in east-central Alabama which challenged the Whig planters
of the Black Belt.

By 1858 the Whig -American party structure disappeared.

Vast num-

bers of ex-Whigs and former Democrats -turned -Know-No things entered the

Democratic Party.
for office.

What all these factions shared in common was

a

desire

This political migration, however, created the problem of

too many candidates for a limited number of offices, which in turn in-

creased Democratic factionalism.

In the eighteen fifties a new gener-

ation of lawyer-politicians emerged.

They consisted of men of modest

economic circumstances--small to moderate slaveowners--whose economic

mobility was blocked because quality cotton lands had become monopolized
by the major planters and the lands available were selling at astronomical
prices.

Thus, politics became their vehicle for social mobility.

From
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the Wilmot Proviso through the
Kansas disputes, these lawyer
-politicians

used the southern-rights issue
for their own ends.
outsiders, men on the make.

Most were political

They sought power by attacking the
national

Democratic regulars who controlled the
Party machinery.

Moreover, they

habitually shifted from extreme to moderate
southernism.
changed party allegiance with regularity.

They also

At times they tried to mani-

pulate public opinion; on other occasions
they followed the general consensus.

By the mid-eighteen fifties most south
Alabama Democrats con-

sidered themselves southern-rights men.

In fact they ran against each

other for state and national office, questioning
their rival's dedication to the "southern way of life."
Compounding Democratic difficulties was William L.
Yancey of Montgomery.

Although returning to the national Democratic fold in
1856,

he had declared war against Party leadership after he failed
to acquire
a post in President Buchanan's cabinet.

He turned against the Montgomery

Regency when they welcomed two of his bitterest enemies--ex-Whig-Unionist

Henry Hilliard and editor J. J. Seibels.
The radical southern rights platform again became Yancey's modus

operandi in his assault on Democratic Party loyalists.

In 1858 he col-

laborated with Edmund Ruffin in organizing the League of United Southerners "to fire the South to Secession."

Although Yancey had co-operated

with Robert Barnwell Rhett of South Carolina in recommending disunionism,
he soon backed off from advocacy of secession.

His disunionist views,

it seems, were, more a reaction to frustrated ambition than any systematic

plot to dismanLle the Nation.

Nevertheless, opportunist that he was,

Yancey persisted in agitating the Southern-rights issue by demanding a
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federal slave code for the
territories.

On this issue he was joined

by ex-Whig-Americans from
east-central Alabama who, Ufa,
himself, had
never been part of any political
inner circle.
Divisive sectional sentiments popular with Black Belt and
south Alabama voters could concei-

vably enhance their own careers.
In 1859 William L. Yancey ran for
Benjamin Fitzpatrick's Senate

seat.

Clearly, this was an attempt to dislodge
the Montgomery Regency

which had been loyal to the national
Democratic Party.

Outstanding among

Yancey stalwarts was the Eufaula Regency, under
the tutelege of state
Senator E. C. Bullock and the erratic planter-editor
William

F.

Samford.

Also supporting Yancey were erstwhile Whig-American
nullifying editors
like J. J. Hooper of the Montgomery Mail

.

Hooper, an extreme Southern

chauvinist, was one of the State's most consistent and
outspoken advo-

cates of secession.

William L. Yancey's 1859 attempt to obtain a Senatorial post and
to topple the Montgomery Regency failed,

in part, because some southern-

rights legislators pledged to him changed their votes with the promise
of political jobs from the Montgomery Regency.
It was the lack of a specific issue that really blocked anti-Party

cliques from taking over the Alabama Democracy in 1859.

An issue was

needed that could be dramatized and politicized as an immediate threat
to the stability of Alabama's slave owning counties.

Such an issue would

demonstrate that a Democratic Party controlled by northerners was not
capable of protecting Southern institutions.
Almost from the moment that black bondsmen were introduced into

Alabama there was a pervasive fear of slave uprisings.

Any act of re-

.
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sistance on the slaves' part was
met with immediate retribution.
At
times whites panicked as rumors of
slave rebellions spread through
Black
Belt communities. Alabama passed
a host of slave codes that
attempted
to govern both slave and free
black behavior. Nat Turner's
rebellion
in Virginia traumatized white
Alabamians,

causing them to tighten their

already stringent slave ordinances.
With the rise of immediatists in the
ranks of Northern abolitionists, white Alabama confronted a new
senfcitrfent^hich called for something

other than colonization or gradual emancipation.

From the eighteen thirties

through the eighteen fifties Alabama southern-rights
agitators played
on the racial fears of the State's white population
by maintaining that
the northern wing of both the Democratic and Whig had
become abolitionized

On the eve of the national debate over the Wilmot Proviso,
a move-

ment to halt the domestic slave trade began in central Alabama.

This

campaign was an indication of white apprehension about the uncontrolled
growth of the black population.

While Alabamians fretted over the merits

of the 1850 Compromise, an African Colonization society was organized
to rid the State of its freedmen.

The Republican Party emerged in 1854.

It

drew together many di-

verse elements, all of them being cemented by a common opposition to
the further extension of slavery in the territories.

view, rising Alabama politicians like Congressmen
L. M.

C.

Taking a contrary
C.

Clay, Jr.,

Curry, and Sydenham Moore were thereby able to gain office.

J.

The)

insisted upon the south 's determination to acquire more slave territory
for slavery and pictured the Republican Party as central to a vast nor-

thern conspiracy dedicated to abolitionism and to the destruction of
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southern society.

Alabama's political opportunists who
capitalized on the

int,
:erre-

lated issues of southern rights
and the Republican threat to
their section appealed to a very susceptible
electorate. Southerners had lived

with slave insurrection anxieties for
generations.

Now they feared that

abolitionists would either subject the
south to a bloodbath by forcing
the violent overthrow of slavery or
would precipitate a race war by

denying slavery room to expand,

m

spite of these fears, however, sou-

thern-rights agitators still lacked a single
dramatic event that would
point up the danger of southern Democrats
compromising with the northern

Democratic political establishment.
they had that event.

On the night of October 16, 1859,

John Brown, on that date, led a determined hand

of black and white abolitionists in an attack upon
Harpers Ferry, Virginia
Their purpose was to incite rebellion among Virginia slaves which
then

hopefully would catalyze slave upheavals throughout the cotton states.
When news of Brown's abortive raid reached south Alabama, its white population reacted hysterically.

Alabama's southern-rights factions, to

repeat, now had their long-desired incident.

No issue galvanized white fears or engendered such blind hatred
for the north as did John Brown's aborted insurrection attempt.

Terrible

visions of Alabama slaves murdering and plundering their masters became
standard fare in the State's Black Belt press.
1792 Santo Domingo slave revolt.

Newspapers recalled the

Editors reported that John Henry Kagi,

one of Brown's confederates, had marked out a chain of Alabama Black

Belt counties where he had traveled and where bondsmen were expected
to rise.

Allegedly, Russell, Macon, Lowndes, Autauga, Dallas, Wilcox,
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and Monroe counties were marked on his
map.

1

Brown's raid was that newcomers were
suspect.

One lesson drawn from John

Community hostility was

directed against all outsiders, especially
those who deviated in any way
from southern custom.
"Places on Brown's map designated the points
of insurrection,"

revealed the Clarke County Democrat

.

C.

E. Haynes editor of the Clarke

Democrat claimed that abolition emissaries had
been at work,

"if the

citizens living about the points designated on Brown's
map have noticed

any suspicious character and would make them known... much
light might
be thrown on this dark nefarious plot." 2

No central Alabama journal was

as obsessed with detailing suspected incendiary activity
as the Montgomery

Mail.

Fire-eating editor J. J. Hooper, who drew no distinction between

Republicans and abolitionists, recommended that all those living in or
near the areas specified on Kagi's map should interrogate all slaves to

determine "what communications had been held with slaves by Republicanfree soil emissaries."

Those who acted suspicious or those who professed

"unsouthern" opinions were arrested and forced to leave Alabama.

Hooper

chided Mobile officials for being too lenient with suspected incendaries.
"They should have been whipped, ducked, tarred,
a rail and then hanged to a tree."

feathered, ridden upon

3

Such pronouncements contributed to the crisis mood in central

Alabama.

For instance, Loachapoka,

in Tallapoosa County,

concerned citi-

zens gathered in order to adopt measures for the "protection of our citizens and property against the evil and mischievous designs of Republican

abolitionists and other characters dangerous to the interests of our
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community."

They passed a resolution

recording

that R. w.

I nma n,
a hardware dealer fro. New
York and ft suspicious character/'
be returned
to the north.
Macon County organized a vigilance
committee "to guard

against strolling Osawatamies [John
Brown type incendiaries] and
preserve
a strict police in the neighboring
towns and their vicinity."
Hooper
again warned: "never before is it
so necessary for us to sleep
with
one eye out at the window.
Patrol!
Patrol!!
Patrol!!!" Autauga County

residents created a vigilence committee
to keep a watchful eye over all
transients.

The Southern Era confidently asserted
that "the anti-slavery

movement ramifies the entire south/ and that
"there are agents and emissaries of the Black Republican Party scattered
throughout Alabama,"4
What made Alabama newspapers so sure that
abolitionists Republicans

were traversing Alabama was the northern response
to John Brown's raid.
The activities of the "Secret six/' highly respected
New England Brahmans

who financed Brown's raid, were widely reported.

Moreover, the Alabama

press quoted Joshua Giddings of Ohio, who said that he looked forward
to the day "when the torch of incendiary agents shall light up
the towns

and cities of the South and blot out the last vestiges of slavery."

Northerners who condemned Brown's execution encouraged the Eorence
Gazette to proclaim,

"The Brown sympathizers,

lican Party are full of treason and blasphemy!

the north and the Repub-

John Brown the murderer

and assassin is held up as a saint, an apostle of liberty." 5

George W. Gayle, editor of the Cahaba Slav eholde r, announced that
it would be fatal to place any hope in the conservatism of any northern

class.

"On our own arms must we rely to preserve slavery secure and pro-

fitable."

Upstate firebrand David Hubbard claimed that the entire north

283

had been abolitionized.

Montgomery district congressman
David clopton

claimed the "Black Republican Party
is steadily advancing to
power and
in the event of success, the Union
cannot be maintained." Representative Sydenham Moore of the Tuscaloosa
district knew that the north had

become subverted by anti-slavery radicals
and that they had silenced conservatives in this section.

He deplored a sectional fanatical
party

like the Republicans who could gain power
by deluding and manipulating
the voters.

John Brown's raid, then, was exploited by
Alabama's southern-rights
factionalists.

Northern Democrats as well as Republicans could
be no

longer trusted unless they were firmly under southern
control.

"Union

demonstrations by our Northern brethren are grand humbugs,"
observed
Congressman J. L. M. Curry.

Union meetings in the north are "participated

7
in by many men who will turn around tomorrow and vote for
Republicans."

Through December 1859 Alabama's press fueled the panic of whites
living in the slave-dense Black Belt.

An "unsound traveler" was caught

bearing a letter from "old Ossawatamie,

"

he be lynched.

Anyone connected in any manner with plots to burn and mur-

der, the Eutaw Whig suggested,

burried."

and there were demands that

should be sent to 'V;here they would be

A suspect was arrested in Autauga County for "having in his

possession several letters from some of Brown's men in the North... he
was bound over in the sum of $10,000."

Barbour County officials charged

a new resident, Josiah Bass, with making abolit ion statements and tarrc

and feathered him and "rode him out on a rail."

'

A peddler, one Albertson,

was incarcerated in Cahaba, Dallas County for being "an abolition emissary."

A crowd gathered outside the jail, and a lynching was barely averted.
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In Tuskegee, Macon County, a stable
was burned

lost), allegedly the work of an
"incendiary."

(and eighteen horse
>es were

Alabamians were told to

be on the lookout for Frederick
Carstacke's Wil d Sports in th e
"a viler,

Wfrgt,

more abominable, lying, abolition
publication was never printed,"

declared the Southern Advocate, "surely
our booksellers can find some

way to prevent such books from being foisted
on them... they can let

it

be understood that they will destroy and
not pay for them." 8

Few Alabama newspapers raised questions about
the reliability of

these incendiary stories.

To be sure, John Forsyth, editor of the Mobile

£gg iste r and P arr of the conservative Democratic inner circle, protested
.

-

.

against "such dangerous teachings—behind every bush

leader."

9

a

slave rebellion

But Forsyth's call for reason was disregarded.

Meanwhile, goaded by the terrifying thought of losing racial control, Alabama's legislature turned its attention to strengthening domi-

nation over the slaves.

The General Assembly heard demands to halt the

emancipation of bondsmen by owners, since White Alabamians had always
viewed free blacks as a potential "spark" for slave rebellion.

John

Brown's raid brought renewed pressure to completely remove the freedman
from Alabama.

The legislature passed restrictions on free-blacks.

One

measure declared void all wills which emancipated slaves, either directly
or indirectly; prohibited the authorization of the removal of slaves,

directly or indirectly, from the State; for the purpose of freeing them.
Another act provided that any freedman might voluntarily select a mastc"
and return to the status of slave.

State Senator E. C. Bullock also

presented a petition from the Marengo County grand jury asking that
bill be passed that would prohibit all commercial activities between

a
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blacks and whites.
The Committee on the Judiciary
in the lower House was
instructed
to inquire into the expediency
of changing the law of
evidence in order
"to meet the insidious
designs of the Abolitionists."
Any white .an
suspected of "encouraging or promoting
sedition among our negroes, shall
be liable to conviction upon,
ne^ro evidence, provided that
such evid ence
does not contradict the testimony
of white persons the Jury
deems cre-

dible."

11

A bill introduced in the Senate, and
later passed, imposed
on "book peddlers."

The^J^ej?^^

a tax

commented that "Yankee book and

periodical agents inflict injuries on Southern
institutions.

Tens of

thousands of books, pamphlets and papers are
annually printed and distributed to empoison the Southern mind."

Its editor called for the

passage of a book-salesman tax which could put
the focus on abolitionist
literature and the traveling sellers who "often are
tampers of slaves
and the insidious mouth vendors of northern fanaticism."

The lawmakers

in the course of their deliberations on this "salesman
act," also de-

nounced Hinton Rowen Helper's The Impending Crisis and called upon
constituents to suppress the anti-slavery tract. 12
The lower House passed a resolution eighty-seven to one, which

condemned northerners when, "their leaders have been preaching a crusade

against our institutions, which in their estimations justifies and sanctifies murder, arson and rebellion; a state of feeling which wholly

unfits them for political brotherhood."

Stephen A. Douglas was also

denounced as an enemy of the south, and Douglas' squatter sovereignty

doctrines were pronounced subversive of the rights and property of

^
206

southerners.

Editor and state representative
John Forsyth, a Douglas
partisan, responded by noting that
northern Democrats were of a
conservative temper and were friends of
13
the south.
The vast majority of
Alabama's Democratic inner circle,
being pro-Douglas, would support
him
for the presidency.
The Black Belt press did its part
in influencing legislative opinion.

It called upon the lawmakers to
prepare for the "irrepressible con-

flict."

For example, the Gainsville Independent
in slave-dense Sumter

County insisted "the Militia system of
our state must be revised and

improved," and asked furthermore that the
State's slave patrol system
be improved.

It

further urged the legislature to establish
a regular

police patrol unit vhich would make "a servile
insurrection impossible." 14
Reacting to white apprehensions, the General Assembly
provided for the

organization of volunteer corps in each county, not to exceed
8,000 men.
In order to equip these forces,

it

budgeted $200,000, a sum larger than

that appropriated by any other slave state, after John
Brown's raid,
for equipping the militia.

It

would raise this sum by levying a surtax

of 5 percent on all State taxes and a poll tax of 25 cents on each white

man between 18 and 45.

It also provided for the State-supported edu-

cation of two young men from each Alabama County in the privately-owned

military academies at LaGrange and Glenville.

The cadets would be under

obligation to return to their respective counties and drill the militia.

A charter was also granted

to the Southern Fire Arms Company to manufac-

ture fire-arms within the State.

Significantly, those legislators who favored passage of the mill'
tia measures were part of Alabama's anti-Montgomery Regency forces.
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Some Montgomery Regency men,
unmoved by this panicked
anti-abolitionist

sentient, saw other implications

in the military measures.

State sena.

tor William Garrett wrote to
fellow conservative Lewis Parsons
that the

militia ordinance was designed "to aid
the Southern movement" in south
Alabama. Garrett demanded "at the
outset a clear and official expl;
Lanation of the amounts expended and
contracted," and he urged that the.
;se
sums "be brought before the people."
it a secret."

Don't let these "schemers keep

The people ought to know the cost of every
aspect of this

militia program, including "commissions to
communities to purchase mus-

kets."

Under the "specious cry of Southern Rights they
have been fattening

upon the people of Alabama." 16

William Garrett's advice went unheeded:

Alabama taxpayers were never informed about the costs of
their new military program.

Another indication of public anxiety was the passage of a legislative resolution directing the Governor, in event of a Republican
victory
in November,

1860 to call a convention to determine state action.

The

resolution passed seventy-five to two in the lower House and unanimously
in the Senate.

17

Upstate representatives voted for the measure because

they were no doubt intimidated by the mood of belligerance, particularly
in the state capital, that followed Brown's raid.

Given these sweeping and extreme actions by the lawmakers some

qualification is in order; otherwise the climate of opinion governing

Alabama might be misread.

Not unexpectedly secession sentiment was high

in central and south Alabama, regions of massive slave concentration

and a traditional hotbed of southern chauvinism.

rife with daily insurrectionary scares.

These were the areas

But in north Alabama, where
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slavery was not a dominant feature,
there was a general tendency
towards
moderation. According to Joseph
Hodgson, many upcountrymen
"were ready
to deny that occasion existed for
extreme action, and in the event
of
the meeting of a convention,
would be ready to resort to any
delay by

which the passions of the hour could
be assuaged and the dreaded spectre
of disunion be exorcised." 18
It

is difficult to determine the
motives of many southern rights

advocates at this stage.

Some like George W. Gayle were ideologues
who

would brook no compromise over slave protection.
L. Yancey functioned on two

levels-a desire

Others like William

to maintain southernism

and an interest in using the issue to gain
power.

Then there were the

rank opportunists that William Garrett alludes to.

Outstanding among

them was Judge Samuel Rice who served in every party
in pre-Civil War

Alabama and finally became a Republican in 1870.

However they all shared

one objective—the dismantling of the conservative Montgomery
Regency.

Alabama's warring Democrats were scheduled to meet in Montgomery
in early January 1860 to select delegates to the national Democratic

convention scheduled for Charleston, South Carolina.

On the eve of the

State's caucus the anti-Montgomery Regency cliques were in the ascendent
for weeks prior to this caucus.

William L. Yancey and the other factions

hostile to the national Democratic party had been working to block Alabama's endorsement of Douglas at Charleston.

They were insisting that

all presidential aspirants among the national Democrats would have to

endorse a resolution calling for a federal slave code for the territories.
But Douglas, a leading contender for the nomination, had since
1854 upheld the principle of popular sovereignty (whereby the people of
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a territory,

either through a territorial
legislature or a constitutional

convention, could accept or reject
slavery).

By blocking Douglas, Yancey

and his collaborators were also striking
a blow at two of his Alabama

supporters, Senator Benjamin Fitzpatrick
and J. j.

gomery faction.

S eibels

of the Mont-

The anti-Douglas movement in Alabama
was initiated by

William M. Brooks, a Yancey man who chaired
the Perry County Democratic
meeting which rejected Douglas or any other
candidate who did not affirm
constitutional protection of slavery.

Eighteen other Democratic county

meetings were held after Harper's Ferry, and the shock
waves
and all confirmed the Perry County resolution.

it evoked,

A few gatherings even

adopted resolutions maintaining that "the election of
a Black Republican
to the Presidency would be sufficient cause for
secession.

1,19

The most divisive pre-convention caucus was held in Montgomery.

William L. Yancey and other Montgomery agitators prepared to dislodge
the pro-Douglas Montgomery Regency by having Montgomery Democrats com-

mit themselves to the federal slave code proposition.

The conservative

Montgomery leadership knew the forcing of the slave-protection issue
would further fragment Alabama's Democrats and might result in the senatorial defeat of Benjamin Fitzpatrick at the March 1861 session of the

legislature.

Such a possibility notwithstanding, Fitzpatrick and the

conservatives around him still supported the Democratic Party's 1856

Cincinnati platf orm--the doctrine of federal nonintervention in the territories.

These Party regulars felt that Douglas would campaign on that

plank and that he had the best chance of winning nationwide.

Further-

more, Alabama's national party regulars were convinced of the impracti-

cality of any Democrat being selected who favored congressional protec-
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tion of slavery in the territories-vhich
Benjamin Fit Z patrick even
called a baneful abstraction.

There had been two meetings of Montgomery
County Democrats to
select delegates to the State Convention.
1859.

The first on November 12,

The November 12 gathering at the height
of the post-Harper's

Ferry panic found the anti-Montgomery
Regency Democrats in control.

They elected Samuel Arrington as chairman and
James T. Holtzclav, a

Yancey law apprentice, and George W. Whitman
as acting secretaries.
The caucus proceeded to the matter of federal
protection of slavery In
the territories.

It

approved resolutions that would commit Alabama's

delegation to Charleston to this position.
logic of a Douglas endorsement.

The caucus then debated the

Yanceymen noted Douglas' position that

the people of a territory could exclude slavery prior to the
formation

of a state constitution, finding it evidence that he was an unsound

candidate.

Almost redundantly, the caucus advised southerners to demand
20
federal protection.

William L. Yancey, to no one's surprise, was named to lead the
Montgomery County delegation to the state caucus.
tegy at this caucus was evident.

His faction's stra-

They would topple the Montgomery Regency

by a direct assault on Douglas, thereby forcing a split among state Democrats.

They would themselves then replace the discredited pro-Douglas

bloc as the party "wirepullers" in Alabama, and Yancey would become United
States Senator and State party chieftain.

The national party regulars stormed out of the county caucus, and J.J.
Seibels cal led for a second caucus of Montgomery Democrats to meet in December
and select a contesting slate of delegates to the state convention.

He asked that
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those not in agreement with the
pro-Douglas conservatives abstain from

u
attending.

21

But Yancey and Thomas L. Arrington among
other anti-Douglas Democrats did attend the Montgomery caucus.

When a committee was appointed

to draft resolutions and appoint delegates
to the state convention,

Arrington condemned the motion, arguing that delegates
had already been
appointed by the earlier Montgomery meeting.

Yancey holding the floor,

refused to recognize pro-Douglas Regency men and also
appropriated the

Democratic label for the southern-rights bloc.

He accused the national

party loyalists of trying to destroy Alabama's Democratic organization. 22
This intra-party struggle recalls the clashes of the late 1840

's

between

the pro-Union faction led by Senator William

R.

Calhounites under Senator Dixon Hall Lewis.

The issue then as well as

King and the Alabama

in 1860 was not only southern rights but who was going to direct the

fortunes of Alabama Democrats.

After the Yancey-led clique left the hall, Party regulars reorganized themselves and appointed their own delegates to the State convention.
J. J.

The delegation was made up of leading Montgomery Regency men:

Seibels, Henry C. Semple, Henry Hilliard, George Goldthwaite, and

John D. Phelan.

All of them were elderly lawyers, judges, and planters

who had been fighting party battles since the 1840 's, and who feared
a divided national and local Democrat Party.

Schism could mean the end

of their power in Alabama--as well as the election of a Republican President.

They did not want the State's Democrats to demand a platform un-

acceptable to northern Democrats.

The Dred Scott decision, they reasoned,

gave constitutional sanction to slaveowners to take their slaves wherever

.
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they wanted, and it could be endorsed
by "true Democrats/' both north
and south, and it could serve as a
point of concensus for the party.

They hoped that by standing firm they could
thwart the opportunists
grouped around William L. Yancey. 23

National Democratic loyalists, however, faced
an insurmountable

obstacle.

Alabamians-especially in slave-populated central and
southern

regions were, after Harper's Ferry, more than ever
opposed to popular

sovereignty and to its author, Stephen Douglas.
fears, rested with the "abolitionized North."

Responsibility for their

Alabama Congressman J.

L. M. Curry wrote Governor A. B. Moore, who stood close
to the southern-

rights wing of the Democratic Party, "Our Convention can hardly
hesitate

upon our right to the Federal protection of our property in the Terri-

tories...the people of the South are with us now."

0/

After noting the

defensive mood of his fellow Mobilians, Democrat Levi Lawler wrote, "I

am willing to see one more effort to save the Union; but

I

should regard

the nomination of Judge Douglas, or the election of a Black Republican

as fatal to its perpetuity.

If the northern Democracy force their man

upon the party, the harmony and unity of the party will be broken and
defeat certain."

25

Thus, with significant public opinion arrayed against

them, Alabama's pro-national Party managers confronted a severe test
to their authority as the state convention began on January 11,

I860.

The vast majority of delegates were not the Democrats of the

eighteen forties and early fifties.

Most were ambitious young men who

were just beginning their political careers as southern-rights advocates.

Among the most prominent were several youthful lawyers who were sponsored

by older Black Belt southern-rights

f actionalists

26
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The convention was embroiled
in factional conflict
fro. the outset, with leadership of
Alabama Democrat's at issue.
The southern-rights
malcontents deeded federal
protection of slavery in the
territories
and thereby blocked an endorsement
of Douglas. Montgomery
Regency Democrats, however, were willing to
leave the question of popular
sovereignty
to any future decision of the
Supreme Court. Their avowed object
was
to secure Douglas' nomination and
thereby preserving the power of
their
leader, Benjamin Fitzpatrick.

The first struggle was over the
seating of contested delegations
from Montgomery County-the Yancey-led
faction and those selected by

Montgomery Regency's rump caucus.

The extremists succeeded in appointing

John T. Morgan, Dallas County firebrand,
to head a committee of six to
pass upon the two contested delegations.

Morgan reported in favor of

the Yancey bloc and claimed that Montgomery
Regency leaders were dis-

rupters who refused to abide by Democratic Party
practices.

The conven-

tion concurred with the Morgan committee, by a vote of 211
to 110, and
the Yanceyites were seated. 27

But even before the delegation issue was

settled, the southern-rights faction won an important victory which

sealed the fate of the national party regulars.

William L. Yancey, William

F.

Samford, and E. C. Bullock had care-

fully planned their tactics toward the end of controlling the meeting.

Yancey moved for the selection of a temporary chairman early on the first
day, and nominated H. D. Smith a southern ultra from Lauderdale County.

Trying to out maneuver Yancey, conservative Nicholas Davis placed Unionist
J. M. Bulger in nomination.

Bedlam broke loose.

When the shouting sub-

sided, Leroy Pope Walker nominated another southern-rights man Francis
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S. Lyon, who was

confined by the delegates, thereby
placing the anti-

Montgo.ery Regency forces In
control.

Lyon's acceptance speech was no-

thing less than a slave-protection
code for the territories that
would
28
satisfy the south.
sunken the issues of electing a
chairman and

m

the seating of contested delegations,
the anti-Fitzpatrick and anti-

Douglas forces could claim victories.

The delegates next turned their attention
to the platform they
would recommend to the national Democratic
party at Charleston.
was selected to head the platform committee.

Yancey

His committee instructed

Alabama's Charleston delegation to offer as a
plank in the national party

platform a federal slave code for the territories.

If the national Demo-

crats at Charleston did not approve the Alabama
resolution, then Alabama's

delegation was instructed to withdraw.

A second measure offered by Yancey's

committee declared opposition to the nomination of any
candidate for

President who did not abide by the Alabama platform.

Of 445 delegates,

seventy-one mostly from north Alabama, opposed the withdrawal instructions, but only twelve voted against the one binding a presidential

nominee.

Leroy Pope Walker was chosen to lead the Alabama delegation

at Charleston.

29

William L. Yancey, ending the convention's deliberations, maintained that every state Democratic faction was represented on the resolutions committee and that the platform was framed as a guide for the

national Party.

30

Clearly,

this was a dl. ingenuous assessment.

gomery Regency Douglas supporters had been denied

a

Mont-

voice on the reso-

lution committee, and the Yancey bloc of firebrands actually sought a

southern-controlled national Democratic party.

This objective could
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only be achieved by putting
a southerner in the

tfnite House.

If the

ultras could help bring it
about, then they would
control the Alabama
Democrats and Yancey would be
senator and patronage dispenser
in the
state.
John Brown's raid had given
them, political outsiders
up to now,
the opportunity they long
Bought -in order to divest
Alabama's Democratic
inner circle of its authority.
Because of the actions of the
State convention, the national Democratic
Party faced its severest test since
the 1848 squatter sovereignty
convention.

John Forsyth, in the General Assembly,
complained that instructions to Alabama's Charleston delegation
were in effect an ultimatum
that would split the national party and
bring on a Republican victory.
Forsyth, J. J. Seibels, and highland
Douglasite Joseph Bradley told

Douglas that the actions of the Alabama Convention
reflected the politicians' will rather than the peoples'. 31
It

is questionable, however,

were of one mind.

that all southern-rights politicians

Some of the moderates among them voted for the reso-

lution to withdraw at Charleston simply as a threat, believing
that fear

of Democratic schism would force the Douglas men to make
concessions
to southern demands.

If the threat failed,

gard its instructions to withdraw.

the delegates might disre-

Other Alabama delegates confided

that even if the Alabama delegation did bolt at Charleston, this would

not break up the Party or the Union:

in some fashion or other the Demo-

crats would reunite before the 1860 campaign got under-way. 32
not all the southern-rights men were determined disrupters.

Therefore
Many looked

upon their instructions as just one option among others.

Charleston was buzzing with rumors about the intentions of the
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Alabama delegation.

Few of the Alabama delegates
could be described

as absolute disunionists
.

William L. Yancey, John T. Morgan,
and L.

P.

Walker at best could be designated
as conditional unionists.

Although
they came to the Convention pledged
to withdraw if they didn't
get a
Platform endorsing a slave code and
a pro-southern president, they
still

never threatened disunion.

Significantly, they were considered
disunion-

ists in Alabama where their reputations
as "uncompromising Southrons"

were at stake.

According to Allen Nevins, Yancey and
his followers came

to Charleston to dissolve everything-the
Party, then the Union. 33
ever,

How-

their strategy was simply to maintain their
new mastery of the State

party and to secure southern domination among
national Democrats.

There

was no plot to use the convention as a test run
for secession.
Yancey, moreover, was as mild as a windless May
morning.

From

first to last, the reputed fire-eater went about
Charleston listening

intently and with utmost courtesy to every faction.

Neither his words

nor actions demonstrated the confirmed disunionist.

Northwest delegates

at Charleston said that he was the father of the "Alabama Platform
"--the

federal slave code--that would guarantee the dissolution of the Convention.

Yancey retorted that he had done no more than an honorable man

had to do, and that he would go in all good will, only where duty led
him.

An Alabama delegate, following Yancey's course, asked newspaper

columnist Murat Halstead "what was the Democratic platform for if

it

was not for the vindication of the great constitutional principles."
Halstead wryly countered, "The Democratic party is an organization for
the purpose of obtaining Federal offices or in other words a political

Corporation like a great lottery Co. for the distribution of spoils."

34
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And indeed the slavery
irabro8lio was , in

^

, device

^

^^

ship positions in the State
and nation so that old
malcontents and new
political aspirants could
dispense and receive patronage.

Douglas Democrats came to
Charleston to gain the nomination
fc
tor
the little giant and frame
a popular sovereignty plank.
John Forsyth
wrote Douglas that his supporters
from the north and west should
"stand
firm and insist on your nomination
as indispensible to Democratic
secession and a break will be made in
the phalanx of Southern opposition."
The thinking of the Douglas men was
obvious.

They knew that the Alabama

delegation had instructions to withdraw
if their resolutions were not
adopted.

Only the Mississippi delegation had
agreed before the Conven-

tion to join in walking out.

ask for anything better.

It

Douglas' advisors said that he could not

would rid the Convention of his most hostile

opponents and win the nomination and platform for
them.

Douglas had

thought for some time that southern radicals
represented a minority posi-

tion in that section.

Thus, he had made his appeals to Alabama moderates

like Senator Benjamin Fitzpatrick and John Forsyth.

After observing

Yancey's concilliatory manner in Charleston Forsyth wrote Douglas:

"My

fear is that Yancey .. .will not... stand up to the instructions and leave
the convention."

Upstate unionist Joseph Bradley also told Douglas that

he was "now afraid the fire-eaters will not bolt."

By the second day's

proceedings, however, six other slave states agreed to follow Alabama
out of the Convention if their sectional demands were rejected.

Their

decision came after the resolution committee adopted Douglas' federal

nonintervention position.

By these developments the pro-Buchanan faction were jockeyed into
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prominence.

Their twin objectives were
to stop Douglas and
gl oss over
the divisive slave code
issue. Buchanan wanted
a second ten,, „ hlch
vas almost an ^possibility
and, hating Douglas, he
worked to prevent
the letter's nomination.
Buchanan's chief "wire puller"
at charl,
Leston

was Senator John slidell of
Louisiana.

He had h elpe d make chariest,
:on

the convention site since South
Carolina was anti-Douglas territory,
and he made promises of patronage
to any and all delegates who
could

be pledged to stop Douglas.

On the evening before the convention
debate over the platform,
the pro-Buchanan clique of
Senators--Slidell, James A. Bayard of Dela-

ware, and Jesse D. Bright of Indiana-sent
for Yancey.

They prevailed

upon him to recognize the implications of
the Alabama instructions.
If the slave-state delegations bolted,

tory with a nonintervention platform.

it

would ensure a Douglas vic-

The Buchanan Democrats knew that

Douglas could never be nominated by a two-thirds
majority as long as
the south stayed in the Convention. 36

Yancey agreed to remain in Charleston.

Richard Taylor, son of

the former President Zachary Taylor and a delegate from
Louisiana, was

present at the meeting and revealed that Yancey "undertook to call his

people together at that late hour, and secure their consent to disregard
their instructions."

William

L.

37

Ironically, these were the same directions

Yancey himself had imposed on the Alabama delegation.

"We waited until near dawn for Yancey's return," Taylor recalled,

"but his efforts failed of success."
a Douglas man,

Ex-Alabama Governor John A. Winston,

insisted that "they should be obeyed to the letter and

carried the majority of the Alabama delegates with him."

Probably Winston
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sought to wrest the leadership
of the Alabama delegation
fro m Yancey
by making it adhere to the
Yancey-inspired withdrawal
resolutions and
thereby to secure Stephen
A. Douglas' nomination.

The next day the convention
began to debate the Yancey
and Douglas
Platform reports. The former had
been drawn up by fifteen
southerners
and their California and Oregon
supporters.
It denied the right of
any

territorial legislature to abolish
slavery, to prohibit its introduction,
or to destroy or impair slaveholders
rights; and declared it the duty
of the federal government to
protect the rights of persons and
property
in the territories.

It was in substance the condition
of Alabama dele-

gates for remaining in the Convention.
to Douglas.

And it was totally unacceptable

38

The Douglas plank which was accepted by the
Douglas-controlled

resolutions committee was basically the same as
that included in the
1856 Democratic platform; namely,

in the territories.

federal non-interference with slavery

This time the platform contained the added state-

ment that questions regarding the rights of property
in states and ter-

ritories, arising under the Constitution, were judicial in character
and that the Democratic Party was pledged to abide by and faithfully

carry out such determination of these questions as the Supreme Court
had made or might make.

39

Reflecting his ambiguous behavior of the previous night, V/illiam
L.

Yancey's address to the Convention was a combination of vague concili-

ation and southern nationalism.

After reviewing the history of the issues

dividing the north and south he asked that the Democratic party rcdedicate
itself to "the high principles of constitutional government and act ac-
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cordingly."

He denied that either
er he
ne or t-h*
ai %
tne Alabama
delegates were dis-

unionists-nonetheless he declared that
the Union would be broken
if constitutional principles
did not prevail.

up,

He pleaded with southern

delegates to present a united
front in favor of

a

platform that recog-

nized their rights and guaranteed
their honor, and he concluded
by turning on Douglas.
Both reports were presented to
the Convention which
adopted the Douglas plank by a
vote of 165 to 138.

When the Douglas platform was accepted,
Leroy Pope Walker of Alabama enumerated the reasons why his
delegation
could not endorse it.

Then the delegates left the hall, followed
by those from Mississippi,
Louisiana, South Carolina, Florida,
Arkansas, and Texas.

After the

walkout Douglas was unable to secure the
necessary two-thirds majority
for the nomination.

This was because of a resolution offered by
John

R. Howard of Tennessee demanding that any
candidate must receive two-

thirds of all the votes originally represented
at the convention in order
to be nominated.

The Douglas men had based their whole strategy upon

the assumption that only two-thirds of the votes remaining
in the con-

vention after the bolt would be necessary.

When the Howard resolution

passed 141 to 112, even the most optimistic among them began to lose
hope.

With 202 of only 254 remaining votes needed to nominate, Douglas

would now have to carry every free state delegation plus

19 votes from

among the seven full slave-state delegations remaining in the convention.
That was impossible.

The Convention adjourned after fifty-seven ballots,

to meet in Baltimore June 18,

1860.

The bolting delegates, meanwhile,

organized a meeting a day after their departure.
of moderation.

Yancey spoke in favor

Many of the bolters, meanwhile, had second thoughts.
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^

They began to seek a way
back into the national
Party by dragging
feet on the issue of a
separate southern political
organization and they
refused to endorse a southerner
for the presidency.
The bolters then
adjourned, to convene again in
40
June at Richmond, Virginia.

It is difficult to access
the behavior of Yancey
and other sou-

thern nationalists at Charleston.

Ex-Governor James Hammond of South

Carolina viewed the performance
of Alabama's delegates as rank
expediency.
In Yancey's ambition to be a
senator, to replace Benjamin
Fitzpatrick
as Alabama's party chief, he had
persuaded the Alabama Convention to

bind the state's delegation to "that
slave code po S ition-a stance that

was intended to discredit all Douglas
Democrats in Alabama." 41

man Martin

J.

Crawford of Georgia concurred with this
judgment:

Congress"In

reference to the difficulties at Charleston
it all grew out of the Senatorial race in Alabama.

The platform that came out of the state's
Demo-

cratic convention was made for the purpose of
electing its author [William
L. Yancey]

to the Senate of the United States." 42

Yancey and other Alabama ultras, as indicated above, tried
to
present themselves in Charleston as southern moderates.

political target was Alabama itself.

Yancey's main

When the pro-Buchanan's bloc brought

their proposal to stop Douglas, he readily agreed.

There was a politi-

cal advantage in not bolting, and it may have been a factor in Yancey's

decision.

Anti-Douglas Buchanan Democrats might be useful in obtaining

Administration support for his move to replace Fitzpatrick whose senatorial term expired in March 1861.

In other words, Yancey could not

appear as fire-eater par excellance to those Democratic insiders he
deemed important in furthering his political ambition.

After Yancey
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failed to keep the Alabama
delegation at Charleston,
ex-Governor Hammond
said that he "lost control of
the movement "43 Even at
the southern
meeting after the bolt, as noted
above, Yancey stressed caution
and
.

restraint, advice that many ultras
thought uncharacteristic of a
man
who built a reputation on agitating
sectional differences.
At Charleston, moreover, Yancey's
position on the slavery questio
did not differ from southern-rights
moderates like Mississippi's Jefferson Davis.

Both

x,ere

conditional Unionists.

Yancey believed that both

the Union and slavery could be preserved
so long as the Democratic Party

controlled the federal government and the south
directed the Party.
Such had been the intent of most southern
Democrats since the ISAO's.

This purpose was in jeopardy in 1860 because leaders
of all shades of

opinion believed the balance of sectional power was
shifting away from
them.

Much has been written about Yancey's secession schemes tracing
his role back to the formation of the League of United Southerners;
his
1858 Slaughter letter, in which he suggested using the Leagues to "fire
the southern heart to secession"; his co-operation with Robert Barnwell

Rhet in 1858, when both spoke in South Carolina about the feasibility
of separate state secession.

However, much of Yancey's disunionism was

only rhetoric for home consumption.

He lived in an area of Alabama and

in an age which considered such oratory to be "manly."

Yancey used fire-

eating demagoguery as a weapon in the campaign against conservative

Alabama Democrats.

He invariably retreated when accused of preaching

outright secession; witness, for example, his denial of the implications
of his disunionist remarks to James Slaughter, or his claim to being
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minted

at the 1858 Southern Co^ercial
Convention in Mont 8 o,oer when
y
he had taiked openly of
secession if the African slave
restriction were
not lifted.

Few southern nationalists at
Charleston demanded secession.

The

panic and hysteria triggered by
John Brown's raid had momentarily
subsided. Murat Halstead rejectes
the theory that the southern
bolters
were trying to split the Party, thereby
ensuring the election of a Re-

publican president, and precipitate
secession.

Both Democratic wings

would later nominate their own presidential
candidates, and the south
would seek to throw the election into the
House, where
a

president favorable to the slave states.

hoped to elect

it

44

There were also many southern Democrats who
longed to get back
into the good graces of the national Democracy
before the June Convention.

Radical secessionist Robert Barnwell Rhett from South
Carolina

judged the Charleston withdrawal as a mere tactic.

After Charleston,

Rhett ridiculed those southern Democrats who departed
hastily to mend

fences at home and then to seek readmission into the national party. 45
To be sure there was also an ideological minority, men such as Alabama

editor George W. Gayle, who insisted upon secession as the south

's

only

option.

William L. Yancey, immediately after Charleston, appeared weary
and frightened.
ton?

How would the people of Alabama view events at Charles-

In a letter to Senator C.

C.

Clay, Jr., he shows the strains pro-

duced by recent events:
You have doubtless seen that both conventions
have ad journed--making no nominat ions--The Nat 1
was demoralised--fact ious and adjourned to save
1

"

304

an open disruption. Ours had
timid and perhaps
wise men in our councils, who
were unanimous a
to the platform and as to
the holding another
Convention in Richmond ... .You and
our delegation
each and all must take an early
occasion fn
your places, to speak of our
action here and
must susjtain us... call for aid
of every man.
I
send... large numbers of my
speeches and our protest
Give them circulation. .where
it will
tell on our cause.
Do it at once-so as to bear
on the election of delegates
to the coming state
convention—prompt and efficient action
is the
order of the day.... An early occasion
and a decided stand by you, Curry, Pugh,
Clopton, Moore
...will nave vast influence not only
in Alabama
but over the whole South
1 write in great
haste--amidst such noise and confusion.... 46
.

Yancey, no doubt, feared also that his
actions at Charleston would be

interpreted as a failure of nerve and of
leadership.

Barnwell Rhett believed as much:

Certainly Robert

there was obviously "some want of

nerve in the management of the bolters ... and an
evident want of stewardship.

Yancey is not capable in that way, however great an
orator and

debater

.

47

As far back as the factional struggles of the late forties and

early fifties in Alabama, Yancey repeatedly showed an inability to lead
and often followed the more astute guidance of Dixon Hall Lewis and
John
A.

Campbell.

He failed to direct effectively Alabama's Southern Rights

Associations (of 1351-1852) formed at his behest.

They became merely

vehicles for other Black Belt politicians who wished to manipulate the

southern-rights issues for their own advancement.

Yancey's ineffectual

attempt of 1853 to perpetuate Alabama's Leagues of United Southerners

helped finish them off in late 1853.

All these developments, as well

as Yancey's dismal performance at Charleston, bear out Rhett's evalua-

tion.

Clearly, he lacked the intuitive touch of leadership.
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Alabama's bolting delegation
returned home to a greeting of
criticism and praise. The Montgomery
Advertiser
spoke of the delegates

talking firmly out of the Convention

in the path of duty and honor...

bearing with them the respect and
admiration of a Nation."

Interestingly,

this newspaper which was being financed
by Yancey categorically denied
that the walkout was "a disunion
movement.

the constitution.

organization."

48

It

It

was a movement to uphold

is not even a movement to form
a Southern sectional

Yancey, in a two-hour Montgomery speech
to an ultra

audience, tried to maintain his extremist
reputation.

He said that Ala-

bama would lose her self respect and honor if
she sent delegates to the
National Democratic Convention at Baltimore in June. 49

As in the past,

such pronouncements helped to enhance his image
among national party

Democrats as a dlsunionist.

Some Alabama southern-rights newspapers

blamed the collapse of the Charleston convention on the
Douglas faction.

Pro-Douglas men, they alleged, demonstrated that a determination to
rule
or ruin the party:

"It seems strange to us that when the Northern Demo-

crats found the South so united and determined against Douglas they still

remained unwilling to make any concessions and still refused to unite with
use in presenting to the country some candidate whom both sections of
the union could have supported.

""^

The pro-Douglas press was convinced that the crisis was part of
a carefully engineered plot to destroy thf Union by disrupting the Demo-

cratic Party and thereby assuring a Republican victory, which would be
used as a pretext for secession.

The Southern Advocate, still under

"
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the editorship of William
B. Figures, the former
Whig-Unionist and now
a Douglas Democrat, objected
strongly to the "Yancey group
prating of

southern-rights as if they were the
whole South," talking of
"Southern
interests as if they owned all the
negroes in the South," clamoring
about
"Southern honor as if they were the only
people in the South!" The majority in the South could not be didicated
to nor led by the "nose...
and they didn't like. .Yancey 51
.

.

Pro-Douglas papers attempted to brand Yancey
a radical disunionist
by publishing his 1858 James Slaughter
letter which recommended using
the Leagues of United Southerners to raise
secession consciousness among

southerners.

Thus, Yancey and his supporters, these
papers concluded,

had a "grand design" which was put into operation
with the Charleston
walkout.

Significantly, none of the Alabama newspapers published
accounts

of Yancey's attempt to keep the State's delegation
at Charleston.

Pre-

sumably the purpose of Alabama's Douglasites in putting the
secessionist
label on Yancey was to keep him on the periphery of national
Party poli-

tics.

No sober-minded party regular would allow an irresponsible fire-

brand to replace Benjamin Fitzpatrick.

John T. Morgan also came under attack.

He was villified by both

Montgomery Regency Democrats and the State's most consistent secessionist
George W. Gayle, Morgan's Dallas County neighbor.

The Montgomery Con-

federation claimed Morgan had a most checkered political career:

"He

commenced his political career as an old line Whig"; then, during the
1850 Compromise debates he became a southern-rights man; he was part

of the Know-Nothing leadership in Dallas County in 1855; Eighteen fiftysix he supported James Buchanan and he became a "disrupting Democrat"

"

"
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again in 1859; and later, with
Yancey

.

s

aid , hg

^^

credentiais
chairman at the State Democratic
Convention and helped lead
Alabama
delegates out of the Charleston
Convention. The Confederation '.,
exclusion:
"A most consistent cleaving
52
to principle
!

Confirming the charges of opportunism
leveled at him by the Confederation, Morgan upon returning
to Alabama began to equivocate
in his
support of the Democratic rump meeting
of Southern-rights delegates
at
Richmond,
charging him with a lack of sincerity
and a failure of nerve
because Morgan would not declare his
honest intentions for secession,

George W. Gayle claimed that Morgan
"is so afraid of the charge of disunion,

for fear of his personal political
fortunes" as the secessionist

tide seems "to have receded somewhat in south
Alabama...."

Gayle con-

cluded, Morgan and his "kind were after a
little petty County supremacy.
I

will wash my hands of any such fizzling crowd,
and for my part, they

all might all go to h-11." 53

The possibility of being cut off from national Party
spoils and
patronage for an uncertain future must have given ambitious office
seekers
like John T. Morgan second thoughts.

Even Congressman James Pugh, an

ultra from Alabama's extremist Eufaula district in the heart of the Black
Belt, believed (in May 1860) that fire-eaters like Robert Barnwell Rhett

were advising action too extreme.

Pugh had been "cursing Rhett loud

and deep," reported South Carolinian John E. Ashmore
heard more earnest denounciations

.

:

"I have never

54

Meanwhile, at a May 5th Democratic meeting in Montgomery, ex-Governor

John A. Winston, a pro-Douglas man, denounced the defeated slave code

platform of the Charleston convention.

The disharmony between the national
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Party loyalists and the anti .
Montgomery Re
and Morgan-was still
pronounced.

^

y facti

„^ ^ ^
n

At stake was not only

of the national Party's
position on slavery in the
territories but who
was going to control the State
organization.
On May

7,

at the urging of John Forsyth,
Montgomery Regency stal-

warts led by J. J. seibels along
with north Alabama Unionists-all
proDouglas men and Party regulars
met in Mobile and decided to
organize the
"National Democracy of Alabama."

They agreed to run county meetings

that would elect representatives
to a convention scheduled for
Montgomery
on June 4. This convention would
select delegates to the national
Democratic Convention in Baltimore. 55
On the same date of June 4, the anti-

Douglas factionalists who had control of
the State meeting of January
1860 were to hold their own caucus to choose
delegates to the Richmond

rump session.

Montgomery then, was a city in political turmoil
on June

4.

The

two state Democratic factions met to elect
delegations to the Baltimore

national Democratic Convention and to the Richmond rump
convention.

The

national Democrats surprised their opponents by assembling
a relatively
imposing body of delegates.

All the counties, except Morgan, of the

Tennessee Valley sent delegations.

So did half of the Black Belt coun-

ties and five counties in south-west Alabama. 56

The pro-Douglas men in Montgomery reaffirmed the 1856 Democratic

plank of federal nonintervention in the territories, and approved the
Douglas platform of the Charleston Convention which endorsed the Dred
Scott decision.
J.

J.

They then elected delegates to the Baltimore Convention.

Seibels was chosen as delegation leader.

The vast majority of
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those selected were from
nerth Aiabama.

Joh „ A. Winston ended the
pro-

ceedings by excoriating the
Richmond Convention "as
calcuiated to precipitate the south into a
secession fro. the Democratic
Party and from
the Union itself-for which
there is now no good cause,
and for which
the South is wholly unprepared...." 57

The ex-Governor failed to mention
a prime motive of Alabama's
regular Democrats-to regain mastery
of the State Democratic organization.

In June, momentum was again with
them.

"Southern way of life" had occurred.

an aberration it was thought.
leston.

No new "outrage" to the

John Brown's raid might be only

The ultras had been wavering since
Char-

Many had second toughts about cutting
themselves off completely

from the national Democratic party.

The southern-rights caucus in Montgomery did
pass a resolution

upholding in principle the platform passed by the
state convention in
January 1860.
Charleston.

It also vindicated the action of Alabama's
delegates at

However, reflecting the changed mood, William L. Yancey

made a plea for restraint.

He personally wanted to see the Richmond

Convention nominate a candidate and then adjourn.

But to pursue such

a course, he admitted, would not be advisable since Mississippi
and

Louisiana had already accredited delegates to both Richmond and Baltimore, and four other states were likely to follow the same policy.

Yancey

stressed the twin need for Southern unity and for moderation as well as

conciliation.

He urged the Montgomery caucus to accredit delegates to

both Richmond and Baltimore.

He read a statement which, he thought, should

be made to the national Democratic Party in order to dispel the charges
that Southerners favored disunion.

It read:

"We come once again to you,
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as brethren, offering you
the olive branch of
peace.

Do us sittply

,

U8 .

tice-protect us, when necessary to
our safety, and we will
once again
be a united as well as a
constitutional party."

The caucus acted on

Yancey's suggestions for conciliation
and directed the former
Chariest on
delegates to attend both the Richmond
and Baltimore conventions.
None
of the bolters protested this
bitter prescription-that directed
them
to Baltimore, hat in hand, seeking
forgiveness and readmittance into the
national councils of the Democratic
Party.

L.

P.

Walker was chosen for

a New York mission to get support
from New York Democrats for
Alabama's
seceding delegation at Baltimore. 58

Clearly, then, southern nationalists from
Alabama were not inter-

ested in June 1860 in leading any disunion
movement, especially when the

public mind was not receptive -nor was it in
the late spring-to such
a prospect.

It

is more difficult to determine, however,

if these southern

rights advocates were willing to compromise on
their demand for a con-

gressional slave code for the territories.

Certainly, Douglas and his

supporters would brook no compromise on federal protection for
slavery

— they

stood absolutely opposed to it.
J. J. Seibels immediately accused "Yancey Democrats" of going

to Baltimore in order to disrupt the national Convention again.

He also

charged Yancey with "manifest inconsistency," since he had stated earlier
that it would be dishonorable for any Alabamian to attend the Baltimore

Convention.

59

Seibels and John Forsyth were confident that their wing of the

Alabama Democracy would be seated at Baltimore.
to defeat once and for all the Yancey faction.

They had a strategy

They had, in a letter
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to Douglas

recorded

Benjamin Fitzpatrick for the
vice-presidency,

insisting that such a development
would defeat and enable
national Party
Democrats to carry Alabama.
Seibels had sounded out
Fitzpatrick and
had received what he thought
was a positive response. 60
Meanwhile, Alabama bolters arrived
in Richmond.

There the newly

formed Constitutional Democratic
Convention was at a standstill.

No

platform was adopted or nominations
made, and after a two-day session
the remaining delegates left for
the Baltimore meeting.

Before continuing to Baltimore, Yancey
stopped in Washington where
a significant event took place.

Douglas' east coast manager George
Sanders

of New York visited Yancey and said he
was authorized to offer him second

place on the ticket.

Sanders added, in order to persuade Yancey,
that

Douglas would probably be dead within six months
of the election anyway.

Yancey scorned the offer, possibly recognizing that

it

would be impossible

for him to stand next to the hated Douglas in
Alabama—and on noninter-

vention platform no less!

Interestingly, however, Edmund Ruff in, the

Virginian secessionist went to see Yancey about this time at the
excited
request of Alabama Congressman James L. Pugh, a friend of Yancey's.

Ruffin said Yancey "received me very politely— but he did not seem disposed to converse freely and

I

inferred, as I had heard intimated, that

he was fearful of saying something to commit himself." 61

The possibility

exists that Yancey hadn't entirely rejected the Sanders' bid at the
time of Ruf fin's visit.

In any case, he did refuse to make any disunion

committment to the Virginia ultra.
The Douglas Democrats were well organized at Baltimore.

They

went into the Convention with a firm base of northern strength and took
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the nomination by force

antagonize the south.

.

Yet they

du

nothing

wouid unnecessariiy

Douglas had aimed his recent
senate speeches at

isolating southern extremists
fro, the south and had
not tried to mate
a frontal assault on the
section as a whole.

On the seating of delegates,
the Douglas-controlled
credential s
committee called for seating all
the southern Douglas delegates
who were
challenging the Charleston bolters.
Yancey argued the claims of
Alabama'
holters, but their credentials
were challenged and only the
Seibels-led
62
faction was seated.
This caused South Carolinian James
Hammond to observe that "it was silly enough to
secede at Charleston on a very distant
and improbable issue, it would have
been amusing if it had not been so

mortifying to see Yancey and the other
leaders of this great splurge...
stand amazed and bewildered at their own
success, with their fingers
in their mouths utterly unable to lead
an inch further; but then to
see them sneak back to Baltimore, humbly
entreat to be re-admitted into
the same convention with platform unchanged
and to be so scronfully re63
jected."
This refusal to seat the Alabama delegates, as well
as the

other bolting delegations, irreparably divided the Party.

The Douglas men now began a frenzied and belated effort to reestablish their candidate's credentials as a nationalist and as a willing

arbitrater of sectional differences.

They did indeed offer the vice-

presidency to Senator Benjamin Fitzpatrick, who was immediately deluged

with telegrams from constituents demanding that he decline.

President

Buchanan and Alabama Democrats convinced Mrs. Fitzpatrick that the Senator would be "eternally ruined if he accepted" and asked her to intercede.

Smarting from the rebuff at the hands of the Douglas Democrats,
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Yancey visited Fitzpatrick
and appealed to the
southern patriotism of
his old political enemy
urglng him to reject
,

^ ^ ^^^^

'

however, counseled Fitzpatrict
otherwise:

"To refuse now would be
to

cower before your enemies
disgrace your best friends and
place yourself
in a most unenviable position."
But Fitzpatrick withdrew,
explaining
that Seibels had misunderstood
their conversation in Washington;
and
he declared:

"to accept a place on the ticket
with Douglas whose views

are entirely opposite to my own
64
would compromise my political
integrity.-

One suspects, however, that Fitzpatrick
would have welcomed the oppor-

tunity to run with Douglas.

He had never identified with the
extreme

southern-rights wing of the Democracy, neither
in Congress nor in Alabama.

On southern rights he differed with
the fire-eating

Jr., his senatorial colleague from Alabama.

C.

C.

Clay,

Indicative of his ambivalence,

when he turned down the offer, Fitzpatrick denounced
the "distracting
differences at present in the ranks of the Democracy."

He further implied

that these differences were engendered by extremists,
such as Clay, who

heated the passions.

This produced the final break between Fitzpatrick

and Clay; henceforth they would have neither social nor
political asso-

ciations .

The vice-presidential nomination went then to Hershal
of Georgia.

Johnson

V.

Johnson's willingness to accept it and Fitzpatrick

'

s

in-

ability may reflect the degree of control that the southern-rights cliques
in Alabama had over the State Party, espp^ially in Fitzpatrick

"southern conscious" region of central Alabama.

1

s

excessively

Fitzpatrick refused to

join the campaign against Douglas in Alabama and was thought to be friendly
to the national Party nominee.

6

"*
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The seven bolting Charleston
delegations and other state
delegations north and west mt in
Richmond s Maryland

^

,

June 23,

I860 and adopted federal
protection of slavery in the
territories
as its major plank of whit
they called the "National
Democratic Party"
-just to confuse the nomenclature
even more.
Incumbent vice-president
John C. Breckenridge was unanimously
nominated for President and Oregon
Senator Joseph Lane for vice-president.

Even a casual look at Breckenridge

'

record discloses that he did

s

not represent the interests of
southern chauvinism.

Far from being iden-

tified with the slave-code extremists,
he had made a speech in 1856 that

distinctly favored federal nonintervention
in the territories.

He refused

to join either side in the Lecompton
debates and absented himself from

the Senate rather than break the deadlocked
vote over the Kansas Consti-

tution.

The Kentuckian, moreover, was known to be on
friendly terms

with Douglas.
by the Buchanan

Actually, the Breckenridge-Lane tickets had been
devised

bloc— Representatives John Slidell

Cobb of Georgia, and the President himself.

of Louisiana, Howell

The ticket was put together

in order to destroy Douglas and hopefully quiet
the Party rebels.

With the Democratic Party hopelessly divided, giving a decided
edge to the Republicans, Edmund Ruff in conversed with various Alabama

delegates.

He learned that they would chose secession "as soon as a

Black Republican shall be elected President which we suppose will occur
next November."

He talked with Governor

A

.

B

.

Moore and he "intimated

very clearly that he thought the southern states ought to secede before

Lincoln is inaugurated as President

.

"^

Much of Ruffin's report of secession sentiment among Alabama dele-

gate. was probably

id*

talk on thelr paft

viction.

^

^

thaa

Many Alabama ultras, Joseph
Hodgson wisely argues, believed
that with three or £our
parties In the field no one
could obtain an electoral majority, the House of
Representatives would choose a
president,

and the slave states by adroit
trading could achieve Its
goals-a federal
slave^code in the territories and
a Democratic Party under
southern control.
The only impediment to this plan
would be a Lincoln victory
in November.

Then southern extremists would be
forced to turn to a

southern Confederacy.
In addition to the two contesting
groups of Alabama Democrats,

there were two other parties that sought
the presidency:

tional Union Party and the States Rights
Opposition Party.

composed of former Whig -Americans

.

the Constitu-

Both were

The Constitutional Union Party, took

national shape in the spring I860, and was especially
strong in Alabama's

western counties of the Black Belt.

Its state power rested with old

Whig-Union planters of west-central and south Alabama
as well as with
pockets of Whig-Unionism in north Alabama.

Constitutional Union followers traced their Whigism back to the
late eighteen thirties and early forties.

They prided themselves on a

conservative faith in orderly progress--internal improvements, protective tariffs, stable currency fixed by the federal government.

equally scorned fire-eaters and abolitionists.
s

They

They believed that seces-

ion would destroy their economic and social domination at home as well

as produce racial havoc throughout the South.

They looked with disdain

on the strident younger Whig ultras of east-central Alabama with their

pro-slavery agitation.

Interestingly these Whigs were lawyers and editors,
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not major planters.

The Constitutional Unionists,
then, wished to con-

serve the nation, though .any
of the. believed in states
rights.
Unfor
tunately, these .en were as old
as John Bell, their candidate.
The
young southerners had other
68
loyalties.

The Constitutional Unionists
identified Yancey and Alabama's ult
ras
as outright secessionists.
On the question of slavery
rights in th e

territories, however, Bell himself took
evasive middle ground.

He ignored
the slavery issue and party platforms,
and made the sole issue the con-

stitution, the Union, and the laws.

Bell's Party had newspaper support
throughout the State.

In north

Alabama, the Athens Union Banner rallied
upcountry voters to the ticket.
So did the Montgomery Post in central
Alabama.

C.

C.

Langdon of the

Mobile Advertiser, an old Whig chieftain, turned
his columns over to
Bell's cause.

In late May,

the Constitutional Unionists issued the fol-

lowing call:

We honestly believe that today there are over
30,000 conservative voters in Alabama who do
not sympathize with or wish to vote for either
wing of the Democracy of Alabama ... .That the
disunion wing of the Alabama Democracy has control of the party in Alabama
Yancey and his
ilk have control and unless conservative men
rally around some sound National men, such as
Bell and Everett [Edward Everett of Massachusetts,
Bell's running mate] and put both wings down,
Alabama will be lost. 69
The fourth and smaller party, the States Rights Oppositionists,

was a makeshift organization containing radical Whig -Americans

.

Most

had co-operated with Democratic ultras in their assault on Democratic
Party regulars in south Alabama during the local elections of 1859.

They refused to join the Constitutional Unionists or initially either

^

segment of the Democratic Party.

strident fire-eaters:

Among them were some of
Alabama's most

Thomas Judge, the Whig

who campaigned

for Congress in the Montgomery
district in 1857 and 1859 as
a disunionist
George Shortridge and Judge
Samuel Rice, both of whom moved
from party
to party and from unionism to
secessionist!, as they sought
office; and
J. J.

Hooper, editor of the Montgomery

Gayle editor of the Cahaba

^holder

extreme southern nationalist.

mil

who competed with George W.

for the mantle of Alabama's
most

Among the State's most volatile
southern

chauvinists, these Whigs were, according
to the Constitutional Unionists,

always stirring up passions with their
secessionist threats.

An Opposition convention was held in
Montgomery on July
In attendance,

2,

I860.

too, were some old-line Whigs, men who
had played a key

role in managing the fortunes of the now-defunct
central Alabama Whig
Party.

There was William

P.

Chilton, a law partner of William

L.

Yancey;

attorney James Gilchrist; and Montgomery planter- lawyer
Thomas H. Watts
led the old "wirepullers."

The convention was composed of seventy-eight

delegates from seven east-central counties.

These extremists advocated

a new party based on the principles of the disbanded League
of United

Southerners.

They passed resolutions supporting slavery extension in

the territories but split over a resolution introduced by Thomas Watts

that declared the views of Bell and Everett on slavery extension to be

satisfactory.

Watts was trying to bring the Oppositionists into Bell's

camp and thus become the "boss" of a revived Whig Party in central Alabama.

But the Whig ultras led by Hooper and Judge defeated him, and the

Watts bloc left the Convention.
The Oppositionists finally decided to support Breckenridge

.

During
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the campaign Itself, the
y advocated secession m ore
consistent ly than
did the De mocratic ultras.
J. J. Hooper, for example,
used his paper
to organize "Minute Men"
clubs in the Black Belt to
prepare Alabama for
secession.

Although these Whig -American ultras
joined with Breckenridge Democrats, they were not deterred from
contesting
their allies for local

offices.

They ran candidates for tax
assessor and county commissioner

in the Montgomery district.

to gloat,

This inspired the pro-Douglas
Autauga Citiz en

"Great Yancey men-truly glad to
learn it.

Wonder how many of

them would vote for Yancey if the
contest should be between him and Thoma
8

Judge for Congress in this district.

Yancey and Fitzpatrick.

»

These are only Yancey men between

Editor William

C.

Howell asked Montgomery Brecken

ridge Democrats "if they intend to stand by
and see their party beaten

by Whig-American fire-eaters" who ostensibly
supported their presidential
candidate?

71

Both wings of the Democratic Party

Unionists professed to be pro-Union.

as well as the Constitutional

Each claimed that it alone could

defeat the Republicans and avert disunion.

However, the southern-rights

moderates who arranged the Breckenridge ticket could not prevent ultras
among Breckenridge partisans, such as J. J. Hooper from increasing
racial
tensions and secession fervor as Lincoln's election became imminent.
Since all of the parties equated Republicanism with black equality
and abolition, none of them paid much attention to the Republican Party

platform.

Had they done so they would have found that

it

reaffirmed

the equality doctrine of the declaration of independence without defining
it in terms of Negro citizenship.

The Republican platform deplored dis-
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union just as the Bel!, Douglas,
and Breckenridge platforms
had done.
It recognized the power of
each state to control Its
own domestic Institutions. But then the Republicans
had upheld the
Proviso-

HUM

denying the authority of Congress
or of a territorial legislature,
or
of any other power, to legalize
slavery In the territories. They
.1,
.so
rebuked efforts to reopen the African
slave trade.

On these two points,

which rankled southern ultras, the
Republican position was clear:

slave

should be confined to its present
territorial limits but that It should
not be abolished entirely.
In a speech on February 27,

1860, and never reported in Alabama,

Lincoln carefully avoided all excess.

He repudiated Hinton Rowen Helper

anti-slavery tract, condemned John Brown's raid, and
spoke in terms of
sectional conciliation and broad nationalism.
south

's

attitudes toward the Negro.

He shared some of the

For example, he praised the Dred

Scott decision for its doctrine that a black could not be
a citizen,
and candidly declared,

"I am not in favor of Negro citizenship."

He

emphatically disclaimed the doctrine of social equality for the races;
he refused to press the repeal of the fugitive slave law; he took no
stand against the admission of further slave states. 72

But these non-

threatening views of the Republican candidate were not reported in Ala-

bama's press during the campaign.
In Alabama,

then, three well organized parties confronted each

other as the great contest got under way.

The Douglas forces contained

the Montgomery Regency leadership and north Alabama conservatives.

These

national party regulars were older and had held positions of power in
the state.

Though having the fewest papers in their cause, they were
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sustained by three influential
newspapers located i„ three
strategic
locations. John Forsyth's
Mobile Resistor aided Douglas
in south A.abama. The Montgomery Confederation
of J. j. Selbele fought fQr

^

"Uttle giant" in the Black Belt.

Upstate William B. Figures'
Southern

Advocate vigorously canvassed for
Douglas and the Union,

m

central
Alabama the Gainsville Independent
and the Autauga Citizen came
out for
Douglas.

The southern ticket of Breckenridge
and Lane had .ore Alabama
press
support than their opponents.
It was endorsed by all
extremist papers
in central and south Alabama.

In Montgomery,

the Advertiser and j. j.

Hooper's Montgomery Mail, claiming the
largest circulation in the city

enthusiastically backed Breckenridge.

Other ultra journals in his camp

were the Eufaula clique's T he Spirit of the
South and George W. Gayle's
Cahaba Slaveholder and the Mobile Mercury

ential papers came out for Breckenridge:
and the Florence Gazette.

In north Alabama two influ-

.

C.

C.

Clay's Huntsville Democrat

About fifty-four journals in all hoisted the

Breckenridge and Lane banner on their mastheads.

More than a third of

73
them, as early as June 1860, approved the "right of
secession."

Clearly, the Breckenridge faction included Alabama's major pro-southern

agitators which compromised Breckenridge

'

s

Union pronouncements.

The Bell and Douglas parties shared a similar strategy.

having no formal agreement, they seldom attacked each other.

Although
And they

both attacked the past positions of Breckenridge and Lane on slavery.
The Montgomery Post, Alabama's leading Bell paper, quoted Joseph Lane
as saying he was against territorial legislatures exercising power to

prohibit slavery; and editor Daniel Sayre also charged that Lane believed

321

they could not even establish
74
it.
Some Bell supporters in the
Black Belt were more militantly
prosouthern than were his followers
in more southern counties.
For example,
they focused critically on
Lane's claim that all Americans
should submit to a Republican victory,
"contrary to the South's attitude."
They
also condemned Breckenridge
s approval of squatter sovereignty
in a July
•

1856 speech.

Thomas Watts, a Bell supporter aware
of the militancy of

his eastern Black Belt district,
ascribed the Breckenridge doctrine
of
federal slave code in the territories
to Bell, though the latter had
not

taken that position. 75

Both Watts and Sayre, editor of the
pro-Bell

Montgomery Post, came out for congressional
protection of slavery in
the territories.

Both had visions of organizing a new
opposition party

to last beyond the November outcome.

They took liberties with Bell's

position on slavery in making their pitch to an
east-central Alabama

constituency which had always been predisposed to
pro-slavery agitation.
Meanwhile, Bell supporters in Mobile desired to leave the
question of

slavery protection in the territories to the courts.
Mobile district Bell men were still pro-Union Whigs. 76
to conclude that in lower Alabama,

then,

Many of these
It

seems safe

there was a sharp difference

among Constitutional Unionists on the issue of congressional protection
of slaves in the territories.

The vast majority of Bell men in north Alabama were Unionists.

Ex-Senator Jere Clemens was uncompromising.

In a Huntsville speech he

assailed legislative resolutions pledging the State for forceful resistance in the event of Lincoln's election.
by which a minority dictated to a majority.

This was a bad principle,

Republicanism might be the
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cause of res i stance in i860,
but lt mlght be

other cause tomorrow.
this importance,

it

is elected President?

„a

tarl£f> g

^^ ^

Once in our history a tariff
„as invested with

may again.
Good God!

Go out of the Union because
a Republican

where is this to end?"

elevens also

objected to the grant of so much
power to the "secession" Governor
as
to enable him to "railroad"
Alabama out
of the Union.

" If yo „

are pre-

pared to exchange all this for the
horrors of civil war," he declared,
"posterity can only say such madness
came as a result of excess of hap-

piness."

77

Clemens later made a detailed report of
the campaign in Alabama.
He referred to "our Douglas cousin./
described a vote for Douglas as
'

"half a vote for us," and attributed much of
the danger confronting the

union to Buchanan:

"I believe the old scoundrel would rather
burst this

government into pieces than see either Bell or Douglas
in the White House." 78
Meanwhile, the campaign progressed, Thomas Watts failed
to establish an

effective organization for Bell in the eastern Black Belt; and,
with
a Republican victory almost assured, he announced that it
would be cause
tor secession.

Contesting Watt's secession assertion was Henry Clanton, another

old-line Montgomery planter-Whig.

If Lincoln were elected, he stated,

the south should submit until the new President committed some unconsti-

tutional act.

Clanton noted both the Senate and Supreme Court were de-

cidedly against Lincoln and that in all probability the House would be
too.

With both Congress and the Supreme Court hostile to Lincoln, if elected, he

would be utterly powerless.

Not to secede would not be submission to

Black Republicanism but rather obedience to the Constitution and respect

323

for law and government. 80

Late in the campaign, „ he
n it became evident
that Breckenridge
was the leading candidate
in A .aba
supporters o£ John
,
to unite the Bell-Douglas
parties. Bell manager, met
in selma on October
and
passed resolntions instructing
10
their electors to vote in
the electoral college for any candidate
who might be able to defeat
Lincoln,
providing the party of this
candidate should have passed
similar resolu81
trons.
Alabama's Douglas men, however,
refused to join with the Constitutional Unionists.

M

„„

•

Douglas' own views on secession
and popular sovereignty were
often
ignored or de-emphasized by his
Alabama backers. Their campaign
strategy
was to expose the secessionists
sentiment of Alabama's Breckenridge
supporters.

They proclaimed Douglas as the nominee
of the official national

Democratic Party, and the candidate for
Union and equality.

The pro-

Douglas press devoted most of its columns
to denouncing Yancey and the

southern-rights ultras who sustained Breckenridge.
as a secessionist.

Yancey was stigmatized

Southern Democrats, Douglas papers argued,
were

splintered and consequently could never halt the
"free sellers

11

and,

therefore, Yancey and his extremist followers had
concocted a disunionist
plot.

Breckenridge was being used by them to divide the Democrats
and

to ensure Lincoln's election.

According to the Mobile Register, the south should compromise with

northern Democratic leaders rather than reject them.

Southerners, John

Forsyth argued, could rely on northern conservatives like Douglas in the
coming struggle.

Like Jere Clemens,

Forsyth could not see how principle

or constitutional right might be vindicated or secured if the national
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government became Lincoln's for
four years.

AUW

. Dernocrats

join northern Democrats to beat
back the Republican threat.

^

The territorial question was unimportant
to J. J. seibels and William
B. Figures,
and they were willing to await
a Court decision as to an
exact definition
of slavery's status in the
82
territories.

Most of the propaganda of the
pro-Douglas men was directed toward
Yancey.

-the

Former Governor John A. Winston charged
that the "Alabama Platform"

slave code-was but a scheme to
precipitate revolution.

He asserted

that "gentlemen might not admit it here,
they might talk gingerly about
it,

but it was talked plainly in Charleston,
and meant dissolution of the

Union and nothing less."

When the bolt had occurred, Winston stated

that a number of Alabama delegates exclaimed,

Party is broken at last."

"thank God, the National

The ex-Governor said that twenty years in

politics enabled him "to smell several rats," and he
noted that Yancey
83
"strutted" in Charleston as a man who had accomplished
his purpose.

Winston obviously was misrepresenting Yancey's behavior at
Charleston.
If anything, we have observed Yancey displayed a lack of
conviction as

spokesman for the extremist wing of the Alabama Democratic Party.

Through-

out the presidential campaign neither Winston nor any of the Party regulars

who supported Douglas mentioned Yancey's co-operation with Buchanan Democrats in trying to hold Alabama delegates at Charleston.
All pro-Douglas and pro-Bell papers focused on Yancey's past seces-

sionist statements.

They claimed that he had single handedly initiated

the 1848 Alabama slave protection plank, though John A. Campbell clearly

shared responsibility.

They pointed to Yancey's attempt to disrupt the

Democratic Party at the 1848 convention in Baltimore.

They again seized
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upon Yancey's dames
slaughter let£er as damnl „
g evldence
to "precipitate the South
into revolution." Some
Douglas
it

^

%

papers ran

daily as a reminder of
Yancey's "treason." 84

Yancey himself denied all
the secessionist charges
leveled against
him, heightening the
controversy, there was even
a dramatic clash between
J. J. Seibels and Yancey's
oldest son in a Montgomery
saloon-„ith Seibels

wielding an umbrella and young
Yancey a cane.

Uter Yancey wrote

friends
that to say "I favored the
nomination of Breckenridge with
no hope or
belief of his election... thereby
assuring the election of Lincoln....!

pronounce it an infamous calunmy."
he declared,

The accusations urged against
him,

"are part of a grand conspiracy
entered into to destroy my

character-in order to destroy. .the cause
.

I

advocate-the election of

a Southern President." 85

As the campaign progressed Yancey toured
north and south alike

speaking in behalf of Breckenridge.

He invariably emphasized two themes:

The Republicans posed a great threat to
racial control in the South and
he himself was not a secessionist.

mington, Delaware.

On September 27 Yancey spoke in Wil-

The issue of the campaign, he proclaimed, was the

preservation of the Constitution-the constitution as defined
by Yancey
and by his South.

He designated the Republican Party the "mulatto party"

—which favored freedom for

the slaves and universal amalgamation.

was with them on that issue, Yancey maintained.

allusion to himself as a "disunionist,

Douglas

He concluded with an

twenty-seven feet high, weighing

three-hundred pounds and eating a little nigger broiled every morning
for breakfast, and a roasted Union man for dinner."

In October at

Cincinnati, Ohio, he told a crowd that no part of the South would resist
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If the Constitution were
preserved through the election
of Breckenridge,
Bell, or Douglas. 0n ly a
Republican could, he asserted,
force secession. 87
In late October 1860 Edmund
Ruffin, the Virginian
disunionist,

expressed dissatisfaction with
Yancey's avoidance of secessionist
rhetoric. He implored him "to
assume the position in regard
to secession
that Patrick Henry did for the
rights of the colonies in the
time of the
stamp act."

Ruffin predicted political rewards
if Yancey took the "high

ground" of secession:

"I earnestly desire that you may
have assigned to

you the best and most honored positions
in the public councils.

..

.But

not wait .... I entreat you to assemble
and address your fellow citizens
....Call upon Alabama to act forthwith to
lead the movement .. .of seces,

sion.

,,88

That Ruffin should make such a plea suggests
the absence of

a disunionist' s cabal of fire-eaters before
Lincoln's election.

Yancey, in his northern travels stressed the
racial theme.

The

north and the south had a stake in preserving
the superiority of the
"white race" which could only be retained by federal
protection of sla-

very in the territories and the defeat of Lincoln.

That northerners

discriminated against free blacks was probably the basis of Yancey's

expectation that the doctrine of slave protection would find favor with
them.

Feeding the fears of a Baltimore audience, he warned them that,

with Lincoln's victory another John Brown with 5,000 men, would invade
south; poison all the wells; set fire to all the houses, cities, and
towns; murder and ravage all the women and children;

set free all the

negroes; drive out all the whites; and take possession of all the land. 89
In Boston he declared,
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There isn't a man among you
who is not welcome
in the South] if he doesn't
come to steal our
niggers. We have plenty of
northern men in our
cities; they do not try to
steal our property
or to incite rebellion, and
they stay. But let
any one come with a lighted
torch to this magazine under us-our slave
populat ion--to blow us
up and to destroy our society,
we would be less
than men if we did not hang him
to the highest
tree.-7

'-'

In New York City, again seeking
to explain the South

's

plight

and evoke the sympathy of northern
listeners, Yancey emphasieed the

impending threat to slavery as well as
its racial consequences:
Suppose the Republican party gets into
power,
suppose another John Brown raid takes
place...
and that Lincoln... is in power, where
will there
be a force... to check that band? Our
towns are
burned. .poison is found secreted throughout
the
South in order that it may be placed in our
springs and in our wells; with arms and ammunition placed in the hands of this semi-barbarous
people, what will be our fate? .. .Where then will
be our peace, where our safety, when these
people
are instigated to insurrection when men are prowling about the South, knowing they are protected
by an Administration that says that by Constitutional freedom is guaranteed to every individual
on the face of the earth? Can you expect the people
of the South to give such a government their assent? 91
.

Yancey's racial appeal was utilized to convince northerners of
the need of a southern president.

race doom for the south.

To him Loncoln's election spelled

White northerners, those who shared with white

southerners the same anti-Negro bias, would be held responsible if "Black

Republicanism" came to power.

Should it occur, Yancey claimed, the slave

states had no alternative but to separate from a federal government con-

trolled by "higher law fanatics."

Before returning to Alabama, Yancey

spoke in New Orleans and told his audience that Lincoln intended to re-

duce the south to another Santo Domingo
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While Yancey campaigned in
the north, Breckenridge
supporters in
Alabama presented a divided
front.
Their Unionist speeches
in the highlands, where Unionist
sentiment prevailed, was often
printed and praised
by upstate Breckenridge
organs like the Florence Gazette.
But in

central
and south Alabama the overwhelming
majority of Breckenridge
newspapers
and orators were fire-eaters.
It followed that they
condemned the timid
and submissive attitude of the
south.
Yancey's "southron" rhetoric
pales
in comparison with the stridency
of eastern Black Belt
ultras-like edi-

tors J. J. Hooper and George W.
Gayle.

Lincoln's election was assured,

Gayle proclaimed, even before

"Give us that Gulf Confederacy.

It

is

the only hope for the South.... We
have unwaveringly contended for the
last ten years,

that it would be better for all
concerned to make two

...distinct governments of all the territory
comprising the United states.
J. J. Hooper announced that even the
victory of Bell,

Douglas would not avert post-election difficulty:

Breckenridge, or

••There

is no arbiter

but the Sword, these fanatics-Republican
Aolitionists-will respect
the steel whips which tyrants have to be scourged." 93

The Black Belt press that stood with these Breckenridge
ultras

persistently warned whites of the threat of racial amalgamation if
their
candidate were not elected.

As the campaign heated up, another wave

of insurrectionary fear struck central and south Alabama.

No other jour-

nal was more zealous in reporting it than J. J. Hooper's Mail, thereby

appealing to white racial anxieties and helping to harden the lowland
concensus for secession.
At times these fears were based upon actual incidents of bondsmen

retaliating against their owners.

For example,

two slaves were tried

^
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and found guilty of killing
*heit mas ter on .

dudgo Joh „ G111 shorter

re_ded

_

that their execution
take place at

the site of the murder
as an object lesson to
would-be slave rebels. 94

Hooper inflamed the prevailing
uneasiness in Montgomery County
by telling his readers that
Edward Everett, John Bell's
running mate,
endorsed the amalgamation of whites
and blacks. That Everett's
children
went to school with blacks in
Massachusetts was sufficient basis
for
J.

J.

the charge. 95

The Democratic Watchman, published
in the heart of the

Black Belt, alerted all slaveowners
to the fact that southern
Douglas
Democrats were really the vanguard for
northern Republicanism and that
Douglas' doctrine of popular sovereignty
was "Red Republicanism" in
disguise.

Fueling white Alabama's fears even more
J. J. Hooper announced
(on July 11) that "Texas is now aflame,
abolitionist emissaries sent into

Texas by Republicans and popular sovereignty
Democrats have incited Texas
slaves into firing white homes.
guard.

He cautioned Alabamians to be on their

If an organized band of abolitionists were
bold enough to fire

southern towns before Lincoln's election, Hooper reasoned,
what "may

we expect from them afterwards?"

White men had to vote for Breckenridge

if only to "keep the abolitionists from getting control
of the government."

Hooper also alleged that an organized anti-slavery company were active
in the south-western Alabama counties of Choctaw and Washington. 97

He

condemned the Bell papers for sneering at the accounts of Texas fire
scares and insisted that all whites adhere to Southern "principles." 98
The pro-Bell Montgomery Post under constant pressure from nearby Breckenridge papers, believed the stories of the Texas "uprisings" to be exag-
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gerated but seemed to feel
that where
ere cnere
there wa,
was cn
so »
much reportorial smoke
there must be at least a
little abolitionist fire."
i

Pressures mounted on Black Belt
editors whom Breckenridge
partisans
considered unsound on slavery
or on secession. John
Hardy, editor of
the pro-Douglas Selma State.
Sentinel , told of efforts by
ultras to drive
him out of business. They first
tried to buy him out, he
stated and;

failing to meet his selling price
of $10,000 they attempted
to ruin him
by spreading the rumor that he had
been "bought" with Douglas money.

When this tactic failed, Hardy's
enemies allegedly procured the
names
of the Sentinel

's

subscribers from post offices and then
hired agents

who attempted, unsuccessfully, to
persuade them to drop their subscriptions.

Then Yancey brought a libel suit against
him.

Hardy,

the ultras sponsored a public meeting
in order to spread anti-

Hardy sentiments.
J. J.

Finally, said

The beleaguered editor was particularly
critical of

Hooper's Montgomery Mail, which he labelled
the "Negro insurrection

daily."

Hardy asserted that "we would not be surprised
if Hooper did

actually get up a second edition of John Brown's
raid... to keep up the
excitment for Breckenridge in the South." 100
During the course of the election campaign some of
central Ala-

bama's pro-Douglas newspapers shifted in their political
loyalties and
endorsed Breckenridge.

The Prattville Autauga Citizen dodged criticism

that it was "soft on southernism" by declaring that either
Breckenridge

or Douglas would do.

The Greensboro Alabama Beacon in Greene County

switched from Douglas to Breckenridge in July. 101
Stories of northern-inspired conspiracies continued to dominate
the Black Belt press.

An "old abolitionist" who was "caught and whipped"

in Pine

Uvel, Montgomery County, get
away,

it was reported,

and J, j

Hooper admonished his readers
to »lp 9k out £or him .„

The Montgomery
Advertiser demanded that Whigs
and Democrats put aside
differences to
comhat the "Goths and Vandels
of fanaticism who riot in
our sanctuaries." 102
John T. Morgan contributed to
the mood of fear and
belligerancy when he
called both Bell and Dougias
'Wlaeto Republicans." He also

re_ded

that "Irish and Germans were ail
inclined to be Republicans" and
shouid
be removed from Alabama. 103
In Choctaw and Washington
counties of south west Alabama,
a meeting

convened to determine the character
"of a new secret association formed
in their counties~"the Friends of
% society."

Two of the association's

organizers allegedly were abolitionists and,
a witness testified someone
said that if everybody in Alabama thought
as he did slavery would not

exist in the state in "three years."

these men from the County."

A resolution was passed to "drive

The Clarke County Democrat advised that

such abolitionists, when discovered, should be
hanged, or not touched.

After a while when the Texas tricks shall have been
practiced here, our
people will see the widdora of the rope." 104
Whites in Talledega County in upper central Alabama were panicked

when "four strange white men and eight negroes," all well armed
were
found within fifteen miles of the town.

A "negro boy," upon being arrested

and whipped, revealed "a most diabolical plot... with our negro population

contemplating the destruction of Talledega, the massacre of the citizens,
and ravaging of the surrounding counties."

A vigilance committee was

formed and two newly arrived white men were arrested along with eight

wandering blacks.

The Talledega Reporter cautioned slaveowners to "keep
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your slaves at home, and
worthless traveling white
men off your premies
Don't talk politics in their
presence and hearing. We
learn that
the

idea prevails among the, that
a blaclc Republican

. Negro , and that
if a black Republican is
elected President, he will
set the, all free."
is

One day after his arrest, a
%hite incendiary" was wrenched

cell by a mob and hanged.

f rom

his

The Reporter's editor noted
that "the evidence

against him, though not legal,"
105
was sufficient to prove his
guilt.

Governor A. B. Moore wrote a constituent
in Talledega informing
him that fifty pistols were en
route to the militia:
"The reason I send
them is that there is quite an
excitment in the neighborhood ... in
re gard
to the slaves.

A Negro had made some disclosures which
has alarmed the

citizens-they yesterday purchased all the guns
and pistols

in Fayett-

ville, and have begged me to order more
pistols immediately."

Moore ob-

served that "these occurrences are becoming
common throughout the slave

states."

He blamed Alabama's "treasonable demagoguery-the
Unionists

-for opposing

the Military bill,

the object of which is to make the

people of Alabama, secure against Northern fanatics and
the poor misguided
and deluded Negroes."

10 ^

Governor Moore's indirect observation about the ease with which
slaves could be manipulated into violence typified white attitudes
toward

black resistance.

They desparately wanted to believe that their slaves

were truly content, for the psychological burden of admitting to the
existence of alienated, savage, and vengeful black men surrounding them

would have been crushing.

The fantasy could be maintained, and the danger

somewhat abated, if outsiders could be blaimed for disturbing a naturally

well-ordered and safe society.

Since public safety was of vital concern
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to every white roan all
,
could

^

^

The fear of insurrection
was such that it even bridged
the gap between
the classes.
The shock waves produced by
Talledgega's "uprising scare"
spread
across the slave counties. Too
.any local Negroes, the
Autauga Citizen

contained, "are allowed

to have

[church]

stings.

We suggest to this

community the propriety of putting
out patrol companies, and
would advise slave owners to keep their
Negroes at home after dark."
Apprehensiveness also reached into some north
Alabama slave precincts.
"Citizens
of northern Alabama," the

m^Al^a^ of

"read a warning of dark suspicions.

Limestone County, exclaimed,

Who knows but what some deep-eyed

villian under the guise of friendship
may be at this time tampering with
our slaves, and furnishing them with arms
and poisons to accomplish their
hellish designs."

Later Talledega was warned from another
source that

"we are in imminent danger of the most
revolting character."

The south

"is over-run with... low lived hypocritical
scoundrels accomplished in

the arts of "negro stealing and of underground
railroad management.
107
All Northerners should be suspect as agents of
insurrection."
If proof of these threats were needed,

cited.

"recent" cases might be

At Coffeeville, Clarke County, for instance, some
gypsies asked

a planter to lend them some slaves to assist at a burial.

The next day

it was discovered that the casket contained ammunition and
arms.

too, poison had been found on slaves in different part
in some cases angry whites had taken their revenge.

Then,

of Alabama, and

The instigators,

of course, were northern abolitionists, 108 and they inspired conspiracies
of "Black Republicanism" which has "become so strong and so bold as to
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attack our institutions on
our own soil and wage
a servile war upon **.«™
in September .ore incendiary
activities were -uncovered/,
together
with instances of actual
slave resistance. A free
blade ba g8 a 8 e .aster
on the Alabama-Mississippi
railroad 'was arrested for
complicity in the
nefarious plot recently discovered
in Talledega County."
A Barbour County
vigilance committee tarred and
feathered several men who were
alleged
to be abolitionists and drove
them from Alabama. 110

Macon County whites

formed posses to hunt down a
Negro "who killed his overseer."
tnan

The bonds-

made his escape and "at last
accounts had not been captured."

Later

a mob of whites of Tuskegee thought
they had captured "the culprit"
and

"before the sun set he was burned
to ashes."

One Montgomery County slave

was found guilty of inciting black
bondsmen against the 'white people
of Alabama." 111

The Black Belt Breckenridge press not only
focused its attention

upon lurking emissaries from the north who
inspired slave conspiracies,
it also kept the threat of racial
amalgamation alive.

An anonymous writer

using the pseudonym "Cotton" in the West
Alabamian. claimed that the

Republicans "have two methods" to destroy slavery:

to precipitate a

slave rebellion and then force southern whites to
"amalgamate with their

former slaves."

J. J.

Hooper told his readers that "amalgamation at

the South, as well the North,

Greely."

is the programme and hope of Seward and

Their aim, he warned, in an obvious appeal to the nonslaveholder,

"is to free the negroes and force amalgamation between them and
the chil-

dren of the poor men of the South.
of the way of the contamination.

The rich will be able to keep out
But the poor white man of the South

will not consent to the Seward plan; they will fight to death, first." 112
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Another unsettling event
occurred during the sunder
and fall of
I860 and it engendered
further anxiety in
the cotton belt.

it was evident

that the corn crop of
Alabama was an absolute
failure

because of the worst drought
in decades.
to local needs."

"The yield can not be
equal

Staple fanners maintained that
"Within the next six

or eight months there will be
much suffering for bread."
well,

By late June

Cotton, as

"ha. been failing rapidly ..
.the long continued drought
is beginning

to produce its effect even
on the sun loving plant."

Black Belt planters

abandoned their expectation of a
minimum five-million bales.

By mid-

August reports from Coffee County,
one of the chief staple-producing

counties in south Alabama indicated
"that there is not a sufficiency
of corn made for the general
consumption of bread,

gard to feeding the stock."

saying nothing in re-

Cotton "is very inferior, not making
near

half a crop, and rain is yet needed."

South Alabamians talked of peti-

tioning the Governor "to call the legislature
together for the protection of property from levy and sale by execution
until another crop...
for under the present crop no man can buy
a support for the next year
ill

and pay any debts."

Cotton prices fell to eleven cents a pound, the lowest
since 1855.
On the Liverpool market cotton dropped below six cents
a pound, the lowest

since 1854.
secure.

The lifeblood of Alabama was the credit that cotton could

When dought reduced the expected crop by more than

lines of credit contracted and money grew scarce.

a third,

The credit pinch pro-

vided Alabama ultras with further evidence of northern conspiracy.

George

W. Gayle insisted that if Alabaroians would quit trading with the north,

they would cease giving "their dollars and cotton to a set of fanatics
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secession as a solution, it wonld
end northern co mm ercial and
political
domination of the south. 114
As Lincoln's election neared,
cotton prices in the north
depressed
further and markets shut down.
Cotton piled up in commercial
centers,
some banks suspended specie
payments, and much credit was shut
off.

Now more than ever the north became
the scapegoat.

Southern nationalists

argued that the crisis was just the
latest manifestation of Alabama's
colonial bondage, that every tremor in
the northern economy sent shock

waves throughout the south.

Alabamians, radicals proclaimed, had to

control their own affairs.
Thus economic insecurity coupled with
incendiary slave uprising
scares did much to build a groundswell for
secession in central and south

Alabama— especially as Lincoln's election became certain.
There was, in addition to the current cotton crisis,
another less

dramatic but no less important economic factor—the
condition of Alabama's small farmers.

Small planters from the Black Belt, particularly

east-central Alabama—knew that their position rested on cotton and
slavery.

The large planters owned the best lands, and by the late fifties

had encroached on the lands of the less wealthy. 115

The aspiring plan-

tation owner who sought mobility through the combination of slaves and
cotton sought relief by demanding the reopening of the African slave
trade, suppression of northern anti-slavery attacks, and the passage
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of a congressional slave
code £or the terrl£orles
_

with

election of Lincoln ana his
po iic y of slave vestriccioa>
of the small planter seemed
desparate.

impendins

^

Nor should „e neglect the
aspirations of Alabama political
lead ers
from the factors contributing
to the State's growing
willingn ess to seeede from the Union, ultras,
many of them small slaveholders,
had b een
political outsiders for most of
their public lives. Their
presidential
eampaign strategy had failed and
a Republican's about to
become President.
Men like Yancey, who had never
obtained high place or preferment
in the Union conceivably might
have their ambitions realized
in a sou-

them

nation.

Toward the end of October firebrands
shifted their attack from
Douglas and Bell to Lincoln.

They now called for disunion.

L.

P. Walker

stated that a Republican victory would
necessitate immediate secession. 116
"If secession were contemplated/' the
Florence Gazette advised,

"would

it not be better to secede immediately
after the result of the election

is known, while Buchanan and his cabinet
who are friendly to the South

have power than to wait till Lincoln and
his wide awakes get possession
of the purse and sword?"

Others contended that Europe would never allow

a civil war in the United States.

Because slavery was essential to cheap

cotton production and because western Europe depended
on southern cotton,
it was generally believed that Europe

(specifically England) would not

permit the north to upset the south

"peculiar institution."

would northern capitalists.
by slave labor.

"s

Neither

They also depended on cheap cotton produced

Alabama, therefore, would have nothing to fear by se-

parate state secession.

117

"Within one month from this time," the Mont-

"
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gomery Advertise, predicted
"the South will be called
upon to choose
between submission to the rule
of a party whose avowed
purpose is the
abol ition, not the restriction
of slavery ... .We are
defeated in the

Union, but out of it we are
still masters of the
world-cotton is king." 118
By November 1, I860 south
Alabama had turned to military
defense,

excessively so.

J. j.

Hooper urged the arming of every
county,

abolitionism, he warned, was at the
threshold,
in hand.

vile

'with torch and knife-

This mood of belligerency prevailed.^
So wrote a Mobile corres-

pondent to President Buchanan.

He found public opinion "much
excited"

at the prospect of a Republican
victory and forecasted that the Alabama

Convention, which was to be called following
Lincoln's election, would
not be controlled by Unionists.

A Virginia school teacher in Clayton,

Barbour County, wrote of the situation there:

"They are all violent

fire eaters, are for disunion to a man, and
speak of any one, who pro-

fesses the smallest love of the Union, as a traitor
to his country, namely
the South...."

He also noted that much of County's ultra
sentiment could

be attributed to the provincialism of central
Alabama and the insularity
of Black Belt whites:

"The cause of half of the violence in public opin-

ion here is their ignorance of politics; they never see
any papers except
local papers, and the Charleston Mercury

119
.

Some central Alabamians, particularly those in east-central coun-

ties—organized themselves into "Minuete Men" clubs pledged
out secession.

J. J.

to carry

Hooper provided editorial leadership in the for-

mation of these 'hotspur" organizations.

On the eve of the election, Hooper

printed Robert Barnwell Rhett's false allegation that Lincoln's running
mate, Hannibal Hamlin, was a Negro or a Mulatto.

"White men of Alabama
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are you ready for the
doctrine of N egro-e uality "
?
q
ashed Hooper.
"Do
you believe in .ending
your sons and dau hters-aye,
g
your daughters to
school with negroes and in
asserting that the negro
their intellectual e q uaH A free nigger
to preside in the
Senate... the smell would
be awful." senator C.
C. Clay, dr., who had
long ago tied his fortunes
to south Alabama ultras
said that he Vould probably
resign" if Uucoln

U

were elected. 120

clay,

like other extremists, would
take his chances

for preferment in a southern
Confederacy.

Lincoln's impending victory
signalled the implementation of
the

Alabama legislature's ordinance which
provided for a caucus which would
determine State action. Governor

A. B. Moore, however, was in
a quandary

and looked to the fire-eaters for
assistance.
forty days should elapse between
elections.
C.

State law specified that
He asked state Senator E.

Bullock of the Eufaula clique for advicse
about designating a day

for the election of delegates to a
State convention that would determine

Alabama's response to the Republican victory.

The Governor, moreover,

wanted to forestall Alabama Unionists from
blocking secession.

"It is

...important that the election should not be ordered
in advance... as
the submissionists [Unionists] would no doubt,
take advantage of it both
in the election, and in the Convention to thwart
the objects of those

who will be for resistance in some form."

E.

C.

Bullock, in reply, noted

that Moore had the constitutional power to shorten the
time between elections.

He wanted it as short as possible,

fearing that secessionist

feeling would dissipate if voters had more time to consider "resistance." 121
In spite of mounting pressure for secession, some Alabamians con-

tinued to argue against leaving the union.

The few Douglas and Bell
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newspapers in the lowlands
presented the case against
disunion by cluing that secession would
be economically damaging
to southern interests
especially in the territories
and, far from ending
violations of the
fugitive slave act, would make
such violations more
numerous and more
flagrant.
J. j. seibels inquired,
"Suppose Lincoln should carry
all
the Northern states and be
elected, what then?" „ e
optimistically concluded that 'Ve will have the
Senate and perhaps the House....
We will
still have the Supreme Court and
thus Lincoln will be powerless
for
,.122
evil."
North Alabama indicated growing
opposition to secession unLLess
future developments warranted it or
unless a convention of souther;rn

states formulated a common policy in the
crisis.

Many in the Tenn e!issee

valley maintained that it was unthinkable
to sever their relations with
the Union when Tennessee,
S.

D.

to the north had no intention of
seceding.

Cabaniss of Kuntsville assessed upcountry
political sentiment for

Governor Moore.

His intent was to provide guidelines which
might insure

unity of all factions after the Republican victory.

The Bell-Douglas

parties, he thought, had a majority in each of the
upstate counties,

excepting Jackson and perhaps Morgan.

Emphasizing a "very cordial sym-

pathy between the old Whigs and conservative Democrats,

"

Cabaniss con-

cluded that the bond which united them was a common conviction
that the
"settled purpose" of the Breckenridge party was to "precipitate"
a revolution.

The upcountry believed that lowcountry ultras had concocted

a conspiracy:

They noted the walkout at Charleston, the military defense

bill passed at the last secession of the legislature, and the resolution
of February, which called for a "resistance" Convention if the Republicans
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were victorious.

Upcountry yconen

foUovers could gal „ control
of

mg

^

^

propose<J

^^^

ConvenUon

force

bama into secession and
"bloody war." 123
So me days before writing
his letter,

Cabaniss heard the leading

Douglas man in the area say
that "if the people of
south Alabama should
succeed in putting the State
out of the Union, they
favored putting the
Tennessee Valley out of the State,
contending that secession would
operate
as an utter annihilation of all
government within the borders of
the
state and that the people in this
section could set up a government
as
their own." With this in mind
Cabaniss doubted if any state-rights
men
could be elected to the Convention
from the highlands. 124
But the Unionism of some of the
Bell men in central and south

Alabama was more fragile than that held
in the Tennessee Valley.

The

old Whig planters of west-central
counties were stubborn Unionists, while

their Montgomery district counterparts, such
as Thomas Watts and Judge

Thomas Revis, preferred southern-rights doctrines.

J. J. Hooper was

spokesman for Montgomery Whigs-turned-southern-rights
men.

He declared

it was a great mistake to assume that
Bell's supporters in the cotton

counties would accept Lincoln.

According to Hooper, the majority of

Bell men in Montgomery favored secession if Lincoln
were to become President.

"The Southern people were divided as to men," Hooper argued,

"but

few will submit to free negro domination." 125

The final days of the campaign witnessed the arrival of Douglas
in Alabama.

The first presidential candidate to make a tour of the states,

he scheduled Alabama as his last stop.

Baptist Minister Basil Manly observed,

When Douglas arrived in Huntsville,
"The political excitment is so

"
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high here as to absorb
everything. . .Bougies has
frlends
••••is

stu mp

.

vote at

tU.

Thls only confirms the
opinion

aU

^^^

speak

the first ti m e a candidate
for the Presidency
has tahen the

it

WiH

,

had of hi m hefore.

If J should

be for Brechenridge-i
do not looh to a m an
nor par-

ties... none can save our count-™
country...

proaches, God help us all!

t
I

u~
become

quiescent as the crisis ap-

1,126

When Douglas appeared in Montgomery
he was hit by "addled
eggs"
from assembled Breckenridge
men.
He told an assemblage of
several hundred,

"I believe there is a conspiracy
on foot to break up this
union.

It is the duty of every good
citizen to frustrate this scheme."

No one,

he said, was more anxious to
see Lincoln defeated than he;
but, he insisted, "if Lincoln is elected, he
must be inaugurated." He added
that

the Constitution provided the means
for punishing a president if he
at-

tempted to violate any man's rights or
if he proved a traitor to the
country.

"I hold that the election of any man
on earth by the American

people, according to the constitution,

is no justification for breaking

up this government," Douglas continued.

He ended with a call for Alabama

Union men to rally around the principles of
federal nonintervention in
the territories; "we will crush out northern
abolitionism and southern
127
secessionism.

Douglas spoke in Mobile a day before the election.
rupted by two questions from a Breckenridge supporter:

He was inter-

If the election

were thrown into the House of Representatives and it came down to
either

Lincoln or Breckenridge, who would Douglas support?
Douglas accept a seat in his cabinet?

Douglas,

If Lincoln won would

in reply, would not sup-

port either candidate and, moreover, asserted he would not serve any
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On election eve Douglas
accompanied John Forsyth to the
offices
of the Mobile Register where
the results of the
balloting could be had.
Both men knew the outcome
beforehand. Dispatcher, fro,
the north and east
made it plain that Douglas
was overwhelm and Lincoln
victorious.
It
was no shock. For weeks Douglas
had privately conceded defeat.
Forsyth
had already prepared an editorial,
which was read to Douglas,
endorsing
the call for a state convention
to debate Alabama's future
in the Union.

The wisest policy for Alabama
Unionists, Forsyth contended, would
be to
yield to the widespread demand among
central and south Alabamians for
a convention:

to elect as many conservative
delegates as possible, and

to try channelling matters into
some safe action.

Douglas dissented.

If the Union men could not prevent
a convention, he argued,

not control it when the delegates
convened.

they could

But Forsyth countered that

the only way to manage the secession
current was to appear to go along

with it.

His editorial appeared the following day. 129

On November
and Douglas 13,613.

6,

Alabama gave Breckenridge 48,671 votes; Bell
27,834,
Breckenridge

against both contenders.

's

plurality in other words was 7,224

Douglas carried five counties:

Mobile in

south Alabama and Lauderdale, Lawrence, Madison, and
Marshall in north

Alabama.

130

In the four upstate counties,

Douglas Democrats were better

organized than the supporters of Breckenridge or Bell.

Two former Whigs,

William B. Figures, editor of the Southern Advocate and Douglas elector
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Nicholas Davis, both of Huntsville,
did yeoman work ln
e£fectlng the
Douglas victory in the four
Tennessee Valley counties of
upstate Alabama. This was also true in
Mobile where John Forsyth's
Mobile Register
toiled tirelessly for the
Illinois
Senator.

Significantly, in the nine far
northern counties, Douglas and

Bell-the anti-slave code candidates-had
except two, Jackson and Dekalb.

a majority in every county

The Douglas vote in this region
was

high, as indicated below. 131

County

Bell

Lauderdale
Limestone
Madison
Jackson
Marshall
Lawrence
Morgan
Franklin
Dekalb

Breckenridge

444
368
400
130
165
525
144
715
204

706
522
591
1760
441
370
549
902
849

3095

6690

Douglas
790
325
1300
565
763
576
545

460
202
5526

Central and south Alabama present a different
132
picture.

The

Black Belt, home of the cotton kingdom, had
since the 1830's been a hotbed of southern chauvinism and negrophobia.

Southern-rights ultras

managed the Breckenridge campaign in the lowlands.

To them the presi-

dential contest was not only over the future of slavery
in the Union
but over control of the Alabama Democratic Party.

Extremist support of

Breckenridge was used to discredit the pro-Douglasmen who sustained
their

man and who had for years, up until January 1860, provided leadership
for the State Democrats.

Throughout the campaign, lowcountry Brecken-

ridge men charged Douglas and Bell supporters with being "soft on sou-
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thernism."

—

Although emphasizing
continuation of „„ ion they
,
alLso stressed
party's Platf0rm calUng
.

^ir

for a ffideral

and an end to northern
criticism of alavery.

suve

cod£ fa

territo

However, with Lincoln's

victory assured by Ute October,
these Breckenridge uUras
came out for
disunion. Their strategy
of throwing
the

president dection

into the

House of Representatives was
defeated hy the impending
HepuhUcan success,
and working within the
"system" was no longer a viabie
alternative.
Chronic political outsiders,
they had nothing to iose and
much to gain
by striking for southern
independence. After all, a
revolutionary aovement might serve the politically
ambitious men who had never
achieved
high office in the old Union.
The confederacy might gain
eminence-if
they helped to build it.

Lincoln's election had a devastating
effect upon Union sentiment
in south Alabama.

To make matters much worse, it
was turning out to be

an extremely harsh year for the
State's cotton economy.
poor, money was scarce,

being demanded.

Crops had been

suspension of specie payments and of banks
was

Food was selling at inflated prices.

In this atmosphere

of economic and political insecurity Yancey
made a rousing speech in

Montgomery in favor of immediate secession.
Moore who also urged disunion.

He was followed by Governor

Mobile's businessmen opposed a separa-

tion, according to reports, but some observers
found that nine-tenths

of the lowland counties were secessionists.

reported:

The Hayneville Chronicle

"There are not a dozen papers in the state,

so far as we have

seen, but warmly advocate the policy of withdrawing from the
Union."

The Richmond Whig noted that all pro-Douglas papers in central Alabama
"have either had their Union batteries spiked; or else they have turned
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with the tide and are
as strong dlsunionIsts

«W

^

^

The darUe county
Democrat declared:

Paper or a Brecfcenridge
paper tn these parts
at this time.

11

3

The Democrat reported
accurately.

^^

their Mntempor _

^ ^^

The Greeneville Messenger
[In

Butler County] for example,
had consistently campaigned
for Bell.
November 6, Its editor, even
while vowing that 'Ve are no
saw no other possible course but
"separation from the Union."

After

The selma

EeEorter of Bellas County, also a Bell
paper, joined the secessionist
camp.

s. w.

C. Watson,

editor of Benton Herald, observed
that "all the

newspapers in Dallas County support
the secession movement except
the
Selma Sentinel."
In PiUe County ,
TrQy AdvGrtiser> one Qf

m

>

^

few Douglas papers in the lowlands,
proclaimed,

"w e for one throw off

the garb of Democracy and go for
secession at once.

Before Lincoln's

election we were against disunion. .but
now the die is cast... our only
.

salvation is in secession."

Rabid secessionist journals like J.
J. Hooper's

Montgomery Mail demanded the proscription of
Unionist newspapers.

"They

ought to be banned from Alabama" because
they were published by "aboli-

tionists who hoped insidiously to propagate
objections to and arguments

against the institutions of the South." 135
Leading political figures in south Alabama, supporters of
Bell
and Douglas in the past, now closed ranks with their old
enemies.

Whig manipulator Thomas Watts published a letter dated November

vocating the immediate secession of Alabama.
meant doom for the south.

Old

10,

ad-

For him, Lincoln's victory

James Webb, an old-line Whig planter from

Greene County and a Bell elector, declared,

"that our future career is
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to be o £ eternal discord
and o£ angry

conclude that separation,
vith all its consciences,
is „ot only ln .
evitable but desireable."
John A. Winston, who had
supported Douglas
and collaborated with the
Montgomery Regency, publicly
announced, "I
look upon the position of
those who talk about an
overt act as a lame
and intent text to avoid
the issue...." As for
co . operatlon „ uh other
slave states, "that is but
a device of timidity and
cowardice, or a
I

piece

of strategy for delay and
postponment.

My own views are that we should

go into the Alabama convention
and take steps for a separation." 136

Whig Joseph Henderson of Camden,
Wilcox County boasted to his
brother,
are all for secession do™ here.
No opposition in this
County,

very little in any of the counties
down this way."

The res-

pected Montgomery Whig planter J.
H. Clanton admitted to a
Montgomery
audience, that in the election he had
declared in favor of waiting for

an overt act before separating.

The overwhelming majority which the

north gave Lincoln served as that overt
act.

immediate secession.

Now he, too, advocated

13 7

Lincoln's election split the Montgomery Regency.

By the end of

November, J. J. Seibels believed that submission
to Lincoln's administration would be "unconditional surrender.

It seems to me we must

The key to his conversion was racial fear.

part."

Secession, Seibels exclaimed,

was preferable to remaining in the Union and being "stripped
of a half

million in slave property and to have turned loose among us thousands
of freed blacks."

He had no illusions that disunion could be done peace-

ably, never having believed that "a giant Nation could die without
a

giant struggle."

But other Montgomery Regency stalwarts, Benjamin Fitz-
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Patrick and State
Representative Boiling Hall,
refused to come out for
Wdiate secession and called for a
Convention of cotton
states to determine the course of
resistance for
138
the entire south.

Liters from Black Belt and
lowland planter Whigs
calling

for

separate state action flooded
Alabama newspapers in November.
Planter
W. H. Crenshaw insisted
on i mmediate secession
before Lincoln's inauguration. Old-line Whig judge
J. K. Henry demanded
secession because overt
acts sufficient for dissolution
had been committed, and
added that Alabama "ought to secede, even if
alone." Bell protagonist M.
C. Lane of
Greeneville charged that more than
sufficient crimes had been committed
against the south to warrant secession.
Stephen F. Hale of Eutaw, in

Greene County, was another important
Whig who stumped for Bell but who,
after November 6, advised Alabama to
take the course of "separate state

secession."
the.

The most forthright Bell paper in
east-central Alabama,

Montgomery Post, now concluded that the
south could no longer sub-

mit to northern "aggression." 139

Resolutions adopted at various public meetings
in the lowcountry

were held in Montgomery, Macon, Greene, Wilcox,
Dallas, Choctaw, Pickens,
and Mobile counties.

All resolved to secede by separate action; all
pro-

140
claimed the election of Lincoln "as grounds for
secession."

Two weeks after the election, Black Belt disunionists
wrote a

public letter to Governor A. B. Moore asking him to
set a date for the

election of delegates to a convention that would determine
Alabama's
fate.

Although an ardent secessionist, Moore still procrastinated--in

the hope that some other slave state would lead the secession movement.

On November 14 he issued an address stating that he could not call a
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Convention until after the
electoral votes were counted
in Washington.
But he predicted that with
the Republicans in power
"slavery will be
abolished in the District of
Columbia, in the dockyards
and arsenals,
and where ever the federal
government has jurisdiction.
It will be
excluded from the territories,
and other free states will
in haste be
admitted to the Union, until they
have, a majority to alter
the Constitution. Then slavery will be
abolished by law in the states." 141
Finally, one day after the
official confirmation of Lincoln's
election, Moore issued a proclamation.
On Decet.ber 6, he called for
a state convention to meet a month
later-on January 7th in Montgomery.

He designated December 24,

-for which

I860 as the day for the election
of delegates

act he was accused of violating the
Alabama Constitution

which provided for a forty day hiatus
between all political contests.
But Moore was under intense pressure from
the secessionists to call an

early meeting and, as noted above, he himself
favored disunion.

Perhaps we should pause in the historical narrative
at this point

—and consider

the state of mind of white Alabama; why they reacted
to

the election results as they

did— with passionate

and extremist rhetoric.

Underlying the conviction ot those who lived in counties with
massive
slave population and who considered Lincoln's election as "the last
straw"

was the consensual agreement that racial control was irrevocably
threatened
by what they considered an avowed anti-slavery Administration.

Few south-

central Alabamians, however, knew Lincoln's actual position on slavery.

Nor did they carefully assess Northern racist sentiments.

Directly after
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his .Uctioa, L incoln
reiterated h is fundamental
the states to meintain
slavery fa

interference with that right.
the Fugitive slave Act.

^

^

Furt hermore, he favored

^^
^

indeed, though it was
. dif£lcult concesslon

for hi. to aake, he was even

wiUing

to accept a constitutional
amendment protecting slavery in the
142
states.
Such moderate sentiments,

notwithstanding, white southerners
retained their particular image
of
Republicans as fanatics and abolitionists
bent on freeing all bondspeople.

Looking to non-slaveholders and
poor whites in particular, secessionists intensified their efforts
to equate Republicans with
black-whit c
equality and disseminate reports of
insurrectionary plots. There i s an
element of hysteria in J. J. Hooper's
editorial statement:
The recent elections ... show that the
North believes in the doctrine of Negro equality.
That
is the expressed doctrine of their
leader Lincoln
Here in the South, we believe that the
white man
is better than the negro; and the
poorest white
man in Alabama would cut the throat of his
daughter
before he would marry her to a negro
Horace
Greeley, Senator Seward and such representatives
in Northern sentiment, would be proud to
have
buck negroes for their sons-in-laws. Hamlin who
is Lincoln's vice-President is a free negro,
and
boasts of his African blood.... Let the North...
be the home of the mixed race; and let the South
be the home of the white man, proud of his race
and proud of his race's superiority! Amalgamation at the South, as well as the North is the
program... of Seward, Lincoln and Greeley. Their
aim is to free the negroes and force amalgamation
between them and the children of the poor men of
tne South. The rich will be able to keep out of
the way of the contamination.
But the poor white
man of the South will not consent to the Lincoln
plan.
They will fight to the death first .. .amalgamation is viewed with horror here... with the
South united... aye with a single cotton state to
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shift for itself... Southern
men are white
1Ce men
and intend to continue such.l«

"There is but one safety for
the South," Hooper insisted,

"and that is
to leave a Confederacy now
moulded and fashioned for
their destruction.
...We are a white neople here;
and those whoever they be
who advise submission to a Republican government
144

are our deadly enemies."

Many south Alabama political figures
and editorial writers affirmed
the impending danger to the
"southern way
of life."

Le vi Lawler, Mobile

southern-rights Democrat, expressed anxiety
over the reaction of nonslaveholders to the election results but
concluded that "those who do
not own slaves are in the main true to
their country [i.e. the South]

and will defend the rights of their
neighbors as well as their own.

None

of our people are willing to see the
Negro and the white man stand upon
a platform of social or political equality.

The entent of the whole

South and of the civilized parts is to keep the
African in his continual

subjection and it will be done,

in my opinion the only effectual way

to do it is to form a Confederacy of slave states." 145

Judge John D. Phelan, a Montgomery fire-eater, claimed to
know
the purpose of Lincoln and the north.
of the races,

It was "the essential equality

that the black is not an inferior race, and entitled to

an equal status with the white man in Church and State, in office and
honor, and in the great and sacred institution

non-slaveholders of the South look to it."

of_

marriage

.

Let the

Phelan forsaw Republican

rule repressing non-slaveholders and forcing "negro amalgamation" upon
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the South,

which, he prophesied, a
few generations, we
'will see
a rnulatto race possess
this country as they do
in Mexico and Central
America. Let the Southern
non-slaveholder awake to their
danger and
strike for disunion." The
strident editor of the
concurred. With Lincoln in power
Alabama "is exposed not only
to amalgamation but to a servile insurrection." 146

S^th^ab^

Xenophobia, intensified by real
and imagined slave uprisings,
continued to obsess Black Belt
whites. A Carnival worker was
detected
in overly "familiar conversation
with slaves" and was "railroaded
out
of town."

The Mobile Tribune recommended
that "every man or woman, known

to entertain free soil or abolitionist
sentiments" be expelled.

Mobile

residents were warned to be on the lookout
"for dealers in Abolition
books, etc."

The Montgomery Mail heard that an
Association of freedmen

in Mobile had been discovered.

J. j. Hooper asserted that

"the time

has come for the South to expel every free
negro from its limits.
and we cannot live together."

They

The Montgomery Adv ertiser reported that

a vigilante patrol found letters confirming
"that there are spies from

the North or traitors among us.

traitors in our midst."

This is no time for either spies or

In Mobile,

a music teacher who "on several oc-

casions had spoken abolition sentiments quite freely defying
the citizens

there," was forced to leave the city. 147

By December, then lowland Ala-

bama seemed psychologically ready for unqualified secession.

Many in

central and south Alabama were prepared to accept immediate secession
--"straight out "--without waiting for a convention of slave states to
meet and withdraw as a bloc.

In other words there was growing sentiment

in lower Alabama for single state secession regardless of what other
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cotton states did.
But not all of the state
was o£ one mind.

Upcountry counties

in the north-central and
Tennessee Valley, regions of
low slave and

eotton density-opposed disunion
unless a convention of southern
states
formulated a common policy. Many
i„ the Iennessee VaUey
TOlntained
that secession was unthinkable
while Tennessee directly to the
north
had no intention of seceding.
Many highlanders believed that
if Ala-

bama seceded then Tennessee would
become a staging area for a Union
attack
on north Alabama.
Upcountry leadership rested with a combination
of Whig and Democratic Unionists.

Two of them, for example, Congressmen
George Smith

Houston and W. R. W. Cobb were the only
Alabama representatives who refused to sign an address of southern congressmen
which was directed to
their constituents and which called for separate
148
state secession.
Old Whigs like Robert Jemison and William R.
Smith of Tuscaloosa as well
as Nicholas Davis of Madison and Jere Clemens from
Lawrence were other

important politicians who counciled moderation.

Some of these men were

stubborn Unionists and they would not countenance secession under
any
circumstances.

Others would accept a Republican administration unless

and until it committed an overt act against the South.

If secession

ever became necessary, they favored a co-operative action whereby the
entire south would leave as a unit.

At a co-operat ionist caucus in

Leighton (in Lawrence County), those in attendence declared their opposition to unilateral state secession, but decided that they would approve any action taken by a Southern convention.

Another such meeting

in Tuscaloosa County was made up of "the piney woods Aristocracy- -Robert
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Jemison and William R. Smith
and their friends."

They also adopted resolutions demanding consultation
with other southern states. 149

Nor were these the only
meetings in the north-central
count:
lies
that rejected independent
Southern states' actions.
In Limestone County
a resolution was passed stating:
e favor a convention of the
fifteen
slaveholding states to consider what
is best to be done, trusting
that
there is yet a reasonable ground
for a peaceful solution."
Tuscaloosa,
the majority wished "first, to
use all honorable exertions to
secure
our rights in the "Union... and if
we should fail in them, we will
maintain our rights out of the Union."
The far northern counties of Lime-

%

m

stone, Lauderdale, and Madison strongly
advocated co-operation in the

form of an all southern state convention
and only en bloc action.

For

example, 100 "prominent" Hunstville citizens
signed a petition calling
150
for such a convention.

Jere Clemens corresponded with Senator John
J. Crittenden of Kentucky, who is best remembered for his attempts
to fill Henry Clay's place

and save the Union by compromise in 1861.

Clemens revealed that "the

Union men of Alabama have a difficult and dangerous
part to play

hands are in the lion's mouth

it is

more serious than

I

feared.

Our
I

believed that the Bell and Douglas men combined would have a majority
in the State... this expectation has been disappointed.

Too many Union

men in south Alabama had defected to the "fireeaters. .If the election
.

was held tomorrow two-thirds of the members elected would be for immedl
secession."

Clemens said that he differed with Yancey in believing

"redress" could be obtained in the Union, and that Alabama Unionists

only needed time.

He predicted that in the forthcoming election for

rc
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delegates to the January

7

convention "the counties of
the Tennessee

valley would give large
majorities against secession."

"South of the

mountains," however, 'Ve shall
be badly beaten and there
is no concealing the fact that we are
in great danger of being
hurried into disunion before the month of January
151
is passed."
Clemens' point about the Unionists
needing time to marshall their

forces is crucial.

Governor Moore, it will be recalled,
had provided

only three weeks for campaigning
before the December 24 election for
delegates. Moore and the disunionists
knew that although secessionist
sentiment dominated most of central and
south Alabama, a more moderate
temper might prevail by early January.

Clearly, therefore, they opposed

giving Unionists and co-operationists much
time to present their case to
the voters.

Clemens' letter to the Florence Gazette,
reflected the fears

of most of north Alabama:

"I know there is not in the whole of the

Tennessee valley, arms and ammunition enough to
resist the incursion
of a band of five-thousand marauders.

requires time

able."

..

.A state so situated absolutely

Talking of peaceable secession will not make

it

peace-

152

There were also a few pockets of cooperation and Unionism in
the
lowcountry.

Four former Bell and Douglas newspapers opposed unilateral

state action for secession.

The Gainsville Independent in Sumter County

pleaded for a convention of all the cotton states before "resistance is

determined."

The Autauga Citizen, the mouthpiece for Senator Benjamin

Fitzpatrick and Regency ally Boiling Hall, advised Black Belt voters to

exercise restraint.

The Alabama State Sentinel of Dallas County warned

its readers that there was a movement for disunion, and it urged the
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„

the Unlon t0

secessions.

^

^

^

^

John c. Harvey, editor o
f the old . llne
ftlg

scoffed at the notion that
lincoln

"immediate secession."^

.

s

^^

^

election Kas adequate
cause

0nly the Au t auga

citi^

of the four Joarnal
.

was not located in the
Khig-pianter region of west-central
Alabama.
There were even a few prominent
men fro. the cotton slave
counties
who favored cooperation with
the Union. Both Senator
Fitzpatrick and
Supreme Court Justice John A.
Campbell were keenly aware that
secession
would mean the loss of high federal
positions.
Fitzpatrick had been
elected President pro-tern of the
Senate, and this honor would go by
the
boards if Alabama seceded.
Fitzpatrick's Montgomery Regency was
divided.
His enemies controlled south Alabama.
The only way to thwart old opponents who now saw their political
careers tied to a Southern Confederacy

was to buy time-in the hope that disunionist
feeling would diminish as
the weeks passed.

Consequently, Fitzpatrick's tactic for
salvaging power

was to adopt cooperation.

"The Southern states should go out together,"

he insisted, or at least, "a sufficient
number. . .should go out to insure
a new Confederacy." 1
For John A. Campbell of Mobile, a Calhoun
man before his appoint-

ment to the high court in 1853, the thought of surrendering
his judicial posr was both depressing and frustrating:

"I do not regard the

election of Lincoln as a sufficient cause for dissolution
of the Union,"
Campbell observed.

'The circumstances of his election impose the duty

of moderation on his part

There is a radical division in his own party,

and he was chosen because he was more conservative and
constitutional in

his opinions and ideas."

He further asserted that the loss from fugitive
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slaves was not materlal;

„not

Qne Southerner

^

a .an who had lost a slave
by northern rescue."

wanted, Campbell stated,

slavery."
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tas „ cessa tion of the
agitation against

To turn back to the politicai
narrative, and to the contest
for
delegates to the state convention,
it became evident that two
parties
had emerged. One bloc of voters
favored separate state secession-that
is unilateral state

action-and the other endorsed cooperative
action,

with the slave states seceding en
bloc.

There were different shades of

opinion among the cooperationists,
varying from unconditional Unionism
to support of secession only if the
rest of the south would join Alabama

in this final step.

The campaign for delegates began in late
November.

Secessionists

from the Black Belt and southern counties
enjoyed advantages that up-

country moderates and conservatives could not
overcome.

For example,

Governor Moore was a "straight out" seceder and he
used the powers of
his office toward such ends.

Indeed, he had set the state convention

date well in advance of Lincoln's inauguration.

Radical control of most Alabama newspapers was another
handicap
of upstate conservatives.

The Breckenridge press had been stumping for

secession since late October when Lincoln's election seemed assured.

With wide newspaper coverage, the disunionists could mobilize the
social
unrest brought on by the Republican victory and bring Alabama's cotton

kingdom behind their program of immediate secession.
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As was to be expected
secessionist in the Black
Belt also organised vigilance committees.
Such groups as "the Minute
Men" enforced
the orthodox view of
secession and suppressed
anything that appeared to
be "northern."
central and southern counties
only the "straight
outs" were sufficiently organized
to prepare an electoral
ticket, although
contentious and close elections
ensued between the. and

*

^

Witness for instance, Autauga
County where Boiling Hall,
supported
by Senator Fitzpatrick, ran
as a cooperationist
.

Significantly, this

was the last clash between the
refining leaders of the Montgomery
Regency
and Montgomery's ultras, to defeat
their old conservative opponents
and
it would help to determine what
faction would manage Black Belt
politics.
The ultras worked energetically to
defeat their old conservative enemies.

Boiling Hall warned of the horrors of
disunion and of the military weakness of Alabama-of anything that would
deter the voters from secession.
He was defeated by twenty-three votes
(603 to 626), by an opponent who

enlisted Yancey's support.

But in one central Alabama county
bordering

on the Black Belt, Tallaposa County,
secessionists received

a

setback

in the election for delegates; and it made
"committed" Tallaposa dis-

unionists to proclaim their devotion to the Union. 156

Cooperationists dominated in the north-central counties.

Alabama had always differed from the southern part of the
state.
for two counties,

and slavery.

Upcountry
Except

its soil and topography were not conducive to cotton

This region, lying partly in the Tennessee Valley, sold

much of its production across the state line in Tennessee.

In other words,

the upcountry possibly had greater economic and political ties to
the

north than in Alabama itself.

Furthermore there was no railroad connecting
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north and so ,lth Alabama
for th£ lowUnds
,

aiways £ought

broad-based interstate
transportation system.

^

^

North Alabama, conse-

gently, did not share the
intense fire-eater views
of the more isolated
plantation communities of the
Black Belt.
The tactics of Madison County
secessionists, led by L. p.
Walker,
suggests the weakness of upcountry
"straight outs." They offered
to
form a coalition ticket with
cooperationists
The latter, led by Jure
Clemens and Nicholas Davis,
suspected that this concession
was an ultra
trick-by which their delegates
would agree to vote with the
cooperationists
majority and then switch once inside
the Convention.
In any case, the
.

cooperationists rejected their bid. 157
During the brief campaign, the most
common argument of both co-

operationists and Unionists forces was that
secession would not cure any
of the evils of which the south
complained.
Cooperationists maintained
that a convention of southern states
might be able to secure redress of

their grievances and press the enactment of
some kind of federal slave
code.

Hasty action by the South they warned might turn
the border states

against secession and prompt them to form a third
confederacy.
Clemens in numerous addresses asked a fundamental
question:

secession preserve slavery?

Jere

How would

With their section out of the Union, new

slave territories would forever be closed to the South by
a stronger
and hostile north.

Lincoln, moreover, would never allow the South to

secede peacefully.

There would be civil war and Alabama would be invaded

and occupied by Union armies pouring through the Tennessee Valley.

Con-

servatives also argued that Governor Moore's proclamation established

convention election procedures was illegal because it allowed only
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eighteen days between the dates
of issuance and ejection,
and Alabama
law required a period of forty
days. This unlawful act
Inspired many
cooperatlonists to talk angrily of a
conspiracy:
It

In earlier

and to find proof of

events-the legislature's provision for

a convention in

event of a Republican victory and
the bolt of the Alabama delegation
at Charleston.

sion.

The State, they claimed, was being
railroaded into seces-

158

Secessionists avoided responding to the
charge of election mani-

pulation by the Governor.

They attempted to divert attention to the

idea that the two-week period between the
delegates' election and the

January

7

meeting of the State convention allowed time for
adequate con-

sultations with other states.

The issues, they asserted, were more than

a decade old and fully understood by the voters.

These secessionists

invoked their old image of a vast northern cabal dedicated
to the over-

throw of slavery.

Lincoln, they argued, would tamper with the Court's

membership and obtain a majority favorable to the exclusion of slavery
from the territories, thereby reversing Dred Scott.

According to this

sinister line, Republicans were also plotting to abolish slavery in
Washington, D.C.

Indeed, no slave would be safe in the Union as long

as Personal Liberty laws remained on the books of Northern states and

the kidnapping of bondsmen continued.

"Straight Outs" also warned that

enough free states could be carved out of the territories to give Northerners the three-fourths majority needed to amend the Constitution and

abolish slavery.

These ultras insisted that, constitutionally, Alabama

was within her rights in leaving the Union.

In ratifying the federal

Constitution, Alabama entered the Union by separate action:

it should
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leave by the sa TO .ethod.

The North , moreov

^

4

„

^^

^

would do nothing to prevent
southerners fro. exercising their
constltutional rights. 159
Of great concern to upstate
secessionists was the vast non-slave-

holding population of their region.

The last census had shown eight

northern counties in which the
slaves were fewer than 13 percent
of
the population.

Small wonder that cooperationists
were in a majority,

and that outright Unionists controlled
some Valley counties.

Predictably,

the most consistent argument used by
secessionists to arouse non-slave-

holders was the equation of Republicanism
with black-white equality.
Even without slaves most Alabama whites
were responsive to a racial appeal.

When Senator

C.

C.

Clay, Jr.,

threatened to resign if Alabama did not

secede before Lincoln's inauguration, he told the
non-slaverholder that

Republicans intended to make the Negro "his equal in
political and social

privileges."

The slave would be the peer of the white man and
would

claim his "daughter in marriage." 160
L.

P.

Walker also attempted to arouse the fears of non-slaveholders

by evoking the image of servile insurrection.

Speaking at a north Ala-

bama meeting he admonished the politician who sought "to array the
rich
against the poor, or the poor against the rich."

Those who taught non-

slaveholders to believe that they had no interest in the preservation
of slavery should be condemned, he continued:
liable as the slaveholder in this crisis.

The yeomanry were as re-

He asserted that "this whole

subject has reached this simple proposition—shall Negroes govern white
men, or white men govern Negroes:

Remember now, that universal emanci-

pation and universal suffrage, go together.

When this point is reached,
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and the ballot is free alt*.
to black a „d vhlte .„ ny
God

such a possibility

Administration of a
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youdarej £or a singu day;
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who proclaim this doctrine
of universal eman-

cipation, and. ..all that the
freeman holds dear is soon ended.
...The

whole social fabric of Southern
civili za tion-the highest best
ordered,
and most perfect embodiment of human
government the world has ever seen
will pass away forever...."

He cautioned that "in all great
political

crisis, delays are always dangerous.

Delay now is destruction." 161

Another upstate ultra told the readers
of the Huntsville Southern

Advocate that
the nonslaveholders are even more greatly
interested than the slaveholders: for upon the
successful spread of Republican doctrines, carried
to their legitimate results, the non-slaveholders
are the ones who will suffer most. The slaveholders as a class are rich, and therefore would
be enabled speedily to take themselves and
their
fortunes out of a country once more delivered
over to barbarism and the besotted ignorance of
central Africa. But the non-slaveholders, what
an appalling fate would be theirs? I shudder to
contemplate! What social monstrosities, what desolated fields, what civil broils, what robberies,
rapes, and murders of the poorer whites by the
emancipated blacks would then disfigure the whole
fair face of this prosperous, smiling, happy Southern land. 1°2

These immediate secessionists, the "straight outers," continued
to play on white fears of slave revolt.

After Lincoln's election the

tactic was employed in order to build unity for separate state secession.
J. J. Hooper was again prominent

in reporting servile plots.

In early

December he revealed a massive insurrectionary conspiracy in the Black

Belt--Pine Level, Autauga, Prattville, and Hayneville.
a deep laid plan among negroes."

"We have found

The Montgomery Advertiser stated,

"it

363

is general all over the
country ... We hear some
startling facts.

They
have gone far enough in the
plot to divide our estates,
mules, lands,
and household furniture......
ty
slaveg

^^

to the region were arrested.

confessed that slaves were "to

^^

^^^

^^

The authorities Shipped
the Negroes" who

Mke

. general rise

holidays.

They are to kill the families
on a certain night and then
get together and take the
County-Montgomery County. They look
for aid
from Lincoln and the Northern
people. We cannot find out the
exact time,
but they generally pitched on..
.the 26th of December.

No humbug in this!" 163

In an editorial J. J. Hooper
instructed Black Belt planters to
keep "non-

resident vagrants away from their
plantations.

"Slaves are generally

loyal but too many have the impression
that Lincoln's election has made,
or will make them free.... Let close,
rigid discipline and the omission

of the usual Christmas holiday festivities,
mark the year 1860 and the

election of Lincoln as a black epoch with the
164
Southern slave."
Dallas County was also struck with slave revolt
"fever" on elec-

tion eve.
alert.

The Dallas Gazette reminded County slaveowners
to be on the

"Remember that fire, poison and the knife are supplied
to bad

negroes by our pious brethren of the North-let no stray
vagrants remain
about your premises— jail every suspicious character

Christmas week

has been appointed by the Abolitionists and their Republican
allies for
a servile movement .. .dire circumspection should be exercised everywhere
in the cotton region."

Meanwhile Clarke and Macon counties expressed

similar anxieties as the election and Christmas holidays approached.
It was recommended that Clarke County slaves be prevented from "going

to town" for Christmas day in light of the alleged uprising plot scheduled
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for

Cristas

Jtecr^

week.

However,

dissented:

^
^^^

Issac Grant , editor ,
f

If the slaves

kept

^

clarke

they may think the white
folks are uneasy, and such
a thought might encourage notions that would not
otherwise have entered their
heads....
But at the same time, keep
up the patrols." The
Macon Republic re 1

ported that vigilance patrols
had been organized to
enforce order among
the slaves during the holidays
"to guard against strolling
Osawatamie,
[John Brown raiders]."

Praising such action of Macon's
planters, the

editor warned "never before was
eye out at the window.

Senator C.

C.

Patrol!

Clay, Jr.,

it

so necessary for us to sleep
with one

Patrol!!

Patrol!!!"
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A friend of

stated that south Alabama's "negroes
threatened

to poison the water here.... Some
seem to think there is a great deal

of rebellious feeling amongst the negroes.
...I would not be surprised
...they are so imitative,
for freedom

ignorant and undisciplined --in fact unfit

1,166

The heavily-populated slave counties were united
in the be
that racial authority must be maintained.

bell

l

ie

I

Supreme Court Justice Camp-

(who was from Mobile) admitted as much in confiding
to ex-Prosldent

Pierce that "many of these rumors of slave insurrections
have no foun-

dation at all and... all the facts of any must be exaggerated.

But no

community can exist or prosper when this sense of insecurity prevails. ""'
It

was precisely this "sense of insecurity" that Alabama ultras politi-

cized in order to sustain the secessionist- impulse prevalent in the low-

country.

By late December whites in the cotton counties

wtVfl

m ar-un-

animous in the conviction that Lincoln and his Party would wreck racial
havoc on the south.
As election day, December 27, 1860, neared the straight outs--

1
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those favoring independent
state

acWon toward secesslon ..
strengthened

their position.

Governor Moore appointed
sixteen commissioners to confer with leaders in other
slave states whose
legislatures and conventions were to meet prior
to Alabama.
Among those selected as
"ambassadors" were some o£ the State's
most ardent secessionists:
E. C. Bullock
and John Gill shorter of the
Eufaula clique; Edmund w. Pectus,
brother
of the Governor of Mississippi,
was sent to Mississippi; John
A.
born and educated in South
Carolina, was assigned to the
Palmetto state;
and L. P. Walker traveled to
168
Tennessee.
it was the responsibility
of these men to act as committees
of correspondence, keeping
Alabama

EWe,

officials informed of activities in the
other slave states, and to stir
up secession sentiment in these states.
Thus, while sponsoring secession abroad, the straight outs were also
promoting the cause of separate
state action at home.

John A. Elmore addressed the Convention of
South Carolina and

advised its delegates to take immediate and
unilateral action.

Such

action would exacerbate matters, and Alabama as well
as the other southern states would speedily follow. 169

On December 20,

the Alabama election for delegates to its January

South Carolina did indeed secede.

7,

four days before

1861 Convention,

Alabama immediatists promptly chal-

lenged the cooperationists to "co-operate with South Carolina."

The

latters action, only a few days before the election gave Alabama
seces-

sionists an obvious propaganda advantage.
On the heels of South Carolina's secession, Alabama's congressional representatives—except for upcountry unionists George Smith Hous-

ton and W. R. W. Cobb--signed a public statement asserting that Repub-
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lican leaders were detprm-fno^
determined t-~
to make no concessions
to the south, and
that the^sections only
hope lay in immediate
secession by separate state
action.
All of
Congressmen from
centrai
gouthern
districts were intent upon
pushing through secession
before the excitment over Lincoln's election
subsided.
i

AlaWg

^

Representative David clopton from the
Montgomery district, in a
letter of December 13th to Senator
C. C. Clay, Jr., strongly
opposed
compromise:
"Many and various efforts are
being made to compromise
existing difficulties and patch up the
rotton concern. They will all
be futile." He was among several
Alabama colleagues who had declined
to vote on certain issues,

"believing that we ought to keep
ourselves

clean of all compromises."

Clopton conveying the general impression

in Congress, asserted that,

regardless of party, lawmakers believed dis-

solution of the Union was inevitable.

Clopton himself, expressed a de-

termination to die free rather than live a slave
to Black Republicanism.
"I would be an equal, or a corpse," he declared.

"The argument is ex-

hausted, further remonstrance is dishonorable,
hesitation is dangerous,

delay is submission.

..

let the God of battles decide the issue." 171

Obviously, Alabama cooperationists labored under great handicaps.

Their best argument— namely, the need for concerted action among the
slave states— was robbed of its force by South Carolina secession and
the determination of most of Alabama's political leaders to follow
suit.

On December 24 voters went to the polls to decide upon delegates
to the January 7th Convention and in effect to determine Alabama's fate

within the Union.

The returns came in slowly, and it was not known for

certain which side had a majority until the delegates themselves convened
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two weeks

ut. r

.

^e

returns have

^

7

so

Fitspatrick reported from
Washington, "that we don't
know now, which
Party has a majority In our
convention." 1
„ ouever , Jere clemens

^

"

confidence when he told Senator
John J. Crittenden that "the
nine counties of the Tennessee vailey
have given in a solid body
for the Union.
My own majority in this County
[Madison] .. . is 1039. ... No
returns have
yet been received from the other
parts of the state." cleans
adamently
predicted that "the six mountain
counties, adjoining us, will
certainly
vote as the Valley has done, for the
173
Union."
Clemens left the mistaken impression that all cooperationists
were Unionists. Although most

upstate cooperationists were inclined
toward the Union, many still regarded secession as constitutional,
especially if a national compromise
could not be achieved.

Confusion reigned across Alabama.

For example, the Montgomery

A dvertiser, an ultra organ, computed the vote
at 36,000 for secession
and 27,000 for co-operation (an estimate which
later proved correct),

while a cooperationist journal said its cause was
victorious by 33,000
to 24, 000.
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Part of the confusion may be attributed to the difficulty

in learning the precise views of a number of candidates.

In some coun-

ties the cooperationists wished to unite all factions opposed to
separate

state action, and it was desirable that they conceal their views,
espe-

cially if they were more pro-Union than pro-secession:

Otherwise some

of the cooperationists might vote with the straight outs.

It

is even

difficult to tell whether some of the defeated candidates were cooperationists or secessionists.
from the same party.

In some counties both winner and

loser were

This was the case in Henry, Limestone, Montgomery,
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and Morgan counties.

In Lauderdale County
one of the defeated
candidat es

was a cooperationist and the
other loser was a straight
out.
It is al so
difficult to classify the
candidates according to former
political

affil
So me had been prominent
in the 1860 presidential
campaign, but
most were comparatively unknown. 175

i«

ation.

When the election results became
known, the secessionists in
central and south Alabama were in
a majority.
They won in twenty-nine counties for an approximate vote of
36,000. The cooperationists were
victorious in twenty-two counties, collecting
28,000 votes. One County
in north Alabama, Calhoun, elected
secessionists, while one in south

Alabama, Conecuh, gave a plurality for
co-operation.

In eight counties

in the Black Belt the immediatists had
no opposition, and the coopera-

tionists went unchallenged in three upcountry
counties.

The total vote

was about 65,000, 25,000 less than the total vote
in the presidential
,

election.
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A recent analysis of the Convention election by Thomas
B. Alexander
argues that approximately 75 percent of the Breckenridge
voters in Ala-

bama voted for secessionists candidates and that the remainder
stayed
v,

nome.

177

„

But this evaluation does not explain the thirteen counties

just above the Black Belt that voted for cooperationists delegates.

All thirteen--areas of low slave density-had been in the Breckenridge
column,

except

two of these counties, Coosa and Tallaposa, voted

heavily for Bell and Douglas.

Significant numbers of Breckenridge votc-T

in these upper-central counties voted for cooperation.

This section of

Alabama showed a marked increase in the number of voters over those who
cast ballots in November.

The graph below bears out this point.
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These Breckenridge counties were populated
with yeoman farmers

who owned few or no bondsmen, and economic
independence made them less
susceptible to racist anxieties or rumors of slave
plots than the poorer

whites of the low country.

To the latter, emancipation would bring a

direct confrontation with blacks in the labor market.

Although the up-

country yeoman farmers were also racists, they were not as
negrophobic
as whites further to the south.

They witnessed bitter election campaigns

and they gave their votes to the cooperationists candidates.

Certainly,

this was true in Tallapoosa and Coosa, two counties which formed a wedge
that drove deep into the immediate secession region below.
In the Tennessee Valley, upcountry, where the combined Bell-Douglas

vote exceeded the Breckenridge vote, 90 percent of the former Bell-Douglas

voters cast their ballots for co-operation and the remainder did not go
to the polls.

In south Alabama,

however, only a little over a third of

the Bell-Douglas men voted for co-operation somewhat less chose imme-

diatist candidates, and the remaining third did not vote--mostly in those
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counties where no cooperation^
candidate announced. A11
five former
Bell counties in south
Alabama elected straight
out delegates.
In Baldwin, Butler, and Macon, the
vote for immediatists was
in excess of 80
Percent of the total and there
had been no effective
opposition,
Greene County, where a contest
did take place, one of the
straight out
candidates, James Webb, had been
a Bell elector, and he rallied
.any of
his old Whig-planter neighbors to
the immediatist banner. 179

m

Slaveholding density determined the
vote.

Counties with a heavy

slave population in 1860 were
secessionist, and usually by a wide
margin;
whereas those with a small proportion
of slaves were cooperationists

Half of the cooperationist counties had
less than 25 percent slaves in
1860, while less than one-seventh of the
immediatist counties were popu-

lated by over 50 percent slaves.

Seventeen straight out counties were

predominantly black, and nine of them were 62.5
percent so; no cooperationist counties had so high a percentage.

region were dominated by immediatists.

The State's cotton-producing

They were a majority in counties

that produced 25,000 bales of cotton or more in
1859:

tion county grew that much.

only one co-opera-

The immediatist counties, home of Alabama's

large plantations, also had a higher per capita wealth than did
the co-

operationist counties.

Fourteen of the latter had less than $1000 per

capita wealth in 1860, but only nine immediatist counties were that poor.

On the other hand, only two co-operation counties (Madison and Morgan)
had a per capita wealth of $2000 or more in 1860; and ten secessionist
counties ranked that high, with three above $5000. 180
In the Black Belt, where the plantation predominated,

obviously was concentrated in the hands of the planters.

the wealth

Many of them
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Joined the immediatists as
a result of economic
distress-depleted cotton
prices brought on by drought~and
Lincoln's election. As to
small plantcr
(those Who owned 20-50 slaves)
of east-central Alabama,
they .new that
status and place rested upon
slavery and cotton. They were
desperately
trying to be upwardly mo bil e
at a time when both slaves
and good soil
were held by the big operator and
selling at a premie They,
above
all others were demanding more
slave territory and federal
protection of
slavery in this territory. These
small planters viewed Lincoln's
victory
as a threat to their economic and
racial security.

Small wonder,

that regions with dense slave population
desired secession.

then,

Furthermore,

they were goaded by demagogues who, after
Lincoln's election, sought
a southern confederacy where they believed,
honor, white supremacy, and

high office awaited them.
Before the January Convention met, Governor
Moore took possession
of Forts Morgan and Gains on Mobile Bay and the
Federal Arsenal at Mount

Vernon.

These acts, and the dispatches of radical commissioners
to the

other slave state meetings, was done to pressure convention
delegates
into secession.

Governor Moore informed lameduck President Buchanan of

his actions and Buchanan did nothing, prefering to leave Lincoln with
the crisis.

The Convention met on January

7,

1861.

Immediate secessionists

among the delegates advocated prompt and separate state secession:

cooperationists favored an all Southern Convention to consider
of grievances or secession.

Actually,

the

a redress

in the latter group there were

many different shades of opinion, varying from unqualified Unionism to

advocacy of secession with the condition that other southern states would
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support

M

«.b.

should she secede .

In thelr

^^^^^

to0; were
secessionists who wanted to .ahe
one last plea for southern
rights in
the Union and await an overt
act against the south bv
Lincoln's ad ral „istration.

There is an interesting correlation
to be made between net
worth
and political views.
(The Appendix provides a
graph which gives a breakdown as to age, birthplace,
occupation, slave ownership, and
net property
worth of each delegate.) The
immediatists, holding an average of
$26,270
(Median $20,000) in real property,
were considerably wealthier than the

cooperatives

with $10,388 (median $5000).

They were also wealthier

in personal property, having an average
of $60,523 (median $37,913) as

against only $26,304 (median $11,400) for
their opponents.

Averaging

32.5 slaves each (median 19), the immediatists
held twice as many as
did their adversaries, whose average was only
15.9 (median 12).

Thus

the backbone of the secessionist drive was
provided by the striving

planter-lawyer who owned 20 to 50 slaves.
out state withdrawal from the Union:

The wealthier favored straight

lawyers and slaveholders comprised

the bulk of this bloc; and there was a high correlation
between individual

position, property and immediate secession. 182
Jere Clemens, the cooperationist delegate from Madison County

knew that his faction had a slim chance of "carrying a majority of the
Convention."

He hoped that "we may be strong enough to refer the ques-

tion of secession to the people."

Clemens wanted "to gain time" so

th.

the forces of compromise in the north would hopefully settle the issue. 183
But with the Convention being held in Montgomery where di.sunionism

and hostility to compromise prevailed, the moderates were at a distinct
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disadvantage.

Cooperationist Thomas McClelland
described the martial
spirit that greeted the
delegates upon their arrival:
"state troops
are parading in the streets
here day and night and
they have guards
stationed nightly at the Capital,
even this Sunday morning
the first
thing that saluted my ears
was the drum and fife of
the Minute Men."
Moreover, the spirit of belligerency
was evident throughout Montgomery
all during the proceedings.
"The troops and the People
are very rabid,"
McClellan observed.
»J frequently hear it said that the
State must be
taken out, or there will be a hanging
184
"
Clemens, and ex-Whigs Nicholas Davis
of Madison County and Robert

Jemison from Tuscaloosa led the moderates.

The straight outs were cap-

tained by ex-Whig Thomas Watts;
ex-Know-Nothing John T. Morgan as well
as Yancey, who characteristically alienated
both friend and foe before
the meeting was over.

On the eve of the first meeting, the
cooperationists knew that
they did not have the votes and conceded the
contest for temporary chair-

man.

William

S.

Phillips of Dallas County, an immediate secessionist

candidate, was elected.

On the vote for permanent chairman, immediatist

William M. Brooks received 53 votes and cooperationist
garnered A5 votes.

Robert Jemison,

Since neither Brooks nor Jemison voted, the voting

strength was 54 for separate state secession and 46 for cooperation.
This same breakdown of votes was displayed on all major issues until
the secession ordinance was voted upon.

On the first day of the Conven-

tion Yancey and Watts, who were old political antagonists, walked to
the platform arm in arm "a token of unity against Northern oppression.

Following the election of a permanent chairman, secessionist G.

1,185

C.
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Whatley introduced a resolution
denouncing the United States
and the
Republican."

HUA

It

Governs

also insisted that the
people of Alabama

would not sub.it to the
"inauguration and administration
of Abraham
Lincoln." This was a maneuver by

the straight outs to test
the cohesive-

ness of the cooperationists

.

Heated debate ensued.

plied, cooperationists William
R. Smith and Sydney

The resolution imC.

Posey claimed,

that force would be used to prevent
Lincoln from being inaugurated.

This matter was settled by an amendment
which read that Alabama would
not submit to a Republican administration
that adhered to slave restriction,

in the territories and the watered-down
version passed unanimously. 186

The immediatists kept the pressure on the
cooperationists with
a propaganda campaign.
A. P. Calhoun,

For example, on the second day of the
secession,

South Carolina commissioner, addressed the
delegates.

He invited Alabama to join with South Carolina, which
had already seceded,
in the formation of a Southern confederacy.

him,

Governor Moore, following

transmitted reports from Alabama commissioners to the other
slave-

holding states.

The delegates learned that secession by the remaining

southern states, including the border, was imminent.
Secession sentiment was frequently stimulated by telegrams from
these Alabama commissioners and from Congressmen.
that on January
E. W.

7

E.

C.

Bullock reported

the Florida convention had approved immediate secession.

Pettus telegraphed that Mississippi had drafted a secession ordinance

and would secede

n.i

the ninth or tenth.

Congressmen Sydenham Moore and

David Clopton telegraphed from Washington that House Republicans had refused to consider Crittenden's compromise and had endorsed the actions
of the commander of Fort Sumter in Charleston harbor.

187
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After Co^issioner Calhoun's
speech had evoked an
outburst of
thunderous applause in the

galleries, the delegates
decided to bar the

public from Convention
proceedine*
oceeain § s

-

R(1
fnro adjourning
mA *
Before
for the day they

learned that the chairman had
selected a thirteen-man
committee consisting of seven immediatists and
six cooperationists
This body would
determine what action the convention
should take in regard to
federal
relations.
It would eventually draft
the secession ordinance.
.

The third day produced debate on
a proposed resolution to
resist
forcefully attempts to coerce any of
the seceding states.
On this point
Yancey clashed with several
cooperationists who insisted that they
really
represented the majority of Alabamians.
Yancey, flushed with anger, exclaimed that any resistance to the will
of the convention majority would
be treason against Alabama.

His constituents, upcountry Unionist
Nicholas

Davis sharply replied, denied the sovereignty
of the convention because
of the way it had been called.

They would sustain the delegates' work

on ly if it reflected the popular will, and the
way to ascertain that

wass to hold a plebiscite on secession.

They would meet Yancey, Davis

concluded, at the foot of their mountains and settle
the question of
I

QQ

treason with bayonets.

Watts and Morgan admonished Yancey for his intemperate and fireeating rhetoric and tried to placate the cooperationists.

Apparently,

Yancey had not lost his talent for making enemies even among his own
partisans.

After the Convention he was not selected as a delegate to

the Confederate Convention which would meet on February 4,

1861.

He

dejectedly wrote his brother, "I have no idea of ever returning to publie life again,"

]

89

a vow, of course, which he did not keep.
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The cooperationists attests
to gain time continued
to meet determined opposition. On the fourth
day these efforts to refer
secession
to a general Southern Convention
and to have a popular referendum
on
disunion were both defeated by the
identical votes of 54 to 46. 190
S ome

cooperationists, in voting for these
measures felt that they had performed their duty to their constituents
and prepared to join the straight
outs.

This shift of position, they argued,
was prompted by a desire

not to give the impression that Alabama
was divided on resisting Repub-

lican rule.

Yancey presented an ordinance of secession drawn
up by the committee of thirteen.

The measure was accompanied by a resolution inviting

other southern states to meet in convention for
consultation at Montgomery

on February

4,

1861.

Confident of victory, the immediatists, pending

Yancey's motion, gave the cooperationists an opportunity to
speak in

opposition to straight out secession.

Several upstate cooperationists

condemned the impending decision, maintaining that many north Alabamians

preferred secession from the state, and annexation to Tennessee, to disunion.

Others predicted war and disaster for the State.

Jere Clemens

affirmed that he would vote for the secession ordinance because
certain to pass.

it

He was right, the vote for passage was 61 to 39.

was
Further-

more, fifteen cooperationists who voted against the resolution later

signed it.

After the secession ordinace passed, Chairman Brooks declared

Alabama a free, sovereign, and independent state.

Brooks advised the

cooperationists to forget any plans of "reconstruction."
he warned, are now independent:

"and sink or swim,

Alabamians,

live or die,

they
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will dismiss tha ldea
of . reconstltuUon Q£
oM union nw
ever." On the same day
that the Convention
passed the ordinace
sion,

it also

affiled

the resolution

Siting

^
of seces-

the delegates of all
slave-

holding states to meet on
February 4 for the purpose
of forcing a Sou192
thern Confederacy.
Political edition and economic
instability have already been
cited as key factors for
secession support. A deeper
motive was summed
up by delegate E. S. Dargen
of Mobile, one of the straight
outs on the
committee of thirteen,
giving his reasons for support
of the ordinance,
he told the Convention that he had
for years been convinced that
the

m

southern states would be compelled
to secede or abolish slavery.

day had now come, he said, when
Alabama must make that choice.

The

Further-

more
if pecuniary loss alone were
involved in the abolition of slavery, I should hesitate long
before
I would give the vote I now intend
to give.
If
the destruction of slavery entailed on
us poverty
alone, I could bear it
But poverty .. .would be
one of the least evils that would befall
us from
the abolition of African slavery. There
are now
in the slaveholding states over four million
slaves;
dissolve the relation of master and slave, and
what I ask would become of that race? To remove
them from amongst us is impossible ... .We neither
have a place to which to remove them, nor the means
of such removal. They therefore must remain with
us; and if the relation of master and slave be
dissolvpd, and our slaves turned loose amongst
us without restraint, they would either be destroyed by our own hands... or we ourselves would
become demoralized and degraded. 193

With Lhe Convention business completed, the doors of the hall were
thrown open and crowds swarmed onto the floor.

Montgomery's residents

had been making their presence felt throughout the proceedings.

To some
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degree they acted as an emotional
lobby
tor see******
»
y for
secession.
For example, they
had orsanized a KO ck
convention in the Senate
chamber on January 10,

adopted an ordinate of secession,
and appointed a .essenger
to convey
a copy of It to "the iower
house"-the real convent ion-and
ask its con194
currence
To the cheering crowd, a State
flag made by the ladies of Mont-

gomery was raised over the capital.

Upcountry Unionists could not con-

tain their depression and bitterness.

A delegate viewed the new flag

against the southern sky and wrote:
"Here

I sit and

from my window see

the nasty little thing flounting in
the breeze which has been the pride

of millions of Americans and the boast
of freemen the wide world over." 195

Another lamented,

H

have no language to express my feelings
when the

new flag unfurled in the capital, to see a large
crowd .. .transported
with joy at such an event... was to me a soul sickening
spectacle that
I ever

witnessed in all my life." 196
The news of secession spread across Alabama.

support in the Black Belt continued into the night.

Demonstrations of

An exception was

the house of Henry Semple, a Montgomery Regency conservative,
which was

kept in darkness when his neighbors dwellings were lighted because, he
said,

they would be in mourning before the year was out. 197

Secession produced great bitterness in north Alabama.

vention was denounced for not referring
dorsement.

it to the people for their en-

Black Belt and south Alabama straight outs had deliberately

avoided a popular referendum.
down.

The Con-

They feared that it would have been voted

The immediatists regarded such a procedure as costly, time con-

suming, and unnecessary.

In the Convention they argued that they had
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c«. t*** fra .

the people , havlng been
selected a

^ weks

and that they knew the
popular will.

^

Nevertheless, bitterness was
rife in many mountain
communities.
One upcountry County burned
Yancey in effigy. The United
States
'
it was reported, continued
to fly over the courthouses
at Athens and
Huntsville after the adoption of
the secession ordinance. 198
Lawren ce
County Unionist Thomas Peters
praised the Union, declaring
that outside
of South Carolina "in the cotton
states politicians are trying the
ex-

periment of getting along without
the people.

Thus far they have succeeded."

He also predicted a bleak future
for masters and slaves:

"But in the

end unless we resort to military
government there will be a revulsion;
and as the Negro is the sole cause of
our present troubles the fury of
the non-slaveholder will be turned
against him and his masters and we
199
will have another

tragedy...."

H. hi Clay believed that a successful
attempt would be made to

excite the upcountry to rebellion against Alabama
and that there would
be civil war in their midst.

A proposal was even made to form a new

state to be called Nickajack— out of the upcountry
counties— which might
200
possibly be joined by counties in northeast Georgie and eastern
Tennessee.

But L. P. Walker, Alabama commissioner to Tennessee,
reported that Tennessee would follow her sister states out of the Union.

moderation on the highlands.

This news exerted

Once the war got under way, however, it

is significant that north Alabama, particularly the nine Tennessee Valley

counties, had the highest desertion rate in Alabama.

On January 21, 1861, Alabama's seven-man Congressional delegation

withdrew from the federal councils.

Of this delegation, two of them
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were upstate Unionists,
George Smith Houston and W.
R. w. Cobb.
(Cobb
refused to leave with his
colleagues and stayed on for
an additional week
in the capital.) The other
five were ardent secessionists.
James Pugh
of the Eufaula Regency was one
of the more vitriolic.
In one letter
toward the end of January, he
wrote of his fears that upcountry
Alabama
and the border states would yet
consummate an agreement thus
undermining
the seceded states.

The only way to avoid the
"calamity of reconcilia-

tion is war," he declared and,
there fire, South Carolina had "the
power
of putting us beyond the reach of
compromise by taking Fort Sumter at

any cost."

This would put an end to all schemes of
201
reconciliation.

Alabama's two Senators, Clay and Fitzpatrick,
were divided on
disunion.

Clay had accused the "Black Republicans" of
plotting to des-

troy the south's domestic tranquility,

"imperiling the lives of our wives

and children by their schemes of manumission."

Clay and like-minded

southern representatives may have turned to secession
out of failure
to win the presidency for the south and thereby
manage the political

future of the United States.

had admitted,

Shortly after the Republican victory, he

"of course, we cannot

these people, unless we control it."

live under the same government with

And just before he left Washington,

Jefferson Davis told him, "We have piped and they would not dance now
the devil may care.

When the Confederate Convention began its deliberations in Mont-

gomery on February

4,

1861,

representatives were present from six sece-

ding states of the lower south.

Alabamians selected moderates to repre-

sent her and denied places to most of the ultras.

Their thinking was

obvious, many of the state's less extreme straight outs as well as her

381

cooperationists
Sover„ me „t would b0

to prove how rationa,
and deliberate
.

^

Jn SQ dolng they

new

^

thereby
the wavering border stat»«
i.
states that there
was nothing to fear from
a southem confederacy under ,h
»
Igglsh rule .
.

Turthm>

^

^^

apectr Um of southern
Politic! opinion couid he won
over to secession
only if the hard core radicals
were repudiated. Thls
as . Mo „
to
ultras who believed high „f„
ce uas thelr due

cm

Al.W.

^

fired the State to secession.

^

William L. Yancey, for example,
was not chosen as

a delegate.
Despite this slight, however, and
despite his protestations about
ever
seeking office again, he did
aspire to the presidency of the
Confederacy
There was, in fact, a general
impression outside the Gulf states
that

either he or Rhett would be chosen.

Although always misjudged as a stri

dent disunionist, Yancey over the
years alienated many southern conser-

vatives and chauvinists with his extremist
invective.
insiders he was known to lack leadership
qualities.
ism had passed; moderation prevailed.

Moreover, among
The time for ultra-

The Confederate Constitution,

except for expressed recognition of slavery
and prohibition of revenue

tariffs and internal improvements, was like
the federal Constitution
that the lower South had just abandoned.

of a president and vice-president.

Moderation dictated the choice

Jefferson Davis of Mississippi, al-

though an ardent sectional ist, was hardly a radical.

Georgia Whig Alex-

ander H. Stephens, a last-minute secessionist and
clearly not

a

fire-

eater, was elected vice-president.

Davis arrived in Montgomery on February 16,

1861.

On the night

his arrival, Yancey allegedly greeted him with these words:

"The man
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and the hour have

-st

«t.«

tragic episode, a

southern society „as about
to experience its

civU war brought on Ur el by
g
y

of losing mastery over
its slave population.

the south

.

s

fear

On February 18, 1861,
Davis took the presidential
oath of the Confederacy
on the portico^
the capitol building at
Montgomery.

EPILOGUE

When the war

c ame

Mny

ln north

AlabaM

^^

^

During the course of
ho.tilttt.. 2,578 uhlte Alaba
„, lans
Union army
. l a r 8 e number of „ho m were fro m the
,
"seditious" counties
of Winston,
tar , F ay ette, Morion, an d
Blount. The Mj or Uy of
these
Unionists joined the first
Al.b.
hri ga de-one hundred an d
tUtf from
Winston County alone. 1

^

^

«

M

A far greater number of Union
sympathisers remained

J

home and
by maintaining the security
of the hills, they furnished
a refuge for
thousands of deserters and conscription
evaders, thus depriving the Con-

federacy of vitally needed manpower.

Their hostile presence in the moun-

tains served as a picket line for
federal forces in the Tennessee
Valley
and a buffer against Confederate
attack.

Another segment of the population also
manifested disloyalty.

Thousands of Alabama slaves-including once
trusted servants- left the
plantations.

These massive desertions lead one to question
how common

and how real the "bonds of affection" between
slaveowner and slave had

ever been.

Certaintly, many slaveholders lived in dread
that their bonds

men once freed would menace them and their
plantations.

However, most

blacks had a passionate attachment to freedom and
a desire to live as

independently as possible.
in forming churches,

In all aspects of social

existence-whether

seeking employment or education, strengthening their

families, or entering politics— black Alauamians struggled for
a way

of life that would provide them with dignity and self respect.

2

Civil War and Reconstruction ended political careers of some and
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conversely opened up new
opportunities for others in
Alabama:
Of those
ambitious politicians who
were active in the eighteen
fifties, the ca-

pricious Willi*, L

.

Yancey

U

most prominen

^ ^

fche

derate Presidency and offered
the post of Attorney
General. He turned
down the nomination and
accepted instead Davis' offer
of a special diplo-

matic mission to Europe.

As was to be expected, he
proved to be diplo-

matically inept and was recalled.

Upon his return, Yancey represented

Alabama in the Confederate Senate,
where he became the leader of the
anti-Davis forces, thereby reverting
to his familiar role of
outsider
who agitated against the established
party system. Among other things,

Yancey wanted to force Davis into a
public statement commending him for
helping to bring on southern secession. 3
Benjamin Fitzpatrick, a conservative Democratic
Party loyalist,
had a high standing in the Senate as indicated
by the fact that he served
as President p^-tempere of that body for
the last three years before

Fort Sumter.

He opposed secession, but in the end thought
opposition

was useless.

Secession, we have seen, meant the end of his political

career.

He not only lost his high position in the Union but
also his

state organization— the Montgomery Regency—for

it

had finally been smashed

by its foes, the southern rights ultras of the eastern Black Belt.

Fitz-

patrick retured quietly to his plantation near Wetumpka and lived there
during the war taking no part in Alabama's Confederate politics.

In

1865 he made a brief return upon being elected president of the State

Constitutional Convention, but the Republicans soon disfranchised him.

Williamson

R. W.

Cobb, Alabama's consistent Upstate Unionist, was

defeated for the Confederate Congress in 1861 but won in a renewed bid
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two years later, when he
managed to capitalize on
the growing anti-war

sentient.

*

1864,

shortly after his term
began, Cobb was expelled

Horn that body for his pronounced
Unionist sympathies. 4
Cobb's unionist ally,
Congressman George Smith Houston,
refused
to serve in the Confederate
army. But he also declined
to take the oath
of allegiance to the government
of the United States, an
act that commended him to white Alabama after
Appomattox. He was elected to the

United States Senate in 1865, though
he was not permitted to take
his
seat.

Then, in 1874, he became the
redeemer Governor of Alabama-the

first Democrat chosen for that office
in the post-bellum years.

campaign- "the white man's movement "-was
directed against
domination" of the State under Republican
rule.

His

the "nigger

Finally in 1879 Houston

realized his old ambition of taking a seat
in the United States Senate.

5

Some of Alabama's old Whigs rode back into
power as the State

wearied of the war.

Robert Jemison, a leader of the cooperationists,

replaced William L. Yancey in the Confederate Senate.

C.

C.

Clay, Jr.,

also served there until 1863 when he was defeated by
Richard Walker,
the former Whig-Unionist, later southern rights
oppositionist, and finally

moderate.

Thomas Watts, another ex-Whig who joined the secessionist

ranks after Lincoln's election, also took advantage of the growing
wartime discontent and in 1863 defeated Governor John Gill Shorter of

Eufaula clique fame who had replaced Governor A. B. Moore in 1861. 6
Supreme Court Judge John A. Campbell, who began his political

career as a Calhounlte comrade of Dixon Hall Lewis and after his selection to the High Court in 1853 became a Unionist, was anathema in his

own State after secession.

His Unionist sentiments had won him many
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powerful ene.ies~the mos t
lmplacable belns
«..

Yancey.

„„ .„

Although Campbell, „ ow shed
of hl , Judlclal

^

^

to the position of Attorney
General, hi. ene.ies blocked
htm.

lam

After the

war Ca» P bell la be s t re^bered
as an attorney ar uln
8
8 before the Court
in Slaughter-House, a case
which contributed to a
relnterpretation of
the fourteenth amendment. 7

Other prominent Alabamians openly
collaborated with the Union
armies.

defeated.

Editor J. J. Seibels ran for the
Confederate Senate and was
He then took a commission in the
Confederate army.

By

1L864

Seibels was part of a "secret treasonable
peace society" in Alabama that
sought to "take the state back into the
Union on any terms." By 186 5
Seibels was co-operating with federal
forces and with the Republican
Party.

8

Ex-United States Senator Jere Clemens, who helped
lead the cooperationists, accepted a commission as a Major
General in the Confederate

army at the beginning of the war, but later he defected,
went to Philadelphia, and made speeches for the Union League.

9

Judge Samuel Rice who was in turn a Democrat, Whig,
Know-Nothing
and secessionist, became a "scalawag" after the war and
joined the Re-

publican Party in 1870. 10
Several Alabama fire-eaters eventually achieved the high offices

they had been seeking since the late 1850'

s.

Leroy Pope Walker, the

straight out secessionist from Madison County, was appointed Secretary

of War in Davis

1

first cabinet but proved to be utterly inexperienced

in administration.

He resigned,

after coming under fire in the Confe-

derate Congress and was offered instead a foreign mission which he de-
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dined.

He spent the balance of the
war years as a Judge in a
military

court.

By 1863 he was a!so collaborating
with Alabama Unionists,
drafting resolutions for the
return to the Union. He
defended north Alabama
Unionists accused of treason in
1863. Walker In effect had
again shifted
position as Alabama sentiment soured
against the war. After hostilities
ended, he retired to his law
practice and never sought political
preferment again.
Firebrand Congressman J. L. M. Curry
fashioned a unique career
in the post-bellum years.

A man of distinctive scholarly gifts,
Curry

was appointed agent of the Peabody fund in
1881.

This grant of George

Peabody, a New England millionaire
philanthropist, was created to encourage

state normal schools in the twelve southern
states.

Curry established,

through the fund, the first segregated normal
school system in the south.
He was also placed in charge of a fund set up
by Connecticut philanthro-

pist John F. Slater for black schools in the south.

Cwing to his repu-

tation as an administrator, he was appointed by Grover
Cleveland to be
United States minister to Spain.

By the time of his death,

in 1903,

Curry

was better known for his achievement as an administrator than a
secessionist agitator.

12

Several Black Belt southern-rights opportunists who had yearned
for political elevation in the late 1850's became Democratic machine

politicians in the post-Reconstruction period.

These former "outsiders'"

distorted Republican rule and emancipation in Alabama as "nigger domination" and rode into power on the wave of the "white man's movement."
Thus, they found that appeals to white racial anxieties were still operative.

Former Whig and later southern-rights Democratic Congressman
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L.

Pugh hel ped reorgant2e

AUbama

,

s

DemocraUc party

^

i88Qis
He was eiected to the
United states Senate in 18
80 and served sixteen
13
consecutive years there.

William

C.

Gates, a protege of Pugh's
and .ember of the Eufaula

clique, gained a reputation
as an ultra in 1860 and
became a Black Belt
political manager after 1870.
He served in the Alabama lower
House f rom
1870 to 1872, and in 1875 was chairman
of the Judicial committee at
th e

State Constitutional Convention.

He was elected to Congress from
th e

Eufaula district in 1880, reelected
si. times, and resigned in 1894
when
he became Alabama Governor.
This former radical ultra- -''the
one-armed
hero of Henry County "-then fought
Populism ln the State.
In 1890, when
the Farmers Alliance was strong,
he bitterly opposed the Populists'
sub-

treasury scheme and led the Alabama hard
money men.

Interestingly, he

was one of the few men who opposed the
soldier and grandfather clauses
of the post Reconstruction Alabama Constitution
and demanded an equal
14
standard of fitness for members of both races
at the polls.

Probably no Alabama demagogue after the war achieved
as much
success and notoriety as John T. Morgan.

A man with consuming ambition,

he helped lead the forces of "white supremacy" in
overturning Republican

rule in 1874.

In 1876 he was elected to the Senate, where he remained

until his death in 1907.

Morgan had been a Know-Nothing in the late

fifties and continued after the war to stir racial animosities.

He was,

however, a man who when it served his interests, disregarded racial con-

victions and party loyalty.
an attempt to bar him.

For example,

some Senate Republicans made

He soon won their approval by voting to confirm

the appointment of Frederick Douglas as Marshal of the District of Columbia
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While in the Senate He
Joined Republican
expansionist and came to symbolize the southern push
for new markets.
He waged a ceaseless
struggle
in behalf of United States
efforts to penetrate Africa,
Latin Amerlca ,
and Asia.
Using the states-rights
argument, he fought effectively
from
1886 to 1888 against the Blair
education bill f or eradicating
southern
illiteracy,
1900 Morgan led the successful
southern attack on the
Force bill~ which would have
abrogated the grandfather clause
in the

m

constitutions of the southern states-and
in both national and Alabama
politics, he became a power that it
was not safe to disregard. 15
Edmund Pettus, Dallas County ally
of John T. Morgan who had gained
a reputation for his fiery
secessionists speeches, also became an
impor-

tant political manager in post
Reconstruction Alabama.

He replaced the

deceased James Pugh in the United States
Senate in 1897 and was elected
on his own in 1907.

Two fire-eaters-Thomas H. Herndon and Edward
A. 0. O'Neal-who

were frustrated in their attempts at political
advancement before the

war-became important Democratic managers during Alabama's
Bourbon period.
Herndon served in Congress from 1878 to 1883 and was
chairman of the
Mobile Democratic organization.

O'Neal played an important role in "the

white man's movement" of 1874, was elected Governor in 1882 and
re-elected
in 1884.

17

Two of the State's most outspoken secessionists both Black Belt

newspaper editors— ended their careers obscurely.

George W. Gayle of

the Dallas County Slaveholder assisted in prosecuting the war so actively

and expressed his views so freely that, at the close of the war, the federal

authorities arrested him for conspiracy in the assassination of President
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Lincoln.

He was

L,t„ discharged without

a trial and

Hved out his

last

years as a farmer. 18
J. J. Hooper of the
Montgomery

Man

vas elected secretary of
the

Provisional Confederate Congress
In Montgomery but lost
his post of permanent secretary when Jefferson
Davis moved his government to
Rid ,„„.
He died in Richmond in 1862. 19

One last episode merits attention
because
theme of this study.

it

highlights a r,ajor

Several Black Belt slaveholding
families found

that the Emancipation of slaves
and consequent loss of racial
control

was so unbearable that they sought asylum
in Latin American countries
that still maintained slavery.

Most of those who left accepted the
offer

of welcome extended by Brazilian authorities. 20
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